

Journalism under Fire in China:

The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* 1929-1949

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that the work embodied in this dissertation is the product of original research, contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in an tertiary institution or university, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the dissertation, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, this dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the dissertation, nor does the dissertation contain any material that infringes copyright.

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Some of materials in this thesis are based on work I have published in Chinese, and these materials have been subsequently edited and revised for the dissertation. These include some material from the journal article Wang, Yi. “Jujian Yundong Yu Zhengdang Quanmian Kongzhi Zhongguo Xinwenye [拒檢運動與政黨全面控制戰後中國新聞業, The Refusing Censorship Movement and Political Parties’ Domination of Journalism in Post-war China].” *Fu Jen Historical Journal* 35, (September 2015): 73-104. Chapter 4 includes a largely edited version of the article Wang, Yi. “Damei Wanbao De Tingkan Yu Zhongguo Xinwen De Zhuanxing [大美晚報的停刊與中國新聞的轉型, The Closure of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* and the Transformation of Chinese Journalism].” In *Minguo Xinwenshi Yanjiu* (2014) [民國新聞史研究, Studies of Chinese Journalism during the Republic Period], edited by Ni Yannian, Liu Jizhong and Cao Aimin, 230-38. Nanjing: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2014. The publishers of these papers hold the copyright for that content, and access to the material should be sought from the respective books and journals.

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Matters of Technical Presentation of the Thesis

Chinese, Japanese and Korean names are presented in the thesis based on the order of surname first and given name second with the exception of a full name with both a Chinese and English component. Both Pinyin and Wade–Giles transliteration systems are used to cope with Chinese names. Under the principle of regarding history, names of some well-known Chinese figures are generally written based on traditional Wade–Giles system, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Soong May-ling, rather than Jiang Jieshi, Wang Jingwei and Song Meiling, and only traditional Chinese characters are used in the thesis if necessary. For the purpose of reducing obstacles to non-specialists in understanding the thesis, transliteration of historical technical terms is avoided as far as possible. For example, I adopt the term ‘the Nationalist Party’ rather than ‘Guomindang’ or ‘Kuomintang’, and likewise ‘Isolated Island’ rather than ‘Gudao’.

All translations of Chinese language materials are my own unless otherwise stated. Names and titles of Chinese and Japanese references in footnotes are written by way of transliteration with English translation. I add their original language title following the transliteration and English translation in bibliography. For example:

Gao Hua, *Hongtaiyang Shi Ruhe Shengqide: Yan'an Zhengfeng Yundong De Lailongqumai* [How did the Sun Rise over Yan'an: A History of the Rectification Movement] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011).

Fujiwara Akira, *Nitchū Zenmen Sensō* [A Comprehensive War between Japan and China] (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1982).

Footnotes are written as:

Gao, Hua 高華. *Hongtaiyang Shi Ruhe Shengqide: Yan'an Zhengfeng Yundong De Lailongqumai* 紅太陽是如何升起的：延安整風運動的來龍去脈 [How did the Sun Rise over Yan'an: A History of the Rectification Movement]. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011.

Fujiwara, Akira 藤原彰 . *Nitchū Zenmen Sensō* 日中全面戦争 [A Comprehensive War between Japan and China]. Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1982.” in bibliography.

In the thesis, many historical archives are used as primary sources. These sources as reference contain two parts: the archival institute or the archival name, and the file number. For example: a document from the Shanghai Municipal Archives as reference is written as: ‘Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q 431-1-45’, and a document of the Shanghai Municipal Police file is written as: ‘Shanghai Municipal Police, 8671’. In light of the Turabian style regulation, newspaper articles are presented in the references by the name of the paper and the day the article was published.

Abstract

The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, (*Ta Mei Wan Pao* 大美晚報) was an American owned and managed newspaper in China with both English and Chinese language publications. It was published from 1929 to 1949 and, during this time, it both witnessed and participated in a very significant historical period for China and arguably the most crucial period in the history of Chinese journalism. In 1929, C. V. Starr, the American owner, with his ambition of business in China created the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (*SEPM*) from two existing papers and based the paper in the French Concession of pre-war Shanghai, a zone of extraterritoriality. Then, the newspaper experienced the gory Isolated Island incident with a terrorist attack and assassination, a hard time in the wartime capital Chongqing, the great depression in post-war Shanghai and the final closure soon after Shanghai was taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This thesis will make an original contribution to the field by offering the most detailed historical account of the *SEPM* to date. It includes a complete inventory of the newspaper's various editions and activities, which includes the first documented history of the various incarnations of the newspaper's radio station, Ta Mei Radio. In providing this inventory, the thesis also enhances our understanding of the historical foundation, motivation and limitations of the development of journalism in modern China, with a particular focus on Shanghai. In the first place, this thesis offers the most comprehensive historical trajectory of the *SEPM* supported by hitherto unpublished primary sources from a multitude of archives throughout the world, and supplemented by a range of secondary sources in both English and Chinese. Moreover, a selection of articles (initially published in supplements of the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* from 1932 to 1940) have been translated for the first time and used to document key moments of the newspaper's history.

The vicissitudes of the *SEPM* highlight the turbulence of Chinese politics. More importantly, they provide a lens to present the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in its critical turning point. Journalistic professionalism originally rose in the United States during the late 19th century in response to the commercialisation of the press. The Missouri School of Journalism, the first of its kind, was established in 1908 with the ideal of creating education programme to form the norms of professionalism and promote them in practice. The professionalisation of American journalism significantly influenced the development of

Chinese journalism in the first half of the 20th century. By studying the *SEPM*'s archives, much evidence of both the efforts to professionalise journalism throughout and the devastating effects that the conflicts had on the development of professional journalism in this turbulent period will be presented in the thesis. Moreover, this period of the *SEPM* is very much marked by the angst-ridden articles that many Chinese journalists felt the need to write (often – for their own safety - anonymously) as their activities as journalists began to shift from protecting the public interest through objective reporting (a value chiefly derived from the professional prototype of American journalism) to activities that became increasingly partisan. These articles are also analysed in the thesis. Thirdly, this thesis applies Bourdieu's field theory to tease out elements of the historical outline of the *SEPM* that are particularly salient to the development of professional journalism in China. Struggling to integrate the fearless reporting that was valued by the Missouri-trained journalists and the fear of the growing power and ruthlessness of the Japanese occupation, journalists relied on their wordsmithing – their social and cultural capital – to respond to their predicament. Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of *field* and *habitus* establish an analytical framework through which the course of an individual's history as well as history as it is objectified in social institutions can be re-told through the paradigm of a symbiotic relationship that dynamically transforms both entities. Important elements of Bourdieu's field theory (*field*, *habitus*, *capital*, etc.) have been applied to the case of the *SEPM* in order to better articulate aspects of its history and its place within the broader sweep of the history of professional journalism in China.

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Introduction

Gould, Gould, feel your head, clear your eyes.

Do you know what this era is?

Can imperialists continue their fierce and brutal acts in China?

Can Chinese workers be treated as slaves at your wish? ...

Stubborn imperialistic Gould!

Remember China has been free from the imperialistic yoke, work must be hard but existence must be glorious.

The Chinese people have become masters of China!¹

In 1949, long-time American resident of Shanghai, Randall Gould, was subjected to a sustained attack on his character. In Chinese newspapers, he was pilloried as the perfect example of American imperialism. On 25 June 1949, the *Liberation Daily*, Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, which had just been established in Shanghai stated:

Following the liberation of Shanghai on 25 May by the People's Liberation Army through its irresistible force, it was unanimously understood that the people who were suppressed by Chiang Kai-shek's bandit group and the bureaucratic capitalists would stand up and become the masters of the country. However, Randall Gould, as a stubborn and unreasonable imperialist, does not understand this. On the contrary, he ignores the laws and regulations of the People's Government, and vainly attempts to force laborers to be his slaves by resorting to his economic power. This is not the reality but part of his dream world.²

As the manager and the editor in chief of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (*SEPM*), Gould had worked in China for nearly 20 years, and was an old hand at Chinese affairs. Under his leadership, the *SEPM* had held a significant leadership role in supporting the Chinese cause of resistance against Japan and promoting journalism professionalisation. Such great contributions, however, did not prevent the newspaper's fate of being forced into ceasing publication and having the label of imperialism attached to it soon after the Chinese Communists occupied Shanghai in May 1949.³ This

¹ Randall Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 277, no. 1 (September 1951): 189.

² Kangyi Gaoerde Yapo Zhongguo Gongren [Protest against Randall Gould as He Suppressed Chinese Workers] *Liberation Daily*, 25 June 1949.

³ See Du Ruo, "Suqing Diguo zhuyi De Quzhu: Lun Zilinxibao Zaoyao Shijian, Gaoerde Shijian, Mengda Shijian He Oulifu Shijian [Clean Borders of Imperialism: Examining the Incident of Spreading Rumours by the North China Daily News, and Gould, Manderson and Oliver Incidents]," *Shijie Zhishi* 1949, no. 5: 3.

Communist takeover marks a significant turning point in Chinese journalism history. The press reform was immediately implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) soon after its military victory. It fundamentally subverted the inherent mode and landscape of modern journalism which had existed for almost a century in China. These reforms led to the closure of many newspapers, while other privately owned newspapers became public entities. For journalists, the fundamental purpose of media was changed irrevocably. The media became the Party's voice.⁴

Shanghai was known as the 'Paris of the East,' a centre of opulence, conspicuous wealth and high living. The city was a globally significant centre of modernity, and began to enjoy its modern prosperity as a global economic and trade centre from the time it was forcedly opened to foreigners in accordance with the Treaty of Nanking signed on the 29 August 1842:

At Shanghai, the English, later the International, Settlement was established in 1843. The new foreign residents were allowed to rent land in a strip alongside the Huangpu river outside the Chinese walled city of Shanghai. Regulations governing land use in this settlement were first drawn up by the Chinese authorities, and later versions (1854, 1869, 1898) provided the basis on which the mainly British Land Renters elected a committee to maintain order and construct roads and jetties; in 1854, this became the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC). Also in 1854, these Land Renters established a Shanghai Municipal Police Force (SMP) and, in response to the seizure of the Chinese city of Shanghai by rebels in 1853, a Shanghai Volunteer Corps (SVC).⁵

Almost a century later, during the Interwar Period, in sharp contrast to Europe that was bogged down in depression, Shanghai rapidly expanded and became one of the most bustling metropolises in the world. Modernity in Shanghai at the time was not only embodied in the neoclassical style of buildings springing up everywhere, but equally in

⁴ For more details about the process of the Chinese Communist Party realising domination over Chinese journalism after its military victory, see Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi* [A Comprehensive History of Chinese Journalism] (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 1996), 2:1154-59; Ma Guangren, *Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi* [A Contemporary History of Journalism in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 1-173; Yang Kuisong, "Xin Zhongguo Baokan Tongzhi Jizhi De Xingcheng Jingguo: Yi Jianguo Qianhou Wang Yunsheng De 'Touxian' Yu Dagongbao Gaizao Weili [The Formation of the Mechanism of Control over the Press in New China: A Case Study of Wang Yunsheng's collaboration in about the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the transformation of *Ta Kung Pao*]," in *Baoren Baoguo: Zhongguo Xinwenshi De Lingyizhong Dufa* [To Serve the Nation: Journalists as Prisms of Chinese Press History], ed. Lee Chin-Chuan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013), 355-401; Zhang Jishun, "Thought Reform and Press Nationalization in Shanghai: The Wenhui Newspaper in the Early 1950s," *Twentieth-Century China* 35, no. 2 (April 2010): 52-80.

⁵ Robert Bickers, "Shanghaianders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937," *Past & Present*, no. 159 (May 1998): 166.

the flourishing of an urban culture that included sophisticated arts performances, conspicuous consumption, and the emergence of a peculiarly feminine urbanity.⁶ Prosperity brought rapid growth in both population and industry with the result that the social structure of Shanghai became increasingly complex. Barbara Mittler's ground-breaking study of Shanghai's news media during the late-19th and early-20th centuries draws attention to the mythologising of the city and its Chinese residents, which was indulged in by the local press through the invention of an essentialised figure, known as the *Shanghairen* ("people of Shanghai"):

On the pages of Shanghai newspapers, the essentialized *Shanghairen* emerged as an attractive yet frightening, exotic yet necessary model for Chinese inside *and* outside Shanghai. Again, as in the case of women, newspapers reflected not the realities found on the streets of modernizing China but the realities found in the minds of the modernizers. The *Shanghairen* functioned as a "cultural experimental animal," on whom the often painful transformation of Chinese civilization was performed.⁷

A large number of industrial workers and educated urban residents shared the same civic space and pride of place, fostered by a variety of formal and informal social organisations, more or less heterogeneous or homogeneous in their membership; the majority of English residents, known as Shanghailanders, being the most exclusive of all the nationalities present in Shanghai:⁸

These were the small treaty port people, whose fortunes were inextricably tied up with the existence of the British concessions and extraterritorial privileges in China. They worked in treaty port service occupations (administrative, service sector, police), or worked for, or ran, utility companies, land investment and real estate firms. [...] the British community in Shanghai actually provides a clear model of what a settler community looks like and how it develops. The nature of its multilayered identities and their interaction are also clearly identifiable. Shanghaileander identity was always British and imperial, but Shanghailanders' local 'imagined' identity, so easily and readily dismissed by contemporaries and by historians, was of crucial importance to them, and to the Sino-British imbroglio. At different times their British, imperial or local identity was more prominent than the others, but all three were ever-present.⁹

⁶ Liu Jianhui, *Mato Shanhai: Nihon Chishikijin no "Kindai" Taiken* [Demon and Magic Metropolis Shanghai: The "Modern" Experience of Japanese Intellectuals] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2010), 224.

⁷ Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872-1912* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 314.

⁸ Kohama Masako, *Kindai Shanhai no Kōkyōsei to Kokka* [The Public and the State in Modern Shanghai] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 2000), 43.

⁹ Bickers, "Shanghailanders," 163-64.

For some Western adventurers – perhaps consumed by the ennui of everything going athwart in their homeland - Shanghai was also the place of dreams and escape.¹⁰ In the late 1910s, this land where the Sassoon and Kadoorie families achieved their success greeted a new American adventurer. Cornelius Vander Starr landed in Shanghai on 19 December 1919 with his own dream of creating an insurance empire.¹¹ A decade later when Starr’s insurance company had taken shape, he began to throw himself into Chinese journalism, running the *SEPM*.

Figure 1: The Present Situation of the AIA Insurance Buidling in Shanghai¹²



¹⁰ Lu Hanchao, *Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 38.

¹¹ Ronald Kent Shelp and Al Ehrbar, *Fallen Giant: The Amazing Story of Hank Greenberg and the History of AIG* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 17.

¹² The *North China Daily News* and C. V. Starr’s insurance company, the predecessor of AIA insurance company, both worked in the building before the Communist takeover. In May 1998, AIA insurance company returned to this building. The photo is taken by the author in 2016.

Shanghai, as the centre of Chinese journalism, can be traced back to a century before, when the city was forced to open up as a treaty port, and the establishment of extraterritoriality made foreign settlements in Shanghai become a state within a state in the true sense. Qin Shaode demonstrates that besides economic, cultural and geographic factors, the existence of foreign settlements was critical in making Shanghai the centre of the press and publication in modern China. Protected under foreign settlements, reformists' newspapers gave publicity to their ideals, partisan papers expressed their different opinions from those of the government, and the commercial press steadily developed.¹³ As these settlements in reality did not respond to either Chinese authority or foreign embassies or consulates, they were managed by the Municipal Council, an autonomous administrative institute composed of elected land-owning representatives. Foreign settlements in Shanghai became the haven for independent newspapers, such as the *SEPM* (established in the Shanghai French Concession of 1929).¹⁴ Curiously, the *SEPM* has not drawn much attention from academics, despite its enormous potential as a repository of primary source material for the history of professional journalism in China. Extraterritoriality not only enabled foreign colonies and settlements in China to possess executive and judicial independence from the Chinese government, but also became the fulcrums for Western values and culture to influence Chinese society:

The Chinese-ness of the foreign settlement, which often surprised Europeans arriving there for the first time, must always be borne in mind. Shanghailanders constructed their community in the midst of China's most populous metropolis.¹⁵

More importantly, the principles and practices of journalism management in foreign settlements were based on the ideals and principles of their motherland. British, American and French liberal ideals of journalism in settlements contrasted sharply with Chinese administration controlled areas.¹⁶ Some scholars have questioned whether the early missionary papers are indeed newspapers. Toh Lam Seng, for example, questioned whether the early newspapers established by Western missionaries were genuine modern

¹³ Qin Shaode, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun* [Arguing the Development of the Modern Press in China], 2nd ed. (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2014), 150.

¹⁴ Mittler, *A Newspaper for China*, 3.

¹⁵ Bickers, "Shanghailanders," 170.

¹⁶ Qin, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun*, 158.

newspapers. Toh argues that although these papers introduced a concept of ‘periodical’, they cannot be classified as modern papers as their functions were periodical religion tracts rather than monthly journals with contents of timely relevance.¹⁷ Therefore, he divided the origin and early development of modern newspapers in China into two stages: religion monthly journals before 1858, and the new pattern of newspapers after 1857. These later newspapers provided abundantly relevant news information, designed columns by imitating Western newspapers, expressed clear political positions and served as a platform for Chinese intellectuals to discuss social affairs.¹⁸ According to Toh’s definition, a modern press should have two important characteristics: it should be periodically published and be concerned with current events.

By the mid to late 19th century, the professionalisation of journalism had begun in earnest in the United States, and it soon spread to China. In the early 20th century, Chinese intellectuals and journalists, most clearly represented by Liang Qichao and Huang Yuansheng, were committed to improving standards of journalism in China:

One of the defining characteristics of professional journalism, in China as in the West, was the separation of objective (*keguan*) reporting from subjective (*zhuguan*) commentary. As C.P. Scott, influential editor of the Manchester Guardian in the late-nineteenth century, put it: comment is free, but facts are sacred.’[...] [In China] there was evidence of the conceptual distinction between fact and commentary (or opinion) early in the new century. Liang Qichao, a pioneer in so many aspects of Chinese journalism, was the most prominent journalist of the day who struggled to resolve the tension between fact and opinion.¹⁹

Chinese journalists in Shanghai who supported this movement formed informal associations throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, and regularly expressed their ideas and anxieties about the profession of Chinese journalism in numerous articles published over an extensive period in the *SEPM*:

In Shanghai a few local journalist associations were formed; however, these were more like social clubs than genuine professional organizations. This situation reflected the continuing low status of journalists within China’s press. Even for journalists working in the most successful commercial newspapers, the role of all but the most senior editors was a very limited one.

¹⁷ Toh Lam-seng, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi, 1815-1874* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002), 32.

¹⁸ Toh, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi*, 206-10.

¹⁹ Terry Narramore, “Illusions of Autonomy? Journalism, Commerce and the State in Republican China,” in *Power and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu*, ed. Billy K. L. So, John Fitzgerald, Huang Jianli, and James K. Chin (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 179.

Indeed, in the risky political climate of the warlord period, journalists were, in a sense, edited out of newspaper columns. [...]. This meant that most journalists were a small part of a larger, mechanistic formula for printing news.

The mismatch between professional ideals and practice was to frustrate Chinese journalists throughout the 1920s and 1930s.²⁰

Some of the most influential Chinese journalists that ended up working for the *SEPM* had graduated from University of Missouri. The Missouri University journalism education model was proposed as a term by Yong Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan to describe the professionalisation of Chinese journalism. Lin Muyin understood the term to denote the very influential American model of journalism education that flourished in modern China.²¹ Significantly, the *SEPM* is a repository of original contributions to the dissemination of the main tenets of this early school of professional journalism in so far as the newspaper published an extensive series of articles whose themes and topics mirror the curriculum and preoccupations of the Missouri model of professional journalism. Indeed, at one period, exploring the way for the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was one of the highest priorities of a group of Chinese journalists working for the *SEPM*, or associated with journalists writing for the *SEPM*. They contributed to the publication of a series of regular articles known as the *Journalist Seminar*. Lu Yi, one of the main organisers of the column, gives the following account of the formation of the *Journalist Seminar* in the Chinese edition of the *SEPM*:

I remember that it was a midsummer evening, and there were some professional journalists casually gathered in a small restaurant called 'Renaissance' on the Avenue Joffre (currently Huaihai Road). After chatting with each other, they all felt troubled and distressed as they did not have sufficient opportunities to study for improving themselves due to hectic and stressful lifestyles. Under the background of that time that the successively intensifying national crisis, what journalists should do and what attitude they should take in their work became an urgent and common issue which had to be solved immediately. Therefore, we reached an agreement to gather for dinner in the evening of every Sunday and hold discussions on questions of common interests. Sometimes, we analysed Chinese or international events, and other times, we discussed journalistic theories and practice or criticised specific editorials or news reports published in a newspaper. Initially, there were just three to five people in the seminar, but later, it became a group with ten to twenty people. Finally, approximately thirty people joined in, and

²⁰ Narramore, "Illusions of Autonomy," 184.

²¹ Lin Muyin, *Yizhi Yu Liubian: Misuli Daxue Xinwen Jiaoyu Moshi Zai Zhongguo (1921-1952)* [The Introduction and Adaptation: Journalism Education Model of Missouri University in China: 1921-1952] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2013), 5-6.

our meeting place was thus changed to a Sichuan restaurant called ‘Beautiful Sichuan’ on Hankow Road. We all deemed that we benefited in our daily study and work from this seminar. In several months, we felt that it was a pity for us to just have a meeting once a week without any document to systematically record what we had achieved. Therefore, we decided to open a column, ‘Journalist Seminar’, which was published on every Friday in the Chinese edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*. This column had a total of 90 issues, and was finally suspended on 7 May 1936.

He added:

The main aim of the publication was to study journalism theories and practical issues. We hoped to actively learn what we had not gained from academic and self-education, to express what we wanted to say directly, and be able to criticise the people and their behaviours where it was appropriate.

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That the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was a long-standing preoccupation for a number of Chinese journalists in Shanghai keen to hold firm to their ideals of professionalism in the most adverse of circumstances is very much in evidence throughout the pages of the *SEPM*. One of the key arguments of the present study is that the largely unpublished history of the *SEPM* represents a hitherto unexploited mine of primary source material for the history of professional journalism in China. Certainly, this thesis seeks to demonstrate in its own modest way that the *SEPM* is deserving of further scholarly interest. The current study attempts to provide the groundwork for such a history of the *SEPM*. We have undertaken extensive archival research to uncover primary source materials in order to generate the raw materials needed to begin to narrate a fully documented history of the newspaper. During this process, it has become apparent how further research on the *SEPM* could add significantly to a more complete understanding of the vicissitudes of professional journalism during a turbulent period of Chinese history.

Statement of Primary Materials

Primary materials in this thesis consist of archival documents, published archives and books and journal articles, relevant personages’ diaries and memoirs, newspaper and magazine archives, and monographs on Chinese journalism history published during the

²² Lu Yi, “‘Qingji’ De Qianshen: Shanghai Jizhe Zuotan [The Predecessor of the Chinese Youth Journalists Association: Journalist Seminar in Shanghai],” *Xinwen Yu Chuanbo Yanjiu* 1981, no. 2: 26.

Republic period. Amongst them, the relevant archives about the *SEPM*, and the memoirs of Randall Gould, are the most valued primary materials for restoring the paper's narrative. Historical factors, particularly the Nationalist Government's relocation to the wartime capital Chongqing during the War of Resistance against Japan, and the subsequent retreat to Taiwan in 1949 following defeat in the Chinese Civil War, resulted in the well-preserved archives about the newspaper being separated and stored in different areas of the world.

The majority of the archives of the paper (for the period it was published in Shanghai) are held at the Shanghai Municipal Archives. In 2011, I visited the Shanghai Municipal Archives and began my research. The archives on the *SEPM* stored there covered the historical periods of pre-war Shanghai, the Isolated Island, and post-war Shanghai to the Communists' takeover. Amongst them, the most valuable and well-preserved documents were the reports submitted to the Shanghai Communist administration by the newspaper management and printing workers, whose standpoints seriously collided, and the instructions given by the Communist officials during the newspaper's final closure in 1949. These archives have a significant role to play in the restoration of historical facts surrounding the newspaper's closure. Since 2014, the Chinese government began to tighten up archival control, and the documents about the newspaper's closure are no longer accessible. Most of the documents concerning the paper's wartime publication in Chongqing from 1943 to 1945 can be found at the Chongqing Municipal Archives. The remainder were transported to Taiwan with the Nationalists' evacuation in 1949, and they are now preserved in three institutes: the Academia Historica; the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica; and the Nationalist Party Archives. In the 1980s, collaboration amongst the Central Archives, the Second Historical Archives of China, and other local archives, facilitated the publishing of voluminous archives as books and journal articles, and a great deal of valuable information and clues are able to be found in these materials.

The Shanghai Municipal Police files are also an indispensable reference in this thesis. These files generally consisted of documents of the police office of the Shanghai International Settlement. In the spring of 1949, when the troops of the Chinese Communist Party were approaching Shanghai, the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy removed the Shanghai Municipal Police files after negotiating with Chinese authorities. Although

some materials were lost when a typhoon hit during the voyage to Japan, the majority of them were ultimately transferred to the United States and housed at the Central Intelligence Agency until 1980s when these documents were turned over to the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.²³ These materials are now also accessible in the National Library of Australia.

However, due to external constraints, it has not been possible to use some archives relating to the *SEPM*. They comprise of Gould's correspondence and letters housed at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and his unpublished document found at Leiden University of the Netherlands.²⁴ With the exception of the published archives, the Second Historical Archives of China, where most of the archives of the Republican period not taken to Taiwan are stored, is still a relatively hidden world and remains mostly inaccessible to the public. It is also assumed that there would be further relevant documents that are yet to be discovered. Preserved in the Shanghai Municipal Archives, the documents of the French Concession, where the *SEPM* was located before the Attack on Pearl Harbour, are not completely available as they might not have been fully catalogued.

In addition, the possibility should not be excluded that some relevant archives might have been missing, damaged, or destroyed. War spanned the whole Republican period, and institutes for collecting and preserving archives had to contend with the scourge of war as well as the geographical relocation of governing bodies. There is reason to believe that regimes that perished with the end of war might have systematically destroyed relevant archives that may have documented war crimes. After 1949, various political factors over a long period also have had adverse effects on archival preservation. Natural environmental conditions should not be overlooked. Unfortunately, some surviving materials were damaged to varying degrees by worms and, due to inadequate facilities for the preservation and restoration of documents, harsh natural conditions, high

²³ Marcia R. Ristaino, *Guide to Scholarly Resources Microfilm Edition of the Shanghai Municipal Police Files: 1894-1949* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1984), x.

²⁴ Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan mentioned Gould's unpublished document, *Three p.m. Shanghai Time: A Memoir in Three Parts*, which is kept at Leiden University, see Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence," *Journalism Studies* 12, no. 5 (2011): 569.

humidity and damp degraded the condition of others.²⁵

As the chief editor of the *SEPM*, Randall Gould seemed to have a strong interest in writing. Besides the writings preserved at the Hoover Institute, and the Leiden University, his published books and journal articles provide another fundamental basis for revealing the history of the *SEPM*. Out of all of his publications, *China in the Sun* and *Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949*, have much value as historical records. Published in 1946, *China in the Sun* contains Gould's journalistic experience in China. It includes useful information about the narratives of the *SEPM* in Shanghai and Chongqing until 1945. *Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949*, is a journal article recollecting the whole course of the final closure of the newspaper in 1949 written after Gould came back the United States. Gould's published memoirs and relevant archives corroborate and complement each other, and it is doubtless that these help support the accuracy of the narrative in relation to historical facts. The *SEPM* in its twenty years of operation published several different editions of newspapers in both English and Chinese. Amongst them, the Chinese evening edition is the best preserved and is important material for the thesis, but the English edition and other Chinese editions of the paper have also been used.

In addition to *SEPM*, other relevant materials from the same period have also been used. These include the political organs of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, other commercial papers, magazines, memoirs and diaries by prominent politicians and journalists during the Republic period, such as Tseng Hsü-pei, Hollington Tong, Hu Daojing, H. G. W. Woodhead, John Leighton Stuart and Wang Shih-chieh, which are indispensable references in this thesis. The archival study in the thesis faces the difficulties that some historical documents may have been destroyed, are missing, or not open to the public. By making most of the primary sources available, it is still possible to restore a relatively complete and clear picture of the history of the *SEPM*.

²⁵ About the situation of the preservation and access and management of the archives during the Republican period in China, see William C. Kirby and Cheng Linsun, "China's Wartime History: Notes on International Efforts for Preservation and Access," *Modern China* 25 no.1 (January 1999); William W. Moss, "Archives in the People's Republic of China," *The American Archivist* 45 no. 4 (Fall 1982): 385-409.

Research Methodology

Microhistory study has been adopted as the main method in the thesis. Microhistory was originally proposed in the late 1970s by a group of historians, mostly from Italy. It performs on the basis of scaling down the size of observation, microscopic analysis and detailed study of documents.²⁶ In microhistory studies, the scale of research is downsized to focus on accurate research objects by nominating specific names of individuals and social groups, and those nominations will generate the clues, which Ginzberg and Carlo Poni refer to as Ariadne's thread.²⁷ In view of a common failing of insufficient proof in the process of shaping a relatively complete narrative in microhistory writing, Carlo Ginzberg proposes a conjectural paradigm.²⁸ This paradigm demonstrates that historians are able to arrive at reasonable explanations and conclusions when relying on conjecture and fragmentary materials, and thereby solving a common contradiction between limited documents around research objects, such as the history of specific individuals or social groups, and highly rigorous proof methods of social science. Aspects of the microhistory approach have informed the methodology of this thesis in the recovery of key historical facts regarding the *SEPM*. More importantly, the microhistory method has helped solve the issue of utilising relatively limited historical materials to recover the most complete history possible. On this basis, this present study has been able to compile the first relatively clear and comprehensive historical outline of the newspaper. Additionally, following the research of Monika Krause, Huang Shun-Shing and Hsiao Hsu-Chih this thesis also explores the application of Pierre Bourdieu's field theory to the history of the *SEPM*.²⁹ All of these scholars have utilised field theory in their studies of the history of journalism. As Krause states: "Field theory allows us to historicize journalistic ideals and analyse their institutional base."³⁰ In the final chapter,

²⁶ Giovanni Levi "On Microhistory", in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, edited by Peter Burke, Cambridge: Penn State Press, 99.

²⁷ Carlo Ginzberg and Carlo Poni, "The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historical Marketplace," in *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe*, ed. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 5-6.

²⁸ Carlo Ginzburg and Anna Davin, "Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method," *History Workshop*, no. 9 (Spring 1980): 6.

²⁹ See Huang Shun-Shing, "Xinwen De Changyu Fenxi: Zhanhou Taiwan Baoye De Bianqian [Analysing the Journalistic Field: The Vicissitudes of the Press in Post-war Taiwan]," *Xinwenxue Yanjiu*, no. 104 (July 2010): 151-53; Hsiao Hsu-Chih, "Baoli, Ansha Yu Xingcunzhe De Jiye: Minguo Shiqi De Xinwen Changyu Chutan [Violence, Assassination and Survivors' Memories: A Tentative Examination on the Journalistic Field during the Republic Period]," in *Xinwen Meijie De Lishi Mailuo* [Historical Trajectory of News Media], ed. Huang Shun-Shing (Taipei: Cheng She-Wo Institute for Chinese Journalism, Shih Hsin University, 2014), 24-37.

³⁰ Monika Krause, "Reporting and the Transformations of the Journalistic Field: US News Media, 1890-2000," *Media Culture Society* 33, no. 1 (2011): 90.

this thesis similarly, but in a more modest way, explores the applicability of Bourdieu's field theory to the history of the *SEPM*.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter One establishes the grounds for the development of modern journalism from the early missionary influence and shows how the newly emerging profession of journalism was undergoing a major transformation as exemplified by the educational program inaugurated by the Missouri School in 1908. China was very ripe for the Missouri influence particularly during the Republican period with Chinese graduates of the school returning to China to take up influential positions with other influential American figures visiting and working in China thus contributing to the development of Chinese journalism. This early history reveals two important issues: (1) the debates around the function and practical skills of journalism; and (2) and the political and economic conditions required for Chinese journalism to develop, particularly regarding extraterritoriality.

Chapter Two outlines the history of the establishment of the *SEPM* during a period of much turbulence in politics. The *SEPM* was established as a specifically American voice in an overwhelmingly British Shanghai. Expressing a strongly American view, the paper made a vigorous stand against the actions taken by the Japanese military, especially the atrocities committed against civilians. Censorship started to be imposed and was intensified during this period. However, the establishment of the *SEPM*'s own Chinese language radio station became key to avoiding some of the limitations placed on print media. The Chinese language supplements *Journalist Seminar*, *Night Light* and *Journalist Weekly* published in the *SEPM* provided a public space for discussions about the core values and practices of professional journalism with particular reference to activities in Shanghai and the hinterland occupied by the Japanese forces. After Shanghai became an 'isolated island' in the later part of the 1930s, challenges intensified for the *SEPM*. *Journalist Weekly* articles were potentially inflammatory and reported news unpalatable to all sides. The protection provided by extraterritoriality was essential for the operating of the paper in both its English and Chinese versions.

Chapter Three recounts the impossible situation the journalists and newspaper

organisations faced during the second Sino-Japanese War and the Isolated Island Period for Shanghai. Newspapers played a crucial role in the War of resistance against Japan; chief among the foreign-owned newspapers resisting censorship was the *SEPM*. However, this was not without loss of life among the staff in violent circumstances. The *SEPM*'s editors and owner were very keen to preserve the tradition of the newspaper particularly its commitment to professional news reporting. However, through the Isolated Island Period and during the Resistance to the Japanese occupation, the *SEPM* editors and journalists found themselves challenged by increasing nationalism and the function of journalism changed. Japanese control spelt the extinction of the immunities that extraterritoriality had for so long afforded the residents of Shanghai. Although Gould and Starr were forced to leave China, Starr's strategy during the war was to open the New York edition, as well as re-opening the paper in the newly re-established capital Chongqing. Gould returned, and oversaw a crucial but hitherto poorly documented period of the *SEPM*'s history.

In the fourth chapter, the difficulties faced by the re-established the *SEPM* in a newly liberated Shanghai are explored. From what has been examined in this chapter, the *SEPM* persisted in its principle of reporting news objectively and in an independent manner, even though the general media environment in post-war Shanghai and China in general was immersed in political propaganda. When faced with the controlling censorship of the Nationalist regime, Gould chose a tactful way to tame the tide of trouble and successfully maintained the newspaper's independence. What Gould had to deal with, in order to secure the *SEPM*'s survival and continue to publish in alignment with the core values of professional journalism during such a chaotic period of Chinese society, was well and truly far beyond issues limited to the niceties of nuanced reporting. After the civil war, sharp and deep contradictions plagued the paper as it tried to balance very conflicting objectives – maintenance of the standards and principles of professional journalism while avoiding the ire of the Communist regime. The paper closed and Gould was forced to leave China.

Chapter Five explores the potential of a possible future iteration of research on this newspaper, namely the application of a theoretical framework that attempts to delineate more precisely the underlying forces shaping the development of professional journalism in early twentieth century China. This chapter seeks to link the findings of

this present study of the *SEPM* to key elements of Pierre Bourdieu's (1930 - 2002) theoretical approach adopted as the framework of this chapter (as proposed in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*).

Contribution

This thesis makes an original contribution to the field by offering the fullest historical account of the *SEPM* to date. In doing so, the thesis also enhances our understanding of the historical foundation, motivation and limitations of the development of journalism in modern China, with a particular focus on Shanghai. In the first place, this thesis offers the most comprehensive historical trajectory of the *SEPM* supported by hitherto unpublished primary sources from a multitude of archives throughout the world, and supplemented by a range of secondary sources in both English and Chinese. Moreover, a selection of articles (initially published in supplements of the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* from 1932 to 1940) have been translated for the first time and used to document key moments of the newspaper's history. These articles also give us some insight into the development of professional journalism in Shanghai during the relevant period.

This study also provides the most complete inventory of the newspaper's various editions and activities, which includes the first documented history of the various incarnations of the newspaper's radio station, Ta Mei Radio. The *SEPM* and the scope of its operations are summarised in the Table 1 (See Chapter 1).

From a newspaper in English, it later expanded to include a Chinese edition, a radio, a pictorial and overseas edition. As can be seen from the table, the paper was not only published in Shanghai but also in Chongqing once the wartime capital moved after the war broke out completely with Japan. The Chinese edition at various times had both morning and noon editions. The present study also identifies three important Chinese supplements published in the *SEPM* during the 1930s:

1. *Journalist Seminar*: 31 August 1934 – 07 May 1936
2. *Journalist Weekly*: 12 December 1938 – 27 November 1939
3. *Night Light*: February 1938 – 30 August 1939 (under the editorship of Zhu Xinggong)

To further facilitate future research on the history of this period of Chinese journalism in Shanghai, archival research has been undertaken to compile the first complete list in English of the almost two hundred titles of every article published in the fifty editions of the *Journalist Weekly* supplement. Another original contribution has been made in the form of the first complete list in English of the articles published in the *Journalist Seminar* supplement.³¹ It is important to note that the influence of the *Journalist Seminar* column still exists as it was the foundation of the Chinese Youth Journalists Association, which grew into the current Chinese official journalist organisation: All-China Journalists Association.³² At the time, the *Journalist Seminar* noted their purpose:

We are trying our best to enrich the column to take part of the responsibility of improving journalistic endeavour. These are the materials that we need in accordance with our plan:

1. Discussion of journalism theories
2. Information about Chinese and foreign scholars on journalism studies
3. Studies on practical techniques for the press
4. Introduction and investigation on the local press
5. Information about the journalistic cycle, and all theoretical and practical narratives based on the view of other subjects about journalism studies and management.³³

In addition to these contributions, extensive work has been undertaken to translate a selection of twenty-four articles from the supplements. They have been selected to reveal the practical skills and ideologies of journalistic professionalism, balanced with nationalism under the national crisis, and Chinese images towards Western countries, including their political systems and culture. *Journalist Seminar* has been the focus of research by Chinese scholars for a long time due to the relations between *Journalist Seminar* and the later official journalist associations of China. However, scholars have not utilised this column combined with the later published *Journalism Weekly* in order to explore the topic of professional journalism. These articles together with those from *Journalist Seminar* and ‘*Night Light*’ are a unique record of the professionalism ideals that Chinese journalists sought to promote and safeguard throughout those years. Previous scholarship in the field of the history of Chinese journalism is examined

³¹ This list is an original translation based on Xu Jizhong’s Masters thesis of Anhui University in 2013, ‘Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar]’, 87-96.

³² See Ma Guangren, “Woguo Zaoqi De Xinwenjies Tuanti [Earlier Journalism Associations in China],” *Xinwen Yu Chuanbo Yanjiu* 1988, no.1: 69.

³³ Bianjizhe Yan [A Speech of the Editor], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 September 1934.

specifically to explore the applicability of Bourdieu's field theory to this aspect of the history of Chinese through the prism of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.

Chapter 1: Journalism in China before 1929

The impact of foreigners in China goes back to the beginning of modern Chinese press. The crucial founder of Chinese journalism history studies, Ge Gongzhen, established the narrative that the emergence of modern newspapers in China was derived from foreigners, it has been a consensus that modern press was not a natural product of the development of Chinese society itself but a Western exotic introduced into China.¹ The roots of modern Chinese journalism to a large extent can be traced to Western Christian missionaries who established publication houses in treaty ports on the southeast coast from the mid-19th century. The London Missionary Society entered China with the explicit aim of publishing rather than proselytising – believing proselytising could not occur until after they had met their publishing goal. The society was founded by non-conformist Christians for whom a familiarity with the Bible was vital for all believers, in contrast to Catholicism whereby the clergy acted as intermediaries between the faithful and God. Members of the London Missionary Society were sent to China with the aim of learning the Chinese language, creating dictionaries and ultimately publishing a Chinese language version of the Bible.²

In 1807 the London Missionary Society sent Robert Morrison to China. He had to travel via America, due to the East India Company's policy of not carrying missionaries.³ He spent his time there cultivating relationships with the American consul so that he could use the influence of such official connections upon his arrival in China. At the time, foreigners could only enter China for commercial purposes as officials had an 'unfavorable attitude towards missionaries, believing that they were a threat due to their nonconformist ways.' Entrants were closely interrogated, and if their answers failed to satisfy the Chinese authorities, they were obliged to board the next ship bound for foreign climes. Morrison faced three key barriers to his aim of publishing a Chinese language version of the Bible. Firstly, Chinese subjects were legally prohibited from teaching foreigners their language. Secondly, foreigners were only allowed into China for trade. Thirdly, Macau's Roman Catholic Church, set up by the Portuguese

¹ Ge Gongzhen, *Zhongguo Baoxueshi* [A History of Chinese Press] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928), 67.

² Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi* [A Comprehensive History of Chinese Journalism] (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 1992), 1:247.

³ Su Ching, "The Printing Presses of the London Missionary Society among the Chinese" (PhD diss., University College London, 1996), 35.

government, could not relate to or understand Protestants and this resulted in a degree of hostility towards them.⁴

Morrison arrived in Macau on 4 September 1807, and was promptly expelled by the Roman Catholic authorities in Macau. He then went to the American trading post in Guangdong. Here, Morrison masqueraded as an American while he surreptitiously learned the Chinese language. Due to the Qing Government response to England's attempt to land in Macau as part of their strategy during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Morrison, along with other English residents, left Guangzhou for Macau. Having gained some mastery of Chinese and desperate to contribute financially towards his mission, Morrison accepted a position as translator to the East India Company. This appointment meant that he could legitimately return to Guangzhou. He spent time between Macau, where his family was based, and Guangzhou. In 1812, he finished his first book on Chinese grammar, which was printed in Bengal. He went on to print a tract, a catechism and a number of translations of the Bible, which raised the ire of the Roman Catholic Church in Macau and of the Chinese Government. Then in 1813, the London Missionary Society sent William Milne to help Morrison with his missionary work. However, Milne did not have a commercial justification for his presence in China, so he was expelled. Thereafter, Milne and the Morrisons moved to Guangzhou.

Over the years, Morrison travelled between Europe, Malacca, Singapore and Macau. It can be seen that his survival and the creation of the early printing presses in China were due to his ability to move between, within and outside the areas under the control of the court of the Qing Government. Morrison capitalised on the power of the United States for protection within Guangzhou and the gaps in the delicate power balance between the Chinese and Portuguese Governments and Catholic Church in Macau. Thus, although extraterritoriality did not yet exist, its precursors were central to journalism in China from its earliest days. The trading zones, with weakened Qing government control and Western influences, albeit not yet extraterritorially, created safer zones for translating, printing and publishing.

Other journalists, printers and publishers utilised weakened territoriality to progress their

⁴ Su, "The Printing Presses," 44.

aims – having the economic and social capital to move between countries and capitalise on that ambiguous territory was key. For example, the first modern Chinese language newspaper, (published by Milne) the *Chinese Monthly Magazine*, was published in Malacca.⁵ On 5 August 1815, other newspapers established by capitalising on the relative freedom offered by the foreigner controlled areas such as Macau. One important example is *A Abelha da China*, which is recognised as the earliest preserved modern newspaper in China. Established on 12 September 1822 in Macau, this Portuguese language weekly was established by Paulino da Silva Barbosa, a pro-constitutionalism Portuguese officer in Macau, and Dr. José de Almeida. Father António de S. Gonçalo de Amarante assumed the role of the editor in chief.⁶ *A Abelha da China* is seen as providing a significant break from the restriction of the Chinese court and as a pioneer of modern Chinese press. The emergence of the paper is attributed to the autonomy that the Portuguese acquired in Macau, and stimulated the British to seek to acquire the same privilege in China.⁷ The case of *A Abelha da China* demonstrates that the complex interaction of Western political developments, their colonial activities in the Far East, and attempts at the evangelisation of indigenous populations, all contributed to the establishment of what could be termed (perhaps controversially) the modern press in China (see below).

After the establishment of the *Chinese Monthly Magazine* and other similar missionary newspapers outside China, some limited publishing began within China itself, including those by the foreign merchants. This occurred despite limitations on the number of foreign missionaries and merchants in China and the strict supervision that occurred in accordance with the Canton System implemented by the Chinese court.⁸ The two most well-known examples of the period were *The Canton Register* and *The Chinese Repository*. *The Canton Register* was established by the British merchant James Matheson in November 1827, and is regarded as the first English newspaper in China. *The Chinese Repository* was established in May 1832 by Elijah Coleman Bridgman, an American Protestant Christian missionary to China. Morrison provided critical assistance in the formation of both *The Canton Register* and *The Chinese Repository*.

⁵ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:252

⁶ Cheng Manli, *Mifeng Huabao Yanjiu* [A Study on *Abelha Da China*] (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1998), 9.

⁷ Cheng, *Mifeng Huabao Yanjiu*, 192-99.

⁸ Michael C. Lazich, “American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China,” *Journal of World History* 17, no. 2 (June 2011): 198.

He also contributed to Prussian missionary Karl Gützlaff's *Eastern Western Monthly Magazine*, which aimed to improve relations between the East and the West. Established on 1st August 1833 in Guangzhou, this magazine like others, capitalised on extraterritoriality by moving to Singapore. Along with missionaries, Chinese converts to Christianity were active in publishing, such as Wang Tao, who went on to become a prominent journalist and publisher.

Some debate exists about whether these missionary newspapers could be recognised as modern newspapers. There are legitimate arguments that Protestant missionaries, along with the Chinese elite, failed to achieve modern journalism's core values and concepts that are essential to the free press, such as the Fourth Estate. There are also legitimate, albeit technical arguments that these missionary newspapers did not constitute examples of a modern press because, although they published regularly, the average time for each publication was one month. Further to this, much of the content expounded on Christian doctrines with only very limited space devoted to news and editorials. However, according to a study by Zhang Xiantao, the atmosphere of cooperation between the missionaries and the Chinese intelligentsia was critical to the growth of journalism that occurred later.⁹ Zhang proposes that the perennial issue of the freedom of the press in China can be traced back to the influences and heritage of the missionary press in the second half of the 19th century.¹⁰ Zhang argues that Protestant missionaries and the Chinese elites did not promote the values and concepts essential to the existence or flourishing of a free press. On the contrary, the journalism model of the missionaries was finally adopted and remoulded to fit the Confucian political system to serve the interests of the Qing Empire.¹¹

However, in many ways, the missionary press was very progressive when compared with the traditional Chinese *Imperial Gazette*. The Qing Imperial Court published a style of government gazette, including details of the emperor's activities, the emperor's orders and the chancellors' reports.¹² The *Imperial Gazette* had existed for an incredibly long time. Extant copies of two pieces of Dunhuang's *Liaison Gazette* of the year 878 and

⁹ Zhang Xiantao, *The Origins of the Modern Chinese Press: The Influence of the Protestant Missionary Press in Late Qing China* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 12.

¹⁰ Zhang, *Origins of Chinese Press*, 1-2.

¹¹ Zhang, *Origins of Chinese Press*, 146-47.

¹² Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:190.

887 (collected separately in the National Library of France and the British Library) support the argument that the world's very first newspapers appeared in China.¹³ This standpoint has been widely inherited and continually strengthened in the later research although there are distinct perspectives to explain the development of modern Chinese journalism. Tseng Hsü-pei, a leading scholar on Chinese journalism history studies, criticised that traditional Chinese gazettes in their more than one-thousand-year history under the leashed mind of serving political elites represented by scholar-officials were not able to exert influence on both the majority of people's daily life and the progress of national politics, and he proposed that this situation was not changed until Western modern newspaper ideology was introduced into China around the First Opium War.¹⁴ However, these papers lacked many of the essential elements of modern journalism. Barbara Mittler's magisterial study demonstrates that in reality public opinion was overwhelmingly dominated by the court and that there existed less space for the expression of independent opinion. The Imperial Gazette, in Mittler's view, was just a means to disseminate the court's views as the most powerful voice in the country and she therefore deemed that a free press did not exist before Western missionaries and merchants founded their newspapers in China.¹⁵ Mittler demonstrates the progressive nature of the missionary press and explores how it challenged the Chinese court's long-held monopoly on "public" speech.

The development of journalism in China was sluggish until the outbreak of the First Opium War (1839–42). Before the breakout of war, the majority of newspapers in China were published in foreign languages. In comparison with the plentiful seventeen foreign language newspapers published in China, there were only six Chinese language newspapers, including three from South-East Asia. Along with being relatively scarce, Chinese language newspapers were also short lived. Unlike foreign language newspapers, which often sustained publishing for more than a decade – with some even publishing for about two decades – the longest running Chinese language newspaper

¹³ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:53-58.

¹⁴ Tseng Hsü-pei, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shi* [A History of Chinese Journalism], 6th ed. (Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 1989), 101, 125.

Tseng Hsü-pei was born on 19 April 1894, and graduated from St. John's University of Shanghai. Thereafter, he ran newspapers in Tianjin and Shanghai. Since 1937, he joined the Nationalist Government, occupying important positions on journalism and publicity sectors. He moved to Taiwan with the Nationalist retreat in 1949, and took over as the chief of the Central News Agency and the journalism department of the National Chengchi University. He passed away on 5 January 1994.

¹⁵ Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872-1912* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2004), 2-3.

was in print for only six years, while three other Chinese newspapers operated for less than one.¹⁶

Treaty Ports and Extraterritoriality

This situation fundamentally changed after the outbreak of the First Opium War. The war, and the resulting Treaty of Nanking, radically changed Chinese feudalism and the regime of absolute monarchy that had continued for nearly two millennia. However, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, “[...] it is clear that when the Qing government tried to accommodate Western demands of extraterritorial rights and involvement in legal affairs, it did so with very clear precedents in mind.”¹⁷ These events triggered the start of a new era in which the Western powers, by means of a series of signed treaties following military victories, forced the Qing government to agree to the establishment of treaty ports and colonies with extraterritoriality:

It is fairly well established in Western historiography on China that the early treaty port system in general and extraterritoriality in particular were not simply forced on China by the Western powers, but rather were a product of joint efforts to establish a new *modus vivendi*.¹⁸

With the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Hong Kong Island was ceded to the British as a colony, and five coastal cities opened as treaty ports: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The British quickly established a settlement in Shanghai along the banks of the Whangpoo River to further their commercial interests. With the Treaty of the Bogue in 1843 the specific details of the Treaty of Nanking were established and extraterritorial control of the settlement was explicitly included. The American and French Government sought a similar deal to the Treaty of Nanking, with the Americans brokering their treaty (which included extraterritoriality), the Treaty of Wanghia, in 1845 and the French theirs (which did not include extraterritoriality), the Treaty of Whampoa, in 1849. Thus Shanghai’s French and American Concessions opened, and – with further treaties – expanded. Other nations levered treaties with the weakened Qing government, but these tended not to affect Shanghai. In 1854, Britain, United States of America and France combined as the Shanghai Municipal Council, with

¹⁶ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:271.

¹⁷ Pär Cassell, “Excavating Extraterritoriality: The ‘Judicial Sub-prefect’ as a Prototype for the Mixed Court in Shanghai,” *Late Imperial China* 24, no. 2 (December 2003): 175.

¹⁸ Cassel, “Excavating Extraterritoriality,” 156.

the French withdrawing in 1862, and in 1863 the British and American settlements united to become the Shanghai International Settlement.¹⁹ During this period, in exchange for assistance in quelling the Small Sword Society uprising, the Qing ruler ceded extra-territoriality to the international concessions:

In the West's legal encounter with the states of Asia, for example, the practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction emerged as a key technology of a kind of non-territorial imperialism, in effect, a colonialism without colonies as such. In the nineteenth century, international legal discourse justified the practice of extraterritoriality explicitly on civilizational grounds, just as it justified colonialism more generally. However, international law did not divide the world simply into fully sovereign "civilized" states and "savages" whose lands were either *terra nullius* only waiting to be "discovered" or won through colonial conquest. In certain circumstances, a less-than-civilized - whether "semi-civilized" or "semi-barbaric" or even outright "barbaric" - state might have some degree of sovereignty, but it could not impose its laws on civilized men even when they entered that state's territory. Over time, such an exemption from local law became established as the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction, often (though not always) formalized in (more or less imposed) treaties.²⁰

Crucially, too, over many years "extra-settlement roads" outside the French Concession were added (compare Maps 1 and 2). In the dying days of the Qing government, the Chinese government agreed to French police powers and taxation over these roads in exchange for France evicting Chinese revolutionaries from the French Concession. The Government refused these rights to the International Settlement.

The emergence of treaty ports with extraterritoriality resulting from the phenomenon of semi-colonialism in China led to increased opportunities for missionaries to carry out their activities. The symbiosis of very limited colonised areas and the overwhelming majority of Chinese territory effectively controlled by the Chinese regime is often known as semi-colony, which is understood to be a product of Marx's Historical Materialism.²¹ Li Hongyan examined and narrated in detail the complex historical evolution of both the meaning and political position of the term 'semi-colony.' His account starts from when it was coined by Vladimir Lenin to describe the circumstances


¹⁹ More details about the process of reaching these treaties and the direct changes these treaties brought to China, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 158-164.

²⁰ Teemu Ruskola, "Colonialism without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 71, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 236-37.

²¹ Li Hongyan, "Banzhimindi Banfengjian Lilun De Lailongqumai [The Formation of the Theory of Semi-Colony and Semi-Feudalism]," *Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Qingnian Xueshu Luntan*, 2003: 1-24.

of countries divided amongst Western powers (such as Persia, Turkey and China) and progresses to the time when the Chinese Communist Party finally adopted ‘semi-colony, semi-feudalism’ as the official rhetoric to describe the social condition of modern Chinese history.

Figure 2: Map of Shanghai and the British settlement in 1855²²



Currently this concept is being widely accepted by Western scholars to describe and interpret the state of Chinese society in modern history. According to Yong Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, “in the study of modern China, “semi-colonialism” is a widely used

²² Robert Bickers, “Shanghaianders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937,” *Past & Present*, no. 159 (May 1998): 167.

but seldom defined concept.”²³ They propose a tripartite definition as applied to the situation in China: (1) as the term suggests, semi-colonialism is an intermediate state between imperialism and colonialism; (2) semi-colonialism assured the indigenous population a greater degree of “autonomy from Western domination”; and (3) an absence of a single, all-dominating foreign, colonising power – this situation fostered a “dynamic process of constant negotiation and contestation among various Western powers” present in specific geographical zones, or “spheres of influence” within China. From this it can be seen that the term ‘semi-colonial’ reflects an important distinction. Although China suffered successive military failures and humiliations at the hands of external powers, it was never absolutely occupied as a colony by any of them.²⁴ According to Volz and Lee:

In the China case, although the Western powers had achieved a great level of socio-economic penetration and implanted several foreign concessions in the treaty port cities, they did not acquire a full-range formal settlement and territorial conquest (as in India) [...]. Though enjoying extra-territorial privileges, foreign powers had to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty and negotiate with the Chinese government. Foreign newspapers were subjected to Chinese censorship.²⁵

In the treaty ports foreigners could now have wider and more effective contact with local Chinese people while at the same time suffering less interference from the Chinese court:

[...] in all aspects of their lives and work Shanghailanders relied absolutely on Chinese labour, talent, know-how and understanding. As servants, workers, business partners, financial backers, middlemen or managers, Chinese were vital to the Shanghaileander world.²⁶

Missionary activities previously targeted the indigenous populations in Malacca and other Southeast Asian cities. Missionaries were now spurred to move to Hong Kong and the five treaty ports. Thus numerous missionaries’ newspapers emerged thereafter.²⁷ In Hong Kong 1853, British missionary Walter Henry Medhurst founded the *Chinese Serial*, a Chinese language monthly with distinctive British colonialism standpoints in

²³ Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, “Semi-colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence: British-American Press Competition in Early Twentieth-century China,” *Journalism Studies* 12, no. 5, (2011): 561.

²⁴ Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 309.

²⁵ Volz and Lee, “Semi-colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 561.

²⁶ Bickers, “Shanghailanders,” 185.

²⁷ Toh Lam Seng, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi, 1815-1874* [The Beginnings and Development of modern Chinese Newspapers, 1815-1874] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002), 2.

its contents. It was the first Chinese publication after the Treaty of Nanking, and for this reason was endowed with special importance.²⁸ In addition to the missionaries, Western merchants flowed into treaty ports and, with the aid of an auspicious social environment, engaged in endeavours to pioneer a modern press in Chinese territory. In Shanghai in 1850, the seventh year after Shanghai was forced to open and trade with foreigners, British merchant Henry Shearman founded the *North China Herald* (precursor of the *North China Daily News*) an English language newspaper that continued until the Communist victory in Shanghai in 1949:

For a number of reasons, the treaty port system attained its most sophisticated form in the prosperous Shanghai area, where Britain, the United States, and France established settlements in the mid-1840s. The treaties that followed the Opium Wars only gave foreigners the right to reside in the newly opened ports and said nothing about separate foreign settlements.²⁹

In 1857, Alexander Wylie, a British missionary, established the first modern Chinese language newspaper, known as the *Shanghai Serial*.³⁰ The outcomes of the First Opium War were not tranquillity and political stability, but rather increased unrest. The Second Opium War (1857 – 1860) between China and the British and French empires concluded with the creation of Tianjin as a trade port, the ceding of the District of Kowloon to Britain and a guarantee of freedom of religion in China:

The treaties of 1858–60 provided the framework for the so-called “treaty port system,” the essential elements of which were the opening of coastal ports for foreign trade, extraterritorial rights to Westerners residing in the treaty ports, and fixed tariffs in the Sino-foreign trade. All treaties included a “most favored nation” clause, which meant that privileges granted to one power would automatically be granted to everybody else and made it necessary for all treaty parties to be updated on the other treaties in order to safeguard their “rights.” There were no permanent structures for handling legal cases involving both foreigners and Qing subjects, and it appears that treaty clauses on extraterritoriality and jurisdiction were originally intended to be applied on an ad hoc basis by making use of consular courts and local Qing courts of law. This is also what happened in most of the newly opened treaty ports in China.³¹

Later on, the Chinese were also embroiled, with disastrous consequences, in wars and

²⁸ Toh, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi*, 67, 83-84.

²⁹ Cassel, “Excavating Extraterritoriality,” 172.

³⁰ Qin Shaode, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun* [Arguing the Development of the Modern Press in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2014), 9.

³¹ Cassel, “Excavating Extraterritoriality,” 171.

disputes with Japan, Russia, Germany and France. Internal unrest fed on external influences and failures: civilian unrest such as the Taiping Rebellion was triggered in large part by famine while taking on features of Christian millenarianism; and the Boxer Rebellion had its origins in deeply felt dissatisfaction with the concessions given to the West, amongst many other factors. Thus economic and social factors, driven by both internal and external impetus, created a period of uncertainty and political fragility.

With the boom in newspapers arising from the strengthening of the powers of western missionaries and merchants, there was an upsurge of Chinese willing to run newspapers within colonies and treaty ports. Yung Wing, the first known Chinese student to graduate from an American university (Yale), founded *Huibao* on 16 June 1874 in Shanghai. *Huibao* is the first-known Chinese language daily that was run by Chinese citizens in Shanghai.³² However, the most influential and representative Chinese-founded newspaper at this period was the *Universal Circulating Herald*, which was established in Hong Kong on 4 February 1874 by Wang Tao.³³ Wang Tao had worked for the London Missionary Society Printing House in Shanghai, and later purchased their Hong Kong press to found the General Chinese Printing House.³⁴ The *Universal Circulating Herald* pioneered a political editorial style for the Chinese press which distinguishes it both from the ancient Chinese Imperial Gazettes (limited to the circulation of decrees of the Imperial Court) and Western missionary and merchant papers that were established for disseminating religious propaganda and doctrine and providing business and commercial information. It opened the newspaper up to political commentary based on the interests of the nation-state in China. The *Universal Circulating Herald* contained large amounts of editorials with unequivocal positions regarding controversial issues of the time, such as the Taiping Rebellion, political reform and the Qing Government's relationship with Western powers.³⁵

The marked success of the *Universal Circulating Herald* achieved not only wide

³² Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:486.

³³ Toh Lam Seng by comparing *Universal Circulating Herald* with other newspapers found by Chinese at the same period analysed and expounded the special importance and special influence of the paper. For more details, see Toh, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi*, 179-80.

³⁴ Natascha Gentz, "Useful Knowledge and Appropriate Communication: The Field of Journalistic Production in Late Nineteenth Century China," in *Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870-1910*, ed. Rudolf G. Wagner (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 56.

³⁵ Toh, *Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi*, 195-200.

recognition for the newspaper, but also for Wang Tao himself who was highly regarded for his special contribution to the development of modern Chinese journalism, and has been referred to as the father of Chinese journalists.³⁶ The most basic reason for the success of the *Universal Circulating Herald*, would undoubtedly be attributed to its place of publication. Chinese scholars recognise that Hong Kong, as it existed under the British administration, with the rule of the Qing Government no longer implemented, provided a relatively free space for Chinese to run the press.³⁷ Such freedom also existed in Shanghai. Both the International Settlement and the French Concession had been de facto independent states representing different interest groups since the 1860s:

Qing officials were indeed familiar with concepts of extraterritoriality when they negotiated treaties with the West and created institutions to deal with the ensuing problems. Once it was clear to the Qing authorities that they had to grant extraterritorial privileges to the foreign powers, they did it in a way with which they were familiar. [...] there are clear traces of Qing legal thinking in the Chinese texts of the treaties and other legal documents, most important of which is a preference for reciprocity and joint consultation in mixed [legal] cases. Although the Qing authorities were familiar with the problems of granting extraterritorial privileges, they could not have predicted subsequent developments. In the final analysis, it was not the treaties as such that made them unequal, but the unequal power relationship that supported them.³⁸

This situation was the result of a range of political manoeuvrings amongst each interested power after the first Opium War eventuating in a relatively stable political structure.³⁹ Therefore, there was not any single country that could exercise its influence upon journalism activities in Shanghai.⁴⁰

Chinese intellectuals, represented by Kang Youwei and Lang Qichao, faced an unprecedented national crisis after the crushing defeat of the Qing Government in the war with Japan in 1895, so they proposed a range of significant reform in an attempt to strengthen the country. The Qing government, along with the court's reform-minded supporters attempted to respond to the massive civil unrest during a period known as the "Hundred Days' Reform" in 1898. The Imperial Court, under the Guangxu Emperor,

³⁶ Lin Yutang, *A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 79.

³⁷ Qin, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun*, 39-40.

³⁸ Cassel, "Excavating Extraterritoriality," 178.

³⁹ About the complex historical evolution of the foreign concessions in Shanghai, see Lu Hanchao, *Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 28-36.

⁴⁰ Mittler, *A Newspaper for China*, 3.

attempted major reforms to address deep community concerns and unrest by a number of wide-ranging reforms such as moving from absolute monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy and introducing manufacturing, commerce, and capitalism. During the Hundred Days Reform, reformers initially conceived that Beijing was the political pivot to realise change, and the focus of their press work was therefore in Beijing. However, negative conditions doomed their plan. Beijing, as the political centre of the Qing Government was not only home of the numerous powerful conservative bureaucrats, but was the strongest area of their rule. The hierarchy could effortlessly shatter the reformers' attempts, including their attempts at running the press. Newspapers founded by reformers only existed for about half a year, and were then closed down by the court. Reformers at this point began to feel obliged to move to Shanghai.⁴¹ In Shanghai, they ran the press with a greater degree of success by relying on the extraterritoriality of the foreign concession, the position of the city as the junction of the interchange between China and the outside world, and the support from pro-reform officials. The influence of their newspapers was not limited to Shanghai, but spread towards the surrounding areas and even abroad.⁴²

As the movement strongly challenged conservative Manchu nobilities and bureaucrats of the Qing Government, reforms ultimately failed after an opportunist coup d'état was staged by the conservatives, army commander Yuan Shikai and Empress Dowager Cixi. However, the experiences within the Hundred Days Reform ultimately strengthened Shanghai as the home of professional journalism within China. For example, some years later (in 1905) the famous Chinese journalist, scholar and reformist Liang Qichao, who was a central figure in the Hundred Days Reform, worked with Di Baoxian to establish a newspaper in the Shanghai foreign settlements on the instruction of Kang Youwei. The paper they established, *Shibao*, was what Liang called a factional newspaper or *dangbao*. According to Judge, Liang only started to think this way about newspapers after being exiled to Japan.⁴³ Before this time, Liang had published two essays on newspapers, one of these anonymously. At first, he argued for newspapers as the 'eyes ears and mouthpiece of society'. In his essay in 1896, however, he argued that papers should

⁴¹ Qin, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun*, 39-40.

⁴² Qin, *Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun*, 40-44.

⁴³ Joan Judge, "The Factional Function of Print: Liang Qichao, *Shibao*, and the Fissures in the late Qing Reform Movement," *Late Imperial China* 16, no. 1 (June 1995): 121.

work towards national strengthening and popular enlightenment. Judge argues that it was only after he was forced to flee to Japan that he started to think about newspapers as a tool of political struggle against the dynasty from without. It was in his essay “A Warning to my Colleagues” in 1902 that he said that newspapers should warn against abuses by the government and act as a watchdog. Liang’s writings on journalism served the needs of Chinese intellectuals in their pursuit of national modernisation. This journalism ideal became dominant.⁴⁴

Liang Qichao’s position as one of the key figures in the development of new journalism at the end of the 19th century has been questioned by Vittinghoff.⁴⁵ She argues that earlier assessments of Liang as the most influential journalist were inaccurate as they did not take into account the evidence but rather relied on Liang’s own assessments. For Vittinghoff, the changes in the press market during the Reform Movement of 1898 came about because of broad political changes as well as changes in journalism itself. Crucial to these changes was the growing tension between the press and the government.

At the end of the 19th century, the press can be thought of as being made up of groups focusing on three different types of society, says Vittinghoff. The reform press which began in the treaty ports then moved to the hinterland and this resulted in changes to how people thought about the role of the press in society and politics. The court began to consider laws governing the press and established a large scale governmental newspaper system.⁴⁶ In the commercial and private sphere, magazines, literary papers and newspapers aimed at political commentary were established. Shanghai was a key location. After the failure of the reforms of 1898, a ruling was issued which banned the private editing of newspapers. Journalists were also called the ‘dregs of the literary classes’ by the Empress Cixi.⁴⁷ In the last decade of the Qing government, there were many developments in the journalism sphere, with developments in layout, reporting and education. More and more people were reading papers.⁴⁸ Tabloid papers started

⁴⁴ Judge, “Factional Function of Print,” 122.

⁴⁵ Natascha Vittinghoff, “Unity vs. Uniformity: Liang Qichao and the Invention of a ‘New Journalism’ for China,” *Late Imperial China* 23, no. 1 (June 2002): 95.

⁴⁶ A clean line between government gazettes and private papers was not always able to be established. Thompson shows that government officials themselves could also establish gazettes. See Roger Thompson, “New-style Gazettes and Provincial Reports in Post-Boxer China: An Introduction and Assessment,” *Late Imperial China* 8, no. 2 (December 1987): 80-101.

⁴⁷ Vittinghoff, “Unity vs. Uniformity,” 92.

⁴⁸ Vittinghoff, “Unity vs. Uniformity,” 93.

publishing during this period. The first one, *Fun (youxibao)* was published in 1897 and a deluge of tabloids followed. Forty-one tabloids were published in Shanghai in the years between 1897 and 1911.⁴⁹

Journalists felt that they needed to defend the profession. It is in this context that Liang Qichao aimed to change the nature of journalism and the status of journalists. Liang thought that previous papers and editors were deserving of this insulting name but that a political journalism such as the approach he was taking would be more modern and progressive. Vittinghoff points out that the history of newspapers in China which dismisses 19th century newspapers as backward is a story developed by Liang Qichao and taken up by many others since. During the reform period, Liang Qichao called for newspapers to print information in the categories of world news, new government policy, and information on Sino-foreign policies.⁵⁰ However, during this time there were many discussions about the formation of journalist clubs and associations, even dating back to 1905.⁵¹ Despite the fact that none of these were able to be successfully realised, Vittinghoff argues that this era prepared the way for the political and professionalisation of journalism which occurred later.

After Empress Dowager Cixi's victory, Liang Qichao fled to Japan.⁵² Even this victory could not hold back political reform in China, with the monarchy attempting to strengthen its hold, quell rebellion and survive the economic and political humiliations of the unequal treaties meted out by the West and Japan, such as the Boxer Protocol by introducing strategic limited reforms such as the New Policies (also referred to as New Administration and Late Qing Reform). In the dying days of the Qing Government, Chinese intellectuals utilised the press - perhaps not so much as in a *new* way to participate in politics, but rather it was more of the case that they used the press in a more intense way to engage in the public expression of divergent political views. By doing so, intellectuals – both constitutional monarchists and republican – sought to construct a consultation mechanism to propel constitutional reform. The intellectuals

⁴⁹ Wang Juan, "Officialdom Unmasked: Shanghai Tabloid Press, 1897 – 1911," *Late Imperial China* 28, no. 2 (December 2007): 85-86.

⁵⁰ Thompson, "New-Style Gazettes," 80.

⁵¹ Vittinghoff, "Unity vs. Uniformity," 128.

⁵² After leaving Japan, Liang visited the United States, Canada and Australia to raise support for a campaign to modernise China. His visit to Australia coincided with Australia's Federation and he met the first Prime Minister of Australia, Edmund Barton.

used this press to identify themselves as an intermediary channel for the communication between the ruling class and the grassroots people. This was an essential step for the later revolution for republic reform in China: its influence on, and beyond, Chinese journalism was far reaching. It gave impetus to the formation of a new space in China for expressing ideas, which later bolstered the demand for journalism to exist as an independent profession with its own rules and standards. In addition, it represented a space where journalistic activities became subordinate to politics. The constitutional monarchists used this press to lobby for reforms to follow a British model, while the republicans used the press to lobby for reforms to follow a French model.

The *Subao* Case of Shanghai in 1903 demonstrates the key role Shanghai played in setting the scene for the later development of the professionalisation of journalism within China. The case is fundamental to an analysis of the complexity of the jurisprudential arrangements of extraterritoriality (for further information, see *The Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China*, Peking, September 16, 1926, *Being the report to the governments of the commission appointed in pursuant to Resolution V of the Conference on the Limitation Armaments, together with a brief summary thereof*. Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, Washington, Government Print Office, 1926). The newspaper, *Subao*, published articles that were anti-Qing and pro-revolutionary in nature, which irritated the Qing government. The Qing government desired to arrest the relevant people but, as the paper was based within the International Settlement of Shanghai, the Qing government had to negotiate with the settlement administration regarding the case. The Qing Government was at a disadvantage in competing with the Shanghai International Settlement for dominance in deciding the outcome of the *Subao* Case and finally had to accept the British style legal process due to the tough stand made by the Shanghai settlement administration:

In 1903, two Chinese nationalists, Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong, had published a number of articles in the journal *Subao*, in which they reviled the Guangxu Emperor and called for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. According to the treaties, their case was subject to Qing jurisdiction and under the Qing code the two could be tried for *lèse-majesté*, a crime punishable by death by slow slicing (*lingchi*). However, the two activists were in the custody of the foreign controlled police force of the International Settlement and they were able to use the publicity of the case in order to avoid extradition to Qing authorities. The case had important diplomatic repercussions and it was even debated in the House of Commons. In the end it became politically impossible for the authorities in the International Settlement to extradite Zhang and Zou to

a certain death, and the Mixed Court sentenced them to a quite light prison sentence and expulsion from the International Settlement. The case had important implications since it established foreign jurisdiction in political cases that had little or nothing to do with the interests of the foreign community.⁵³

The Qing government retained a British lawyer for the trial and mobilised its diplomatic resources. In the face of substantial pressure on the part of the Qing government, the British administration compromised with the Qing government to some degree. The Qing government did not show unquestionable proof that the main people accused, Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong, did in fact engage in subverting the government. Arguably, both should have been released yet they received sentences of three and two year's imprisonment respectively. The Qing government expected to extradite the pair or force the International Settlement court to hand down very heavy sentences but the relatively lighter sentences given shows there was a large gap between the result sought by the Qing government and the final legal judgement.⁵⁴

The *Subao* Case demonstrated the power, albeit far from complete, that the Western powers had within the foreign concessions and treaty ports to protect press freedom. As a result, during 1902 and 1903, such papers began to diffuse into surrounding regions such Shantou, Guangzhou and the rural areas of Shanghai:

Indeed the tragedy of the unequal treaties was not that the Qing Empire was inadequately prepared for the (re-)introduction of extraterritoriality, but that the policy makers of the Empire were too familiar with the concept to understand what acceptance of the treaties would imply for the future of their dynasty.⁵⁵

The first batch of newspapers with revolutionary leanings to come out in some hinterland cities, such as Changsha and Chongqing, began to print in 1904. Unfortunately, these areas, being outside the foreign concessions, were under the control of the Qing Government, which resulted in these newspapers being promptly banned.⁵⁶ A brief civil war ended with a political compromise between the military commander who had thwarted the Hundred Days' Reform, Yuan Shikai, and Tongmenghui (United League)

⁵³ Cassell, "Excavating Extraterritoriality," 176-77.


⁵⁴ For more details about the process of the *Subao* Case, see Wang Min, *Subao An Yanjiu* [A Study on *Subao* Case] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2010), 12-93.

⁵⁵ Cassell, "Excavating Extraterritoriality," 180.

⁵⁶ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 1:742.

leader, Sun Yat-sen. So, on December 29 1911, Sun Yat-sen was elected as the first provisional president of the Republic of China. During late 1911 and early 1912, a series of complicated accommodations were negotiated around the role of the Emperor and the limits of his power, including interventions and lobbying by foreign powers and leading political and military figures. Finally Sun Yat-sen agreed to a deal whereby he ceded the presidency to Yuan Shikai in exchange for the abdication of the Emperor, and with it, the end to the Chinese monarchy on 12 February 1912. Sent to cover the Boxer Rebellion and remaining to report on the Chinese Rebellion, American journalist, Thomas Millard decided to set up an American newspaper to rival the British colonial *North China Daily News*. His paper, *China Press* (Ta Lu Pao) was established in the first week of the Chinese Republic and was part funded by Sun Yat-sen. Born in Missouri and educated at the University of Missouri, Millard was in close contact with Missouri journalists, and turned to Walter Williams, dean of the newly established Missouri School of journalism, for support.

Figure 3: Extension of the foreign concession in Shanghai 1846-1914⁵⁷



Missouri School of Journalism

On 14 November 1908, the death of the Guangxu Emperor was formally announced to

⁵⁷ Bickers, "Shanghaianders," 173.

the public. On the next day, the Empress Dowager Cixi, the most powerful woman who had dominated China for nearly half a century, passed away as well. They left Puyi, the heir to the throne who was less than 3 years old, a great empire which had been tottering and would soon collapse. Outside the high walls of the Forbidden City, royalists, represented by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and revolutionaries, led by Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Hanmin, through the use of their newspapers, were engaging in heated debate.⁵⁸ This debate was the continuation of the deep political division since the late 19th century within the circles of Chinese political elites and intellectuals on whether to take the path of moderate reform under the pre-condition of retaining the monarchy or that of radical revolution to establish a new republic system in the future of China.

When the contents of the Chinese press was glutted with politics and partisan struggling as the core subjects, journalism on the other side of the Pacific Ocean was experiencing a significant and watershed transformation. This transformation, with a tottering beginning late in the nineteenth century in the form of educational efforts by press associations, evolved into a professionalised modern mass media and climaxed with the creation of journalism as a professionalised vocation requiring formalised journalistic training at university level.⁵⁹

The Missouri School of Journalism was established in 1908 for the purpose of promoting professional education for journalism.⁶⁰ This was a milestone in both the development and continuity of professionalism in American journalism history, which can be traced back to the highly successful commercialisation of the press in the 1830s. As Thomas F. Remington states:

The Western ideal of journalistic objectivity, influenced by liberal principles of the ruler's accountability to the ruled and the empirical scepticism of science, developed as an occupational response by journalists to marketplace competition among commercially or politically motivated suppliers of information and came to define the

⁵⁸ Lin, *The Press and Public Opinion*, 103.

⁵⁹ Betty Houchin Winfield, "Emerging Professionalism and Modernity," In *Journalism 1908: Birth of a Profession*, ed. Betty Houchin Winfield (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 1.

⁶⁰ Sara Lockwood Williams, *Twenty Years of Education for Journalism: A History of the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, U.S.A.* (Columbia, Missouri: The E. W. Stephens Publishing Company, 1929), 6.

journalist's professional ethic of impartiality and independence.⁶¹

'Objectivity' emerged and was crystallised in American journalism with the value of struggling against the press to be controlled and dominated by political parties.⁶² Objective reporting initially developed based on the commercialisation of American journalism, and subsequently this idea became an important component in the ideology and practical guide of professional journalism.⁶³ Objectivity, in the educational ideals of the Missouri School of Journalism, is reflected as journalists' independent position and reporting the truth by heart.⁶⁴

On 3 September 1833, Benjamin H. Day published a new paper, *The Sun*, in New York, which is regarded as the beginning of a new epoch in journalism. The newspaper achieved remarkable success due to its affordability and outstanding skills in writing 'human-interest' news that attracted a wide audience and resulted in substantial profits from advertisement.⁶⁵ The penny press, represented by *The Sun* in the 1830s, challenged the dominance of party papers in the United States, having a far-reaching influence on the professionalisation of journalism. As an example of this professionalisation, before the penny press, nearly all works of a newspaper, such as printing, advertisement, interview and editing, were arranged by one person. With the penny press, the first specialist reporters were employed.⁶⁶

The Penny Press revolution, attributed to the expansion of democracy and the market, brought about a victory of news and facts that overrode editorial and more subjective opinion, and finally promoted the adoption of objectivity as a key journalistic value.⁶⁷ The boom of the Penny Press formed the basis of journalism as a profession. Prevailing conditions led to a consensus that journalism should be further improved through

⁶¹ Thomas F. Remington, "Politics and Professionalism in Soviet Journalism," *Slavic Review* 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 1985): 489.

⁶² Michael Schudson, "The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism," *Journalism* 2, no. 2 (August 2001): 149-50.

⁶³ James W. Carey, "The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator," *The Sociological Review* 13, no. s1 (May 1965): 23-24.

⁶⁴ Ronald T. Farrar, *A Creed for My Profession: Walter Williams, Journalist to the World* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press), 203.

⁶⁵ Michael Emery, Edwin Emery and Nancy L. Roberts, *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, 9th ed. (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 99-100.

⁶⁶ Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 65-69.

⁶⁷ Schudson, *Discovering the News*, 14.

education, with the establishment of the Missouri School of Journalism by Walter Williams being praised as an academic training solution with wisdom and foresight.⁶⁸ Although chairs in journalism had been housed before 1908 at some American universities, such as Cornell, Pennsylvania and Kansas, they solely recognised professorships in journalism studies, and did not significantly contribute to professional journalism studies and training on campus.⁶⁹ The real beginning of professional journalism education started in the Missouri School of Journalism. Thus, Albert Ross Hill as the president of the school proudly demonstrated:

The University of Missouri is the first in America to establish and organise a School of Journalism. I believe it is possible for this School to give dignity to the profession of journalism, to anticipate to some extent the difficulties that journalism must meet and to prepare its graduates to overcome them; to give prospective journalists a professional spirit and high ideals of service; to discover those with real talent for the work in the profession, and to discourage those who are likely to prove failures in the profession, and to give the State better newspapers and a better citizenship.⁷⁰

The Missouri School of Journalism contributed to the journalism education style of placing emphasis on training students' professional skills. Walter Williams believed that a school of journalism should, much like the schools of law, medicine and agriculture, train their students with practical skills in scientific experimental research techniques. He spoke to the state convention:

The School of Journalism, as established by the board of curators of the University of Missouri, is a distinct advance in education. It seeks to do for journalism what schools of law, medicine, agriculture, engineering and normal schools have done for these vocations. A half century ago there were no law schools worthy the name, thirty years ago there were no modern medical schools. Schools of engineering and of agriculture and schools and colleges for the training of teachers are of even later development. Previous to the existence of these schools training in law, medicine, agriculture, et cetera, was obtainable only in the lawyer's office, the doctor's office, on the farm, or, of a teacher, in the school room practicing upon the pupils. With the increase of demands upon the time and thought of professional men, it has been supplemented by actual practical work. In medicine the hospital gives bedside instruction, in teachers' college the model school affords demonstration, in the law school the practice court, in agriculture the farm and the experiment

⁶⁸ Betty Houchin Winfield, "1908: The Aftermath," in *Journalism 1908: Birth of a Profession*, ed. Betty Houchin Winfield (Missouri, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 317.

⁶⁹ Ronald T. Farrar, *A Creed for My Profession: Walter Williams, Journalist to the World* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 132.

⁷⁰ Williams, *Twenty Years Education Journalism*, 25.

station. All these are directed by experienced men and in these doing is learned by doing. The Missouri University School of Journalism is to be conducted upon this plan.⁷¹

Implementing this ideal, Williams fought opposition and provided a real sense of commercial journalism through the use of the newspaper, the *Daily Missourian*, as the laboratory for his students.⁷² The aim was to provide training in professional skills based on the commercial mode of the press as a public service. In 1904, Williams put forward ‘The Journalist’s Creed’ based on his ideals and belief regarding a public service model of journalism that according to him was morally bound to strive to be fundamentally disinterested. In the creed he emphasised his strong belief that the profession of journalism had as its core responsibility to uphold and protect the public interest – in other words, he exhorted his students to take on the sacred trust of disinterested public service.⁷³

The Journalist's Creed

I believe in the profession of journalism.

I believe that the public journal is a public trust; that all connected with it are, to the full measure of their responsibility, trustees for the public; that acceptance of a lesser service than the public service is betrayal of this trust.

I believe that clear thinking and clear statement, accuracy and fairness are fundamental to good journalism.

I believe that a journalist should write only what he holds in his heart to be true.

I believe that suppression of the news, for any consideration other than the welfare of society, is indefensible.

I believe that no one should write as a journalist what he would not say as a gentleman; that bribery by one’s own pocketbook is as much to be avoided as bribery by the pocketbook of another; that individual responsibility may not be escaped by pleading another’s instructions or another’s dividends.

I believe that advertising, news and editorial columns should alike serve the best interests of readers; that a single standard of helpful truth and cleanness should prevail for all; that the supreme test of good journalism is the measure of its public service.

I believe that the journalism which succeeds best — and best deserves success — fears God and honors Man; is stoutly independent, unmoved by pride of opinion or greed of power, constructive, tolerant but never

⁷¹ Williams, *Twenty Years Education Journalism*, 412.

⁷² Farrar, *Creed for my Profession*, 145-47; The *Daily Missourian* is the predecessor of the *Columbia Missourian*, which is a daily morning newspaper published by the Missouri School of Journalism in the city of Columbia.

⁷³ Farrar, *Creed for my Profession*, 202-03.

careless, self-controlled, patient, always respectful of its readers but always unafraid, is quickly indignant at injustice; is unswayed by the appeal of privilege or the clamor of the mob; seeks to give every man a chance and, as far as law and honest wage and recognition of human brotherhood can make it so, an equal chance; is profoundly patriotic while sincerely promoting international good will and cementing world-comradeship; is a journalism of humanity, of and for today's world.

Henry J. Haskell, editor of the *Kansas City Star*, praised Williams' contribution to training the next generation of professional journalists and inspiring them with ideals of an active engagement with public service. As he said:

[...] his (Williams') great contribution in sending out into the world young men and women trained in his ideals, inspired by his spirit of disinterested public service. No one could come in contact with Dean Williams without being permanently enriched from that abounding personality.⁷⁴

Public service was, indeed, a core value of journalistic professionalism as it originated in the Missouri School of Journalism. The key values of journalism today, central to its professionalisation, came from those identified in the Missouri School Creed, which were keeping public trust and public service, clarity, accuracy, fairness, truthfulness, no suppression of the news (except for public welfare), independence, serving the readers' interests, egalitarian, constructive, tolerant, self-controlled, patient, fearless, patriotic and promoting of international good will.

The history of journalism history and its principles were established as the most fundamental and crucial subjects that students completed in the Missouri School syllabus as designed by Williams. His aim was to present the objectives and principles of journalism by providing an understanding of history.⁷⁵ Up to the early twentieth century in the United States, journalism history had been a well-established specialisation in journalism studies aimed at providing professional orientation as it effectively filled in the gap between practical skills and relevant theories and regulations. Journalism school students could learn both positive and negative role models through

⁷⁴ *Kansas City Star*, 30 July 1935, cited in Farrar, *Creed for my Profession*, 167.

⁷⁵ Farrar, *Creed for my Profession*, 141.

historical examples based on the theories and principles for journalism staff. A core issue of journalism studies was the improvement of the profession. This included the process of the freedom achieved by the press from censorship, partisan influence and government control. Historical narratives were used to understand and elaborate on both practical developments and social understanding.⁷⁶

In the 1920s when the Chinese press was propelled towards professionalism, the prologue of research on Chinese journalism history unfolded. Published in New York in May 1924, *The Rise of the Chinese Native Press* by Y.P. Wang is recognised as the first scholarly work on Chinese journalism history. This represented application of the Missouri School's principles of valuing the study of journalism history – Y. P. Wang himself was a former Chinese student at the Missouri School. Unfortunately, the *Rise of the Chinese Native Press* had limited circulation, in large part because it was written in English, rather than Chinese which was more widely used by scholars of China. Within the next few years, other scholarly works were published that were more successful in terms of the diversity of primary sources and the completeness of structure, such as *A History of the Chinese Press* by Ge Gongzhen and by Roswell Sessoms Britton.⁷⁷

With a major part of the Journalists' creed being the promotion of international good will, Walter Williams actively advocated international exchange, and his approach transformed the Missouri School of Journalism into an important vehicle for transmitting American journalism ideologies into Asia. While Millard's overture to Williams was seen as the beginning of the importance of the Missouri School in China, in fact, the Missouri School's first student intake included Wong Hin (Huang Xianzhao), the first Chinese student (who went on to work for *Millard's Weekly Review* and later was a Missouri School Director). Hollington Tong (who became a prominent journalist and politician and was a key figure in the *Shanghai and Evening Post's* relocation to Chongqing) soon followed. From 1917, the Missouri School of Journalism became directly involved in journalism education within China itself. Walter Williams visited China five times, sparing no effort to introduce the ideals of Missouri. His efforts yielded

⁷⁶ John Nerone, "Does Journalism History Matter?," *American Journalism* 28, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 9-11.

⁷⁷ For more details about the recollection of Wang Y. P. and reviews on the *Rise of the Chinese Native Press*, see Ning Shufan, "Huainian Wang Yingbin Jiaoshou: Jianlun Tade Zhongguo Baokan De Xingqi [Reminisce Professor Wang Y. P. and Review his Book 'The Rise of the Native Press in China']," *Xinwen Daxue* 1997, no. 1: 63-65.

substantial results through collaboration between the Missouri School of Journalism and the Chinese press. The Journalism department of St. John's University in Shanghai and Yenching University (with the Missouri School founding student Huang Xianzhao later serving as the Director) in Peiping were set up with reference to the Missouri syllabus and teaching system. In addition, the Missouri School established a five-year programme for exchange for students and academic staff with Yenching University.⁷⁸

Graduates of Missouri were central figures in Chinese journalism. Don D. Patterson, Maurice E. Votaw and Vernon Nash, three early graduates of the school, became the directors of journalism departments at St. John's University and Yenching University.⁷⁹ As the first international student of the Missouri School of Journalism, Wong Hin took charge of the journalism department of the Yenching University. As mentioned, Thomas Millard was a famous Alumni. Along with John Powell he established and managed the *Millard's Review of the Far East*, which later became the well-known *China Weekly Review*.⁸⁰ Hollington Tong obtained his bachelor degree from Missouri – as mentioned, as a founding student – and later held the critical position of a specialist administrator, taking charge of journalism and publicity in the Nationalist Government of China. Tong became pivotal in the leadership of propaganda to Western countries during the War of Resistance against Japan.⁸¹ The list of people who graduated from Missouri and were active in the Chinese press during the Republic period also included Samuel Chang, Carl Crow and Woo Kyatang, all of whom later made a great contribution to the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.

Chinese social conditions for developing Chinese professional journalism made adoption of the American journalism education, in particular the Missouri model, very attractive. Chinese journalism in the early 20th century marks the beginning of the move towards the American model, with American standards being widely used in Chinese universities for journalism education. This move towards the American model broke the

⁷⁸ Lo Ven-hwei, "Misuli Daxue Xinwen Xueyuan Dui Zhonghua Minguo Xinwen Jiaoyu ji Xinwen Shiye De Yingxiang [Influence by the Missouri School of Journalism to the Press and Journalism Education of the Republic of China]," *Xinwenxue Yanjiu*, no. 41 (April 1989): 201-04; Wu Zhiyong and Li You, "Misuli Daxue Xinwen Xueyuan De Jiaoyu Linian yu Jiaoxue Moshi [Educational Ideals and Teaching System of the Missouri School of Journalism]," *Xinwen Daxue* 2009, no. 4: 13.

⁷⁹ Farrar, *Creed for my Profession*, 167.

⁸⁰ Lo, "Misuli Daxue Zhonghua Minguo," 201-04; Wu and Li, "Misuli Daxue Jiaoyu Linian," 13.

⁸¹ Wei Shuge, "News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Formation of the Guomindang Centralised Foreign Propaganda System, 1937-1938," *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (May 2014): 123-25.

dominant position of the long-term British influence on the press in China. The American journalism educational model was highly regarded in China, as it met the needs of the unique environment that existed in China at that time. Chinese reformists, with ideals of emancipating China from a semi-colonial fate, needed to establish socially responsible media. At the same time, the New Culture Movement, in which democracy and science were advocated, provided an advantageous social atmosphere to adopt Western journalism values and systems. With its emphasis on journalism education, the Missouri system was consistent with reformists' ideals of nation building and cultural transformation.⁸²

The New Culture Movement of the 1910s and 1920s was a social movement triggered by academics' rejection of classical education for the creation of a new Chinese culture with western standards, especially democracy and science. At this time, the Chinese language was modernised and democratic and egalitarian values, such as feminism, were advocated, leading up to the May Fourth Movement – a political movement. The term, 'profession' itself, originated in this period in accordance with Sun Huei-min's textual criticism. Introduced into China from the Japanese language, Yoneda Shōtarō, in a range of articles published from April to March of 1919 in the *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, defined professionals as modern intellectuals, and further divided professionals into two classes: independent professionals, and those relying on a salary from government and public organisations or private businesses. These articles were soon after translated into Chinese. Subsequently, 'profession' became a term in Chinese language and began to be widely adopted. However, there was no definite or stable semantic boundary to define the term at that time, and as a result, people used it according to their own subjective definition.⁸³ In early 1931, journalists, lawyers, doctors and accountants were collectively formally recognised as "professional" entities in the Implementation Regulations of the Election Laws for National Conference Representatives, and this was deemed the end of a chaotic understanding of the

⁸² Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, "American Pragmatism and Chinese Modernisation: Importing the Missouri Model of Journalism Education to Modern China," *Media Culture & Society* 31, no. 5 (2009): 725-26.

⁸³ Sun Huei-min, *Zhidu Yizhi: Minchu Shanghai De Zhongguo Lvshi (1912-1928)* [Institutional Transplantation: The Chinese Lawyers in Republican Shanghai (1912-1937)] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), 15-16.

definition of ‘profession’ since it was introduced in China.⁸⁴

The ability of China to adapt the American journalism education was generated as a result of balancing different colonial powers’ forces in China. The American neo-colonial ideology of upholding democratic values and open-door policy was a critical factor contributing to the popularisation of its journalism ideology in China.⁸⁵ However, the Americans’ intentions to spread their journalism ideologies clashed with Chinese vigilance. Timothy Weston characterises the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, ranging from the late 1910s to the early 1920s, as a transnational movement of journalism reform, in which the United States, by means of power imbalances in the international environment that gave it political and economic advantage and cultural confidence, exported its professional journalism ideologies into China. Examining the Press Congress of 1921 in Hawaii, Weston criticises Westerners who utilised their superior position to overwhelmingly influence Chinese journalists. He believed that the congress made Chinese journalists feel that American journalistic norms were being imposed with Western arrogance. Weston argues that this exerted a certain negative influence on the willingness of Chinese to adopt Western journalistic values.⁸⁶

There are some similarities for the emergence of journalism objectivity in the United States and China. As has been mentioned in the thesis, newspapers were treated as political tools in the late 19th century and performed a very important role in the process of fermenting the Revolution of 1911 which finally terminated the Qing Empire. After experiencing the role playing for a political mouthpiece from the end of the 19th century to the early 20th century, commercial newspapers realised growth up to the 1920s. Although this trend remained in conflict with journalism intellectuals’ ideals, the commercialisation of newspaper at that time, as Weston argues, at least gave rise to the press becoming more independent and less reliant on political parties.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Xu Baohuang published the first Chinese language textbook on journalism, firstly proposing the concept of objectivity in China.⁸⁸ Although the norm of objectivity that Xu proposed

⁸⁴ Sun, *Zhidu Yizhi*, 17-18.

⁸⁵ Volz and Lee, “American Pragmatism,” 726.

⁸⁶ Timothy B. Weston, “China, Professional Journalism, and Liberal Internationalism in the Era of the First World War,” *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 2 (June 2010): 346-47.

⁸⁷ Timothy B. Weston, “Minding the Newspaper Business: The Theory and Practice of Journalism in 1920s China,” *Twentieth-Century China* 31, no. 2 (2006): 31.

⁸⁸ Steven Maras and Joyce Y. M. Nip, “The Travelling Objectivity Norm” *Journalism Studies* 16, no. 3 (2015): 327.

is with the element of impartiality, reporting truth and separation of news reporting and editorial, objectivity is not treated as a professional ideal. Thus it does not fall short of American scholars' standards, it at least made a contribution to building a set of rules related to objectivity for shaping both journalistic definition and practice, thus people can imagine how the norm of objectivity can work.⁸⁹

However, at the same time a younger generation of intellectuals who were deeply influenced by the Russian Revolution and the May Fourth Movement – which came out of the New Culture Movement and was triggered by the loss of the German treaty ports to the Japanese – began to support Marxism-Leninism. They adopted a revolutionary agenda to mobilise workers and peasants against the failed Chinese State. This blossoming of the Chinese intelligentsia, in large part, can be traced back to the Hundred Days' Reform, especially the central planks of the move from Imperial examinations, the rejection of Confucian education and the adoption of a modern western-style education system.

With this social and political background, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in 1921 by intellectuals who identified with Communist ideas. One of the CCP's major power-bases was – unsurprisingly – the French Concessions of Shanghai. The newly established republican regime to a certain degree became a new but weak mainstay for Chinese journalism, and the Chinese pattern that heavily relied on the balance between nationalism and semi-colonialism did not change fundamentally. The republican administration established after the Revolution of 1911 was, to a certain degree, helpful in forging a favourable social context for a boom in journalism, but it was limited by the failure to develop a robust republican political system. Political realities were still not able to completely meet the basic requirements for the flourishing of the free press and professionalism.

An interesting paradox emerged – journalism was introduced to China with the attempts of Western powers to colonise (or convert) the Middle Kingdom. Colonialist activities within China clearly stimulated nationalism, as demonstrated by the May Fourth movement. Nationalism was a main driving power of anti-colonialism by upholding the

⁸⁹ Maras and Nip, "The Travelling Objectivity Norm," 337.

cause of national independence and self-reliance. However, at the same time that anti-colonialism was stimulating nationalism, semi-colonialism helped to form modern Chinese urban culture, the rising middle classes and the intelligentsia, as people became exposed to, and to a certain degree came to accept Western culture, ways of life and even political ideology. In China's urban culture, one can see the conflict created by colonialism and the benefits that came from it working together as a major force in the modernisation of Chinese journalism. In Shanghai, one can also measure to some degree the limits of this fulcrum of cultural exchange, which seems to have often been almost entirely one-sided:

Shanghailanders defined their identity against a range of others - Britons at home, China hands, their neighbours the French, missionaries - but in the broadest possible sense the Shanghaider position, like the British position in China generally, was underpinned by prevailing notions of 'Orientals', and Chinese, as 'racially' different, and 'racially' unequal. These ideas were widely believed and propagated, and there was a large literature on such topics which sold well and was widely respected. In print, bar talk, letters and books, Britons exchanged their experiences and prejudices about the Chinese 'mind', Chinese society, politics, culture and government. And when the Chinese were not different and inferior, they were different and exotic.⁹⁰

Given the geographically, politically and ideologically divided nature of the Republican Government, it is unsurprising that journalism history in this period contained many contradictions and biased narratives. Research based on Northern experiences, led by Tseng Hsü-pei, summed up journalism in this period as being dominated by warlords in the northern areas of China, which devastated local public freedom of expression and the development of the development. By contrast, journalism in the south – specifically Shanghai – saw multitudinous newspapers published, strengthened by the protection offered by extraterritoriality. That said, authorities of the International Settlement and the French Concession were planning to enforce laws and regulations to restrain freedom of speech because they feared newspapers with unfettered freedom would again lead to the formation of anti-imperialist social movements.⁹¹ The inherently different perspectives and interpretations of the North and South is exemplified by Kao Yu-ya's exploration of the attitudes towards the Northern Expedition of two Northern Chinese newspapers, *Ta Kun Pao* and *Chenbao*. Kao Yu-ya used the reporting in these papers to

⁹⁰ Bickers, "Shanghailanders," 184-85.

⁹¹ Tseng, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shi*, 317.

establish that public opinion expressed in North China challenged the existing common understanding of the Northern Expedition, basing her critique on the view that Southern-based analysis omitted to consider the stand in northern areas of China, but instead viewed it solely from a southern perspective.⁹²

It can be argued that the development of Chinese journalism during the Beiyang period (1912-1927) marked the fastest and the most dynamic progress and the least restrained environment for journalism in China even though it reached the peak of its historical development during the following Nanjing Decade. The press of the Beiyang period, with the background of weak central governance, attained a new height unparalleled in both its development of diversity and integrity. More importantly, journalists in this period had a more profound understanding and insight into the profession in which they were engaged.⁹³ The period saw the upsurge of private newspapers, the persecution of progressive journalists and papers by the Beiyang Government, the continuity of the influence of imperialism in Chinese journalism, and the development of radio, photography, film and education.⁹⁴ In 1927, *Zhongguo Baoxueshi* (*A History of Chinese Newspapers*), written by Ge Gongzhen, was published in Shanghai. This is the first Chinese academic monograph on Chinese journalism history. In the following year, the Central Broadcasting System as the official radio station of the Nationalist Party was established in Nanjing with the call sign of XKM.

Shanghai professionals and their associations were fundamentally different from groups and guilds that arose before the Republic, in part due to their existence as part of the new, burgeoning middle class that had not existed before reforms such as the Hundred Days Reform, and in part because they reflected the urbanisation that occurred in the treaty ports and foreign concessions. It is possible to view journalism's progress towards professionalisation and its exponents' transition from traditional Chinese literati to professional journalists as a process whereby Chinese elites moved from passively engaging in the press, mostly just for survival, to being actively involved in this

⁹² Kao Yu-ya, *Beifang Baozhi Yulun Dui Beifazhi Fanying: Yi Tianjin Dagongbao, Beijing Chenbaowei Daibiao De Taolun* [Reflection of Newspapers in North China towards the North Expedition: An Examination based on the Case of the *Ta Kung Pao* of Tianjin and *Chenbao* of Beijing] (Taipei: Student Book Co., Ltd, 1998), 270.

⁹³ Wang Runze, *Beiyang Zhengfu Shiqi De Xinwenye Jiqi Xiandaihua (1916-1928)* [Journalism Development and Modernity in the Period of the Beiyang Government: 1916-1928] (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2010), 369-70.

⁹⁴ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi*, 2:121-22.

profession for the purpose of realising their specific aims in journalism.⁹⁵ This transition can be divided into three stages:

- (i) initially adopting the press as a tool for resisting Western aggression;
- (ii) being the political parties' mouthpiece around the time of the Revolution of 1911;
- (iii) finally adopting Western professionalism in the 1920s.

Professionalisation of Chinese Journalism: Previous Scholarship

Research on professionalisation in modern China is derived from, and has benefitted from, Western sociological studies. Xu Xiaoqun rates the *process* model for understanding professionalisation as a great progress on the *attribute* model, whereby professionalism is imbued with some static properties, such as professional knowledge, moral ethics and self-governance realised by relevant standards for access into the profession. While the process model incorporates the *attribute* model, it constitutes theoretical progress to the degree that it conceives of professionalisation as a dynamic historical process, rather than just a series of static attributes. Furthermore, Xu also points out a limitation of the process model. Based on recent research on professionalisation in Continental Europe, he found the *process* model was too narrowly based on the Anglo-American experience, which was an impediment to a more precise comprehension of the professionalisation process as it had played out in other countries. Therefore, he refined the model so that its concepts could more readily account for the specificities of the professionalisation of journalism in Chinese cases through the examination of the interaction between professionals and the state during the Republic period.⁹⁶ As one of numerous professions Xu discussed, the professionalisation of journalism in the republic period of China was concisely generalised as journalists in the process of transition from traditional literati to modern professionals actively engaged in forming the identity of their profession, which included successive demands for freedom of the press and public expression.⁹⁷

Since the 1920s, a group of founders of Chinese journalism studies sprang up, such as Xu Baohuang, Ren Baitao, Huang Tianpeng and Zhang Jinglu, with the publication of

⁹⁵ Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1996), 2:121-22

⁹⁶ Xu Xiaoqun, *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9-12.

⁹⁷ Xu, *Chinese Professionals*, 161-62.

their monographs on journalism studies. In the monographs, journalism theories, practical skills and the division of staff based on specialisation, and moral principles were expounded and discussed with much detail referring to the examples of journalism in Britain, France and America. In these monographs, ‘profession’ as a term had not been frequently used, especially in books published before 1930. However, details regarding the core values of professionalism ideals, to a certain degree, were widely discussed in these monographs.

Ren Baitao reviewed and compared the development of journalism in Britain, France and America, and this was the only instance in his book where he used the term ‘profession.’ He claimed that the French newspapers were not professional compared with the newspapers in Britain and America as, he argued, newspapers in France were too politicised, and were usually utilised as tools to express political opinions and assail political opponents.⁹⁸ It can be seen that ‘professional’ in Ren’s opinion meant that journalism and journalist should be independent from all partisanship. Zhang Jinglu proposed journalism as a profession, and specifically expounded the characteristics and values of the profession. He emphasised that the profession of the journalist required greater effort compared with other professions due to the fact that – in his opinion – a journalist had the heavy responsibility of fulfilling the onerous duties of faithful public service.⁹⁹ In fact, public service was commonly described in this batch of monographs.

Ren Baitao deemed the primary function of the journalist was as a public agent who served the interests of the majority, while maintaining a stance of independence, objectivity and unwavering faith to facts and the truth.¹⁰⁰ Xu Baohuang proposed that journalism should represent public opinions, thus journalists should speak for the majority, and not willingly become the mouthpieces of partisan views.¹⁰¹

Commercialisation of the press was another focus in these monographs. These authors supported commercialisation, but it had to be on the basis of respecting public interests. Xu Baohuang was active in publishing advertisements in newspapers. Referencing

⁹⁸ Ren Baitao, *Yingyong Xinwenxue* [Practical Journalism] (Shanghai: Yadong Library, 1937), 192-93.

⁹⁹ Zhang Jinglu, *Zhongguode Xinwenjizhe Yu Xinwenzhi* [Chinese Journalists and Newspapers] (Shanghai: Xiandai Shuju, 1932), 16-17.

¹⁰⁰ Ren, *Yingyong Xinwenxue*, 11.

¹⁰¹ Xu Baohuang, *Xinwenxue Gangyao* [Outline of Journalism] (Shanghai: Lianhe Shudian, 1930), 7-8.

American examples, he proposed that advertisements constituted ‘commercial’ news so long as they did not contain salacious and misleading information, and that they were welcomed by the public.¹⁰² Huang Tianpeng deemed that newspapers should be run and managed independently, and if the managers understood that newspapers should serve the public, then their newspapers would enjoy the support of the public. Thus, circulation would be enhanced and it would bring in more income from advertising.¹⁰³

Due to scholars’ consistent rethinking and exploration, knowledge of the context and the historical limitations of the professionalisation of journalism in China can both be expanded from various angles today. We have already seen that Natascha Vittinghoff’s recent research has nuanced our understanding by questioning long-held views concerning Liang Qichao’s role in the development of new journalism at the end of the 19th century.¹⁰⁴ Earlier assessments of his role have been found rather wanting in so far as they have not properly taken into account the bias inherent in Liang’s own (self)-assessments.

Stephen MacKinnon in accordance with his observation of journalism in 1930s China proposes that some new features catalysed by means of capital together with technological innovation had been emerging in the Chinese press, which was centred in Shanghai, and these innovations were spread nationwide. According to MacKinnon, the press up to the 1930s had realised a transformation from a heavy reliance on political patrons in the early 20th century to a commercial model with Chinese features: ownership, to a certain degree, was monopolised by oligarchs, and journalistic practice were inextricably bound up with Western peers. Under this development, he argued that the emergence of such elements as discussions around objectivity, professional division and the establishment of increasing numbers of journalism schools, symbolised that Western professionalism had been adopted in China.¹⁰⁵

Terry Narramore amplified the focus from the 1930s to a wider timeframe. By reviewing

¹⁰² Xu, *Xinwenxue Dagang*, 12.

¹⁰³ Huang Tianpeng, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye* [The Press in China] (Shanghai, Lianhe Shudian, 1930), 2.

¹⁰⁴ Natascha Vittinghoff, “Unity vs. Uniformity: Liang Qichao and the Invention of a ‘New Journalism’ for China,” *Late Imperial China* 23, no. 1 (June 2002): 95.

¹⁰⁵ Stephen R. MacKinnon, “Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period,” *Modern China* 23, no. 1 (January 1997): 7-8.

and examining the professionalisation of journalism from the establishment of the Republic regime to the outbreak of the war against Japan, a trajectory of professional journalism development in China was presented. In his opinion, journalists placed hopes on the professional ideals to offer them a peaceful space from the dangerous environment of factional fighting, but their practice encountered difficulties. Soon after Chinese newspapers stepped into commercialisation, professional journalists (as members embedded in the system of newspaper magnates) increasingly felt they were not able to avoid the constraints derived from the priorities of commercial profits. On the level of governance and control of journalism, more serious pressure rapidly followed the rise of the Nationalist Government and patriotism under the on-going Japanese threat and direct invasion.¹⁰⁶

Timothy Weston has further examined the emergence and development of commercialisation. He argues that though commercial dailies had existed in the Late Qing period, the New Culture Movement should be considered the watershed event of the commercialisation of the press. He does this without denigrating the contribution that earlier pre-1911 newspapers had made to the development of journalism in China:

Advancing beyond an earlier generation of scholarship that largely overlooked Chinese newspapers of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s because they were thought to have been of little importance to the forces driving historical change, recent research has convincingly established that newspapers of the pre-1911 Revolution period in fact contributed much to the shaping of Chinese culture and politics, especially in Shanghai. Newspapers of that era experimented with novel forms of expression, created space for new types of people to comment on subjects of “public” concern and introduced readers to non-Chinese currents of thought and forms of political and social organization.¹⁰⁷

Within the formation of professional journalism through the efforts of the intellectuals who participated in the movement, newspapers had been circulated as products of mass consumption since the 1920s. However, he pointed out that commercial practices did not meet expectations. Driven by profit, commercial papers became cautious with

¹⁰⁶ Terry Narramore, “Illusions of Autonomy? Journalism, Commerce and the State in Republican China,” in *Power and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu*, ed. Billy K. L. So, John Fitzgerald, Huang Jianli, and James K. Chin (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 177-78.

¹⁰⁷ Timothy B. Weston, “China, Professional Journalism, and Liberal Internationalism in the Era of the First World War,” *Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 2 (June 2010): 329.

regards to political agendas, and concentrated their main efforts on local social news, which easily attracted readers. According to Weston's research, the commercial press in the 1920s did make newspapers more independent from political parties, but this also meant that the newspapers had an increased burden of catering to the tastes and interests of a much wider public. This invariably limited their ability to meet the expectations of intellectuals who hoped to serve the public interest.¹⁰⁸

Yong Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan's study on Chinese professional journalism focuses on the social conditions at the time American journalism education, in particular, the Missouri model was being adopted in China. They characterise Chinese journalism in the early 20th century as the beginning of the move towards the American model, with American standards being widely used in Chinese universities for journalism education. This move towards the American model broke the dominant position of the long-term British influence on the press in China - the degree of admiration that American journalism educational model won in China, in Volz and Lee's opinion, was very high. This phenomenon was thought of as meeting the needs of the unique environment that existed in China at that time. Chinese reformists with ideals of a China finally emancipated from a semi-colonial fate, needed to establish socially responsible media, and the New Culture Movement, in which democracy and science were advocated, provided an advantageous social atmosphere for adopting Western journalism values and systems. Journalism education as the most effective means to promote the press, which promoted reformists' ideals of nation building and cultural transformation, was therefore suitably justified in following the Missouri system.¹⁰⁹ According to Volz and Lee, American neo-colonial ideology of upholding democratic values and open-door policy was a critical factor contributing to the popularisation of its journalism ideology in China.¹¹⁰ However, the Americans' intentions to spread their journalism ideologies had the potential to clash with Chinese vigilance.

Weston characterises the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, ranging from the late 1910s to the early 1920s, as a transnational movement of journalism reform, in

¹⁰⁸ Timothy B. Weston, "Minding the Newspaper Business: The Theory and Practice of Journalism in 1920s China," *Twentieth-Century China* 31, no. 2 (April 2006): 30-31.

¹⁰⁹ Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, "American Pragmatism and Chinese Modernisation: Importing the Missouri Model of Journalism Education to Modern China," *Media Culture & Society* 31, no. 5 (2009): 725-26.

¹¹⁰ Volz and Lee, "American Pragmatism," 726.

which the United States, due to the power imbalance on the international scene and relying on its political and economic advantages and cultural confidence, was able to export its model of professional journalism into China:

The movement to professionalize Chinese journalism must be understood in the context of a trans-Pacific conversation on journalism that radiated out from the United States and which was connected to a broader early twentieth century American movement to export middle-class ideas around the world. The impulse to export American values reflected the self-confident, racist and evangelical side of American progressivism after 1898, the belief among Americans that the United States stood at the forefront of Western civilization and that they had a right and duty to steer other societies towards the American way.¹¹¹

Examining the Press Congress of 1921 in Hawaii, Weston criticises Westerners who utilised their superior position to overwhelmingly influence Chinese journalists. He believed that being the congress in Hawaii making Chinese journalists feel that American journalistic norms were being imposed with “Western” arrogance. Weston argues that this exerted negative influence on the willingness of Chinese to adopt Western journalistic values:

[...] owing to the radically asymmetrical power relations that underlay it, the attempt to transfer Western knowledge about professional journalism to China, tied as it was to Western ideas about what modern societies should look like and how they should function, and underwritten by American cultural arrogance born of the rising economic and political power of the United States, was a fraught process. It establishes that even at the height of American confidence in the value of journalistic professionalism grounded in scientific objectivity, at the very moment when Americans were working assiduously to transfer Western journalistic norms and practices to China, the Western press itself was anything but professional or objective in its coverage of foreign societies, and that it was Westernized intellectuals from politically and economically weak countries, such as the Chinese who took part in the Press Congress of the World meeting in Hawai'i in 1921, who were in the best position to analyze this state of affairs.¹¹²

Fan Yaping's research approaches the subject from the perspective of Chinese domestic centralism. He examines the transition of Chinese traditional literati to professional journalists from the time when Western missionaries introduced modern newspapers

¹¹¹ Weston, “China, Professional Journalism” 331.

¹¹² Weston, “China, Professional Journalism” 346-47.

into China to the beginning of the Nanjing Decade. This transition is summarised as a process whereby Chinese elites moved from passively engaging in the press, mostly just for survival, to being actively involved in this profession for the purpose of realising their specific aims in journalism. The author deems that Chinese journalists' awareness in this transition experienced a big leap which can be divided into three stages: (i) initially adopting the press as a tool for resisting Western aggression; (ii) being the political parties' mouthpiece around the time of the Revolution of 1911; (iii) finally adopting Western professionalism in the 1920s. Multiple social elements, such as Chinese economic and cultural conditions, openness to social change for modernity, social acceptance and general evolution of the press, in addition to the growth of the Chinese press itself, together formed the external influences that promoted professional identity. However, as the development of these elements were haphazard, often even hysterical, and with all kinds of difficulties during the process of Chinese social modernity, the course of either the professionalisation of Chinese journalism or the formation of professional identity involved a process that was complex and fluctuating in its pace.¹¹³

Lin Muyin focuses on the localisation and influence of the 'Missouri University journalism education model', which she describes as the "American model of journalism education" in China from 1921 to 1952. She states that the Missouri model was originally introduced into China in the 1920s. After that time, it was widely adopted as the model to guide and direct the establishment and development of the Chinese journalism education system up until the early 1950s when the American model was fully replaced by the Communist model of the Soviet Union during the Chinese Communist Party's process of transforming Chinese universities.¹¹⁴ However, Lin omits that the formation of the Missouri model is a consequent product of the professionalisation of journalism in the United States. As a result, she only considers the Missouri model as an educational model rather than a professionalism model of journalism (i.e., practices of journalism). In this sense, her research is limited to a degree to the analysis of the characteristics of the adoption and adaptation of the Missouri

¹¹³ Fan Yaping, *Zhongguo Xinwen Congyezhe Zhiye Rentong Yanjiu (1815-1927)* [A Study on Chinese Journalists Professional Identities: 1815-1927] (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2011), 236-61.

¹¹⁴ Lin Muyin, *Yizhi Yu Liubian: Misuli Daxue Xinwen Jiaoyu Moshi Zai Zhongguo (1921-1952)* [The Introduction and Adaptation: Journalism Education Model of Missouri University in China: 1921-1952] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2013), 5-6.

journalism education model in China during the republican period. Lin deems that the corporation and exchange mechanism of journalism studies and education between China and the United States did not exist for nearly 30 years post 1949, yet there was still a submerged platform, in which the American model represented by Missouri was still rooted in the heart of Chinese journalists.

By reviewing this scholarship, it can be seen that studies on the professionalisation of Chinese journalism that have emerged are based on a variety of perspectives, but all have as their main focus the period before the late 1930s, while largely ignoring the decade from the late 1930s to the late 1940s. In contrast to the research above that examined the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in a macroscopic view with a focus on the years before 1930, Hung Chang-tai shifts the focus to a specific journalist, Fan Changjiang, to observe his journalistic activities and writing style around the period of the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. By documenting the historical details of an individual journalist, Hung concretely presents how the professionalisation of journalism in China suffered politicisation during the war. Hung demonstrates that Fan Changjiang made a significant contribution to first-hand reporting and that his innovative writing style stemmed from his belief in an ideal of journalist professionalism. However, when the war between China and Japan broke out, Fan was moved by his patriotic emotion to help Chinese resistance.¹¹⁵ Hung demonstrates how the war politicised Fan Changjiang's professional journalism career. In his war-front report work, Fan experienced many unsatisfactory policies and behaviours of the Nationalist Party, such as strict censorship and a lack of discipline amongst the troops. These impelled Fang to join the CCP in May 1939, and it marked the turning point in his career from a professional reporter to a political advocate.¹¹⁶ Hung reveals that under the national war of Japanese invasion, journalists' patriotic emotions and the harsh control over journalism exercised by both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party together led to the politicisation of professional journalism.

During the Nanjing Nationalist Government period, the press was able to enjoy the relatively free environment from the Beiyang period as the government was not all

¹¹⁵ Hung Chang-tai, "Paper Bullets: Fan Changjiang and New Journalism in Wartime China" *Modern China* 17, no. 4 (October 1991): 427-29

¹¹⁶ Hung, "Paper Bullets," 460.

powerful. This was especially the case in Shanghai as the foreign settlements maintained their independence and prosperity. Thus, as argued in Chapter 1, extraterritoriality was a necessary condition for the developing modernisation of Chinese journalism.

Extraterritoriality existed in the coastal cities due to economic prosperity, convenient transportation and infrastructure as well as better education. This sharply contrasted with the enormously underdeveloped nature of other areas in China, particularly the hinterland. As a result, the Chinese journalism boom of the 1920s and 1930s can only be said to exist in a very limited number of China's metropolises. However, this excessive reliance on extraterritoriality emerged as a congenital problem as it led to Chinese journalism during this boom period becoming unbalanced, discordant and unsustainable. It was during this period that the *SEPM* was established in Shanghai. The newspaper provides a useful focus point to explore the strengths and weaknesses of extraterritoriality and the development of a modern and professional Chinese journalism.

Table 1: The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* publications and radio inventory

Time & place of publishing	Shanghai (1929.04.16 – 1941.12.8) DAILY			Chongqing WEEKLY Editor: Randall Gould	New York WEEKLY Editor: Randall Gould (in China) Stefania Chaney Wilson	Shanghai DAILY Editor: Randall Gould	
	Pre-war Period Editor: Carl Crow, T. O. Thackrey	Isolated Island Period Editor: T. O. Thackrey, Randall Gould					
Language of publication							
English Edition	1929.4.16–1937.11.11	1937.11.12–1941.12.06		1945.2.18 – 1945.6.24	1943.1.1– 1946.12.27	1946.2 – 1949.6.14	
Chinese Edition	1933.1.16 – 1937.11.11	Evening version (1937.11.12 – 1941.12.8)		No publication	No publication	No publication	
		Morning version (1937.12.1 – 1940.4.26)					
		<i>Ta Mei Wan Pao</i> (<i>morning edition</i>) [大美晚報晨刊] (1937.12.17 – 1938.4.27)	<i>Ta Mei Pao</i> [大美報] (1938.5.1 – 1940.4.26)				It might exist according to the advertisement of the evening version. However, there is not a library to collect them.
		<i>Ta Mei Pictorial</i> (1938.5.1 – 1939.4.16)					
Ta Mei Radio Station	Began to broadcast in winter, 1937 under the name, Ta Mei Radio Station, and was forced to close by the Japanese on 8 December. It was regained by the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> in August 1945, and was sold to Chinese private businessmen on 3 November 1945.						

Chapter 2: The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*

For a Clear Picture of World Events Read the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*

China this year is passing through one of the most vital stages of her long history. Never before has it been so important that residents in China keep abreast of world events, because day by day this great country is coming into closer contact with all the nations of the world.

No better medium than the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* can be obtained through which to keep pace with the world developments which are exerting such tremendous influence upon the China of today and the China of tomorrow.

Through its special United Press cable service from America and the three great European news services, this paper is able to present a daily picture of happenings throughout the world, much of it 15 hours ahead of any other Shanghai newspaper.¹

In 1929, the *Shanghai Evening Post* was established by Cornelius Van Starr, the founder of the American International Group.² Its predecessor was the *Shanghai Gazette*, which was started in 1918 by Eugene Chen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nationalist Government. After changing ownership several times between American and Chinese owners, it was renamed the *Shanghai Evening News*.³

The American Newspaper Company purchased the paper for \$2500 and renamed it the *Shanghai Evening Post*.⁴ The first edition was published in April 1929 with the company making the paper's purpose clear:

A company organised for the purpose of acquiring the newspaper and

¹ This is an advertisement of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*. See James L. Huskey, "Americans in Shanghai: Community Formation and Response to Revolution, 1919 – 1928," (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1985).

² Ronald Kent Shelp and Al Ehrbar, *Fallen Giant : The Amazing Story of Hank Greenberg and the History of AIG* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2009), 40.

³ Shelp and Ehrbar, *Fallen Giant*, 40

⁴ The start of the *Shanghai Evening Post* is generally regarded in April 1929. See Wang Xin, "Yifen Poju Yingxiang De Waishang Huawen Wanbao [An Influential Foreigners-run Chinese Evening Paper: The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*]," *Xinwen Yu Chuanbo Yanjiu* 1993, no. 3: 145; Paul French, *Carl Crow - A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times, and Adventures of an American in Shanghai* (Hong Kong: University Press, 2006), 171; Yu Maochun, *The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1947* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 160. Although Thomas Chao, in his book, proposed that American Newspaper Company brought it in April 1928, the earliest newspaper that the author can find was published in November 1929. As no archival document or memoir that shows the exact day has been located, the author accepts April 1929 as the establishment of SEPM in this thesis.

establishing it as an independent journal, with no special purpose of propaganda or policy to serve except that of giving correct, unbiased information and confining its expressions of opinion to the editorial page.⁵

In the practical management of the newspaper, C. V. Starr, the owner of the American Newspaper Company, respected the position of the profession of journalism. He remained detached from the *Shanghai Evening Post* and handed over responsibility to the editor, Theodore Olin (T. O. or Ted) Thackrey.⁶ It could speculate that C. V. Starr appreciated the social cachet of being a newspaper proprietor. It has been said:

As Starr expanded his publishing activities, he began to cut quite a swath through Shanghai society. The January 1935 issue of *Fortune* magazine, founded five years earlier by Luce, features an article titled "Men of Shanghai," with brief profiles of six expatriates and Chinese movers and shakers. Luce's friend got great treatment—Starr's is the first profile in the package, and the longest.⁷

Thackrey was an experienced editor with Scripps-Howard newspapers in the United States and a youthful newcomer to Shanghai. He was known for his open-mindedness and applied this to the Open Letter section of the newspaper.⁸ This interesting character went on to work for the *New York Post*, where he married the owner. He later characterised his political views as "non-communist Left".⁹ Even after leaving the post of editor, he contributed articles to the paper. Thackrey described the paper thus:

Its viewpoint is to be tolerant, kindly, but firm on matters involving Sino-American relations; seeking for the ultimate abolition of any false and unnatural barriers toward the friendly intercourse between the two nations; to print the truth as it sees the truth, without fear or favour, and without intolerance for any viewpoint which may be totally at variance with its own.

Its columns are to be open at all times to the intelligent presentation of opinion, both in agreement with and at total variance with its own expressed view upon any given problem, or every problem affecting the welfare of the community in which it is published.

It recognises its position as a guest in China, and conducts itself as a guest; not deviating in any matter of principle; but not nagging, or indulging in petty scolding."¹⁰

⁵ Thomas Ming-Heng Chao, *The Foreign Press in China* (Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), 65.

⁶ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 65.

⁷ Shelp and Ehrbar, *Fallen Giant*, 42.

⁸ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 67-69.

⁹ NY Daily Compass: Millionairess to Start Paper, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 May, 1949.

¹⁰ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 66.

In 1930, the *Shanghai Evening Post* purchased the rival British-owned *Mercury* for \$10 000, and the paper's name was changed to the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (*SEPM*).¹¹

C. V. Starr “had to promise the *Mercury*'s editor H. G. W. (Henry George Wandesforde) Woodhead to create a column for him, called ‘As a Briton Sees It’.”¹² Woodhead, a British journalist who once worked for the *North China Daily News*, made the decision to move to Shanghai from Tianjin in the hope of finding a more lucrative post as his financial situation had deteriorated and the economy had fluctuated so the cost of living was not viable in Tientsin. When he arrived in Shanghai, the *Shanghai Evening Post* was in the process of merging with *Shanghai Mercury*. He accepted C. V. Starr's offer to write a daily column, which attracted a high salary and freedom to express his views.¹³ Soon after, Woodhead was given a title of “diehard” and created a sensation by reporting Chinese opium activities in Shanghai and exposing suppliers in his column of the *SEPM*. He even displayed hundreds of packets of opium to prove its availability. For this, he was disliked by many Chinese readers, who reacted by withdrawing their advertisements in the newspaper for fear of being connected to a foreign anti-Chinese journalist.¹⁴ Wang Boheng, in an article published in 1930, specifically expressed his resentment and detestation of the British journalist. He described Woodhead as a crazy and stupid person who was inherently anti-China.¹⁵

The founding editor of the newly formed the *SEPM* was Carl Crow, a Missouri-born newspaper man and ad-man, who started his newspaper career as night editor of the China Press – China's first American newspaper.¹⁶ Crow had originally gone to Shanghai as an agent for the U.S. wartime propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information, and went on to work in advertising. As a journalist, Crow experienced some

¹¹ Shelp and Ehrbar, *Fallen Giant*, 40.

¹² Volz, Yong Z., and Lee Chin-Chuan. “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence.” *Journalism Studies* 12, no. 5 (2011): 565.

¹³ H. G. W. Woodhead, *A journalist in China* (London, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1934), 242.

¹⁴ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 66-67.

¹⁵ Wang Boheng, “Zhongguo Zhi Xizibao [Western Languages Newspapers in China],” in Xinwenxuekan Quanji, ed. Huang Tianpeng, 1930, cited in Yong Z. Volz, “Yi ‘Zhenxiang’ De Mingyi: Liuxue Zhishi Fenzi Dui Xifang Baodao De Pipan Jidui Xinwen Jiancha De Xuandao [By the Excuses of the ‘Truth’: criticism towards Western media report and defence for Chinese censorship by Chinese intellectuals who had oversea study experience],” in Baoren Baoguo: Zhongguo Xinwenshi De Lingyizhong Dufa [To Serve the Nation: Journalists as Prisms of Chinese Press History], ed. Lee Chin-Chuan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013), 296.

¹⁶ James McGregor, “Review of Carl Crow - A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times, and Adventures of an American in Shanghai,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 170, no. 1: 66-68.

conflict with the English journalists who were dominant in Shanghai at the time. He ‘and his fellow Missourian were soon dubbed "cowboy correspondents" because of their hayseed origins and penchant for chasing real news.’¹⁷ This colourful character was of some renown before becoming editor – including his role in negotiating the release of foreign hostages of a warlord who derailed a new Shanghai-Beijing express train near the Jiangsu-Shandong border.

From the outset the *SEPM* “was strongly pro-Chinese though it looked thoroughly American and included ‘agony aunt’ advice column Dorothy Dix, crossword puzzles, Ripley’s “Believe It or Not” and columns from half a dozen news syndicates.”¹⁸

After a brief stint as editor, Crow recruited his old friend Randall Gould as editor who later became the editor in chief of the newspaper and held a significant role in Chinese journalism history:

He got to know Gould when the bulky Minnesotan had arrived in Beijing as a UP correspondent, Gould was a friend of many of the Missouri News Colony. He had worked as a news editor on the Japan Times in Tokyo in 1923–24 before becoming UP’s roving bureau manager in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Manila in the late 1920s, as well as news editor of the Peking Daily News. Gould was hired in 1931 and stayed as editor of the paper for a decade as well as being a China correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor.¹⁹

Gould was an eccentric with liberal views in his writing and was friendly with some of the Nationalist leaders such as Eugene Chen, and Kung Hsiang-Hsi (H. H. Kung). During his work for the United Press his strong views caused controversy with the American officials; his transfer to Manila ceased and he returned to China in 1929 upon the newly appointed American Minister to China.²⁰

Starr characterised Crow as a brilliant and capable individual, but a “rather poor businessman” so replaced him as manager after only a short stint. “Starr believed Crow was an excellent choice to establish the newspaper but wasn’t best suited to the longer term management of the business.”²¹ However, Crow continued to contribute articles to

¹⁷ McGregor, “Review of Carl Crow,” 66-68.

¹⁸ French, *Carl Crow*, 172.

¹⁹ French, *Carl Crow*, 172.

²⁰ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 83-84.

²¹ French, *Carl Crow*, 174.

the *SEPM*.

Figure 4: C. V. Starr (left) and Randall Gould (right)



The growth and popularity of the *SEPM* increased rapidly since it was established. Beginning with a daily circulation of 300, after two years this figure had grown to a net paid daily circulation of 4000 and had reached 4800 in 1931. By around 1935, they had a daily circulation of 7000 copies.²² Around 2000 of these were destined for overseas customers.²³

Three key readership groups of English-language newspapers during this time were: foreign residents of very diverse backgrounds; the Chinese elite; and foreign audiences outside China.²⁴ The *SEPM* was the only English language evening newspaper in Shanghai and prior to that up until the 1930s it had been the second largest foreign

²² Ma Liang, "A Survey of the Foreign Press in Shanghai by the 2nd Department of the General Staff Headquarters", in *An Archival Collection on the History of the Republic of China*, ed. China's No. 2 Archive Institute (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji), 5:131-49, cited in Volz and Lee, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere," 562.

²³ Chen Tzu-Hsiang *The English Language Daily Press in China* (Peking: The Synodal Collectanea Commission, 1937), cited in Volz and Lee, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere," 563.

²⁴ Volz and Lee, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere," 565.

newspaper.²⁵ The majority of the *SEPM* readers (90%) came from the Shanghai area including the International Settlement, the French Concession and Greater Shanghai. The paper also had readers in Nanking and reached as far south as Hong Kong and as far north as Mukden.²⁶

The *SEPM* drew on a proud American heritage. The American press expanded within China in this period, in large part as a reaction to the British dominance.

It was observed that American news in the local Chinese-language newspapers was mainly translated from European news agencies, particularly Reuters. “This Europeanized American news was confined largely to the seamy side of American life,” Norwood Allman (1943, p. 250), a prominent American lawyer in Shanghai, argued, “as most of the agencies had national axes and were only too happy to blackguard and belittle Americans”.²⁷

The *SEPM* managing editor, Carl Crow, stated: “It was rather irritating and puzzling to us expatriate Americans to see all news from home published as London date line, even the returns of American elections.”²⁸ The news editor, Gould, was irritated by Woodhead’s British presence at the *SEPM*, saying ‘I conscientiously altered his British spellings... I felt a bit grumpy as the *Post* suddenly picked up popularity with the Shanghai British community’.²⁹ A second reason for this American expansion was “the rapid expansion of the American community both in number and power in Chinese major treaty port cities, which provided a broader social context for the growth of the American press. According to the China Year Book (1913, p. 594; 1927, p. 30), the American population in China multiplied from 3470 in 1911 to 8817 by 1924”.³⁰

The expanding American press was also part of America’s shift from “noninterventionism to a new political ideology of America as Empire.”³¹ However, “altruistically and morally intended, the Progressive ideology promoted the doctrines of

²⁵ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 69.

²⁶ Chao, *Foreign Press in China*, 67.

²⁷ Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 564.

²⁸ Carl Crow, *China Takes Her Place* (New York: Harper & Brothers), 5, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 564.

²⁹ Randall Gould, “Three p.m. Shanghai Time: a memoir in three parts”, unpublished manuscript in Sinologisch Instituut, Universiteit Leiden, Netherlands, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 565.

³⁰ Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic,” 564.

³¹ Ralph Raico, “American Foreign Policy: the turning point, 1898 – 1919”, *Freedom Daily*, February - July, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 565.

American imperialism.”³²

The *SEPM* also attracted American journalists and therefore fostered within its ranks professional journalistic skills and experience. Tillman Durdin was one such journalist drawn to Shanghai at that time. Arriving in the port of Shanghai as a workaway on an American ship, he landed a job with the *SEPM* as a real estate editor. Learning his trade in Shanghai, Durdin became the premier correspondent in for the *New York Times* in the mid-1940s.³³ Jack Belden, is another prominent American journalist, a war correspondent, who started his early career working for the *SEPM* during the 1930s. He was also present in Peking during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. He later went on to pen the influential book *China Shakes the World*.³⁴

Political Tensions and Censorship: Challenges for the Press

The *SEPM* in its early period was not all plain sailing. From the beginning, the *SEPM* had significant conflict with the Nationalist Government around news reporting issues. As far back as 2 November 1929, it was recognised that Shanghai local government made a decision to retain copies of the *SEPM*.³⁵ Newspapers within the foreign settlements were immune for censorship within the settlements but were barred from mail outside the settlements.³⁶

The story of the *SEPM*'s censorship, along with that of other papers made international news, for example, in an article in the Australian *Cairns Post* 'Press Muzzled Chinese Way, Government Critics':

Consistent with its policy of withholding postal privileges from newspapers which criticise the Government, the Tianjin branch of the Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] has banned the 'Peking and Tientsin Times', the most influential British paper in North China. The 'Times' recently attacked the Chinese Government's apathy in connection with the murders of foreign missionaries in the interior. Banning foreign newspapers from the mails has recently become a popular Governmental pastime. The 'North China Daily News,' published to Shanghai, was banned for months last year, and the Shanghai 'Evening

³² Volz and Lee, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere," 566.

³³ Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, *China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 32-33.

³⁴ Mackinnon and Friesen, *China Reporting*, 34.

³⁵ Kouliu Damei Wanbao [Detain the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*], *Central Daily News*, 3 November 1929.

³⁶ Clandestine Press, *Cairns Post*, 11 September 1930.

Post,' the only American daily in Shanghai, has now passed the ninety-fifth day of its banishment from the mails, without any official explanation having been offered. The ban in this case is believed to have been due to criticism of the administration of the Chinese military commander at Shanghai.³⁷

As this article published on 10 February 1930 that the paper was experiencing its 95th day of banishment, this indeed refers to the paper's ban of November 1929. The reason for the ban was never officially explained, however the *SEPM* speculate that ban was because they criticised the Chinese Commissioner of Public Safety in Shanghai for not arresting "strike-breaking delivery coolies" and for arresting "several loyal employees who refused to join the strike".³⁸ So, there is a history of industrial discord in the earliest days of the *SEPM* – a theme that reappears at its close some twenty years later.

This is a very significant period for journalism, with the issuing of the 1930 *Publication Law* by the Nationalist Government, which made it an offence to undermine the Nationalist Party or its principles. Likewise the publication of information that destroyed public order was not allowed. To police this, publications could not be released without a permit by the Nationalist Government's publicity office.³⁹

Shortly after the enactment of the 1930 *Publication Law*, in early 1931, *Implementation Regulations of the Election Laws for National Conference Representatives* were created. These regulations formally recognised journalists, lawyers, doctors and accountants as "professional" entities, which was deemed the end of a chaotic understanding of the definition of 'profession' since its introduction in China.⁴⁰ This can be regarded as a sign of progress in the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, and gave impetus to further the professionalism improvement of journalism, nonetheless progress was still limited. The core values of the professionalism ideal - such as objectivity and neutrality in news reporting in public services - were rarely discussed and recognised in the legal document. This situation, to some extent, might reflect the gap between the Chinese journalists' expectations regarding the ideals and practical works in professionalisation, as well as

³⁷ Press Muzzled, *Evening News*, 10 February 1930.

³⁸ Clandestine Press, *Cairns Post*, 11 September 1930.

³⁹ William P. Alford, *To Steal A Book Is An Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law In Chinese Civilisation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 51.

⁴⁰ Sun Huei-min, *Zhidu Yizhi: Minchu Shanghai De Zhongguo Lvshi (1912-1928)* [Institutional Transplantation: The Chinese Lawyers in Republican Shanghai (1912-1937)] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), 17-18.

the government's acceptance of the development of a new understanding of professions.

Politically, this was a very turbulent period. Manchuria became the focus of the conflicts with Japan's invasion of North East China in the Mukden Incident in 1931. This triggered the later Japanese occupation over Manchuria. Japan then on 28 January 1932 utilised the conflicts between Japanese citizens in Shanghai and local Chinese to take an aggressive military action against the local Chinese armies, and it is known as the Shanghai Incident.⁴¹ Japan's behaviour in Manchuria caused the *SEPM* owner to intervene with his staff and dictate the direction of the paper: "C.V. Starr... told his editor Thackrey: 'up to now I've never tried to lay down specific policy for the Post, but on the Manchuria thing – I must. We are against it!'"⁴² However, the *SEPM* was still open to a wide range of views and the people that contributed to its columns reflected the diversity of the newspaper.'

The Mukden incident was later used by the *SEPM* in 1939 as an example of the legitimacy of shifting from the newly emerged professional journalism to partisan journalism at times of national crisis:

First, wartime journalism management should be united rather than permissive. The external aim of wartime journalism management and control is to strive for strengthening our country and crumbling enemies, and the internal aim is for avoiding leakage of military secrets, reinforcing people's consciousness to fight and promoting the civil-military cooperation nationwide. At the early stage of the war in Europe, the third bureau of German general staff established wartime journalism bureau, which has been the most powerful machinery during the war. Except for censoring newspapers nationwide, the bureau is also in charge of issuing German wartime news in their military occupied areas. Japan after the Mukden Incident immediately reinforced the journalism bureau of the Army Ministry. By re-organising Rengo and Dentsu, Domei News Agency as the core of Japanese journalism management and control, was established. Journalism in the Far East has been generally monopolised by Japanese warlords. These are good examples to illustrate the importance of wartime journalism management and control. Even in the Britain and America where people highly believe in freedom during the wartime, such as war in Europe and American Civil War, journalism is strictly controlled by government.⁴³

⁴¹ See Chang Yu-fa, *Zhonghua Minguo Shigao* [A History of the Republic of China], 2nd ed. (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, Ltd., 2001), 250-58.

⁴² French, *Through the Looking Glass*, 175

⁴³ Xinwen Shiye Zai Zhanshi [War Time Journalism], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 9 January 1939.

While the *SEPM* was against the Japanese actions, the paper was not pro-Communist despite Thackrey's left leanings. The *SEPM* reporter Hsaio Fung-soh's musings on the manipulative and dishonest Communists was picked up by the international press:

A Chinese contributor to the Shanghai Evening Post, Hsaio Fung-soh, advises us that the most effective weapon of the Communists among the Chinese has been their exploitation of mass psychology and manipulation of popular movements, notably those of the students, the labourers, and the peasants.

It was through such movements that they surreptitiously manoeuvred their way to the commanding positions in various Kuomintang organs, and Mr. Hsaio proceeds: "The Student Movement was systematically organised until, it gradually spread all over the country and its stand regarding contemporary national affairs respected by both the public and the officials. "In the meantime class-room studies were abandoned and text books replaced by numerous. Communist pamphlets especially prepared for their consumption.

"Obsessed with mistaken ideas of radicalism and incoherent theories of Bolshevised Marxianism (sic), a spirit of revolt drove them into acts of anarchy." The exploitation of the workers by the Communists, we read then, met with even greater success. For the first time in the history of the nation labour unions were organised for political purposes, strikes called to attain political demands; and it is further declared that: "To impress the workers with their own importance, the Communists, caused frequent 'labour congresses' of various unions to be called, during which political issues were made to appear inseparably bound up with various labour problems. "The indiscriminating workers soon came to assure an air of exaggerated self-importance without realising at the same time that the only result of their sacrifices had been beneficial only to the agitators themselves." But the exploitation of the peasants, this contributor to the Shanghai Evening Post avers, has been the most outstanding feature of Communist activity, among the masses. Following the example of the Bolsheviks, he claims, the Chinese Communist party 'advocated an agrarian revolution: "Peasant revolts are by no means uncommon; but an agrarian revolution, such as that advocated by the Chinese Communist party was not only unnecessary but also impossible, as has been proved more than once in Kwangtung and other places.

The slogans employed by the Communists stressed the necessity of uprooting the evils which were the cause of the indescribably wretched conditions under which the peasants were living, and also the necessity of raising their living standards. Whether the plight of the Chinese peasants is as terrible as the Communists would have us believe is a matter for investigation, though it is interesting to note in this connection that foreign travellers to the interior have declared that the average Chinese farmer lives more comfortably than, and certainly does not appear so destitute as peasants in certain parts of Europe to-

day.⁴⁴

During this period, the Chinese Communists were experiencing some success. On 7 November, 1931, the Chinese Communist Party announced the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin, a remote area in Jiangxi Province, in opposition to the Nationalist Government although this regime was not widely recognised. The media played a key role in the Communist *de facto* controlled areas. On the same day of the establishment of the regime, the Red China News Agency, *Red China* newspaper, Chinese Soviet Radio with the call sign of CSR all began operation as official news institutes.⁴⁵ These institutes were not only the vehicles of propaganda but were in the front line of putting across the Party's policies to its local sections. In the early of the year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a guideline of journalism, emphasising that the editorials published on the Parties' organ papers must be the significant policies for local sections to discuss and implement.⁴⁶

Control over the press differed between communist and nationalist controlled areas. The Communist areas had tight control over censorship of publications, however the newspapers and journals in the Nationalist Party controlled regions were not consistently managed but rather erratic in the censorship methods. In the foreign concession ports, the situation was particularly difficult.⁴⁷

The *SEPM* had a longstanding targeted view against the Japanese invasion. Randall Gould, when he was dealing with the Mukden Incident and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, took pride in their brave stance and said that "... in our paper we dealt with Japan and her policies realistically and without pulling punches. No other Shanghai newspaper hit the Japanese so hard".⁴⁸ However, Gould claimed that the anti-Japanese position taken by the *SEPM* at that time did not stem from nationalism but rather a professional commitment to reporting. As Gould recalled, "We never hit below the belt" and "... if we felt the Japanese were wrong we threw the dictionary at them. But if they were right

⁴⁴ In China, *The Telegraph*, 28 May 1931.

⁴⁵ Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi* [A Comprehensive History of Chinese Journalism] (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1996), 2:293-94.

⁴⁶ Institute of Journalism and Communication Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Xinwen Gongzuo Wenjian Huibian* [Collected Documents of Journalism of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1980), 1:70.

⁴⁷ Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 103.

⁴⁸ Randall Gould, *China in the Sun*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1946), 149.

about anything we gave them due credit.”⁴⁹

In fact, the American main editors of the *SEPM*, such as Thackrey and Gould had opinions that contradicted Woodhead in that they believed Japan was being aggressive in China. Some Americans held the same view as the newspaper, but with the British in Shanghai outnumbering the five thousand Americans by more than double, the opposing view was stronger. Thackrey firstly proposed the contentious idea of writing an article to strongly criticise the Japanese aggressive action and Gould immediately agreed with it despite the danger that publishing such an article posed for the *SEPM*. At this critical time, Starr gave the most important support. He approved for Gould and Thackrey to publish whatever they thought, and gave them the freedom to ignore what people might think. Thus, an editorial which condemned the Japanese as a negative power was published on the front page of the *SEPM*.⁵⁰ The article describes the intensity of rage in Shanghai as follows:

Japanese military forces and gunmen have not only lost their usefulness as a part of Shanghai's defence scheme; they have forfeited their right to remain on International Settlement soil. Today we are no more concerned with the technicalities of the Japanese position than the Japanese have thus far been concerned with the rights, property, and lives of the rest of us.

The plain fact is that Japan is waging war against China – and is most improperly using the International Settlement's neutral soil as a base for such war. Not only has she jeopardised the whole future status of the Settlement by such activity but she also has taken over police power from Settlement authorities in a way which we consider undesirable in the extreme, she has extended the power to an area never before contemplated by others at the outset, and she has misused that power in a variety of acts, including arson and murderous attacks upon helpless prisoners. Without delay International Settlement authorities should publicly disassociate themselves from these excesses.⁵¹

The result of the article was a business loss but credit for the newspaper from the readers. Many advertising contracts with the *SEPM* were cancelled despite the increase in copies being sold.⁵² During the Shanghai incident the demand for the *SEPM* almost doubled.⁵³ Moreover, this article irritated the Foreign Settlement administration of Shanghai as it

⁴⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 149.

⁵⁰ Randall Gould, *China in the Sun* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1946), 310-11.

⁵¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 311.

⁵² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 311-13.

⁵³ Woodhead, *A Journalist in China*, 248.

revealed their lack ability to solve the Japanese aggressive action. As Gould recalled:

By the time the Settlement authorities, the Foreign Defense Force officers, and the foreign consuls had read that far, they were apoplectic with rage – not rage at the Japanese, but at the *Post* and everybody connected with the *Post*.

What we had done, they felt, was not so much to attack the Japanese as to throw squarely in their faces the shortcomings of the foreign administrators, who were mainly Britons and Americans.⁵⁴

At this time, all kinds of rumours about *SEPM* circulated. In Gould's recollection, these rumours included:

There was a move in the American Consulate General to shut down the *Post* permanently. Censorship was to be imposed [...] for the first time on all local publications by authorities of the International Settlement and the French Concession [...]. Legal action might be taken in the U. S. Court for China against the Messrs. Starr, Thackrey, and Gould on charges of disturbing the peace – this at a time when Japanese bombs were doing a pretty good job of that in their own way.⁵⁵

In the end, the foreign authorities did nothing. No legal action was taken by the U.S. Court in China.

Thackrey wrote of the Shanghai Incident in vivid detail while, at the same time, never contradicting the official Japanese story. His searing words are even more effective as his tone is moderate and conciliatory with the Japanese forces present in Shanghai at the time. His story was titled “Japanese savagery in Shanghai – what happens daily in Shanghai. What an American editor saw and described” and was published across the world:

**GRUESOME SIGHTS MARK RACE TRACK CORPSES
SWEETEN GROUND WHERE CHILDREN ONCE ROMPED
AT PLAY**

I visited Kiangwan, Race Course today. I shall never be able to return, without a shudder. My previous visits, to see the, crowds of happy Shanghailanders on a Race Day outing¹, betting on their favorite horses; gentlemen jockeys coursing under a brilliant sun. This morning is just such a day overhead; but underneath, nothing but horror. The entrances to my favorite stand are blocked, with corpses, fresh corpses, newly made before my eyes. Perhaps, as the official military communiques; from Japanese headquarters say, these corpses once had been snipers, or even perhaps spies. I make no challenge, I just detail what I see.

⁵⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 311.

⁵⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 312.

There are women, and children among them; women shot through the back, their padded coats run through with military sabres; children whose bodies are riddled with bullets; men, garbed as peasant farmers heaped grotesquely about, their wounds soaking the ground. They are not garbed as soldiers – not even the women and the children – so I suppose they must have been snipers—officially. I suppose so because my very dear friends at headquarter and the Japanese legation assure me –are at pains to point out to me – that the Japanese army and navy are not making war on civilians, nor upon Chinese peasants –or upon the Chinese government, nor upon Government troops – but merely the 19th Route Army from Canton.

So I suppose that these people who seemed so innocent to the casual eye must have been machine gunners) and riflemen from the 19th Route Army, disguised as simple peasants. It is difficult to ask them now. The houses are burned; I saw them burned, with neat precision, not a wasted match, nor an extra piece of kindling. And they? Their corpses sweeten the ground beneath the judges stand; one whose body was soaked in oil and now lies charred beneath the officials' tower will till no crops, again; they lie in little heaps along the grass before this stands, where, on that Race Day recently, the children played and chased elusive butterflies.

And as I walk the top rail, scuffling through the glass which crashed from rifle butt attack upon the office tier, a tragedy of Peace –for remember this is not a war – unfolds beneath my eyes. An Infantry company, just preparing for its duty in the hand to hand fighting on ahead in Kiangwanchen, pauses to watch the drama with me; I above and they be low. The flames from burning farmhuts throw a curtain of red behind, new captive groups of those who fled the fire. An officer turns one of the peasant garbed group away, to face the sun. His shining sabre flashes, up to its hilt in the human sheath; the body falls, a second takes its place, and once again the sabre finds its pulsing scabbard.

And now, a diversion; the next, a tall and likely lad, is flung unbound face down, upon the two who clutch the panting earth in death; and as he falls, a volley from six officers' revolver makes a minor outline 'On his back and courses up his spine. The volley dies, the pistols now are empty, the jerking figure on the ground now still and another takes his turn. I leave, for fear is on me now; the sunshine gone, my feet are lead. The company of infantry in tasting death by proxy; and it is ready for the front.⁵⁶

However, not all the *SEPM* reporters were anti-Japanese. The British columnist, Woodhead, was seen as a pro-Japanese journalist. When the outbreak of fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops in Shanghai occurred – the Shanghai Incident – his pro-Japanese opinion incurred condemnation from nationalists of China. The *SEPM*

⁵⁶ Japanese Savagery in Shanghai, *Northern Territory Times*, 8 April 1932.

provided him with a platform to express his opinions, but the articles from the correspondence columns of the paper criticised him. As Woodhead recalled:

I had not been long in the port when I became the target for many Chinese contributors to English-language periodicals, as well as for scathing attacks in the correspondence columns of the *Evening Post*. At one period – during the Sino-Japanese conflicts in Shanghai – hardly a day passed that I did not receive anonymous threats of assassination. And this was due, not to the fact that I condoned Japan's actions – many of which I denounced – but because I declined to subscribe to the view that Japan's intervention had been unprovoked, and made no secret of my belief that it would not cease until the Chinese military forces had been withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Shanghai.⁵⁷

Woodhead, however, was not uncritically pro-Japanese: he altered his views based on the outcry or his editor's and owner's leanings. In 1933, he reported with an open mind and detached judgment that official Japanese statements about Manchuria (or Manchukuo) were inaccurate. This analysis was provided in a subdued and bland tone:

According to an official Japanese statement, the new Government of Manchukuo, "achieved a marked and healthy progress, and the restoration of law and order" within a year of its inauguration.

H. G. W. Woodhead, editor of the China Year Book... published in a series of articles in the "SEPM"... While he apparently kept an open mind and detached judgment, the picture given by Mr. Woodhead by no means substantiates the Japanese statement. On the contrary, he adduces much evidence of disorder and lawlessness which seriously militate against the country's stability and progress.⁵⁸

Woodhead's views were more representative of the British attitude towards these events. The British understanding on the Japanese action was to see Japan's actions as part of their effort to pursue the trend of international society with full scale of ideology of imperialism. Colonel Amery said in London that "I confess that I see no reason why, whether in act, or in word, or in sympathy, we should go individually or internationally against Japan in this matter [...] Who is there among us to case the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continuous aggression of a vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Woodhead, *A Journalist in China*, 243-44.

⁵⁸ Impressions of Manchukuo, *The Age*, 11 March 1933.

⁵⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 310.

Reporting on the atrocities by the *SEPM* was questioned by some and seen as evidence of Chinese government funding. As Gould recollected, “Both Thackrey and I had gone out and seen atrocities and had reported on them, but most of the club-bar and bridge-table devotees were not prepared to believe that such gentlemen as the Japanese Army, Navy, and Marines could ever forget their much-advertised code of *bushido*.” Gould went on to say that to those in Shanghai’s business community “the *Post* must no doubt be subsidised by the Chinese Government, else it would not say such things.”⁶⁰

In 1933, the *SEPM*, which had initially been limited to an English edition, added a Chinese edition— *Ta Mei Wan Pao*. The advertisement read:

Please Read *Ta Mei Wan Pao*

Fast news delivery: we publish the news collected by our contributing journalists and world influential news agents in both China and the world, and specialise in the financial and commercial news.

Neutral position: our newspaper does not belong to any political party or group. We insist on this axiom, and do not give publicity to anyone.

Abundant contents: besides news, we also deliver information about films, sports, women and other interesting and useful topics for our readers.⁶¹

After the establishment of the Chinese edition of the *SEPM*, true censorship from local administration began to be imposed the newspaper as its self-evident influence to Chinese society. This is what foreign language was not able to reach. The establishment of the Chinese edition marked the importance of the *SEPM* as fundamentally different with other foreign newspapers in Chinese journalism history. As Gould recalled:

Whereas ten thousand was a big circulation for an English-language paper in Shanghai, there ought (so we felt) to be almost no ceiling whatever on circulation for a Chinese- language paper. In literate Japan newspaper circulations ran up to three million or so, China was less literate but had more people. Moreover a lot of our big ramshackle four-story brick building was going to waste. Originally the ground floor had been a saloon, the second floor a dance hall, the third floor a gambling den, and the fourth floor was divided into tiny little rooms each just big enough to hold a bed. Ted (Theodore Thackrey) and I reasoned that the first floor was all right for business offices, and print shop, the second floor for Post editorial and other offices, and that even if we virtually wasted the top floor on prosaic and unremunerative

⁶⁰ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 312.

⁶¹ “Qingdu Damei Wanbao [Please Read *Ta Mei Wan Pao*]” *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 17 January 1933. Original translation.

newspaper files, there was very little excuse for not using the remaining third floor in getting out a Chinese edition, using our name in Chinese – *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, or literally Great American Evening Paper. So the thing was done.⁶²

Organising and managing both English and Chinese newspaper was not easy work. Gould recalled a situation in Peking where a newspaper run by the late B. Lenox Simpson and divided by half English and half Chinese had developed an editorial with opposing policies. Thus, Gould tried to avoid this problem by employing Chinese translator-secretaries to make the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* staff translate the English edition of the paper into Chinese language. Another difficulty that Gould met was Chinese readers demanded a richer content than the English edition could offer as Chinese had been spoiled by numerous tabloids in Shanghai. Although Gould decided, in a certain degree, to meet the need of these Chinese readers, he still emphasised to the editors of the Chinese edition that the importance of the paper to present the American features. As Gould recalled:

In the first place, it's a tough job to run a newspaper in a language one reads very imperfectly, as was my (Gould) case. Years before in Peking I had watched the late B. Lenox Simpson operate a bilingual daily half English, half Chinese. One morning he woke up to the fact that the two sections were pursuing not only different but diametrically opposite editorial policies. In the case of *Ta Mei* I sought to escape this fate by various means, including the employment of successive Chinese translator-secretaries and efforts to make the *Ta Mei* staff translate the *Post* into Chinese. They argued that their Chinese readers had been corrupted by the influence of Shanghai's "mosquito" press, so that their customers demanded an even spicier diet than the by no means flavorless *Post* provided. These "mosquito" papers were so called because they stung, fluttered about, and despite diligent police search couldn't be tracked down as to offices of origin. Therefore *Ta Mei* had to provide scandal, gossip, and (despite our insistence that it was an American paper in Chinese) patriotic service to China whenever the editors thought they could get away with it.⁶³

Delivering news at first time was an advantage of the *SEPM* in the competition in Shanghai. Gould recollected it as following:

As Shanghai is located almost precisely on the opposite side of the world from New York, our afternoon paper went to press at an hour when American and British people had gone to sleep and their day's doings had been fully radioed out to the Far East. Until the *Post* rose to prominence in its field of four English-language papers, the other three papers – all morning publications – could hold this news for hours and then give it to their readers simultaneously. We argued, with

⁶² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 314-15.

⁶³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 316-17.

justice, that the *Post* was so favoured by the construction of the globe that virtually everything arriving by telegraph from America and Europe could be read in our paper the evening before our competitors printed it.⁶⁴

This advantage was maintained and continued, and it benefited the Chinese edition of the *SEPM*. Hu Daojing in his memoir mentioned that a distinct advantage of the *SEPM* in the press of Shanghai was its exclusive rights to use the dispatches of the International News Service.⁶⁵ If there were any special news item, the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* was thus able to translate this material from English into Chinese.⁶⁶

Reporting news: conflict with the Nationalist government

Conflict with the authorities continued to be a hallmark of the *SEPM* as a key practice of professional journalism was seen as holding powers to account for their action. It certainly came to a head when reporting on the activities of the group called the Blue Shirts. The *SEPM*, on 20 July 1933, published a document detailing the names of fifty-five Chinese leaders to be assassinated. This document was handed to the newspaper by Harold Issacs who had a political bias which was pro-communist and he exposed the origin of the document as being from the Communist central press agency.⁶⁷

Wu Tieh-cheng condemned the *SEPM* on 20 July 1933 with the claim that it had fabricated the assassination plan. This was reported in the *Central Daily News* of 21 July 1933, with Wu pointing out that this message was maliciously reprinted from the *China Forum*, which was regarded as an anti-Nationalist Government and pro-Communist agency. He claimed that the purpose was to alienate the relations between political and military leaders, and between central and local administrations. Wu claimed the article had exerted a dreadful effect to the society. Based on Wu's comment, the *Central Daily News* further claimed that the Nationalist Government had ordered the Shanghai municipal government to warn the newspaper and force the paper to rectify the information as it had seriously discredited Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist

⁶⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 314.

⁶⁵ In 1958, there was a merger between the International News Service and the United Press as the United Press International, and it formed the current United Press International.

⁶⁶ Hu Daojing, "Shanghai Gudao Shenghuo," 116.

⁶⁷ Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 105.

Government, and had provoked outrage from the Nationalist Government.⁶⁸

The Blue Shirts was an undercover political group of officers who were disillusioned and looking for a way to strengthen nationalism in support of Chiang Kai-shek. Many writers used this as evidence that Chiang had a tendency towards fascism as this group believed that could use whatever means, including assassination to achieve their aims.⁶⁹ It was a secret faction within the Nationalist Party run on Italian fascist lines and largely funded by the Party Book Shop, a publishing house for Nationalist party-political propaganda. On the same day when the *SEPM* published the news about the Blue Shirt's assassination plan, a telegram was sent to Chiang Kai-shek, reporting that:

[...] the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* as an English newspaper in Shanghai based on the information from anti-Nationalist Government Guangzhou News Agency and pro-Communist China Forum published your [Chiang Kai-shek's] secret order to the Blue Shirts about assassinating 55 opposition leaders with great detail. The newspaper appeared to deliberately use propaganda tactics against the government, and the news would generate a negative impact on society. We must demand the mayor of Shanghai to issue a warning to the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, and ask them to rectify its report.⁷⁰

Chiang Kai-shek responded with the instruction by asking the newspaper to rectify its story.⁷¹ There is a view that the assassination list was likely to be created by Zhou Enlai's office with propaganda intentions.⁷² However, the telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, which has been cited above, shows that the authenticity is very likely to be confirmed through Chiang's own order. To the Nationalist Government in pre-war period, it was not easy to control a newspaper which was located in Shanghai foreign concession area. As Jay Taylor said, compared with the Communist areas where there was a tight control over censorship of publications, the newspapers and journals in the Nationalist Party controlled regions were not consistently managed but rather erratic in the censorship methods. In the foreign concession ports, the situation was particularly difficult.⁷³

The difficulty for the Nationalist Government in dealing with the Blue Shirt

⁶⁸ Hu Yingwen Damei Wanbao Zaoyao [The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury spread rumours], *Central Daily News*, 21 July 1933.

⁶⁹ Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 101-02.

⁷⁰ Academia Historica, 002-080200-00107-128.

⁷¹ Academia Historica, 002-080200-00107-128.

⁷² Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 105.

⁷³ Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 103.

assassination report by the *SEPM* was reflected. The government, as it did not have jurisdiction over the Shanghai foreign concession area, was not able to directly participate in dealing with the event, but asked foreign administration for assistance. On the 21st of the month, Wu Tieh-cheng sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, indicating that he had arranged to formally protest to the newspaper and the American Consulate about the release of this damaging news and its impact on the Nationalist Government. At the end of July, the American Consulate finally replied to Wu Tieh-cheng that they had consulted with the *SEPM*, and proposed that they adopt a more prudent attitude when choosing news sources.⁷⁴ On 29 September of the same year, the *SEPM* again provoked the Nationalist Government with its news report by publishing a story that Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei (one of Chiang's key competitors within the Party) and Soong Tse-ven (at that time, the Minister of Finance) would propose to resign. On the following day, the *Central Daily News* promptly clarified that none of them were planning to resign, and condemned the *SEPM* as being libellous and violating the law.⁷⁵

These cases reflected the conflicts around news reporting between the Nationalist Government and the *SEPM*. However, the Nationalist Government in pre-war Shanghai did not have administrative bodies to enforce their policies inside the foreign settlements; as a result they were obliged to resort to a foreign institute such as the American Consulate when they had disputes with news providers. Their sphere of influence was outside the foreign settlement and therefore the *SEPM* was not adversely affected, despite its position taken.

By 1934, an imbalance within the world of journalism was clearly developing. The basic situation of the Chinese press in 1934 was one of inertia with a continued over-reliance on colonies and foreign treaty ports and little development outside these areas. These circulation figures clearly show the areas in which newspaper circulation was limited as well as drawing attention to the importance of areas such as Hong Kong, Henan,

⁷⁴ Academia Historica, 002-080200-00111-019.

⁷⁵ Song Zhongyao Tanhua: Jiang Wang Song juewu Cizhiyi, Damei Wanbao Wuduan Zaoyao [An Important speech by] Soong Tse-ven: Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Soong Tse-ven do not intend to resign, and the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* Spread Rumour groundlessly], *Central Daily News*, 30 September 1933, 2.

Shanghai and Guangdong.⁷⁶

In the table, Hong Kong under the British administration and Kwantung Leased Territory under the Japanese administration reached 5393 and 4000 in the column of 'Readers per 10,000 People' respectively, apparently higher than other areas in China. Shanghai and Tianjin belonged to the provinces of Jiangsu and Hebei respectively; therefore they have not been shown independently on the table. The fact that there were foreign concessions in these cities accounts for the visibly higher index of readers.

Japanese aggression was growing in Shanghai. The former Editor, Carol Crow, noted numerous anecdotes about excessive Japanese militaristic responses to minor incidents, such as the persecution of a cabaret club owner whose patron's pear accidentally hit a member of the Japanese naval patrol⁷⁷, the humiliation of a Persian boy and his parents when the boy thumbed his nose at the Japanese and a soap manufacturer who insulted the Japanese Emperor by including a picture of an umbrella on his packaging.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ The Kwantung Leased Territory, located in the southernmost part of the Liaodong Peninsula in the south of Manchuria, existed from 1898 to 1945. It mainly consisted of Dalian and Lüshun. This area should have been forced to cede to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, but Japan soon after gave up this territorial claim under the strong pressure imposed on it by Russia, Germany and France. Subsequently, the Russian Navy entered the seaport of Lüshun in December 1897, renamed the place as Port Arthur, and thereafter formally acquired a 25-year tenancy over land under the Russia-Qing Convention, signed by the Qing Empire and the Russian Empire on 27 March 1898. Russia started its effective control over the land, and their troops were dispatched to quarter, but this situation was not maintained over the next decade. Japan, as the victor of the Russo-Japanese War, replaced Russia to take over and govern the area in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth signed on 5 September 1905. After the Revolution of 1911, the Beiyang Government under Yuan Shikai's administration signed the Twenty-One Demands with Japan, in which Japanese tenancy of the Kwantung Leased Territory was lengthened to 99 years. Manchukuo was established in 1932, and it replaced the Republic of China to become the nominal owner of the Kwantung Leased Territory. The Manchukuo government maintained recognition of Japan's lease of the land, and this arrangement continued until the end of the Second World War. For more details, see Kobayashi Hideo, *Manshū no Rekishi* [A History of Manchuria] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008), 21-34; Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2001), 187-98. Manchuria became the place where Russia and Japan competed to enlarge their respective influence and dominance following the First Sino-Japanese War. After the Revolution of 1911, Zhang Zuolin, a native Manchurian, gradually took control over Manchuria. In the later part of Zhang's rule, Manchuria was highly independent from the Chinese central authority. Manchuria experienced relatively fast development during this period of rivalry amongst Zhang Zuolin, the Soviet Union, and Japan. In the 1920s the conflict for the dominance over Manchuria successively intensified, finally leading to the Huanggutun Incident in which Zhang Zuolin was assassinated. The Japanese Kwantung Army successfully plotted and executed the bombing of Zhang's special train as it crossed a bridge close to Huanggutun railway station. The Huanggutun Incident dramatically changed the status quo of the relative power balance in Manchuria. Zhang Xueliang soon after inherited his father's rule of Manchuria, and declared his acceptance of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. This decision finally incurred the aggressive response from Japan with the Mukden Incident and subsequent Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. A state of Manchuria, known as Manchukuo, was declared in 1932 and Aisin-Gioro Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing Empire, propped up as Emperor of Manchukuo. For more details, see Kobayashi, *Manshū no Rekishi*, 56-72; Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 258-62, 304-87.

⁷⁷ French, *Carl Crow*, 189.

⁷⁸ French, *Carl Crow*, 190.

Table 2: Situation of Newspapers' Circulation and Readership in each Area of China in 1934⁷⁹

Areas and Provinces	Circulation	Population	Readers per 10,000 People
Anhui	23,532	19,832,665	11
Zhejiang	103,242	22,043,300	46
Kwantung Leased Territory (Dalian)	120,050	300,000	4,000
Fujian	50,395	13,157,791	45
Henan	36,120	307,831,909	11
Hong Kong	276,700	513,000	5,393
Hebei incl. Tianjin	520,400	34,186,711	152
Hunan	52,300	28,443,279	18
Hubei	114,600	27,167,244	41
Gansu	2,945	5,927,997	4
Jiangxi	37,300	24,466,800	15
Jiangsu incl. Shanghai	1,139,080	33,786,064	337
Guangxi	14,100	12,258,335	11
Guangdong	260,800	37,167,701	20
Guizhou	3,400	11,114,951	3
Macau	11,200	78,000	140
Manchuria	118,100	20,000,000	95
Shaanxi	122,500	11,030,827	20
Shandong	27,700	30,803,245	39
Shanxi	27,700	9,465,558	29
Suiyuan	5,600	1,900,000	29
Sichuan	97,700	40,982,810	19

⁷⁹ The data is originally from a survey published on the column of 'Jize Zuotan' [Journalists Seminar] of *Ta Mei Wan Pao* (the Chinese edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*) on 7 December 1934. The table is drawn by referencing Chin Sei-Jeong's reorganisation. See *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 7 December 1934; Chin Sei-Jeong, "Print Capitalism, War, and the Remaking of the Mass Media in 1930s China," *Modern China* 40, no. 4 (2014): 399.

C. V. Starr approved an editorial by Gould and Thackrey which condemned the Japanese as a negative power.⁸⁰ The article describes the intensity of this rage as follows:

Japanese military forces and gunmen have not only lost their usefulness as a part of Shanghai's defence scheme; they have forfeited their right to remain on International Settlement soil. .

Today we are no more concerned with the technicalities of the Japanese position than the Japanese have thus far been concerned with the rights, property, and lives of the rest of us.

The plain fact is that Japan is waging war against China – and is most improperly using the International Settlement's neutral soil as a base for such war.

Not only has she jeopardised the whole future status of the Settlement by such activity but she also has taken over police power from Settlement authorities in a way which we consider undesirable in the extreme, she has extended the power to an area never before contemplated by others at the outset, and she has misused that power in a variety of acts, including arson and murderous attacks upon helpless prisoners.

Without delay International Settlement authorities should publicly disassociate themselves from these excesses.⁸¹

This stimulated criticism towards the Foreign Settlement administration which was seen to be lacking the ability to solve the Japanese aggressive action. The American Consulate General also used threats and pressure to potentially close down the newspaper permanently but the foreign authorities in the end did nothing. The result was that many advertising contracts were cancelled even though a lot of newspapers were sold.⁸² During the Shanghai incident the demand for the *SEPM* almost doubled.⁸³ It was in this newspaper environment – on 31 August 1934 – that the *Journalist Seminar* column commenced in the Chinese language version of the *SEPM*.⁸⁴ It is through the work of the influential *Journalist Seminar* that the state of journalism in China at this time can be analysed.

⁸⁰ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 310-11.

⁸¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 311.

⁸² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 311-13.

⁸³ Woodhead, *A Journalist in China*, 248.

⁸⁴ Chen Gaowen, "Xinwenxue Zhuankan: Dameiwanbao · Jizhe Zuotan: Wei Jinian Yun Yiqun Shishi 15 Zhounian Zuo [Journalism Special Column: Ta Mei Wan Pao, *Journalist Seminar*, for Commemorating the 15th anniversary of Yun Yiqun's Death]," *Xinwen Daxue* 1994, no. 3: 38.

Journalist Seminar: a milestone in Chinese journalism

From 1934, the *SEPM*'s Chinese edition the *Ta Mei Pao* published a supplement called *Journalist Seminar*. As this complete table of translated article titles indicates, the supplement was focused on a number of issues such as news related to the journalism field, issues faced by journalists at various locations, foreign journalism and the press, technology and development, technical skills such as interviewing, theoretical issues such as free speech and the use of language.⁸⁵

It is important to note that the journalists who participated in the seminar held distinct and different opinions, but held in common ideals regarding journalistic professionalism and the important aim of gathering together Chinese journalism professionals. In accordance with Yuan Shu's recollection, the political spectrum of the people who attended the seminar was diverse, containing left wing, centre, right wing, and some of them were objectivists. The main organisers and authors of the *Journalist Seminar* were Yun Yiqun, Yuan Shu, Lu Yi, and Liu Zucheng.⁸⁶

Yuan Shu specifically mentioned three members of the seminar: Lu Yi; Wu Bannong; and Hang Shijun. He said that Lu Yi at that time was just a simple democrat, Wu Bannong held middle course, and Hang Shijun had strong background of being in the Green Gang and the Nationalist Party.⁸⁷ Although Yuan Shu had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party when he engaged in the *Journalist Seminar*, he clarified that this seminar did not have any connections with both the Chinese Communist Party and the pro-Communist League of the Left-Wing Writers. Yuan even misunderstood that he was the only member of the Chinese Communist Party in the groups of people of the *Journalist Seminar*.⁸⁸ He obviously did not know that Yun Yiqun, another activist in the seminar, had joined the Party in 1926.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ The complete list of articles published is at the end of this chapter. This table is from Xu Zhongji, "Meijie Juese Yu Xinren: 'Jizhe Luntan' Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study on the Journalism Seminar]" Anhui University, 2013. Unpublished MA thesis. My translation.

⁸⁶ Yuan Shu and Ding Ganlin, "Yuan Shu Dui Wenyi Xinwen Ji Jizhe Zuotan De Huiyi [Yuan Shu's recollections on Arts Journalism and Journalism Seminar]," in *Jin Ganlin Wenji* [A Collected Work of Ding Ganlin], ed. Ding Ganlin (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2005), 46.

⁸⁷ Yuan and Ding, "Yuan Shu Huiyi," 44-45.

⁸⁸ Yuan and Ding, "Yuan Shu Huiyi," 46.

⁸⁹ See Gu Xueyong, *Qicai Qiwen Qian: Yun Yiqun Zhuan* [Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House] (Shanghai: Shanghai), 30-31.

Although some key figures were CCP members, this was not a problem for these members or the Party in terms of limiting discussions or affecting the goal of developing professional journalism. The party itself was established by intellectuals and from within intellectual circles. In the early period of the Party's history, party members were, in the main, intellectuals who relied on their occupations, such as writers, editors, lawyers, journalists and university professors for a living. They were not paid by the Party for their participation in revolution, and they were motivated to work for the cause by doing their profession well - their professional income was crucial to their political activities and aims.⁹⁰ So, although later, in movements such as the Yan'an Rectification Movement, Communist Party membership required an orthodox manner of thinking and using writing, the party members at this time had relative intellectual freedom, which meant that their journalism was independent of, and separate from, Party influence.⁹¹

In actuality, the journalist seminar did not initially publish their seminar contents in the *SEPM*. The original publication is not noted and member Yuan Shu could not recall the name of the original paper in his memoirs. However, it is the *SEPM* that comes to be most associated with the seminar. After publishing several issues, conflict developed between the seminar contributors and the newspaper editors, causing Wu Bannong, who was working for the *SEPM*, successfully persuading the paper to establish a supplement for them: the *Journalist Seminar*.⁹² It is important to note that the influence of the *Journalist Seminar* column still exists as it was the foundation of the Chinese Youth Journalists Association, which grew into the current Chinese official journalist organisation: All-China Journalists Association.⁹³ At the time, the *Journalist Seminar* noted their purpose:

We are trying our best to enrich the column to take part responsibility of improving journalistic endeavour. These are the materials that we need in accordance with our plan: prisoners.

1. Discussion of journalism theories
2. Information about Chinese and foreign scholars on journalism

⁹⁰ Chen Yung-fa, *Zhongguo Gongchan Geming Qishinian* [Seventy Years of Chinese Communist Revolution] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, Ltd., 2013), 132-33.

⁹¹ The tragic fate and experience of Wang Shiwei is a typical example which reflects the cruel rectification in Yan'an aimed at forcing the Pro-Communist intellectuals from Shanghai to become CCP members based on the standard set by Mao Zedong. See Timothy Cheek, "The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong's Yan'an Talks in the First CPC Rectification Movement," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 11 (January 1984): 25-58.

⁹² Yuan and Ding, "Yuan Shu Huiyi," 45.

⁹³ See Ma Guangren, "Woguo Zaoqi De Xinwenjie Tuanti [Earlier Journalism Associations in China]," *Xinwen Yu Chuanbo Yanjiu* 1988, no.1: 69.

- studies
- 3. Studies on practical techniques for the press
- 4. Introduction and investigation on the local press
- 5. Information about the journalistic cycle, and all theoretical and practical narratives based on the view of other subjects about journalism studies and management.⁹⁴

In 1935, the *Journalist Seminar* changed to being published each Thursday. As can be seen from the following table, the contents of the *Journalist Seminar* in this period became more and more concerned with political events specifically, with Japan and with some mention of Italy. The state of the press and newspapers in Soviet Russia and Germany were also discussed. The moral and personal dilemmas facing journalists and the discussion of character reveal the concerns that journalists were facing during this increasingly tense period. At the same time, issues of pay and conditions as well as the state of journalism overall are continuing. As can be seen from the table, the death of the influential Missouri School of Journalism founder, Walter Williams, was well noted in the Seminar. It is also interesting to see that the very form of the *Journalist Seminar* – the supplement – was also under consideration. Towards the end of the year, Japanese press censorship and control come to dominate. The journalists are clearly affected and many come to see journalism as a way of saving the nation.

In this year – 1935 – Cheng She-Wo, who had delivered the lecture that the *Journalist Seminar* article “Three developmental routes for newspapers” was based on, established the newspaper, *Lih Pao*, in Shanghai. Cheng She-Wo formed the paper after touring American institutions. The paper relied on simply written human interest stories, reaching a circulation of 200,000.⁹⁵ There was strong interchange between newspapers at the time and *Journalist Seminar* contributor Yun Yiqun later went to work for the newspaper, *Lih-Pao*. 1935 was also the year of the important Zunyi Conference. At this conference, the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Communist Party was confirmed and the CCP marked their movement from Russian style central military practices towards a system to “develop and organise the struggles of the broad masses.”⁹⁶ This would be very significant for the future of Chinese journalism, specifically limiting options for professionalisation. Although journalists at the time were suffering from the

⁹⁴ Bianjizhe Yan [A Speech of the Editor], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 September 1934.

⁹⁵ Chen, “Xinwenxue Zhuankan,” 38.

⁹⁶ Benjamin Yang, “The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao’s Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 106 (June 1986): 265.

conflict with the Nationalist party, which was seeking to enforce partisan journalism, to a large extent they were protected by Shanghai's extraterritoriality. However, travelling outside showed that the protection offered by extraterritoriality was only limited to the international or foreign settlements. For example, renowned media magnate and journalist, Shi Liangcai, along with his wife, son, niece, and the son's schoolmate, were attacked on Chiang Kai-shek's instruction when holidaying outside Shanghai in Haining town, Zhejiang Province. Shi Liangcai, his chauffeur, and his son's school mate died.

Chinese journalism's professionalism was also being limited by actions of the Nationalist Party, through compromising actions by Chiang Kai-shek's secret police – the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. Headed by Dai Li, who also headed the secret Blue Shirts, Bureau agents sometimes posed as journalists, which reduced the professionalism and reputation of the occupation, overall:

Lacking police authority and cover, Dai Li's men frequently chose to pose as journalists, since this gave them a plausible reason for asking questions and taking photographs, Zhang Renyou, for example, pretended to be in charge of the Shanghai office of Wenzhou ribao. Many agents actually held bone fide jobs as reporters and even published journals and magazines.⁹⁷

Around the same time as the Zunyi conference, tensions between the Nationalist armies and the Japanese worsened, with the East Chahar Incident and the North Chahar Incident. A series of agreements led to Japan gaining greater control of Chahar and Rehe. By the close of the year, the December Ninth Movement broke out in Peiping. Thousands of students from universities of Peiping took to the streets, appealing the government to promote democratic development, stop the civil war and prepare for a self-defence war against Japan.

Journalists acknowledged the dangers but still strove for professionalism. On the first year anniversary of the *Journalist Seminar* column, Yun Yiqun argued for the professionalism ideal. As he said:

We deeply feel that journalists hold a very responsible position within the current environment. However, some journalism staff today have

⁹⁷ Frederic E. Wakeman, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 138

almost forgotten their responsibilities and we realise this is a very dangerous situation, which concerns both the healthy development of the Chinese journalism endeavour and the fate of the whole Chinese nation. We had confidence that the Chinese press would use their initiative and drive, but it seems like lots of staff do not take the disturbing facts seriously. Therefore, we should not rely on others, but rather take the responsibility ourselves.⁹⁸

By 1936, Yan'an in Shaanxi province had changed hands from Nationalist Party control to Chinese Communist Party control (in large part because of the close positive relationships the communists had built with local people. The arrival of the last Communist troops in Shanbei marked the end of the Long March. It was this year that American journalist Edgar Snow also arrived in Shanbei, the Red Base of Chinese Communist Party, to conduct interviews for the *Daily Herald*. The inclusion of Snow was part of the Chinese Communist Party's strategy to engage and involve the Western media with their struggles.

The *Journalist Seminar* ceased after 88 issues with the last issue being released on 7 May 1936.⁹⁹ In the memoirs of active members, which were published in the 1980s, it is claimed that the Nationalist Party put strong pressure on the *SEPM* to close the supplement. However, it is likely the reasons were far more complex and multi-factorial, such as the difficulties of collecting enough articles each week and the departure of many journalists to other cities. As the list of articles from 1936 shows, censorship and discussions of the role of journalism dominated these last months of the supplement.¹⁰⁰

The *SEPM* personalised the growing conflict between the Japanese and Chinese in 1936 with a letter that addressed the hurt a young Japanese child had experienced when bullied by a Chinese boy. The case involved a boy in a Japanese school being "slightly thrown" by a Chinese boy, leading the school to demand Chinese and Japanese police action. It showed an attempt to de-escalate tensions between Chinese and Japanese citizens by humanising the protagonists and putting the issue into the correct proportion. The article, concentrating the broad and powerful issues down to the interaction between the two

⁹⁸ Huigu Yu Qianzhan [Review and Anticipation], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 22 August 1935.

⁹⁹ Xu Jizhong, "Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jizhe Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study Based on the Journalist Seminar]" (master's thesis, Anhui University, 2013), 17.

¹⁰⁰ Xu, "Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren," 23-25.

children, “provoked more comment than any of the scores of weighty pronouncements which have been published”.¹⁰¹

Dear Kasuo Kose:

We are deeply regretful over your rough handling. Painful recollections convince us that it is no fun to be even slightly thrown by other boys' of any nationality!

In mentioning this matter, we speak from an expert point of view, for the Americans in the office of the Shanghai Evening Post were mostly raised in small but highly international small towns of the United States. Without exception, we each and all of us can testify, to having been thrown, at about your age and for some years thereafter, both slightly and with enthusiastic vigour, by boys from under many flags. These boys were coloured white, black, yellow, brown, red and all the other skin-hues known to the human race, and our general impression is that it hurts about as much to be thrown by a fellow-American as by a Chinese, providing both throw with the same vim and vitality. On the other hand, if an American or, say, a Japanese, throws harder than a Chinese, the first hurts worst.

Without having had the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, Kasuo, we have a notion that you didn't ask to be put into the newspapers. We rather imagine that, if it were left up to you, you'd prefer to fight your own battles. We doubt very much if you want to play even a minor part in provoking an International incident.

In short, it's our idea, that perhaps you might, if left to yourself, find ways and means, of your own to square accounts with that Chinese boy if he really did you dirt. You are up against a pretty common boy problem, and we are willing to believe you are competent to handle it in due course if let alone and given elbow room.

Without meaning to judge your elders too harshly, Kasuo, we suspect that in this affair your supply of common sense is better than theirs. We suggest that the school authorities, the Pootoo road Police Station, the Japanese Consular Police, the Japanese Consulate General and the Japanese Embassy all fall back and see if you are not perfectly competent to look out for yourself even at the tender age of four years.¹⁰²

By the beginning of 1937, Japan had control of the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong, either through military invasion or through collaboration with Japan-friendly governments.

¹⁰¹ One for the Japs, *Warwick Daily News*, 9 May 1936.

¹⁰² One for the Japs, *Warwick Daily*, 9 May 1936.

The Japanese colony of Manchukuo gave Japan a firm foothold in China's north east but China's central power, and site of the Nationalist Government was Nanjing. Defeating Shanghai would be a huge step toward defeating Nanjing. This also was the year that the *SEPM*'s radio channel began to broadcast under the name 'Ta Mei Radio Station'. The Battle of Shanghai broke out in a similar way to the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July, 1937, with Japan capitalising on historic unequal treaties. Under the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement of 1932, China was prohibited from having any army presence within Shanghai. The same agreement gave Japan the right to base troops in Shanghai. In the lead up to the battle, the Japanese used the features of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement to full effect.

By mid-1937, the Japanese had multiple military garrisons within the city and its many factories and warehouses were militarily reinforced. The Japanese navy also patrolled Shanghai's rivers. In August, Japan dramatically increased troop numbers in Shanghai, precipitated by the shooting of a Japanese Lieutenant, which led the Nationalist Government to break the terms of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement and bring Chinese Army troops into Shanghai. Small scale, small arms gun fire quickly escalated to outright battle. The start of full-scale war between China and Japan can be recognised as the peak time of the newspaper and the boom period. As Gould himself recollected that following the Japanese attack on Shanghai his newspaper stepped into the 'golden opportunity'. On 14 August 1937, the Japanese air force started to bomb Shanghai and many casualties followed as did chaos in the city. Whilst other papers shut down in the attack, the *SEPM* immediately increased printing and the press machines worked without stopping.¹⁰³ Chinese resistance and success despite significant technological disadvantage surprised the Japanese military, which had expected a quick and easy victory. However, after nearly three months of fierce battle, the Chinese army withdrew from metropolitan Shanghai on 26 October 1937 and Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese.

The *SEPM* was established in a time that saw the Nationalist Government under threat from every direction. In violent conflict and competition with the Chinese Communist Party, it resorted to internal state-controlled terror to control and destroy its internal

¹⁰³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 317-18.

enemies. While it was weak, due to internal competition and ideological hatred of the Communists, it failed to quell the invasion by the Japanese, by military power or diplomatic might. Its policy of prioritising internal pacification over external resistance proved to be disastrous. This period for the *SEPM* ended in August 1937.

Shanghai as an 'isolated Island', 1938

The Battle of Shanghai began in August, 1937 and was formally won by the Japanese military on 12 November. A couple of weeks later the Nationalist Government announced Chongqing as the wartime capital of China. Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro was unwillingly to escalate the war in China but finally yielded to pressure from hawks in both his government and military. Requests for additional troops were approved and the ever-growing Japanese military presence further antagonised the Chinese pushing the conflict towards full-scale war.¹⁰⁴ The Nationalist Party recognised the importance of the role of international propaganda. After seven months integration, the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party established a special section to take charge of international propaganda under the leadership of Hollington Tong.¹⁰⁵ Tong recalled it in his memoirs:

On November 15, 1937, I received the welcome word that the Supreme National Defense Council had abolished the Fifth Board, alone [sic] with other sweeping Government reorganizations... the functions of the Fifth Board were to be transferred to the Ministry of Information, which would be a Kuomintang organ. The Ministry would contain an international department with authority over overseas publicity. As Vice-Minister, I was to head this department. I retained this authority until the end of war. Ministers of Information came and went but I remained in my International Department.¹⁰⁶

Tong explained the focus of propaganda efforts:

Of course, our big propaganda target during these pre-Pearl Harbor years was the U.S..... During 1937 to 1941, I was fully occupied with this tremendous propaganda task... While we were extending our

¹⁰⁴ Fujiwara Akira, *Nitchū zenmen sensō* [A Comprehensive War between China and Japan] (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1982), 69-72.

¹⁰⁵ Wu Yanjun, "Kangzhan Shiqi De Guoji Xuanchuanchu [The International Propaganda Section during the War of Resistance against Japan]," *Minguo Dang'an* 1990, no. 2: 118.

¹⁰⁶ Hollington Kong Tong and Walter C. Mih, *Chiang Kai-shek's Teacher and Ambassador: An Inside View of the Republic of China from 1911-1958*, General Stillwell and American Policy Change Towards Free China (Bloomington, Indiana: Author House, 2005), 89, cited in Yanagisawa Hideo, "International friend: Ernest Hemingway in the classified documents of China's Kuomintang," *Hemingway Review* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 133. 133-47.

propaganda reach throughout the English speaking world, the representatives of major magazines and newspapers were beginning to come to Chungking to report China's side of the war.¹⁰⁷

The main activities of the International Department of the Ministry of Information were described in a document, "The Summary Reports of the Propaganda Operations":

Highly regarded by cosmopolitans concerned about the Far East, the articles on China written by foreign reporters staying in China and published in foreign countries shall be probed. If anything is found to be inappropriate, it shall be eliminated or suspended, and the reporter should be persuaded to admit his fault. Propaganda from the department, when dispatched by foreign reporters, is expected to be most effective, which can be realized only when we establish our credibility in utilizing them. The maneuver is troublesome and difficult, but shall never be slighted.¹⁰⁸

From the outbreak of the war the fate of the *SEPM* began to fundamentally change for the worse. The Battle of Shanghai commenced on 13 August 1937 and on the following day there were two accidental air bombings within a kilometre of the *SEPM* offices, which struck the Cathay Hotel and then a large group of Chinese refugees congregating at an intersection. The war stimulated a new demand for news which increased the circulation of the *SEPM*. As Gould recalled,

'*The Post* rolled special editions off its rickety flat-bed press as fast as they could be thrown together. *Tai Mei Wan Pao* ran up a big circulation with the advantage of a rotary press. Soon we all started a morning edition called simply the *Ta Mei Pao*. This latter paper, hastily staffed with men picked up from other papers which shut up shop as the Japanese began increasingly to dominate Shanghai life, was where my real headaches began.'¹⁰⁹

Starr's Declaration and Reporting of the Nanjing Massacre

After the retreat of Chinese troops in November, Japan began to put pressure on the foreign concession administrations of Shanghai, asking them to ban anti-Japanese activities in the foreign concessions. Okamoto Suemasa as the Japanese Consul-General to Shanghai firstly wrote to Cornell Sidney Franklin, the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, proposing that the Shanghai concession administrations should take measures to ban the distributing of anti-Japanese leaflets and fly sheets. Harada

¹⁰⁷ Tong and Mih, *Chiang Kai-shek's Teacher*, 108-09, cited in Yanagisawa Hideo, "International friend," 133.

¹⁰⁸ Translations by the author Yanagisawa Hideo, in "International friend," 134.

¹⁰⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 317-18.

Kumakichi, Japanese Defence Attaché to China, in the meeting on 20 November with senior officials, including the Secretary-General of the Council Stirling Fessenden, warned that Japanese troops reserve the right to take any further action if necessary when the foreign concession administrations were not able to effectively restrain the anti-Japanese activities and the press propaganda. Although the concession administrations claimed to keep neutral, they orally promised to actively co-operate with Japan under the realistic pressure.¹¹⁰ Soon after, newspapers in Shanghai were convened by the Shanghai Municipal Council to attend a conference, in which they noticed that censorship would still not apply to the English newspapers, but the work of Chinese newspapers' publication must be cautious. The concession administrations particularly emphasised that as Japan had controlled the areas around the concessions they must be taken seriously. Any publication stimulating local Chinese resistance ambitions would irritate Japanese, and it may cause them to come into the concessions, and take over the newspapers.¹¹¹

The Concession administration under Japanese pressure and influence chose to compromise and therefore in November 1937, a conference was held where the Shanghai Municipal Council made it clear that they supported both the French Concession and the Settlement. It was revealed that the Japanese, who held the power and occupied the space around the settlement, were prepared to take over the job themselves if the Settlement and Concession officials could not control the Chinese papers. After carefully checking the regulation of the Shanghai Municipal Council, Gould and Samuel Chang, a main editor of *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, they decided to adhere to these new regulations.¹¹² This was the beginning of the Chinese edition of the *SEPM*'s obvious censoring of news and reporting as well as a divergence in content from that being printed in its English language edition.

Although the newspaper compromised with the settlement administrations they still maintained a professional journalism ethic and this brought trouble to the paper. The newspaper later published Chiang Kai-shek's speech un-redacted in the morning edition, and it led to the conflicts with the concession administrations. A week later they printed

¹¹⁰ Ma, *Shanghai Xinwenshi*, 823-24.

¹¹¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 318.

¹¹² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 318.

a milder speech by Chiang on the economic problems leading to a two-week ban of the *Ta Mei Pao* by the foreign authorities.¹¹³ This prompted the *SEPM*'s management to declare that they would continue to print regardless of the ban. French police responded with the statement that no papers would be circulated, but the English language version did not come under these same restrictions.¹¹⁴

Up to the end of November, the Japanese further stood up to the anti-Japanese newspapers in the Shanghai foreign concessions. On 28 November, twelve newspapers in Shanghai were notified that the Japanese military would begin to exercise censorship from 3 pm that day. They were warned that they would suffer consequences if they ignored the regulation. Japan on 13 December stated to all newspapers in Shanghai that from the evening of the next day, articles must pass censorship before they were published.¹¹⁵ Under this aggressive pressure, Starr issued an important protestation which was published in both the Chinese and English editions of the *SEPM* on 16 December. It was published again on 15 July 1940 when Wang Ching-wei's authority announced it would expel fifteen Americans, including Starr, Gould and a British journalist. In Gould's memoir, he mentioned that after hearing of the black list:

Neil Starr and I immediately published a front-page jointly signed statement of policy. We commented on the "order of deportation" as having no pretence of legality or any chance of legal execution. We reprinted part of an earlier statement we had issued during December 1937 in which we had said that our papers strove to follow the best American newspaper tradition of "free speech, of fearless and hard-hitting editorials, realistic and non-partisan, and of straight news presentation, devoid of editorial bias." We stressed that "they submit to censorship from nobody." We said that "our policy has been at all times sympathetic to the only recognized Government of China" and that though we sought to be reasonable and not blindly defiant, "outrage and illegality are not weapons that can change us."¹¹⁶

This statement is regarded as the beginning of the Movement of Foreign Flag Newspapers in Shanghai. However, when the *SEPM* took a harder line in public, the paper, to a certain degree, had to compromise under pressure from the Japanese and Shanghai concession administrations. At the same time as Starr's demonstration was

¹¹³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 319.

¹¹⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 319.

¹¹⁵ Ma, *Shanghai Xinwenshi*, 823-24.

¹¹⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 324.

issued, Japanese troops occupied Nanjing and the subsequent massacre ensued over the following weeks. The English edition of the *SEPM* immediately reported this event in detail.¹¹⁷ Obeying the instructions given by the Shanghai concession administrations, the Chinese edition absolutely ignored this event.

Hollington Tong's deputy was Tseng Hsü-pei, who had long term experience in press work in Shanghai.¹¹⁸ Hollington Tong's background as a Missouri-trained journalist coherently and smoothly merged with Chiang Kai-shek's political ambitions in the wartime period, to create an obvious focus on the English-language press, especially newspapers in the Shanghai foreign settlements.¹¹⁹ This emphasis reflected the Nationalist Government's reliance on propaganda, linked to the psychological needs under a wartime environment and, through this and the competing development of journalistic models in the Communist Party, the professionalisation course of Chinese journalism was transforming. Hollington Tong believed that winning over the support of foreign newspapers in Shanghai settlements was vitally important as they had international influence, which then affected the public opinion of the readership's home country. When they started their work in Shanghai, they found that the Japanese had bought over and taken control of the majority of papers with the exception of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* and the *China Weekly Review* (edited by John Powell).¹²⁰ Thus, these two newspapers became the preferred publications.

On December 5 1937, the Dadao ('Taoist') Government, formally the Great Way Municipal Government of Shanghai, was inaugurated, as the administration of Shanghai moved from invasion phase to occupation.¹²¹ This government was formed before the Japanese troops had taken Nanjing and before the provisional government was formed in Beijing. This precipitous action was the outcome of competition for control of China

¹¹⁷ See Jing Shenghong, *Xifang Jizhe Bixia De Nanjing Datusha* [The Eyewitness of the Western Nanjing Massacre in Reporters] (Taipei: Xinrui Wenchuang, 2011), 1:341-42.

¹¹⁸ Wu Yanjun, "Kangzhan Shiqi De Guoji Xuanchuanchu [The International Propaganda Section during the War of Resistance against Japan]," *Minguo Dang'an* 1990, no.2: 118.

¹¹⁹ Wei Shuge, "News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Guomindang Centralised Foreign Propaganda System, 1937-1938," *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (May 2014): 120.

¹²⁰ Hollington Tong, *Dong Xianguang Zizhuan: Baoren, Waijiaojia Yu Chuandaozhe De Chuanqi* [Hollington Tong's Autobiography: Legend of a Newspaperman, Diplomatist and Missionary] (Taipei: Independent Author, 2014), 119-20; Tseng Hsü-pei, *Zeng Xuebai Zizhuan* [Tseng, Hsü-pei's Autobiography] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, Ltd., 1988), 1: 179.

¹²¹ Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2005), 169.

being fought out between the Japanese military divisions, the Central China Area Army based in Beijing and the Central China Area Army based in Shanghai.¹²² The Central China Area Army was trying to bolster its power by forming a government. The regime used the yin and yang symbol as its flag and attempted to create a veneer of being thoroughly Chinese, with the inauguration ceremony acted out as “a piece of theatre”.¹²³ It was run predominantly by Chinese collaborators from outside Shanghai but had very little under its control, with the international settlement, French Concessions and military zones being out of its control, and areas such the Central District and Zhabei being depopulated and bombed out.¹²⁴ Even the outlying counties it claimed, such as Baoshan and Chongming, were not in its control initially and some never entered its control.¹²⁵ Su Xiwen took the mayor’s position:

It is unknown who first coined the term “isolated island.” At the time it was universally popular... “isolated island” generally referred to the Shanghai settlements, but it did not include all the settlements, nor did it include the Huxi sector of the extrasettlement roads. Its area extended from the Huangpu River in the east to Fahua Road and Daxi Road in the west, and from Suzhou River in the north to Zhaojia Creek in the south. Although Hongkou district north of Suzhou River was part of the Shanghai International Settlement, it was an area of concentration for military offices of the Japanese Army and overseas Japanese residents, commonly known as the Japanese Concession, so it was not part of the “isolated island.”¹²⁶

The *SEPM* continued to publish its English language evening and morning versions *Ta Mei Wan Pao* (morning edition) despite the invasion and occupation. It can be demonstrated that the *SEPM* performed the role of leader in the fight with the Japanese invaders and the regime in the Isolated Island period. For example, the *SEPM*’s numerous reports on Hungzhou’s capture and the appalling behaviour of Japanese troops were reprinted across the globe. As an example, the *Canberra Times* in Australia printed the article ‘Japanese Excesses, Shanghai, Friday’ on Saturday the 8th of January 1938:

The “*Evening Post*” publishes letters from foreigners resident at

¹²² Brook, *Collaboration*, 169.

¹²³ Brook, *Collaboration*, 164.

¹²⁴ Brook, *Collaboration*, 169.

¹²⁵ Brook, *Collaboration*, 169.

¹²⁶ Tao Juyin, *Gudao Jianwen: Kangzhan Shiqi De Shanghai* (Shanghai: People’s Publication House, 1979), 27–28, cited in Yao Fei, “A Study of Daily Life in Shanghai During the Isolated Island Period,” *Chinese Studies in History* 47, no. 3 (Spring 2014): 30.

Hangchow stating that Japanese troops after their arrival were given three days' holiday.

They looted wine shops resulting in a terrible orgy in which civilians were killed and women raped.¹²⁷

The *SEPM* was even-handed in its criticisms though, also reporting on the folly of the Nationalist Government in leaving European and Chinese doctors and nurses unutilised.¹²⁸ The *SEPM* journalist, H. G. W. Woodhead, continued to support the Japanese regime. In January, 1938 the foreign press printed an article 'Britain's Policy in China. Japanese Statement. Possibility of Conflict' that recounted Woodhead's interview of a senior Japanese Commander who argued for Britain to co-operate with Japan:

I am afraid that 'if Britain goes beyond the policy of simply defending her interests in China and makes a determined stand to maintain her political and economic relations with the Kuomintang, a very serious Anglo-Japanese conflict may arise,' declared General Matsui, the Japanese military commander, when interviewed by Mr. Henry Woodhead, formerly editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post*, for publication in 'Oriental Affairs.' General Matsui added: 'There is no doubt about Britain's Far East policy. Her support of the Kuomintang is emphasised by the steadiness of Chinese exchange since the outbreak of hostilities and the large amount of arms and ammunition supplied to China. Japan's actions may have offended Britain, but Britain cannot take action behind Japan's back in China, which is Japan's lifeline and is essential for our expansion, especially after Japan's own growth and development. Nevertheless. I must not be represented as seeking trouble with Britain, with which we desire to co-operation.

'The restoration of war-stricken areas in the neighbourhood of Shanghai,' he said, 'will necessitate a Chinese regime with ample resources, which must be drawn from the Customs, whence the sums allowed for foreign loan services must be much lower than hitherto. Meanwhile negotiations on that subject are taking too much time and I may have to revert to the original plan of taking over the Customs to enable the arrangement foreshadowed above to be made.'

Woodhead later recalled that he suffered much insult and abuse because of his refusal to accept that China was blameless:

I suppose no foreign journalist has been subjected to so much abuse in the Chinese nationalist organs as I have. There have been occasions

¹²⁷ Japanese Excesses, *The Canberra Times*, 8 January 1938.

¹²⁸ Ghastly Wastage, *Albury Banner and Wodonga Express*, 18 February 1938.

when abuse has given way to threats. During the Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai in 1932, when I refused to adopt the view that China had been blameless in the matter of provoking Japanese retaliation, both in Manchuria and Shanghai, there were weeks when hardly a day elapsed without my receiving anonymous threatening communications. I was threatened with death in numerous forms.¹²⁹

Those settlement papers that had to submit to censorship found that it was not always possible to predict what would cause offence or concern to the Japanese-managed regime. The regime did not necessarily wish to hide all their acts, and did not apply the same interpretation of events as that by non-Japanese journalists and readers. A telling example is that of South City Self-Governing Committee head, Chen Yun, who was assassinated to create fear amongst the collaborators. When checking the morning papers, Censor Wu Hongkai reported that he did not have to censor anything. The regime did not view reportage on the details of Chen Yun's assassination as subversive, as creating fear among collaborators or as giving succour to the rebels. Rather, advertising Chen Yun's death was seen as adding legitimacy and credibility to the regime, by proving that people loved the regime so much they were prepared to die for it.¹³⁰

Annual Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

In the week preceding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the Shanghai Municipal Police contacted and visited the main Chinese newspapers in Shanghai, including tabloids, requesting that they not publish articles regarding the second anniversary of the event between 6 and 12 July, 1939. According to the Shanghai Municipal Police files, the *SEPM* was visited by police between 1 and 3 July and the General Editor Gould, after receiving the request, is recorded as having "promised to co-operate with the Municipal Police to the best of his ability."¹³¹ Under police pressure Gould promised to cooperate with the foreign authorities of Shanghai, but his statement suggests that he was leaving himself some room to manoeuvre. The other newspapers in the same report all agreed to obey the orders of the Municipal Police.

After visiting the *SEPM*, the Director of Police Services, Commandant L. Fabre, sent a

¹²⁹ China: Thirty Years a Journalist, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 January 1935.

¹³⁰ Brook, *Collaboration*, 184-85.

¹³¹ Shanghai Municipal Police files, D9300/2.

letter to Gould on 4 July reminding him of his promise to refrain from publishing articles that might disturb the public order. Commissioner of Police, Major K. M. Bourne, reported to Fabre the following day that all Chinese language newspapers, including those that were foreign-owned, had given assurances of compliance with the order. However, the police themselves gave little credence to promises by those newspapers. A handwritten note by a Special Branch Officer scrawled on Municipal Police files indicates this lack of faith. It reads: "The assurance sounds good but I place no reliance on it. The papers will be watched by the Sp. Branch."¹³² In fact, the request of the Shanghai Municipal Police did not subtle tangible effect on the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*. On 7 July, *Ta Mei Wan Pao* on its first page in accordance with source of the Associated Press published Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's toughly worded speech, saying China was established based on a strong ground and all national enemies must have the fate of failure finally.¹³³ On the second page, the paper used the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union' article of 'two years war against Japan invasion', emphasising Japanese plan of quickly ending the fighting in the battlefield of China had been failed, and China by its advantages would finally achieve the victory.¹³⁴

Partisan newspapers

With their moves westward, both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party intensified and consolidated their own partisan media system. Meanwhile, in Shanghai, by relying on extraterritoriality and the anti-Japanese nationalism over the one year time frame of the Isolated Island, the Shanghai-based media utilised their Western ownership as a signboard to successfully avoid censorship and strengthened public opinion against Japanese invasion and the Chinese collaborated government.

The year of 1938 opened dramatically with worsening tension between the Nationalist party and the Communist party, with Communist Party's *Xinhua Daily* newspaper being attacked in Chongqing on the evening of 17 January 1938. The newspaper's history to a certain degree reflects the spotty Nationalist-Communist relations. As the war against

¹³² Shanghai Municipal Police files, D9300/2.

¹³³ Jiangweiyuanzhang Zuori Fabiao Gao Riben Minzhong Shu [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek Yesterday issued the Message to Japanese People], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 7 July, 1937.

¹³⁴ Liangniande Riben Qinhua Zhanzheng [The Two Years Chinese War against Japanese Invasion], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 7 July, 1937.

Japan went on, conflicts between the two parties intensified ceaselessly, interference against the *Xinhua Daily* through public censorship or secret sabotage became increasingly frequent. The day before, the Japanese Premier Konoe announced the cessation of negotiations with the Nationalists over settling the war.¹³⁵

Gould and his journalistic colleagues were caught in a dilemma: although they struggled against the authorities during the war, they also needed to compromise and negotiate in order to ensure the survival of the newspaper. This was the case for wartime reporting.

There is some evidence that the compromise made by Gould may have even breached his own code of ethics. In 1938, the Nationalist Party's Bureau of Investigation and Statistics intercepted a secret Japanese telegram dated 10 April from Shanghai to Tokyo. This telegram, which is currently held in Taiwan's archives and has not been previously translated into English, suggest evidence that the *SEPM* was not politically neutral and may potentially have broken the Missouri Journalist Creed by engaging in cheque-book journalism. The telegram reads as follows:

It is said that the editor in chief of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* recently received a certain amount of allowance from Chiang Kai-shek and Soong May-ling. At the end of last month, the newspaper received money of 50,000 yuan provided by Soong Tse-ven as the fund for propaganda against the Reformed Government (of the Republic of China).¹³⁶ Early this month, the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury published a significant number of news articles and many comments against Japan with venomous tone.¹³⁷

It is worth noting that the telegram provides no actual evidence and, in fact, seems to be repeating a rumour. The most acceptable interpretation of this telegram is that the Japanese forces in Shanghai were being asked to account for the hostility being displayed by the *SEPM* during this period. The explanation of bribery was more acceptable than the alternative explanation: politics and the reporting of straight news.

In this same year, the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* also added a literary supplement,

¹³⁵ John Hunter Boyle, "The Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration. The Background to the Defection of Wang Ching-wei," *Monumenta Nipponica* 25, no. 3/4 (1970), 275.

¹³⁶ The Reformed Government of the Republic of China was a collaboration regime established on 28 March 1938 in Nanjing, supported and protected by Japan. Its effectively controlled areas included Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui provinces, and Nanjing and Shanghai cities. The Reformed Government was finally merged into Wang Ching-wei's Nationalist Government in March 1940.

¹³⁷ Academia Historica article 00208020000506042.

'*Night Light*'. Yet the overall threatening atmosphere continued to develop. From as early as February, the *SEPM* staff L. Z. Yuan and Samuel Chang started to receive threatening letters and parcels containing decaying human hands and other body parts, threatening newspapers to cease their anti-Japanese activities.¹³⁸

In March and April 1938, *Ta Mei Wan Pao* published a serialized translation of a Japanese novella, *Ikiteiru heitai* (*Soldiers Alive*), by Ishikawa Tatsuzo. This novella:

... dealt with the behavior of Japanese soldiers in China. The novella was published in Japan in the March 1938 issue of *Chuo koron* (*Central review*) but was suppressed by the Japanese police because of its explicit coverage of Japanese atrocities in China.¹³⁹

This novella illustrates that Japanese war aggression was not supported by all in Japan, and that writers in Japan were also facing censorship problems.

Meanwhile Gould was making statements to support war morale, for example, in the story 'American Journalist Confident of Chinese Defence':

HONGKONG, March 18.—Complete confidence in the future of the Chinese campaign for defence against the Japanese is expressed by M. Randall Gould, director of the "Shanghai Evening Post," organ of American interest in China, and correspondent of the Boston "Christian Science Monitor," who has just returned from a visit to Hankow.

"The Chinese have now the upper hand in operations," he declared. "Chinese troops movements are extremely rapid and their guerilla tactics working extremely well."¹⁴⁰

During the period, the *SEPM* also produced a radio segment called "A letter from the Editor of the Shanghai Evening Post", which was a regular radio episode by Randall Gould that played on international radio stations.¹⁴¹ Unfortunately, little is known about the contents of these episodes.

While there were critical and analytical stories on Japanese atrocities and morale-

¹³⁸ Chu Chen, 'Calamity of the newspapers', *Journalist Weekly*, 18 December, 1938

¹³⁹ See Karen L. Thornber, "Early Twentieth-Century Intra-East Asian Literary Contract Nebulae: Censored Japanese Literature in Chinese and Korean," *Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 3 (August 2009): 763–64; Karen L. Thornber, *Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations of Japanese Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 190–207 cited in Parks M. Coble, *China's War Reporters* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), 213.

¹⁴⁰ Around the World, *The Workers' Weekly*, 15 April 1938.

¹⁴¹ Programmes On the Air Tonight, *The Mercury*, 19 May 1939.

boosting stories of Chinese success, the number of stories outlining the Japanese activities in China were surprisingly few and were buried within the paper, even very extreme situations such as the Rape of Nanking:

The Damei wanbao, which was published in the unoccupied foreign settlement in Shanghai, for instance, carried a two- part article on April 3 and 5, 1938, entitled “Rijun zhanzhu hou zhi Nanjing” [Nanjing after being occupied by the Japanese military]. This was a translation of an account that had originally appeared in the English- language China Weekly Review on March 19, 1938, as an unsigned article entitled “Nanking—What Really Happened—and the Japanese ‘Paradise.’ ” It began by quoting a Japanese account describing an idyllic situation in Nanking, reading in part, “One sees a playground for Nanking children, with soldiers and Chinese children happy together, playing joyfully on the slides.” The article then gives the real story, which was an orgy of looting, mass executions, and rapes when the Japanese entered the city. “The Japanese combed the former Chinese capital looking for money, loot and women.” Women from sixteen to sixty were victims, and protests of foreigners to Japanese diplomatic authorities were of no avail. With fifty thousand Japanese forces in the city, the report stated, only seventeen military police had been deployed to control the anarchy. The report concluded that more than ten thousand people had been killed and eight thousand to twenty thousand women raped. Few Chinese would have read the English-language original, so by including a translation, the Damei Wanbao brought this information to a much wider audience. Yet the two articles were relatively short and both placed on the lower section of page 3 of the paper.¹⁴²

It is possible that placing these shorter articles deep within the paper was a strategy to avoid the attention of censors and allow the journalists a greater degree of safety in an incredibly volatile environment.

On May 3 1938, Su Xiwen recognised the Reform Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing, and accepted its flag in Shanghai. Liang Hongzhi became leader and the Dadao Municipal Government of Shanghai ended. This same year, Nationalist figure Wang Ching-wei (who was noted in the *SEPM*'s 29 September 1933 edition), disappeared from Chongqing into Vietnam. By the end of 1938, the Chungkuang Mansion in Shanghai was hastily prepared for a conference. This conference was between the Japanese Imperial Army and Wang Ching-wei's representative to discuss peace between the Nationalists and Japan. The plan vacillated and evolved from peace movement or 'third force' to a collaborationist regime and Wang Ching-wei morphed

¹⁴² Coble, *China's War Reporters*, 59.

from negotiator to leader.¹⁴³

It must be remembered that Wang defected from Chungking in December 1938 but the 'Reorganized National Government of China' was not formed until March 1940, and even then the government of Japan delayed full recognition for another half year. During the entire period there was continuing series of secret contracts between high level Japanese and Kuomintang negotiators."¹⁴⁴

The official conference report of November 1938 recognised Wang Ching-wei as the individual who would become leader at the opportune time, and he was recognised as the regime's leader well before becoming official recognition in 1940.¹⁴⁵

In June 1938, intense patriotism which occurred in each newspaper was detected by foreign observers when they felt the Nationalist Party flags waved in all anniversaries and sensational editorials to advocate people against invaders and collaborators. Although these activities were organised by the Nationalist Party behind the curtain, the existence of overwhelming nationalism in Shanghai had been an indisputable fact.¹⁴⁶ In February of the same year, Zhu Xinggong joined the Chinese edition of the *SEPM*.¹⁴⁷ He straightaway started to manage and edit the supplement of *Night Light*.¹⁴⁸ In the Shanghai Isolated Island, the positions of the majority of people, especially amongst intellectuals, were complex and ambiguous. Open resistance only applied to the minority of people, and most of them were frightened by their actions.¹⁴⁹ Zhu Xinggong belonged to the very small minority of people who persisted in the clear-cut resistance position. In Jin Xiongbai's memory, Zhu was described as "a madman".

Because of Zhu's presence, the *Night Light* was significantly changed from a literature supplement to a channel for Chinese nationalism. Just as Jin Xiongbai said, anti-Japanese invasion and Wang Ching-wei's collaboration was the target to lead off nationalism in *Night Light*. In the column, many articles directly condemned Japanese

¹⁴³ John Hunter Boyle, "The Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration: The Background to the Defection of Wang Ching-Wei," *Monumenta Nipponica* 25, no. 3/4 (1970): 267.

¹⁴⁴ Boyle, "Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration," 269-70.

¹⁴⁵ Boyle, "Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration," 295.

¹⁴⁶ Frederic Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1996), 17.

¹⁴⁷ Li Wenxuan, *Baozhang Xunhen: Zhongguo Xinwenshi Shang Beicansha De Baoren*, 131.

¹⁴⁸ Ma Guangren, *Shanghai Xinwenshi: 1850-1949* [A History of Journalism in Shanghai: 1850-1949] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1996), 870.

¹⁴⁹ Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), xiv.

invasion and exposed Wang Ching-wei's collaboration activities. In the article 'Japanese Dream', the author directly mentioned the content of the Tanaka Memorial for revealing Japanese ambition to annex China. As the author wrote:

Eight years ago, Tanaka Giichi wrote down that "in order to conquer the world, we need to conquer China first; in order to conquer China, we need to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia first" in his memorial. This is not just a temporal crazy action.¹⁵⁰

Confronting the ambitions of Japan, the author listed examples of empires failed attempts to conquer others, such as the cases of Persia, Rome, Mongolia and Napoleon's France. Scoffing at Japan the author suggests that the pursuing of the Japanese dream "that there is one day that Japanese will become the language of the world" would make them commit a double blunder of history. However, Japanese ambitions had already been brought to bear on the Chinese people at that moment. The author's tone advocated Chinese people hit back at the Japanese with violence:

I initially did not believe such things can happen, but I have witnessed it up to now. Not only myself, but also my nation, and my country are suffering such things.

The only way which can awaken them is to pick up sticks and hit the heads of these dreamers.¹⁵¹

Stories and common fables were often used as tools to maintain Chinese national identity and to illustrate the nature of the collaborative regime. Furthermore, they also served as a moral warning against betraying China by collaboration with the occupying forces. The 'Story of a Fly' is an example of such a fable used in this way (see translation in appendices). The fly, believing that safety lies with his own kind, ignores a warning from a bee and goes to the place where it sees all of its own kind gathered. Alas, it soon discovers that it too is now stuck to fly-paper and suffers their same fate. Reflecting the actions of many Chinese who went along with the collaboration regime believing its rhetoric and promises of protection, the author warns the reader through the character of the bee that "it is not 100% safe to follow others, and safety may not exist in the world

¹⁵⁰ Ribenren De Meng [Japanese Dream], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

¹⁵¹ Ribenren De Meng [Japanese Dream], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

at all.”¹⁵²

Another method of attacking Japan and Wang Ching-wei was to cite Chinese historical stories to motivate and inspire Chinese national spirit and integrity. ‘Su Wu to Shepherd’ is a famous Chinese historical story, in which Su Wu was shaped as the symbol of loyalty to the motherland. When the story was published during the war against Japan, it had an obvious purpose of utilising the past to allude to the present. In the article ‘The Spirit of Su Wu’, the author particularly narrated the story in a way that the character Wei Lü parallels Wang Ching-wei and his collaborative regime, and hints at ways Chinese people might deal with it. As the author wrote:

When Su Wu was detained in Xiongnu, Wei Lü volunteered to attempt to persuade him to surrender. Let us have a look at what Wei Lu said. “Mr. Su, I, Wei Lü, betrayed to the emperor of Han, and surrendered to Xiongnu. Thanks for the grace by Chanyu (chief of the Xiongnu in ancient China) that I was granted a peerage. Now, I possess more than ten thousand slaves, and countless horses and other livestock all over the mountain. Such high position and great wealth that I have would be rendered to you tomorrow if you surrendered today. Otherwise, who will remember you after you died and your body will become fertilizer for the grass?”

Su Wu kept silence after these honeyed words. Wei Lü kept saying that “if you adopt my suggestion to surrender, I would like to become a sworn brother of you. However, if you refuse me today, do you think you can be lucky to have another opportunity to meet me when you want in the future?”

Besides promises, Wei Lü threatened Su Wu by force, but whether he finally achieved his aim? Not only did Su Wu scold him, but even broke up the friendship with him since then.

The spirit of Su Wu is an just awakening spirit!¹⁵³

Besides Chinese stories, there are foreign models in *Night Light* to encourage Chinese patriotic enthusiasm to resist Japan and strive for national independence. At the beginning of the article, the author introduced the geographic position of Poland which was surrounded with three main European powers: Russia, Austria and Prussia. It unavoidably led to the fate of Poland which was conquered and governed by foreigners

¹⁵² Yuyan: Cangying De Gushi [Fable: Story of a Fly], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 24 August 1939.

¹⁵³ Suwu Jingshen [The Spirit of Su Wu], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 18 June 1939.

for a long time until 1918 when Poland acquired independence. This historical experience caused the Poles to exile overseas. The author emphasised that although five million Poles were living overseas, they still maintained their language and national identity, and never forgot their motherland. As the author said:

The Poles as Slavs have a total population of 25,000,000, and there are 5,000,000 living in separate places in the world. In America, when Poles meet with each other, they still speak Polish, and their children all accept education in Polish. Every Pole is able to sing the national anthem 'Mazurek Dąbrowskiego' (Poland Is Not Yet Lost). Since the new Poland was established, many Poles have returned to Poland.¹⁵⁴

However, the author did not purely emphasise the nationalism of Poland, but also highly praised the spirit of striving for democracy and freedom of the Poles. As the author mentioned:

The white eagle on the Polish national flag is the symbol of freedom that the Poles enjoy. The Poles irrevocably seek the sacred freedom, and carefully protect it. All people who struggle for freedom are always considered countrymen and brothers in the Poles' minds. The Poles participated in every war for freedom in the last century. Wars stimulated growing nationalist sentiment and helped many oppressed nations acquire their dream of becoming independent. The Poles in the tumultuous tide restored their glorious motherland, established a free and independent new Poland, and wrote a glorious historical page that people admire.¹⁵⁵

The tactic of stimulating people's connection to their native place was also used to arouse people's national sentiment in *Night Light*. The author of the article 'Stories of Chilli' was from Hunan Province. He was proud of the tough temperament of the Hunan people, and he owed it to eating chilli. Hence, the author introduced and praised chilli.

I am curious as to whether chilli can hearten people up, and make them become tough and gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and Sichuan are the toughest and most unafraid in China. There are some old sayings, such as 'tough temperament of People in Chu area' and 'the Qin Empire must be destroyed by the people of Chu even if there were only three Chu households left'. These expressions reflect the honour and glory of Hunan people.

¹⁵⁴ Zhuoqiu Ziyou De Bolanren, *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 29 August 1939.

¹⁵⁵ Zhuoqiu Ziyou De Bolanren, *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 29 August 1939.

However, at the end of the article, the author proposed a question:

I am obviously not able to have chilli for every meal since I have been in Shanghai, so I yearn for chilli very much. When I write this article, saliva spurts to my lips. However, which day can I go back to my homeland to have chilli?¹⁵⁶

Based on the wartime background, it hinted that the Japanese invasion prevented people in Shanghai from returning to their hometown as usual, and to an extent, it inspired people's emotions with regard to their hometowns.

A common fable

That year saw numerous assassinations of collaborators, such as regime's foreign minister Chen Yu as well as Tang Shaoyi, who was assassinated on September 30 by the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, in fear he would become leader of the puppet regime of Nanking.¹⁵⁷ Chen Yu's assassins were arrested and interrogated by the Shanghai Municipal Police for 16 weeks, revealing nothing. After six days being interrogated by the Japanese police, they revealed everything, including the existence in the International Concession of a secret wireless apparatus used to keep in contact with Kunming, Chongqing, Tianjin and Hong Kong.¹⁵⁸

Wang Ching-wei established his intelligence service in Shanghai known as No. 76 and as a result Shanghai was affected by a serious terrorist-like atmosphere. Nationalist executions of collaborators and Secret police executions of rebels abounded. Gould recollected that Wang Ching-wei's gangsters set up headquarters at 76 Jessfield Road in the west of Shanghai. This heavily guarded place was a scene of horrific crimes such as ransoms, kidnapping, threats and even be-headings. According to Gould, families of the victims that could not afford the ransoms, received ears, fingers and other body parts through the mail. Although the Wang Ching-wei government was still not able to

¹⁵⁶ Lajiao De Hua [Stories of Chilli], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 June 1939.

¹⁵⁷ Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 72; Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 48.

¹⁵⁸ Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 91.

directly control the newspaper within the foreign settlements, No.76 created obstacles to block the distribution channels and threaten or even assassinate journalists and editors to effectively establish control of the journalism.

The *SEPM* became a vital concern in shaping attitudes and therefore the newspaper became the target within this setting.¹⁵⁹ On 18 April 1939, Zhou Guodong, the general vendor of the *SEPM* was assassinated.¹⁶⁰ In April, No. 76 also attempted to purchase all issued papers of the *SEPM* and they stamped out-dated copies and mixed them with current editions to sell in the low light of the evening with the aim of destroying the credit of the newspaper.¹⁶¹ Wang Ching-wei's attempts to stifle the news made international headlines:

MISHAPS TO MAILS "DON'T GO THROUGH."

Japanese administration of the China posts is breeding a flock of "incidents" involving foreign use of the mails, and protests have been flying thick and fast in the direction of the responsible Japanese authorities who plead provocation without touching on the central point as to whether they actually have the right to exercise such power.

Newspapers have been among the major victims thus far, but a considerable variety of mishaps (if they may be called that) has overtaken mail matter of various sorts.

One of the earliest victims of the censors was the American-owned Shanghai "Evening Post and Mercury." No notification was ever given to the management, and its payments in advance for mailing continued to be accepted, but complaints from outport subscribers speedily revealed the fact of a sporadic and largely unsystematic holding-up of individual issues, this later developing to a point where only one or two issues a month seemed to get out. Formal protest was lodged by the American Consulate-General, but neither this nor official conversations elicited much.

Similar trouble began to be experienced by the American China "Weekly Review" and the British North-China "Daily News," and in no case could any satisfaction be obtained. Finally the censors turned their hands to incoming publications, and it was learned that a number of American periodicals from the United States had been detained, while others suffered scissorings of objectionable matter. Such a storm was raised over this that the practice quietly halted, at least temporarily.

¹⁵⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 321.

¹⁶⁰ Yao Fushen, Ye Cuidi and Xin Shumin, "Wangwei Dashiji, Shanghai [Significant Events about the Wang Ching-wei's Puppet Regime, part one]," *Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao* 1989, no. 4: 164.

¹⁶¹ Yao, Ye, and Xin, "Wangwei Xinwenjie Dashiji," 169.

Meanwhile the only uniformly critical (of Japan) paper in North China, the “Peking and Tientsin Times” of Tientsin, British-owned, began to have issues burned by 'the post office officials, and eventually – after the British Embassy had lodged a protest – there was an announcement that it would henceforth be delivered through the mails to no one but the Embassy! This caused a further protest and a storm of fresh, objections throughout the press.¹⁶²

It can be seen that the regime censored newspapers without addressing whether this was legitimate and newspapers responded with a range of strategies such as appeals to diplomatic power and appeals to the basis of commerce (that a service that had been paid for should be allowed). It can also be seen that strenuous protest was, in fact, successful. As well as disrupting the mail, attempts were made to physically destroy the newspaper with bombs and Chinese staff were even killed in the main street.¹⁶³ The French had good physical protection against the attacks provided by small buildings in the street. One Chinese member of the French police force was shot dead however much potential damage from bombs was minimised by them being intercepted and disabled just in time.¹⁶⁴

The fall of Wuhan in October 1938 is a significant marker of the War of Resistance against Japan, which created a situation where both China and Japan were in a stalemate and felt powerless to immediately annihilate each other by military means. This led to a subtle change in Chinese social psychology. The outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident triggered Chinese patriotic passion to mobilise for the cause of resisting Japanese invasion, and people nationwide eagerly responded to the call of saving the country.¹⁶⁵ However, the bloodshed of Chinese armies on the battlefields during the early stage of the war did not stop the apparent Japanese aggressive attack in the view of many people, although the defiant aim of the Japanese for a three-month battle to conquer China had already failed. Almost ten months of fighting over Wuhan finally finished in October 1938 with Japanese military occupation to the city. After a huge sacrifice by both sides, the Nationalist Government had to head west again, and Japan

¹⁶² Mishaps to Mails, *Cairns Post*, 9 February 1939.

¹⁶³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 321.

¹⁶⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 322.

¹⁶⁵ Hung Chang-tai, *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 2.

gave up massive pursuing and attacking, turning to tighten the stranglehold of the northern areas of Chinese occupation.¹⁶⁶ The horrific war, which would undoubtedly continue over a long period of time presented complexity and uncertainty.

Journalist Weekly

Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury started the *Journalist Weekly* supplement to the *SEPM*'s Chinese edition in December 1938. Compared with the *Journalist Seminar* publishing era of 1934 to 1936, China had been facing some new predicaments. The *Journalist Weekly* would become a platform for Chinese journalistic staff to rationally rethink their duties and responsibilities in this special war-time period after experiencing indignation and harsh realities at the early stage of the war.

Table 3: Complete list of *Journalist Weekly* articles – 1938¹⁶⁷

No.	Date	Title
1	1938.12.12	Prologue The past and today of journalism in Hong Kong Internal news agencies in China Journalism of inland China in developing
2	1938.12.19	Sources of warfare news Critic journalism and journalistic criticism News about guerrilla warfare in Pudong Calamity of newspapers Information of the press in inland China
3	1938.12.26	Fault of newspapers in Shanghai About the conflagration in thatched shacks in West Shanghai Interviewer and newspapers Investigation of newspapers in Chongqing Information of the press in inland China

As can be seen from the list of articles in *Journalist Weekly* in 1938, journalistic concerns

¹⁶⁶ Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1-2.

¹⁶⁷ My original translations of these articles.

included the state of journalism in the cities such as Chongqing as well as the hinterland and overseas in Hong Kong. Political news of the most dire sort was reported. At the same time, *Journalist Weekly* also interrogated the state of journalism itself.

The original intention of the supplement forum from the prologue of the *Journalist Weekly* seemed to be only confined to enhance journalists' cultivation and principles in the view of professionalism. The article started with two distinct social impressions towards journalists that they were positively regarded to transmit information and express demands for people, but negatively considered to be responsible for covering up and glamorising evil. The author did not explicitly state the reason for such a radical view towards journalists in the society. Instead he raised the renowned journalist Cheng Shewo's previous censure on Shanghai journalists and interpreted the aim of opening the *Journalist Weekly*, saying:

Cheng Shewo in the previous year was invited to deliver a journalism workshop, and his first words were in the view of newspapermen of Peiping and Tianjin, most of Shanghai journalists like starting rumours when nothing happens and fleecing based on a critical condition. I today must point out that this is a serious misunderstanding. Shanghai journalists in terms of professional ability and courage are much better than those Peiping and Tianjin journalists. This statement partly reflects the truth although it sounds slighting exaggerated. A cultural celebrity I met on the day before yesterday said it is true that the private life of those journalists who have their nightlife is definitely somewhat romantic. The criticism which asks to impose a strict discipline for journalists' private life is too unnatural to accept. My friends are well satisfied when they hear such pleading for them, but it should not become the reason to have a lower serious and rigorous requirement.

In this epoch, journalists hold a position of great responsibility, and raise people's increasing awareness of their responsibility. It seems that people are willing to remain distant from journalists in their daily life, but hope journalists become a reliable compass inside. Therefore, journalists obtain a new lease of life. Vitalised journalists shoulder a heavy cross of workload, setting off on their long journey. They are not lonely, but will encounter great difficulties. They need to cooperate with comrades, thus to stepping into the path of safety.

Journalists' lives should not be deified. They must have some knowledge gaps and vices in their private life as they are just mortals. It may be difficult to overcome all problems and weakness, but they must make some progress if they try their best.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Kaichangbai [Prologue], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 12 December 1938.

It is therefore obvious to see that journalists' cultivation and high principles in the author's opinion are the critical elements to influence the journalists' public image and social contributions.

In this article, the criticisms made at a seminar two years prior by Cheng Shewo were labelled as untenable by the author who instead praised the Shanghai journalists over and above their colleagues of Peiping and Tianjin for their courage and professional skills. The author emphasised the importance of self-improvement of journalists as ordinary people with shortcomings and the cultivation and development of high principles, which had deteriorated during the wartime period. The aim of the *Journalist Weekly*, as the article shows, was to provide a platform where journalistic staff can communicate with each other for common progress.¹⁶⁹

However, within *Journalist Weekly*, the topic of tightening control over journalism became a focus. Administrations usually enhance their restriction over journalism as one of the measures to tighten political and military controls during the war for supreme national interests, and this was generally accepted in *Journalist Weekly*. The main motivation was native nationalism and patriotic enthusiasm. The article 'Journalism and Freedom' by the author pen-named Pangguan was typical in expressing the connection between freedom and interests of the nation-state in journalism. The author believed journalism should have sufficient freedoms, and further pointed out preventing these freedoms was just the deadly enemy of journalistic endeavours. However, this argument in the author's opinion was based on the precondition that the national interests should be paramount to all the others. As the author wrote:

This freedom should be wielded with the premise of non-prejudiced national interests. There is no doubt that the freedom must be restricted once it challenged the national interests. Unifying consensus and actions is crucial in the process of social mobilisation for completing the aim of struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall become zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country, as seen in the case of Liang Shih-chiu.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Kaichangbai [Prologue], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 12 December 1938.

¹⁷⁰ Xinwen Yu Zhiyou [Journalism and Freedom], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 7 July 1939.

That Liang Shih-chiu was considered as a negative case was closely and inseparably related to his elaboration of principle to adopt articles when he was in charge of a column to be published on the 'Plane', a supplement of the *Central Daily News*. On 1 December 1938, Liang made such demonstration on the prologue of 'Plane':

Resistance against Japan right now has been above everything, and as a result, many people are not able to avoid mentioning 'resistance' once they start writing. I slightly disagree with the phenomenon. We are definitely very happy to adopt the articles with the idea of resistance, but the articles that are not relevant to resistance are welcome as long as they reflect the truth and read smoothly. It is not necessary to lamely make a link with resistance. Nobody can benefit from the resistance 'Eight-legged essays'.¹⁷¹

This statement from Liang Shin-chiu instigated a deluge of criticism by intellectual men of the former League of Left-Wing Writers, such as Zhang Tianyi, Hu Feng and Yu Dafu. Under public pressure, Liang was finally forced to resign from the post of editor in chief of the supplement, which he only had for four months. In fact, most articles published in 'Plane' under Liang's management were relevant to resistance against Japan, although there was still a certain gap compared with many other publications considering the enthusiasm and measure of anti-Japanese propaganda.¹⁷²

The structure of extraterritoriality and the location of the newspaper office contributed to the *SEPM* to become a target of the regime's attention. Uchiyama Kanzo described such a situation that a thief followed by the Shanghai Municipal Police escaped along North Sichuan Road to a lane located in Chinese governed area. After making sure there was no Chinese police around, the thief sat down there, and the Municipal Police was not able to take any action because it would challenge Chinese sovereignty.¹⁷³ The newspaper office of the *SEPM* was just located in the Avenue Edward VII, which was the border between the International Settlement and the French Concession. The newspaper building on the French Concession side, and Wang Ching-wei's intelligence service could make the most of this factor to execute their terrorist activities. As Jin Xiongbai recalled:

¹⁷¹ Xinwen Yu Zhiyou [Journalism and Freedom], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 7 July 1939.

¹⁷² Wu Lichang, "Chongdu Liang Shiqiu De Yu kangzhan Wuguan Lun [Reflection on Liang Shi-qiu's Statement of Articles He Adopted not Needed to Relate to the War against Japan]. *Journal of Shanghai University (Social Science)* 8, no. 5 (October 2001): 45.

¹⁷³ Uchiyama Kanzō, Uchiyama, *Shanghai Xiahai: Shanghai Shenghuo 35 Nian* [My 35 Years in Shanghai] (Xi'an: Shaanxi People's Publishing House, 2012), 151-52.

As the No. 76 did not have any informers in the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, when they broke into the building of the newspaper, they felt they were lost and could not locate the editors' office. They threw grenades and shot randomly at anyone inside. Staff of the paper were terrified and they escaped immediately. Then, the rebels burst into the typesetting room, upsetting letterpress types from the case shelf. Some workers who did not flee in time were killed. There was an armoured vehicle dispatched by the police of the French Concession parked outside to protect the newspaper office. ... The rebels who were taking actions inside after hearing alarms blaring ... raced out of the door under Pan Gongya's order. There was a Vietnamese policeman in the armoured vehicle. ... When he saw Pan Gongya guiding a group of rebels armed with guns rushing out of the building, he immediately fired at Pan. Pan's leg was hit and wounded and he at once shot back, hitting the head of the Vietnamese policeman, he died instantly in the armoured vehicle. ... Pan Gongya with his wounded leg tried his best to run across the Avenue Edward VII into the International Settlement.¹⁷⁴ However, his ability had fallen short of his wishes. After throwing his gun into the International Settlement, another side of the avenue, Pan was finally arrested by the police of the French Concession. Another of Pan's fellow whose surname was Shi was arrested at the same time.

...

As Shi's gun had been thrown in the French Concession, (the police of the French Concession) did not have effective evidence to accuse him. Shi claimed himself as a victim, saying that he just passed by the scene and was wounded by shrapnel. He also had a pass certificate of Japanese military police in Shanghai. The police of the French Concession could not do anything, but noticed Japanese military police coming out to release him. A pass certificate of Japanese military police was ferreted out from Shi. ... The Police of the French Concession did not dare to displease Japanese, and asked Japanese military police to bail him out soon after as well.¹⁷⁵

1938 clearly saw an environment of terror for Shanghai's journalists, with Chu Chen noting in his *Journalist Weekly* article 'Calamity of Newspapers' on 19 December 1938:

Following the retreat of Chinese troops from Shanghai as the war developed, the city became an isolated island and with this change the press in Shanghai fell into darkness. Many newspapers that had been publishing for a long time were suspended. Under strong pressure created by the occupation forces, many intellectuals and journalists

¹⁷⁴ The Avenue Edward VII was the border between the International Settlement and the French Concession. The newspaper building of the SEPM was on the French Concession side, thus the police of the French Concession took the responsibility to protect the newspaper.

¹⁷⁵ Cai Dejin and Shang Yue, eds., *Moku: Wangwei Tegong Zongbu 76 Hao* [The Hell: The No. 76, Headquarters of the Intelligence Service of Wang Ching-wei's Puppet Regime] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986), 59.

accepted new tasks and successively moved into hinterland China. There is however a minority of journalists who have decided to remain in Shanghai and these have begun a long march in a lonely and dangerous environment. This is the so-called 'period of calamity of newspapers'. Those journalists who have stood fast and remained in Shanghai are subject to all manner of bloody terrors and coercion. Such coercion spans from soft promises to threats and intimidation, bombings, poisoned fruit, and even the delivery to journalists of severed human body parts such as arms and heads. In the face of such menace and seduction, the beliefs of some have been shaken and these collaborate with the enemy, engaging in shameful works in betrayal of their homeland. However, the majority of these combatants of journalism still remain true to their own positions. They use up the last of their strength in the fight to give hope to people in the Isolated Island.

It has been more than one year since the outbreak of the full-scale war against Japan, several new newspapers have been established in Shanghai, and some newspapers that possess a long history have been re-established. It appears on the surface that it is a boom for the press of Shanghai, but if we analyse the situation more carefully, we can see that the boom is abnormal. That is to say that the press of Shanghai operates in a 'difficult' period and the degree of the difficulty is growing.

It is obvious that the press in Shanghai along with the whole city will continue its descent into darkness until the balance of the war is fundamentally reversed. To consolidate our front, we should enlarge our scale, enrich our contents and unify our position, so that our fighting capacity can be intensified.¹⁷⁶

Chu Chen identified three aspects of Isolated Island journalists' weakness: lack of unity, irrationality in the division of focus and coordination within newspapers and waste of resources, and finally, and understandably, the tense atmosphere of the war.

Conclusion

The importance of the turbulence in politics during this early period of the *SEPM* cannot be understated. The *SEPM* was established as a specifically American voice in an overwhelmingly British Shanghai. The paper accommodated the views of the British by allowing Woodhead's column (albeit with corrected American spellings). In this early stage of the *SEPM*'s existence, the challenge of how to report the Japanese actions in first in Manchuria and soon after in Shanghai, posed real difficulties for the *SEPM*'s editors and owner. Taking a strongly American view, the paper became a voice against the actions taken by the Japanese military, especially the atrocities committed against

¹⁷⁶ Baonai Shiqi [Calamity of Newspapers], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 December 1938.

civilians. This was especially important as censorship started to be imposed and then was accelerated during this period. As can be seen in this chapter, methods and effectiveness of control of the press differed in the Nationalist and Communist controlled areas. In both cases, however, control of the press was seen as important for achieving military and political aims. During this period, the *SEPM* began its Chinese language radio station, thus avoiding some of the limitations placed on print media. One of the *SEPM*'s responses to the increasingly tightening situation was to foster debates around the notion of journalism itself. Through hosting the Chinese language supplement *Journalist Seminar*, the *SEPM* provided a space for discussion regarding the practices of journalism and provided a platform for discussion of increasing professionalism of journalism. This was very important, especially as the 1930s progressed. Politics came to feature more prominently in the *Journalist Seminar* and the function of journalism and its role in the affairs of the nation was a hot topic. With changes in the *SEPM*'s Chinese language publications (closure of the morning edition, commencement of the evening edition and the pictorial), the space for a more overt Chinese nationalism of resistance against Japan was created. The supplement *Night Light* highlighted the controversial views of its editor, Zhu Xinggong.

After Shanghai became an 'isolated island' in the later part of the 1930s, challenges intensified for the *SEPM*. However the paper continued to foster the professionalisation of journalism and provide a space for discussing the role of journalism through the Chinese language supplement, *Journalist Weekly*. Underpinning the ability of the *SEPM* to publish its potentially inflammatory articles and reporting of news unpalatable to all sides (Japanese, Communist and Nationalist) was its positioning, as an American owned newspaper in the French Concession. Protection provided by extraterritoriality was essential for the operating of the paper in both its English and Chinese versions. There were very real dangers for those associated with newspapers of going beyond the protected space as the murder of Shi Liangcai in 1934 demonstrated. By this later period, extraterritoriality was consistently undermined with the assassination of newspaper workers even in protected zones.

Overall, this period shows the striving towards a professional journalism which is diverted and altered from its natural course by the demands of an increasingly fraught, violent and dangerous situation. Journalism's role in saving the nation from attack

became highlighted. As discussed in the next chapter, the murders of the *Night Light* editor Zhu Xinggong in 1939, and editor Samuel Chang in 1940, and assistant manager T. Y. Lee in 1941 were a huge blow for the *SEPM* and symbolised the dangerous and dire state that journalism found itself in during increasingly troubled political times.

Chapter 3: Reporting in the time of war

The Chinese Youth Journalists Association is strongly concerned about the dire situation faced by journalists in Shanghai. The Association in the demonstration wishes for the journalists in Shanghai to sustain their faith, and keep their efforts to maintain internal justice and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the Yangtze River. Nearly half of the total amount of newspapers in Shanghai have been suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left their jobs. The Chinese Youth Journalists Association has established its branches in the main cities of China, and is willing to try the best to help the journalists who are not able to engage in journalism work arrange new jobs in other cities. The Association expresses the great indignation towards the terrorist attacks to journalists, and the respect and sympathy for the journalists involved into serious troubles as they stand their ground in front of temptation.

Journalist Weekly, 10 July, 1939¹

In 1939, journalists in Shanghai faced a terrible situation. The military conflicts between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party during the War of Resistance against Japan intensified.² Journalism was being dragged into the nationalistic approach in order to combat the Japanese forces. At the same time, Wang Ching-wei's regime undertook a range of violent measures to intimidate and control reporting. The *SEPM* suffered badly during this period with five journalists assassinated. Despite the *SEPM*'s commitment to straight reporting of news and to ideals of professionalism, the demands of war began to affect the paper and its publications. The *SEPM* had to navigate between the pull of nationalism through social demands and the very survival of its staff.

Censorship and Propaganda

Journalist Weekly columns continued to raise issues around journalism practice and the tension of practicing professional journalism in times of warfare. An article printed on 6 February 1939 reflects that the core values of professional journalism during the war began to be re-explained with politicised nationalism elements. An author with the

¹ 'Qingji Xuehui' Weiwen Shanghai Xinwenjie [Express Sincere Solicitude for the press in Shanghai from the Chinese Youth Journalists Association], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 10 July 1939.

² Kuan Chung, *Zhongguo Mingyun Guanjian Shinian: Meiguo Yu Guogong Tanpan Zhenxiang (1937-1947)* [The Critical Decade to Determine the Fate of China: The Truth of the United States and the Negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists] (Taipei: Bookzone, 2010), 125-26.

penname Yu wrote an article 'Journalism education and the major of law politics journalism' which proposed that some people chose journalist as their profession with the simple aim of winning promotion and getting rich.³ The author pointed out that although they may not become corrupt officials, their reason at least to be journalists were based on opportunism. Nevertheless, the author deemed that the case for revolutionary politicians to manage newspapers for their political ambition should be an exception. The author claimed that acceptance of the newspapers being published for political aims during the war against Japan reflects the blurring of the function of the press for public service in the minds of Chinese journalists. Yu has demonstrated that many students who were training at journalism schools in Shanghai would become professional journalists and thought under the national crisis, these people would play an important role in establishing cultural forts for Chinese resistance cause and using 'paper bullets' to annihilate enemies.

On 16 April 1939, the *SEPM's Ta Mei Pictorial* closed. In the same month, former Nationalist power figure Wang Ching-wei, after acquiring Japanese commitment and support, slipped into Shanghai in April 1939, and took refuge in a Japanese hotel in Hongkou area under the Japanese protection. Wang Ching-wei collaborated with the Japanese to establish his government in the spring 1939 and then formed a strong intelligence service known as No. 76 in west Shanghai, violent terrorist activities against journalists ensued. Zhao Guodong, a general newspaper vendor of the *SEPM*, was assassinated. As the result of the clamour of national interests being paramount under the wartime atmosphere, the public opinion of tightening press control and the resulting governmental deeds under the support of this public opinion successively eroded the space for liberalism and professionalism. During the wartime period, more and more people were converted to the view that the press under government control could become an effective weapon to attack enemies, and to counteract enemy propaganda campaigns. As reflected in pages of the *Journalist Weekly*, censorship, propaganda and rumour were especially topical.

In the article 'Censorship and Propaganda', the anonymous author listed methods,

³ 'Xinwen Jiaoyu: Fazheng Xinwenke', [Journalism education and the major of law politics journalism], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 6 February 1939.

importance and side effects of censorship and propaganda, which in the author's views were two of the most powerful means to realise social control. The author's low opinion of censorship and propaganda may clearly be seen from the definition of the two terms given in the beginning of the article. As the author said:

Censorship is a passive containment of individuals' freedom to express ideas and behaviours that clash with the present national system. Propaganda is passive creation of information for giving rise to a common opinion within the group.⁴

The author then proposed that censorship should be essential in society for preventing harmful publications, such as salacious fiction to perturb good social order during peace time, but the use of this measure must be strictly restricted to prevent abuse by those people in power for the purpose of enhancement of their own authority. This was elaborately expounded through the example of adverse repercussions for children under strict discipline by their parents. In the author's view, the degree to which the citizen's free expression is restricted was a notable identifier for classifying liberal countries and dictatorships, and thus, the most perfect censorship was running in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy:

In peacetime, it is necessary for government to carry out censorship, in the hope that social order can be maintained and people's benefit can be safeguarded. Drama and fiction content which is considered filthy will be forbidden regardless of its country of origin. However, governors usually utilise censorship to establish their personal authority and consolidate their power. As a result, censorship will be abused. Take parents' attention to their children's acts for instance, if parents discipline their children excessively, it may cause two possible situations. Children may become hyper timed, dull, subservient and feel themselves inferior; or in contrast, children may also tend to be rebellious, aggressive, stubborn, and get some other bad habits. In the same way, when a government excessively controls their people's speech, they will receive a similar result. Just as an old saying of Confucius, 'virtuous and law-abiding people should have considerable autonomy rather than much restriction, and foolish and savage people should be educated and punished for them to understand the fault they commit.' Modern liberal countries are not willing to control people's speech, and even if they want, they are not able to implement measures to do so. However, dictatorships, such as Soviet Russia, (Fascist) Germany and Italy, have utilised censorship perfectly. As a result, people do not dare to speak out their frustration and fury. Finally, when these widespread discontents accumulate to a certain level, they will overwhelmingly break out.⁵

⁴ Jiancha Yu Xuanchuan [Censorship and Propaganda], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

⁵ Jiancha Yu Xuanchuan [Censorship and Propaganda], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

Enhancing control over speech and expression during wartime, however, was commended as an essential means for the government to effectively mobilise social resources in fighting with enemies. In this special period, as the author expressed, the situation is that “when government has determined its diplomatic guiding principal, differences will weaken the force of resistance and be advantageous to enemies to blatantly propagandise themselves, and as a result, triumphalism will falter.” The author further deemed that only relying on censorship may not be sufficient for the government to implement its policies because social phobia was widespread during wartime, to such an extent that rumours can still be easily and quickly transmitted and scattered even when there is strict censorship. Due to this circumstance, propaganda was proposed to be utilised in conjunction with censorship.

A consensus was almost reached in the *Journalism Weekly* that public speech and expression during wartime should be strictly controlled and dominated by government rather than continue to enjoy the right of freedom: although most people who hold this view might feel antipathy against the governmental restriction and leading position aimed at journalistic activities. In the article ‘Propaganda and Rumour-mongering’, the author under the pen name Jun Yi thought about propaganda as:

Propaganda is more important to fascist countries. The nature of fascism is cheating and blackmail. Only propaganda can mask its evil and ugly weakness. Exaggerated rhetoric is adopted to daunt timid persons and sensational statements are used to fill the stomach of hungry people.⁶

However, the author believed that results demonstrate convincingly that propaganda is an important segment in the process of war and plays a critical role for military victory. This was presented through the case of self-examination by German Emperor Wilhelm II towards the First World War that “German failure is attributed to none of the *Times* by themselves.” Besides showing the importance of propaganda, this case implying British propaganda model to a certain degree hints that the character of a democratic country is not inconsistent with wartime propaganda policy. This provided critical legitimacy and a basis for supporting China to enhance control over journalism during

⁶ Xuanchuan Yu Zaoyao [Propaganda and Rumour-mongering], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 31 July 1939.

wartime.

Compared with Britain, America carried considerably more weight within Chinese society. In the mind of Chinese intellectuals during the republic period, America stood out as a model for China to emulate. Therefore the most persuasive influence on public opinion for Chinese to follow during the wartime period was the evidence based American reality of enhancing journalism control. America in the article 'Journalism and Freedom' was glorified as "the most free and open country" in the world. It was followed by the author's full agreement with President Roosevelt issuing a stern warning to some American media who had, based on unjustified conjecture, reported that there were disagreements between the President and the Secretary of State. This case happened in America which, in the author's opinion, was considered the most complete democracy and firmly proved that the press during the wartime "should not be a private institute of liberalism, but an institute of public propaganda strictly controlled by government." Based on this, the author condemned attempts of branding reproaches of 'dictator' upon President Roosevelt, and strongly questioned their motivation in upholding freedom and democracy in this affair.

The American case in the article 'Censorship and Propaganda' is also a critical ground of argument. As the author writes:

Propaganda during wartime is remarkably effective. For instance, the Entente Powers, as the United States' participation finally achieved victory. Most of the American people initially did persist in isolationism, not willingly getting entangled in the war. However, their disgust with Germany increased as the days passed after large scale propaganda was implemented, and the warring public opinion ultimately dominated America nationwide. This made U.S. Government dare to formally declare war. George Creel, the head of the United States Committee on Public Information, after the war based on his experience of propaganda wrote down the book, *How We Advertised America*. It was said by him that propaganda documents were totally 75,000,000. In his opinion, 'paper bullet' truly contributed to the victory of the Entente Powers.⁷

Combining the case of the United States successfully utilising propaganda to achieve victory in the First World War with the validity of censorship in the discourse above, the author drew the conclusion that it was permissible to support the Nationalist

⁷ Jiancha Yu Xuanchuan [Censorship and Propaganda], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

Government to strictly control public opinion by the means of censorship and propaganda. As the author's summary stated:

All comments contrary to present anti-Japanese policy and undermining national unification should be censored strictly. ... Strict instructions must be issued against those prevailing cock and bull rumours at present.... We should adeptly exploit propaganda to make people know what has happened. Propaganda should be widely, technically and systematically used to influence foreign public opinions.⁸

From the text above, it may not be difficult to identify that Chinese intellectuals' concerns regarding the United States were one-sided, and concentrate on tightening control over speech and expression during the wartime period. Based on this observation, the author proposed that China should imitate American wartime propaganda and censorship, but ignored the fact that such control was cancelled in America soon after the wars, and that the US political and social system underpinning the censorship could reasonably adjust to meet a changed social context after the war and relinquish that control. It was just those very elements of a political mechanism for restoring press freedoms post-war that China lacked and which were ignored by Chinese intellectuals, seriously impeding post-war Chinese journalism. Modern wars have usually produced a restriction of civil liberties and a tightening of political and military controls. Journalism activities as the carrier of social speech and expression thus were restricted as one of the measures used for tightening political and military controls during the war for supreme national interests. Therefore, it is not surprising to have such a strong voice of advocating enhancing journalism restriction in the *Journalist Weekly*.

Enhancement of journalism control, in which propaganda and censorship as the main measures are also a feature of wartime America, but under the adjustment by American political and social mechanism, the degree of the control can be adjusted based on the change of social demand. In anticipation of cooperating with military engagement in European war, America created the necessary public atmosphere to successfully engage in relevant acts during the First World War. The Espionage Act, which was aimed at punishing the people who fabricated news and expressed ideas that might interfere with military actions, exert adverse effects on morale in the armed or military conscription,

⁸ Jiancha Yu Xuanchuan [Censorship and Propaganda], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 19 June 1939.

was issued on 15 June 1917. In the Sedition Act, which was issued in May 1918 based on the amendment of the Espionage Act, people who had behaviours or speech identified as disloyal, profane or insulting to the form of American government, Constitution and national flag would be punished as well. In addition, based on the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, passed in October 1917, cable, telephone and telegraph for foreign communications would be censored by the Censorship Board.⁹ However, this situation was soon changed with the end of World War I. The Sedition Act was annulled in 1921, and the American public opinion during the 1920s was to advocate the people to forget the issues in the wartime period, and return their concentration back to peaceful life. There was a moment that reports exposing corruption in high places, entertainment news and commercial advertisement became symptomatic of interwar American journalism.¹⁰

Chinese political and social conditions were not conducive to emulate America. Using the American example as the case to prove China could enhance control during the wartime looked convincing, but China would not be able to acquire the result obtained by the American model. The enhancement of control over the press and public opinion under authoritarian politics could only have made Chinese journalism step into complete and irreversible partisan mechanism. This might not be realised by those intellectuals. They had a utopian fantasy towards post-war Chinese development that China would seamlessly realise democracy with the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan. This perception was reflected in their views on the French Revolution.

In search of a revolutionary model

To commemorate 150 years anniversary of the French Revolution, the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* on 14 July 1939 published a special issue with 16 pages, which were twice the standard amount. Therefore, sufficient articles to introduce French ethos and discuss the French Revolution, and advertisements of French commodities were also published on this day.

In these articles, although a full-scale debate was under different topics and views about France, the common message at the core was that the French Revolution was highly

⁹ Michael Emery, Edwin Emery and Nancy L. Roberts, *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, 9th ed. (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 256-57

¹⁰ Emery, Emery, and Roberts, *The Press and America*, 265-67, 342.

regarded as the cornerstone of French democracy and prosperity, and the model for China. The newspaper of the day revealed a strong emotion which admired and yearned for French democracy, and attributed all of these to the revolution. The author under the pen name of Tie Lang in the article ‘Commemoration of French Democracy: A Lesson for Chinese People’ to understand the French Revolution as:

The French Revolution broke out on 14 July 1789. This great movement features prominently in the history of the West. The influence of the French Revolution not only liberated the people of France, but also enlightened democratic movements in Europe. The importance of the historical contribution of the French Revolution can be equated with the Renaissance, and the Protestant Reformation.¹¹

In the short commentary, the author greeted “the democratic France is continuing its prosperity,” and shouted “long live France!”¹²

Chinese intellectuals expressed their enthusiasm towards France, and an important reason seemed to be that they had found out an inspiration and antidote to solve Chinese issue from the history of continuous revolution in modern France. At the critical position that the cause of Chinese resistance against Japan was confronted with an unprecedented predicament, Chinese intellectuals hoped to enlighten the people, and give the Chinese confidence for the future by using the case of the French long-time revolutionary history with particular reference to the way that French people finally achieved victory over domestic and international reactionary groups. In the article ‘Struggle between Light and Dark: Impressions in Terms of the Commemoration of the French Democracy and Republic’, the atmosphere of celebrating French National Day was reminiscent of the French long-time revolutionary history, and this history in the author’s view is successive fighting between ‘light’ and ‘dark’. As the author described:

Seeing they are jubilant to celebrate this great day: the commemoration of democracy and republic, besides expressing sincere congratulations, I am evoked with infinite feelings. When we recall the heroic French Revolution, we should understand the revolution is affected by the uphill struggles that accompany successive counter attacks. The light and dark could not get through a day without fighting against each other in more than eighty years.¹³

¹¹ Duanping: Fa Minzu Jinian [Short Commentary: Commemorate French Democracy], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

¹² Duanping: Fa Minzu Jinian [Short Commentary: Commemorate French Democracy], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

¹³ Guangming Yu Heian De Bodou: Faguo Minzhu Gonghe Jinian Ganyan, [Struggle between Light and Dark: Impressions in Terms of the Commemoration of the French Democracy and Republic], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

Democratic and prosperous France today was deemed as the 'light' was victorious over the 'dark', and the author believed that the successful revolution in France was a lamp at Chinese feet for achieving victory of resistance against Japan, and was an omen that China in the future, would achieve the same greatness as that which France had achieved. The author said:

Light relentlessly struggled against dark for more than eighty years. Dark sometimes covered light, but ultimately, light can completely exorcise dark, brilliantly illuminating the human beings. The current Chinese war against Japan is just the striving for light. Light is intensely struggling against dark, and the final result must be the victory the same as France. History tells us that it is a self-evident truth that light finally will come.¹⁴

The article 'Commemoration of French Democracy: A lesson for Chinese People,' presents a similar view of point. The author under the assumed name 'Tie Lang' interpreted French freedom and equality that people enjoyed today after 82-year revolutions as the victory which was dearly bought with long time struggle and tremendous sacrifice. As the author said:

Revolution is not easy work. Its success must be irrigated by blood and with successive struggles by people. French people engaged in revolution for 82 years. The difficulty that they met during this time has not been impossible to put into words, but they finally achieved their political aim of enjoying freedom and equality.¹⁵

The author then deemed that Chinese revolutionary situation was not pessimistic compared with France, therefore, by insisting on revolution, China would be able to realise what France had achieved. It formed an optimistic picture in the author's mind that the victory of the war against Japan would mark the final success of Chinese revolution.

When we recall the Chinese situation before the Revolution of 1911, we can find it was even better than France before its revolution. 28 years have passed after the Revolution of 1911. Although 28 years are not a long period considering the revolutionary process, Chinese people have become solid concrete from lacking spirit of cooperation after striving by countless martyrs. China has not been the sick man of

¹⁴ Guangming Yu Heian De Bodou: Faguo Minzhu Gonghe Jinian Ganyan, [Struggle between Light and Dark: Impressions in Terms of the Commemoration of the French Democracy and Republic], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

¹⁵ Faguo Minzhu Jinian: Gei Zhongguo Renmin De Jiejian [Commemoration of French Democracy: A Lesson for Chinese People], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

Asia, but a world lion. The victory of the War of Resistance against Japan will be the final success of Chinese revolutionary cause. Victory is dawning in the distance. Light is in front of us. Let all Chinese people together to continually strive for that.¹⁶

When the idea was proposed that China would gain freedom and democracy after the victory against Japan by referring to the French example, it might have been ignored on the basis that there was no clear link between the French case and Chinese reality. As a result, Chinese intellectuals should have considered seriously how to utilise the French experience for China, but unfortunately, what they did was simply to equate the result of revolutions in France and the fate of post-war China. Revolutions in France seemed to be regarded as a model of China by Chinese intellectuals. However, their one-sided and superficial understanding towards the violent and bloody revolutions over 80 years made them assess the situation of post-war China over optimistically. As a result, nationalism was invoked without essential scruple of its negative long-term influence for post-war China, in the hope that this could help China to defeat Japan as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the legitimacy of both the Nationalist Government to realise more strict and full-scale social control through the war, and the Chinese Communist Party's violent proletariat revolution was objectively proved. All of these to a certain degree accelerated Chinese journalism to step into a partisan way.

The impact of violence, both threatened and real

Neutrality proved difficult when the *SEPM*, along with the people of the Isolated Island of Shanghai, began to experience real terror, tracing back to Wang Ching-wei's establishment of his intelligence service, No. 76. From this time, the press in Shanghai suffered bloody suppression, as Japan and the Reorganised Nationalist Government of the Republic of China found an effective method to clamp down the media's resistance. Resistance against such collaborationists finally was "savagely though ambiguously sustained" as Wakeman noted.¹⁷ The *SEPM* during the Isolated Island period suffered heavy sacrifice. Hu Daojing's list of martyrs in the War of Resistance against Japan included 13 journalists who were killed in the line of duty during the Isolated Island

¹⁶ Faguo Minzhu Jinian: Gei Zhongguo Renmin De Jiejian [Commemoration of French Democracy: A Lesson for Chinese People], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

¹⁷ Frederic Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.

period. Of these, five worked for the *SEPM*.¹⁸

Cracking down on the *SEPM* through brutal assassination was an updated means after Wang Ching-wei was not able to peacefully cope with the threat of nationalism unleashed by the newspaper. Ma Xiaotian and Wang Manyun, two important officials in Wang Ching-wei's government described it in the following:

In the summer of 1939, Wang Ching-wei launched the so called movement for peace in Shanghai. Such collaborating activities incurred unanimous condemnation from the social public. The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury was more active than other newspapers in the condemnation. ... Ding Mocun initially directed some people to mediate with the intent of stopping the aggressive tone of the newspaper. Instead of abating, the newspaper's scolding of Wang Ching-wei escalated. Ding Mocun and Li Shiqun felt that a more forceful approach was required as previous attempts had not been effective. They ordered Wu Shibao to violently attack the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* aimed as a deterrent to crush the public opinion.¹⁹

Already before the establishment of Wang Ching-wei's regime and his intelligence service there was suppression of, and threats against, the *SEPM* which were likely imposed by the Dadao government of Shanghai led by Su Xiwen. These efforts to silence the paper were not effective but were quite frightening. Early on 1 April 1938, the morning edition of *Ta Mei Wan Pao* received a threatening letter which contained a bomb threat. The letter was as follows.

The "*Ta Mei Wan Pao* Morning Edition" has been attacked on two different occasions by terrorists. "Tsung Tseu Deo Zung" ("Spring and Autumn Taoist Priest") addressed to the General Manager, and which reads as follows:

"This Taoist priest is well acquainted with geomancy. It has now been found that your paper will certainly be bombed on April 6. Care should be exercised."

This letter was sent by post on March 26. Its envelope bears the following printed words: "The Feng Feng Radio Advertising Company". A chop of the Post Office for insufficient postage is affixed to the envelope.²⁰

Given it was April Fool's Day, it was unclear whether or not the letter was of a serious


¹⁸ Hu Jingdao, "Ercidazhan Mengguo Xunzhi Baoren Lu [A Name List of Journalists of who were killed in the line of duty during the Second World War]," *Baoxue Zazhi* (Newspaper Research) 1, no. 4 (1945): 38.

¹⁹ Cai Dejin and Shang Yue, eds., *Moku: Wangwei Tegong Zongbu 76 Hao* [The Hell: The No. 76, the Headquarters of the Intelligence Service of Wang Ching-wei's Puppet Regime] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986), 58.

²⁰ Shanghai Municipal Police file, D8298/43.

nature and an article was published the next day which referred to the letter as being a practical joke. Based on this situation it was very difficult to determine the truth of this threat and in fact other threats to the newspaper successively followed. This contrasts markedly with the period when No. 76 was operating in which threats were backed with real violence such as beatings, kidnappings, bombings and assassination.²¹

Figure 5: Map of Shanghai, 1940²²



The Dadao government of Shanghai was not able to control the publication inside the foreign settlements so their only option was the forbidden circulation of the newspapers outside the area but this method in many cases was not effective. The *SEPM*, for example, was successfully smuggled outside and this caused problems for the government. On 6 March 1938, Shen Yi, the head of the publicity section, reported to the mayor Su Xiwen that the *SEPM* and two other newspapers were continuously smuggled for sale in varying ways from the foreign settlement areas into Pudong.²³ This situation changed things until Wang Ching-wei's regime was established. At this point, the *SEPM* began to suffer

²¹ Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 116-17.

²² See Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*.

²³ Shanghai Municipal Archives, *Riwei Shanghai Shizhenfeng* [Archives of Chinese Collaboration Government of Shanghai] (Beijing: Dang'an Chubanshe, 1986), 804.

serious attacks.

Gu Zhizhong was one of the journalists who experienced and witnessed Isolated Island Shanghai. According to his description, Wang Ching-wei's enthronement in Nanjing, and later actions incurred wide-spread condemnation and fierce scolding by the press in Shanghai. This resulted in Wang Ching-wei's bitterness towards the newspapers and journalists who had opposed him. As a result, he established intelligence service headquarters, which specifically planned and implemented bombing, kidnap and assassination activities at No. 76 Jessfield Road located in the West of the International Settlement where which was sparsely populated.²⁴ As Gould recalled, Wang Ching-wei's gangsters set up headquarters in the west of Shanghai. This heavily guarded place was a scene of horrific crimes such as ransoms, kidnappings, threats and even beheadings. It was recalled by Gould that families of the victims that could not afford the ransoms, received ears, fingers and other body parts through the mail. The publication became a vital concern in shaping attitudes and therefore the newspaper became the target within this setting.²⁵

Despite the Wang Ching-wei government still not being able to directly control the newspaper within the foreign settlements, No. 76 created obstacles to block the distribution channels and threaten or even assassinate journalists and editors to effectively establish control of the journalism. On 18 April 1939, Zhou Guodong, the general vendor of the *SEPM*, was assassinated.²⁶ In April, No. 76 also attempted to purchase all issued papers of the *SEPM*. They stamped out-dated copies and mixed them with current editions to sell in the low light of the evening with the aim of destroying the credit of the newspaper.²⁷ As well as this, attempts were made to physically destroy the plant with bombs and Chinese staff were even killed in the main street.²⁸ Although the *SEPM* suffered this attack, they viewed it only as a minor transgression, and continued to publish stronger rhetoric to scold Wang Ching-wei. Matters escalated and, in June 1939, No. 76 sent threatening letters to newspaper editors and reports to each

²⁴ Gu, "Shanghai Lunxianhou Diren Cansha," 146.

²⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 321.

²⁶ Yao Fushen, Ye Cuidi and Xin Shumin, "Wangwei Dashiji, Shanghai [Significant Events about the Wang Ching-wei's Puppet Regime, part one]," *Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao* 1989, no. 4: 164.

²⁷ Yao, Ye and Xin, "Wangwei Dashiji," 169.

²⁸ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 321.

newspaper, asking them to immediately change their attitudes, otherwise they would face death. Zhu Xinggong, who was the editor of the *Night Light* supplement in the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* at that time published the letter in order to laugh at the senders, although it appeared to carry a mandatory death sentence.²⁹ The No. 76 felt obliged to target specific persons as the means to deal with the newspaper. Thus, the *SEPM* supplement editor Zhu Xinggong became their first target to be killed.³⁰ *Night Light* editor Zhu was assassinated on 30 August, when walking out of the *SEPM* office.

Zhu's death in late 1939 opened a new subtle relation between the *SEPM* and Wang Ching-wei's regime. The press under Wang Ching-wei's suppression with radical means had to compromise after balancing their journalists' survival and basic standpoints with Wang Ching-wei's regime who at least still wanted to present that their political values were to bring peace to Chinese in public. H. Arthur Steiner considers the results from the terrorist actions taken by Japanese and Chinese collaborative regime aimed at curbing media as ineffective.³¹ This conclusion might be drawn without taking into account the sensitive change of the media's attitude to the Japanese and their collaborative regime after Wang Ching-wei's intelligence system performed a series of terrorist assassinations. As Wakeman concludes, the position of the majority of people in the Isolated Island Shanghai vacillated in a grey and equivocal range between resistance and collaboration, and truly committed resistance only happened in a small group of the population.³² This situation facilitated Wang Ching-wei's intelligence service to set goals more accurately and implement ways to suppress the actions of the press.

In the first a couple of weeks after Zhu Xiongong's death, *Night Light* published many articles to mourning for him and to praise his fearless spirit in facing the enemies. Afterwards, it returned to its initial position as a literature supplement rather than an outlet for nationalism. Moreover, shortly after Zhu's death, Wang Ching-wei convened an international journalist conference on 7 September 1939. Randall Gould was initially

²⁹ Gu Zhizhong, *Baohai Zayi* [A General Recollection about the Press] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986), 94; Gu Zhizhong, "Shanghai Lunxianhou Diren Cansha Baoren De Zuixing [Enemies' Crimes of slaughter Journalists in Shanghai after It Fell]," *Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao* 1983, no. 3: 147.

³⁰ Cai and Shang, *Moku*, 60.

³¹ H. Arthur Steiner, "American-Japanese Tensions in Shanghai," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 215 (May 1941): 141.

³² Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, I.

invited to attend the conference, but as Zhu Xinggong was assassinated and Gould wished to propose some questions that Wang Ching-wei was unwillingly to answer, Gould did not attend. The Chinese edition of the *SEPM* published an editorial commentary on the conference. The editorial expressed its condemnation of Wang Ching-wei's regime for Zhu Xiongong's death by joking no one at the conference died from food poisoning or from anything sharp.³³ On 23rd April, 1940, Wang Shih-chieh, Republic government minister, attended a dinner party to welcoming returning overseas Chinese. At the party, he met Samuael Chang. Later that evening, Wang noted in his diary his appreciation for the valiant resistance against the Japanese shown by Zhu Xinggong and the *SEPM*. He noted that although Zhu had received many threats just before his death, he remained utterly without fear.³⁴ Zhu Xinggong should be classified as one of the minority of real patriots in accordance with Wakeman's description of the social features of Isolated Island Shanghai. However, there was another view of Zhu Xinggong's resistance and sacrifice, as expressed in Jin Xiongbai's recollections:

Zhu was eccentric. In other words, he was a famous person, but he was also considered a madman. He usually liked to drink alcohol and smoke, and relying on the narcotic feeling, he wrote down some cynical articles to acquire the admiration from his readers. His aim was just simply like this... In the very beginning, No. 76 thought he was just mad, and did not plan to end his life. Some people had warned him not to scold with such strong rhetoric, but he openly replied in the newspaper that 'I do scold, and people who do not like it could beat me'. His attitude was courting death indeed. It made No. 76 compelled to kill him for its authority.³⁵

Zhu Xinggong's image is represented in two quite different recollections. Most people recalled him as a hero. However, for Jin Xiongbai, Zhu only scolded Wang Ching-wei. Both views agree that the assassination of Zhu was because the nationalism that he released through the newspaper had threatened Wang Ching-wei's regime, rather than journalistic professionalism. In accordance with Hu Daojing's recollection, it was dangerous to engage in journalistic works to resist against Japan in the Shanghai Isolated Island. For journalists, even if they were in the International Settlement or the French Concession, they were still at risk to be kidnapped or assassinated by enemies at any

³³ Pinglun: Wang Xiansheng Qingke [Comment: Mr. Wang Ching-wei Gave a Dinner Party], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 8 September 1939.

³⁴ Wang Shih-chieh, *Wang Shijie Riji* [The Diary of Dr. Wang Shih-chieh], ed. Lin May-li (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), 265.

³⁵ Jin Xiongbai, *Wang Zhengquan De Kaichang Yu Shouchang* [The Beginning and the End of Wang Ching-wei's Regime] (Taipei: Li Ao Chubanshe, 1988), 78-79.

time.³⁶

Hu Daojing read a range of different newspapers every day during the Isolated Island period, so that he could get the information to help get him out of danger. He mentioned that on a day in the winter of 1940, when he was reading the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, a news piece on the first page suddenly came into view, and shocked him. It was reported that the Japanese troops would implement patrol two days later in a specific place of Hongkou where he was living. As it belonged to the International Settlement, the place did not incur Japanese troops, but since the Japanese would come, Hu in accordance with his experience made a judgement that it was very possible that the Japanese would break into resistance houses to search during their patrol. He collected many books and newspapers, and some of them were with the contents of resistance against Japan. He realised that once they were found by the Japanese, it would be a disaster. Therefore, he urgently looked for and hired a house in another place. The next day, he moved to the house with his family in a hurry.³⁷

Assassinations and their impact

No. 76's killing of Zhu Xinggong was the opening act with regards to its attacks against the *SEPM*. After Zhu's death the following three *SEPM* staff were assassinated in turn: Samuel Chang, Cheng Zhengzhang, and Li Zunying. Samuel Chang was the next *SEPM*'s journalist to be assassinated. On 23 April 1940, Wang Shih-chieh, the minister of the Publicity Department in Chongqing, attended a dinner party to welcome returning overseas Chinese where he met Samuel Chang. Only a few months later, on 16 July, Samuel Chang was lying dead in a pool of blood, assassinated while having a coffee and sandwich at a German café on Nanjing Road.³⁸

Chang's death clearly demonstrated the dilemma faced by journalists at the time, a dilemma with real consequences. Samuel Chang's death was understood as a sacrifice of the press in resisting Wang Ching-wei's collaboration regime. Gould in his recollections described the events of Samuel Chang's assassination. He wrote:

³⁶ Hu Daojing, "Shanghai Gudao Shenghuo De Huiyi [Recalling the Life in the Isolated Island Shanghai]," *Shilin*, no. 4 (2002): 109.

³⁷ Hu Daojing, "Shanghai Gudao Shenghuo De Huiyi [Recalling the Life in the Isolated Island Shanghai]," *Shilin*, no. 4 (2002): 114-15.

³⁸ Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 115.

On Friday afternoon I was called off the Columbia Country Club tennis courts by three simultaneous phone messages telling of the assassination of Sammy Chang, my colleague and best Chinese friend. Sam had stopped in a café for a cup of tea. It was his habit to stop there. His name had been on the list of eighty-three Chinese, and only the day before I had asked if he was carrying a pistol. He had lifted his gown and showed one strapped around his waist. On the day of his death he wore it, but he committed two major errors. One was to follow a usual habit in stopping at a public place. The other was to sit with his back to the door. Two Chinese gunmen walked in, shot Sam instantly dead from behind, and walked out again – killing on their way a Pole who tried to stop them.³⁹

However, Jin Xiongbai's recollections had a different narrative about Chang's assassination:

He had made contact with Wang Ching-wei's regime, agreeing to change the standpoint and news bias of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* and had been receiving a certain amount of money regularly. However, Chang always failed to fulfil his promises, and it irritated No. 76. Chang just simply attempted to avoid meeting with No. 76. Finally, he was killed by indiscriminate gunfire when he had lunch at Kiessling Restaurant, a place that served Western food located on the crossroads between Nanjing Road and Jing'an Temple Road.⁴⁰

The effects of assassinating Samuel Chang was immediate. As soon after he was assassinated, the *Tai Mei Pictorial* that he led was not able to continue. In September 1939, about two months after Chang was assassinated, the *Tai Mei Pictorial* published its last issue and ceased to exist.⁴¹

Only a month later on 19 August, another *SEPM* editor, Cheng Zhenzhang, was assassinated. However, No. 76 did not stop at that. The assistant manager of the *SEPM*, Li Junying, slept in the newspaper's office for one year following Chang's death but was finally assassinated 23 July, 1941. He was killed by a gunman, with a bullet to the back of his neck, on the street in front of the *SEPM* office building.⁴²

Faced with the horrors in Isolated Island Shanghai, temporary escape was the choice that had to be made for some journalists. L. Z. Yuan, an editor of the *SEPM* was just one of these journalists. According to Gould:

³⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 324-25.

⁴⁰ Jin, *Wangzhengquan De Kaichang*, 78.

⁴¹ Zhao Xiuhui, "Yifen Zai Yangzhaopai Yanhuxia De Kangrihuabao," *Shiji* 2003, no. 3: 58.

⁴² Zhang Gongchen, *Minguo Baoren: Xinwenshishang De Yinmi Yiye* (Jinan: Shandong Huabao Chubanshe, 2010), 395; Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 188.

One day a quiet Chinese walked up our stairs, entered the news room, and sat down with L. Z. Yuan, our Chinese city editor. After he had left, Yuan came in to me and said, “You know, that fellow described every movement I have made all around Shanghai during the past four days!” The caller had come from the puppet Gestapo out at 76 Jessfield Road. They wanted to let Yuan know he was being shadowed, mostly to worry him, I suspected. The emissary had put a proposition to pay Yuan several times his monthly salary if he would give allegiance to Wang Ching-wei. It was not desired that he quit us – quite the contrary – rather that he spy on us, and of course quit giving us information detrimental to the repute of the Nanking regime and its Shanghai representatives, who lived in a constant state of fear. ... Yuan did not join the opposition, but he did take a quick trip to British-protected Hong Kong to conserve his health. Later he “sat out” the war safely under an assumed name in Manila.⁴³

C.V. Starr and Randall Gould faced similar dangers which forced them into choosing to leave Shanghai. On 15 July 1940, Wang Ching-wei issued a blacklist of foreigners for deportation, on which there were one Briton and six Americans, including both Starr and Gould.⁴⁴ Under these conditions Starr and Gould were finally compelled to leave. The role of managing the newspaper was handed to Frederick Burr (F.B.) Oppen in early 1941.⁴⁵ Thereafter, the voice of resistance against Japan and the Chinese collaborator regime within the paper was relatively silenced; although Gould still believed that, under Oppen, the paper went on to further reveal the atrocities of Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei’s regime.⁴⁶

Journalists during the Isolated Island period were obliged to reconsider their stance in the face of terror and brutal assassinations, and the press staff were forced to choose amongst their professional ideals, social needs to nationalism and basic survival. With the Nazi defeat of France and the creation of Vichy France (July 1940) the French Concession still retained its independence but greater cooperation occurred between the French authorities in Shanghai and the Japanese forces. In the latter part of 1940, international newspapers reported that a photographer of the *SEPM* had been arrested while attempting to take photographs of the Japanese take-over of the French

⁴³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 326.

⁴⁴ Randall Gould, *China in the Sun*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1946), 323; Frederic E. Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 116.

Wakeman cited John Powell’s memoir: *My Twenty-Five Years in China*. John Powell, Randall Gould and C. V. Starr were all on the blacklist.

⁴⁵ Jin, *Wangzhengquan De Kaichang*, 78.

⁴⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 327.

concessions's courts.⁴⁷

Thus it compromised journalistic professionalisation. Jin Xiongbai who occupied important positions in both the organs of the Nationalist Party and Wang Ching-wei's regime recalled:

I worked for the press for quite a long time, thus I was particularly involved with the news about colleagues working in my profession. Unfortunately, there were so many journalists' lives lost. When I read the details in the newspapers, I consistently felt shocked, guilty and deeply grieved about these journalists who were sacrificed one after another. I felt I was close to them, but I was not able to help them. I often argued with Zhou Fohai that most of journalists simply were pleased to dedicate themselves to their profession and follow the rules of professional conduct, and their behaviours did not contain any political elements. Even if they used sharp and fierce rhetoric, it was just derived from their conscience to express what they thought. I secretly introduced some very important and close journalists who claimed to be resisting the Japanese to meet with Zhou Fohai for collaborating ideas. When Zhou met them, he frankly said that "you just scold Japanese based on whatever you like, but as government, we have our difficulties. I hope we can understand each other spiritually, so that radical and sharp rhetoric can be reduced." Nearly every important journalistic staff in Shanghai at that time was accompanied by me to meet with Zhou Fohai, but I am not willing to name those who considered themselves as dutiful journalists. This is the best I can do.⁴⁸

After suffering a number of assassinations, the *SEPM* managers realised that the newspaper may not be able to continue its publication work. On 14 September 1940, Wang Shih-chieh received the news that the management of the newspaper was considering to suspend and sell their properties. Wang immediately sent telegrams to the liaisons in Shanghai, instructing them to persuade the management of the *SEPM* to relinquish the idea of suspending the paper, and promised to provide financial assistance.⁴⁹ This reflects the newspaper's involvement in politics during the war against Japan.

In contrast to the serious conflicts with the Nationalist Government before the war, the *SEPM* during the Isolated Island period had a much closer relationship with Chiang Kai-shek as they both faced common enemies. Chiang Kai-shek was interviewed by the

⁴⁷ Courts in Shanghai, *The West Australian*, 9 November, 1940

⁴⁸ Jin, *Wangzhengquan De Kaichang*, 77.

⁴⁹ Wang, *Wang Shijie Riji*, 295.

SEPM around this time. In Gould's interview with him, he highly praised the contribution of the *SEPM*. As he told Gould:

We all appreciate very much the friendly American attitude expressed by your publications and by other Americans in China. You have had some troubles because of your independent stand, we realise. We feel that you have shown great courage in standing for what you believe to be right and for presenting your news and editorial views without wavering through fear of violence directed against you.⁵⁰

In fact, the *SEPM*, contrary to Chiang Kai-shek's comment, had not held its ground of being politically neutral; rather, on the basis of the need for resistance against Japanese invasion, it actively cooperated with the Nationalist Government to engage in resistance propaganda.

There has also been some speculation about the espionage activities undertaken by the *SEPM*, both before and during the Pacific War. The Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party secretly set up an office in the Isolated Island Shanghai to provide funding support to the newspapers who gave publicity to resistance against Japan.⁵¹ Xu Weinan, who once worked together with Hu Daojing in pre-war Shanghai, became the person in charge of the office.⁵²

The war also had the effect of drawing the *SEPM* into intelligence activities. The Shanghai Municipal Archives has a collection of documents that were sent to New York by the editors of the *SEPM*. Only one of these documents has been published thus far – a document sent by the *SEPM* to the United States on 4 November 1941. This hard copy document contains general information on a wide range of topics relating to the situation in China, including politics, economic, financial, commercial and military information. It is a Chinese-language reproduction without the original English-language version, is marked 'private reading only', and is without name, address and social position of both recipient and addresser. It appears quite possible it was an espionage report provided to the U.S. government, however, if it is, the quality of information provided is very low.

This document includes nine pieces of information, summarised as:

⁵⁰ Randall Gould, *Chungking Today* (Shanghai: The Mercury Press, 1941), 31.

⁵¹ Hu Daojing and Yuan Xieming, "Shanghai Gudao Shenghuo De Huiyi [Recollections of Life in Isolated Shanghai]," *Shilin* 2002, no. 4: 116.

⁵² Hu Daojing, "Guanyu Shanghai Tongzhiguan De Huiyi [My Collection about the Shanghai Local History Publishing House]," *Shilin* 2001, no. 4: 15-26.

Currency Support: The Stabilisation Board of China, an institute established by Britain and the United States aimed at helping the Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government maintain the exchange rate of Chinese currencies during the wartime, successfully persuaded Chongqing administration to agree to give their continued support to the Shanghai exchange market which had been controlled by Wang Ching-wei.

Chongqing versus Shanghai: Tsiang Ting-fu mentioned that extra-territoriality must be abolished immediately in post-war China, but the Chinese government might consider adopting Western representatives in Tianjin and Shanghai in the future.

Economic Future: Weng Wenhao, minister of the Economy Department of the Nationalist Government, said that China should be an ordinary capitalist country on the basis of private enterprise and a large scale of capitalist modern industry. However, many officials represented by Tsiang Ting-fu insisted that China in the future would neither be a capitalist nor corporatist country.

Present Currency Situation: Four government-owned banks of China had issued 14,000,000,000 yuan, and many private businessmen and government officials had complained about such a huge amount of currency.

State Budget Deficit: In the summer of 1941, the actual revenues of the Chongqing administration less than 10% of their expenditure. Thus, the government had to rely heavily on issuing bonds.

Commodity Prices: The commodity prices in Free China were three to ten times higher than Shanghai.

Transportation: industry consumer goods were transported by trucks from Guangzhou to Chongqing. The Burma Road was very active. Since the outbreak of the Eastern Front of World War II, few goods from the Soviet Union were transported into northwest China.

Governmental Business Activity: The Nationalist Government tightened up control and management over more and more industry and commerce activities. Many businessmen complained that the government was very ineffective, but they attempted to seize the high profit businesses.

Politics: the situation in the Wuhan of 1938 had vanished in Chongqing. He Yingqin and Chen Lifu who insisted on government control had dominated the government. Meanwhile, Dai Li and his intelligence service were cracking down on dissidents and thousands of democratic and liberalists had been charged with the idea of left wing and pro-communism, and most of them had been monitored and controlled. Their actions had been limited. The dissidents were doubting that He Yingqin and Chen Lifu were attempting negotiating with the Japanese so as to maintain the strength of the Nationalist Government for the purpose of finally annihilating the Chinese Communist Party, but people still believe that Chiang Kai-shek would

continue to fight against Japan.⁵³

Propaganda for the Nationalist Government in Chongqing

The *SEPM*'s strong standpoint supporting Chinese resistance alienated Wang Ching-wei in Shanghai at that time. The sacrifice made at the *SEPM* for free speech and anti-Japanese resistance was significant. According to Chen Cunren's recollections, the daily 4 pm release of information through publications contrasted the bravery of the Chinese armies with the cruelty of the Japanese armies. This encouraged a highly emotive reaction amongst the people of the Isolated Island and of all the newspapers, the *SEPM* received the strongest reaction.⁵⁴ As it has been examined above, such a strong standpoint incurred a heavy sacrifice for the staff of the *SEPM* through the loss of lives. Meanwhile, it also drew the attention of the Nationalist Government in Chongqing to create propaganda to gain international sympathy and support.

The Nationalist Party realised the importance of improving international propaganda since the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. After 7 months integration, the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party established a special section to take charge of international propaganda under the leadership of Hollington Tong, and his deputy Tseng Hsü-pei, who had long term experience of the press work in Shanghai.⁵⁵ Hollington Tong, with his specialist background as a Missouri trained journalist, and his links with the English press (especially newspapers in the Shanghai foreign settlements), was able to streamline the foreign propaganda section and successfully align the foreign press in China with Chiang Kai-shek's political ambitions during the wartime period.⁵⁶ This was a significant indicator of the blurring of the boundary of journalistic professionalism. In serving the psychological needs of the wartime environment, the Nationalist Government began to successfully embed

⁵³ The information are summarised based on an article, in which staff of the Shanghai Municipal Archives have chosen some from the documents they collect and translated them into Chinese. The article is titled with "Damei Wanbao Zhongguo Qingkuang Baokao, 1941 [The *SEPM*'s reports about Chinese situation, 1941]" and publish in the journal 'Dangan Yu Shiyue', no. 3 of 1998.

⁵⁴ Chen Cunren, *Kangzhan Shidai Shenghuoshi* [The Life during the War of Resistance against Japan] (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2007), 54.

⁵⁵ Wu Yanjun, "Kangzhan Shiqi De Guoji Xuanchuanchu [The International Propaganda Section during the War of Resistance against Japan]," *Minguo Dang'an* 1990, no. 2: 118.

⁵⁶ Wei Shuge, "News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Guomindang Centralised Foreign Propaganda System, 1937-1938," *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (May 2014): 120.

propaganda within professional journalism. This subtle shift fundamentally transformed the course of professionalisation in Chinese journalism.

When Hollington Tong came to Shanghai he found that the Japanese had control over most of the foreign newspapers in Shanghai and whilst they used both legal and illegal methods, it was only the *SEPM* and the *China Weekly Review* that still unconditionally supported the Chinese positions.⁵⁷

As a result of compromise between Japanese and Western powers after the Battle of Shanghai, the International Settlement and the French Concession survived, although the rest area of Shanghai was seized by Japanese. In the view of many people, the settlement area meant an oasis where they could not only flee from Japanese cruel rule but also organise resistance activities more conveniently. The Japanese and the Chinese collaboration regimes established their media inside the settlement thus attempting to influence public opinion. However, relying solely on this method, they were not able to change the strong social thought of anti-Japanese invasion and resistance. Pro-Chiang Kai-shek media consistently gained support from the majority of people. As a result, they were a thorn in Japanese side. In order to silence the press, Japanese clamped down on the governors of the International Settlement and the French Concession to ask Chinese media inside to accept Japanese-organised censorship. Through announcing their foreign ownership, these media enterprises (especially the British and the American) were able to refuse the censorship. This movement became known as the ‘foreign national flag newspapers’. It is through extraterritoriality that the occurrence of the relatively free environment for journalism publications. Once Japan declared war on Britain and America, and the Pacific War fully broke out, Hong Kong was occupied by Japan. On 9 December, China formally declared war with Japan, and the Japanese Army occupied the Shanghai International Settlement. All anti-Japanese newspapers were censored, and the Isolated Island period ended. The *SEPM* evening version’s last issue was 8th December, 1941.

⁵⁷ Hollington Tong, *Dong Xianguang Zizhuan: Baoren, Waijiaojia Yu Chuandaozhe De Chuanqi* [Hollington Tong’s Autobiography: Legend of a Newspaperman, Diplomatist and Missionary] (Taipei: Independent Author, 2014), 120; Tseng Hsü-pei, *Zeng Xuebai Zizhuan* [Tseng, Hsü-pei’s Autobiography] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, Ltd., 1988), 1: 179.

The situation faced by the journalists of the *SEPM* reflects the dilemma faced by all the press in Isolated Island Shanghai. Nationalism was fuelled by the Japanese invasion and the violent and repressive actions of the Chinese collaboration regime. Censorship alone was not effective in controlling the field of the foreign published newspapers and therefore they relied on terrorism and threatening behaviour.⁵⁸ The press became the outlet for nationalism. The rise of nationalism eroded the space for professionalism in journalism to guide the journalistic enterprise. The press benefited from a relatively free speech environment in the foreign settlements of Shanghai but the protection derived from extraterritoriality for journalism became increasingly ineffective in the face of the cruel repression wielded by Wang Ching-wei's intelligence service. Between passionate nationalism and the instinct for survival, journalists were torn between resistance and collaboration. The history of the *SEPM* in suffering brutal repression during the Isolated Island period reflects the dilemma facing the press of being caught between resistance and compromise.

The Japanese victory, although decisive, was not straight forward. By winning Shanghai, the Japanese military was left with the dilemma of how to effectively govern a city that contained the International Settlement and the French Concession while, at the same time, fighting a guerrilla resistance with Chinese patriots within the city. At that time Japan was at war with China, but they were at peace with the countries of the foreign settlements. The Chinese resistance and criminal elements also recognised, and capitalised on, the strategic opportunity offered by the foreign concessions. So, there was a delicate and uncertain period between the fall of Shanghai on 26 October 1936 to 7 December 1941 when Japan entered World War II.

The *SEPM* and the War of Resistance against Japan

The Pacific War launched by Japan not only destroyed the stable structure of colonial powers within China, but also directly endangered national security of many other Western powers. Those Western powers had to reach a compromise with China for fighting with Japan as their common enemy. In this process, those Western powers unavoidably gave up most of their colonial interests in China, and Chinese nationalism

⁵⁸ Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 115.

was proliferating. Nationalism, which was sparked in the semi-colonial areas of China's east coast during the War of Resistance against Japan spread nationwide.

On 6 December 1941, Japan launched the Pacific War by bombing Pearl Harbour. On 8 December 1941, the Japanese government declared war on Britain and America. Soon after, the Shanghai Settlement was fully occupied by the Japanese Army. All anti-Japanese newspapers inside the Settlement were forced to close. The Isolated Island period, which lasted for four years, had come to an end. The *SEPM* editor, Fredrick Oppen later described the invasion of the French Concession and their offices in the article: "Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai":

The story of what happened to the Shanghai Evening Post and its personnel from the moment Japanese boarding parties went aboard the U.S.S. Wake and H.M.S. Peterel in the Whangpoo in the early morning of December 8 (Far East time) is a fairly good mirror of what occurred generally in Shanghai and deserves a retelling if only for that reason.

From 4:30 a.m. until 10 a.m. that grey day in Shanghai the sole evidence of Japan's attack, save for the Rising Sun flag flying over the Wake and the occasional drifting pieces of wreckage from the sunken Peterel, was the presence of innumerable placards throughout the downtown area announcing a state of War and calling on residents to remain [obscured].

No Japanese troops were in evidence in the French Concession or that part of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek. But at about 10 a.m. trucks, loaded with Japanese troops and bluejackets, poured across the bridges and their occupants swarmed through the city. The Post was almost the first establishment to be visited by the newcomers.

Herded Into One Room

All employees were herded into one room by a non-commissioned officer and a dozen privates, waving mausers with carefree abandon.

Names were taken, everybody was searched, our radio station was sealed and a general inspection of the premises was carried out.

The next morning the chief of the Japanese Army Press Bureau "gave permission for the Post's continued publication. Since from the moment Japan and the United States were at war it was impossible for any American to take authority for continuing publication, due to the fact that Shanghai simultaneously became enemy territory under American law, it was obviously impossible for any agreement with the Japanese Army to be binding on the American publisher, C. V. Starr, then 10,000 miles away in New York. Needless to say publication of a paper using the name "Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury" under Japanese censorship and Japanese permission was as distasteful to him as it was illegal.

Such considerations failed to weigh very heavily on the Japanese military, as might be suspected.⁵⁹

Opper went on to describe how the Japanese insisted that H. G. W. Woodhead, who had been characterised formerly as very pro-Japanese, although apparently not pro-Japanese enough, had nothing to do with the 'Pseudo-Post' publishing. The Japanese had closed the American United Press service, so the Pseudo-Post used the Domei Transocean, (Nanking) Central News, Havas, Stefani and Tass services, saying "Domei, never distinguished for impartiality, out-did itself in grandiose claims of Japanese superiority and vicious slanderous attacks against the United Nations."⁶⁰

Opper refers to Lt. Morita Matsuda:

a former Princeton and University of Missouri student and assistant Army Press Bureau chief [who] told them to cut down their small Tass contribution even further and to make it a point to use a Domei release as the lead story every day.⁶¹

Opper described how slow Japanese movement and reassurance worked their magic, and that life in the French Concession (and indeed across Shanghai) continued as normal, albeit without buses and automobiles, and with increasing persecution of foreigners and rapidly increasing numbers of Japanese people.

Constant propaganda directed at the Chinese hammered at the theme that Japan was saving Asia from Anglo-American overlordship while at the same time propaganda directed at those same Anglo-Americans sought to prove that Japan had no evil intentions against individual Americans and Britons but sought only to "preserve peace and order" which had been made impossible by the "machinations of Roosevelt and Churchill."...

Pro-Chinese Chinese continued their anti-Japanese activities in the city with assassinations and bombings a common occurrence. In fact they became so frequent that the Japanese finally forced every Chinese male to serve in a neighborhood "peace and order" group and areas where disturbances occurred were blockaded for days with people in

⁵⁹ Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁶⁰ Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁶¹ Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

many cases dying of hunger and lack of medical attention.⁶²

Opper went on to describe how some locals and foreigners escaped Shanghai and others co-operated with the Japanese, including in preparing anti-American propaganda. He described the *SEPM* financial editor, John Ahlers, who continued writing copy for the pseudo Post, but refused to alter his honest reporting and was promptly fired. Opper described his difficulty in getting people outside Shanghai to understand that life for the Britons, English and Dutch continued on in Shanghai much as before, with servants caring for them, evenings at nightclubs or theatres and normal working life. However, this changed on December 20, 1942:

On that day J. B. Powell, editor of the "China Weekly Review," Victor Keen, correspondent of the "New York Herald-Tribune" and a number of foreign businessmen were arrested by the Japanese Gendarmerie and held in the Bridge House, the apartment house on North Szechuan Road near the Central Post Office and the New Asia Hotel.⁶³

Over several weeks, Opper describes his life before and during internment, and his fellow captives. However, strangely, he does not mention his fellow *SEPM* journalist, H. G. W. Woodhead, who spent three months at Bridge House.⁶⁴ While some accounts describe Woodhead as mostly or strongly pro-Japanese, as British opinion turned against Japan, so, too, Woodhead's opinion appeared to. He is described as spending "years denouncing Japanese militarism in China and as broadcasting strong anti-Japanese messages on radio "at the direct behest of the British government."⁶⁵

Pacific War

With the USA entering the war, General Joseph Stilwell came to the Nationalist capital, Chongqing, as the commander of U.S. forces in China and as the Chinese Government's chief U. S. military advisor. The Sino-American Cooperative Organisation (SACO) – an organisation created by the SACO Treaty signed by the Republic of China and the United States of America in 1942 – established a mutual intelligence gathering entity in

⁶² Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁶³ Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁶⁴ Information Office Claims Woodhead, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁶⁵ Mark Felton, *China Station: The British Military in the Middle Kingdom 1839-1997* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013), 153.

China.

SACO, also known as Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organisation, was set up by the US Navy and Chiang Kai Chek's head of secret police– the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics – Tai Li. The commander for the American forces was Navy Captain Milton E. Miles. SACO – a US Navy operation – worked in parallel (and at times in competition) with the CIA's forerunner; the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). At the same time as SACO was operating, OSS head Donovan was planning a major intelligence initiative – the Dragon Plan – with the *SEPM* founder and owner, C. V. Starr.⁶⁶ There were numerous plans to use the *SEPM* assets as part of the war effort, including using journalists to spy. There are also references to the 'Starr plan', likewise using Starr's resources. However, these espionage exploits did not seem to go far, due in large part to power squabbles within and between Chinese and American power players.⁶⁷ It appears that Starr's espionage ambitions began before the outbreak of the Pacific War, and, as outlined in the previous chapter, the quality of output from the *SEPM* was possibly dubious.

With the outbreak of the Pacific War, wartime censorship and propaganda mechanisms were reapplied in America. After only one month, the *Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press* was passed quickly and came into operation. Nevertheless, there had been a decrease in limitations towards use of the code to thwart mail publications and other restrictions of free speech by using relevant acts compared with the heavy limitations that applied in the First World War. Moreover, respected people in the American press were nominated as the main regulators of wartime journalism management. Byron Price, executive news editor of the Associated Press, was appointed as the director of the Office of Censorship, in which 14,462 staff were in charge of censoring mail, cables and radio communications transmitted between America and other countries. Elmer Davis who had worked for the *New York Times* for a decade and had taken a position of news analyst and commentator of the Columbia Broadcasting System was named director of the newly created Office of War Information that was

⁶⁶ Yu Maochun, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 68.

⁶⁷ More details, see Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War*, 60-76.

established to take charge of propaganda works.⁶⁸ Even with the American concern for freedom of expression and the rights of the press, there was acceptance that censorship and propaganda were reasonable in wartime. Certainly it was consistent with the Missouri School's journalists creed that acknowledged that the public good should be considered when deciding what to publish.

In wartime Chongqing, there were two censorship systems that all media had to face. Firstly, the Nationalist government maintained a regime of censorship over both the Chinese and foreign newspapers.⁶⁹ Secondly, reports that were relevant to American military operations in China were required to accept American military censorship.⁷⁰ The most significant difference between these forms of censorship was that the American's were mainly concerned with military security, whereas the Chinese censorship extended to political concerns, and reports were refused publication for the protection of favoured individuals.⁷¹ Gould regarded the wartime censorship by the Nationalist government as detrimental to Chinese Publication Law, as censors were practically free to delete content they considered inappropriate, whereas he did not comment negatively on American censorship.

Meanwhile, Randall Gould continued his activities in China despite having left Shanghai. As a previous Far East Correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, and occasional contributor, he returned to this role, reporting from Chongqing. Like many patriotic entrepreneurs who moved their factories from Shanghai to Chongqing before Japanese occupied East China, Gould prepared to re-establish the *SEPM* newspaper after Shanghai fully fell into Japanese hands.

At this time, the *Liberation Daily* – under the direction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – began to be completely revised. The newspaper on the day published an article 'A Notice about revising the Party's Organs' written by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. It was followed with an

⁶⁸ Michael Emery, Edwin Emery and Nancy L. Roberts, *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, 9th ed. (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 342-43, 399-400.

⁶⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 188.

⁷⁰ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 188.

For supporting the cause of resistance to Japan, the United States render amount of military aids to the government of the Republic of China. This information of American military censorship in Chongqing reflects this situation.

⁷¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 188.

editorial 'To the Readers', which emphasised the Party's spirit, its character as a mass movement, its aggressive style and organisational discipline as the highest principles of the Party's media organs. This was the period that CCP launched the Yan'an Rectification campaign, with the purpose of giving political education to the many people who had joined the party during its expansion. The plan was also to distance the CCP and its members from Soviet Union influences:

The campaign had two interrelated purposes: consolidation of Mao's control of the Communist movement and tightening of ideological and organizational discipline.⁷²

Writers were central to this movement. At the talks at the Yan'an forum on literature and art held in May 1942, Mao Zedong said:

The writers and artists do not have a good knowledge either of those whom they describe or of their audience; indeed they may hardly know them at all. They do not know the workers or peasants or soldiers well, and do not know the cadres well either. What does lacking in understanding mean? Not understanding the language, that is, not being familiar with the rich, lively language of the masses. Since many writers and artists stand aloof from the masses and lead empty lives, naturally they are unfamiliar with the language of the people. Accordingly, their works are not only insipid in language but often contain nondescript expressions of their own coining which run counter to popular usage.⁷³

This view of journalists' role was very different to that held by those outside the Chinese Communist Party. They did not necessarily see a direct understanding and experience of a situation as being essential to being able to report on it. However, they did accept that partisan journalism was part of the price of being at war. The second half of 1942 saw Japanese expansion across the Asia Pacific, along with some significant defeats. The US's victory at the Battle of Midway on 7 June marked a shift in the balance of power toward the Allied Forces in Asian and Pacific areas. Japan invaded the Alaskan territory of Attu and Kiska, the Philippines, and areas that are now known of as Malaysia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, but by the end of the year, they had all but lost Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, and New Guinea.

⁷² Eddy U, "Reifications of the Intellectual: Representations, Organization and Agency in Revolutionary China," *British Journal of Sociology* 64, no. 4 (December 2013): 630.

⁷³ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press), 3:72.

On 1 January 1943, a weekly New York edition of the *SEPM* was started.⁷⁴ After Pearl Harbour and the increasing control of the *SEPM* by Japanese administrators, Gould and Starr decided to reclaim the reputation of the *SEPM* through this new edition, published outside China. The New York edition would counter Japanese propaganda.⁷⁵ The news covered in the opening edition make a clear stance. The opening edition had the following cover stories:

“Private Claims Against Japan Being Studied”, which outlined options for economic recompense for property owners at the war’s conclusion

“War Outlook For Far East Encouraging” by Earl H Leaf, which announced the tide of the War had turned against Japan

“News Letter Becomes Newspaper” a brief announcement that explained that previous newsletters had become the official new York edition, and how to place advertisements

“Post’s editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai” by the Editor Fredrick B Oppen

“New Communication Lines To Far East Are Being Opened”, which described the re-establishment of radio communication between the USA and Asia

“Repatriation Still A Hope In Washington”, about the repatriation of 1,800 Japanese citizens

“Extraterritoriality will soon Vanish”, about plans to abandon extra-territorial rights in China

“The Shanghai Evening Post Carries On”⁷⁶

The article “The *Shanghai Evening Post* Carries On” describes the purpose of the paper:

Some fifteen years ago a group of young men started out to publish an American daily newspaper in Shanghai. The enterprise was undertaken with serious understanding of the difficulties and obligations involved.

On several occasions it became necessary to state clearly the principles on which the Shanghai Evening Post was conducted and from 1937 onward it was necessary to emphasize them repeatedly.

A front page statement on December 16, 1937, over the signature of Cornelius V. Starr, declared that the newspaper's policy was to follow the best American newspaper tradition of free speech, of fearless and

⁷⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 337.

⁷⁵ *Cornelius Vander Starr, 1892 – 1968* (The Starr Foundation, New York, 1970), 13.

⁷⁶ See *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

hard-hitting editorials, realistic and non-partisan, and of straight news presentation devoid of editorial bias.

Again, on July 17, 1940, a statement signed by Cornelius V. Starr and Randall Gould said that it has been our settled desire to operate upon principles of American policy in keeping with our American ownership and control... Our policy has been at all times sympathetic to the only recognized Government of China... In questions affecting the Government and people of China, as on all other vital issues, we have spoken our mind honestly and freely for what we deemed the right. Perhaps a day may come when this will no longer be possible in Shanghai; in such event, we shall bow with good grace and retire.

Pearl Harbour temporarily put an end to *The Shanghai Evening Post* in Shanghai. Our last issue there appeared on Saturday, December 6, 1941.

There was no publication on Monday, December 8. When a newspaper bearing our name appeared from our plant the following day it was no more our own than the pseudo- National Government of China now at Nanking is the true National Government of China now at Chungking. Our editor was denied participation and later was imprisoned until his repatriation. Nevertheless, it is a source of deep regret to us that anything of the sort could happen, whether by force majeure or otherwise.

Repeatedly, we stated principles under which *The Shanghai Evening Post* was conducted and we still hold to those principles. They involved an obligation. Unfortunate circumstances have made it appear that we have not lived up to that obligation. We feel that we must now contrive to carry on in the spirit so often expressed to our friends in Shanghai.

The New York Edition of *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, of which this is the first issue, is an embodiment of that feeling. At as early a date as possible we hope to establish a Chungking Edition. Through them, we hope to keep alive the spirit of our original undertaking.⁷⁷

According to Yu Maochun, the New York edition was watched carefully by the FBI in America as they were concerned that the *SEPM* was encroaching on their territory.⁷⁸ This article foreshadows the opening of the upcoming Chongqing edition and also provides more detail of the Japanese-controlled the *SEPM* that continued to publish. Australian newspapers quoted this Pseudo Post, for example, *The Age* newspaper of 11th April 1944 quotes the *SEPM* (Japanese-controlled English language daily).⁷⁹ The article

⁷⁷ The Shanghai Evening Post Carries On, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 1 January 1943.

⁷⁸ Despite some claims by Starr, Yu argues that *SEPM* never operated as an agent for OSS. See Yu, *OSS in China*.

⁷⁹ Japanese Fears, *The Age*, 11 April 1944.

by Leaf that appeared on the first New York edition's front page is noteworthy as this United Press journalist, who is credited as the Associate Editor, had visited Yan'an as a guest of the CCP in April 1937 and was very impressed with his observations. However, he fell foul of the Party when he offended his hosts, by telling them what to do:

The CCP was in need of foreign assistance in the late 1930s but it had to be on CCP terms and strictly under CCP control. Mao told Evans Carlson, "We welcome these foreigners who come to help us. But the trouble with so many foreigners is that they soon want to dictate. They must remember this is China and that while their advice is eagerly received, we are the ones to decide if and how it will be used."⁸⁰

As referred to within the front page article of the first New York edition of the *SEPM*, early 1943 also saw the relinquishing of British extraterritoriality in China, with the signing of the Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China, further fighting in New Guinea, with Australians and Americans gaining the upper hand, and Japan having victories in Guadalcanal, including their clandestine evacuation, however, by early February, the taking of Guadalcanal is the first major achievement of the American offensive in the Pacific war. The Japanese bombed mainland Australian and begin a three-day massacre of civilians in Changjiao. By August 1943, Japan declared independence for the State of Burma under Ba Maw, a pan-Asianist, who saw Japanese influence as being preferable to British.

In October, the *SEPM* again published in China – based in Chongqing. It was reported in the press as follows:

Behind steel doors and armed guards, even before Pearl Harbor, Randall Gould edited the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury under Japanese guns. When the Japanese took over the paper after December 7, 1941, Mr Gould and his publisher, C. V. Starr, began a New York edition to maintain the vigorous continuity of the Host's name. Now, at last, there is an edition in Free China. Mr Gould and Frederick Burr Oppen printed their first Chungking edition of the Post October 30. Some idea of this fine journalistic epic may be gathered from Mr Gould's story to "The Christian Science Monitor," of which he was formerly chief Far Eastern correspondent. Here it is:

Anybody with 15 Chinese dollars – equalling 75 United States cents – now can obtain the first American newspaper published in Free China

⁸⁰ Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 50.

— the Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. Even at that rate, we already see we won't make any money. But we do have fun. Costs of the enterprise are terrific, including months of, United States preparations, a 15, 000-mile trip almost by way of the South Pole, Himalayas, and Chungking, costs designed to make any business manager weep. However, nobody is submitting any taxi bills. Transportation is strictly "on the hoof" and the Editor of our new. Chungking edition, Frederick Burr Oppen, and myself are developing jack-rabbit legs from climbing tile ancient stone steps to the apparently equally ancient office of Chungking's daily newspaper, the National Herald, perched against a hillside overlooking the Yangtze.⁸¹

However, the re-establishment of the *SEPM* only occurred after a long and tortuous process. In September 1943, a formal application for publishing in Chongqing was submitted. It later needed to be approved by five different sections of the government, but the Nationalist Government presented active attitude.⁸²

First Chongqing issue 31 October 1943

Due to the long wait for the formal licence of publication, Gould wrote a letter on 20 October to Ho Yao-tsu, the Mayor of Chongqing, enquiring to publish the first issue of the Chongqing edition on 31 October 1943, which was in accordance with their original plan in the situation of without formal publishing approval. In the letter, Gould mentioned Oppen had negotiated with Ho Feng-shan, director of the Intelligence Department of the Foreign Affairs, and Hollington Tong, Vice Minister of Publicity, and had acquired affirmative answers from both of them. Mayor Ho in his reply letter claimed that he had noticed the publication censorship section of Chongqing to allow the *SEPM* to publish on 31 October.⁸³

Producing the paper was quite an ordeal. According to Gould, the conditions for getting the paper printed were challenging. The paper was printed in a shabby office. As it was reported:

... ancient office of Chungking's daily newspaper, the 'National Herald,' perched against a hillside overlooking the Yangtze. The Herald.' like the 'Evening Post,' Is a wartime refugee, having moved its none - too – modern Chinese-made presses from Hankow through the Yangtze gorges in 1938. It gladly made an arrangement for publication

⁸¹ The Passing Show, *Tweed Daily*, 3 January 1944.

⁸² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 337.

⁸³ Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0051-0003-00639.

with the 'Post' as a weekly, but the combined operation is straining the facilities of what is probably the world's most unique print shop.

This is entered through a doorway in the cliff face leading to an S-shaped tunnel equipped by two gas-guard curtains. Suddenly the passage opens into a larger room chiselled from rock considered Chungking's finest bombproof. Under a bamboo framework supporting a split-bamboo false ceiling which protects against falling rocks sit Chinese compositors on high stools peering by dim electric light copy uncomprehended and sticking type.

Two American linotypes inside the cave retired from old age. As the galleys are filled, Chief Printer Chen, a veteran of Hankow who never found it necessary to learn English to operate English-language newspapers, assembles it into wooden forms on a "stone" consisting of a plank covered by a strip of tin. A decrepit Chinese press chugs intermittently from the power of a Shanghai-made electric motor with frequent ministrations of the "chief engineer" whose sole tools are a printer's "stick" and a monkey wrench. The locally made 'Herald' prints on two grades of paper at a different subscription price, but the 'Evening Post' is employing only the best, rendering even use of cuts occasionally possible.⁸⁴

The circumstances in Chongqing that the newspaper faced were very different from those in Shanghai's French Concession. Gould seemingly understood their plight, as he said that "since there is no longer any extraterritorial privilege for foreigners in China, and no areas of foreign control, any American or other foreign-owned publication comes fully under Chinese law and Chinese officials, which is as should be." Gould deemed that it had been a terrific beginning to acquire permission during the wartime period.⁸⁵ Perhaps just because of his sense of urgency about the re-establishment of the newspaper and the relatively supportive attitude of the Nationalist Government, he felt may lead to his consideration for the journalism control and censorship posed by the Nationalist Government, and underestimate how potentially serious the issue would be.

The main barrier in the application was that the Nationalist Government had tightened its control towards journalism and publication, particularly regarding foreigners. Gould at the moment might have not realised that the *SEPM* would not have been able to publish in Chongqing based on the common process when he was mentioning his appreciation for the help and special assistance from Hollington Tong, Soong Mei-ling and other friends. As Gould said:

⁸⁴ The Post returns to China, Daily Mercury, *Mackay*, 22 December, 1943, 5

⁸⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 334.

In starting a Chungking (Chongqing) edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* in the fall of 1943, Fritz Oppen and I had the advantage of great good will which had been built up among Chinese public and officials all the way up to and including the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang by the attitude of our former publications, the original Post and the Ta Mei vernacular papers. Even so, it was still necessary for us to get the permission of five different sets of officials before a license was promised.⁸⁶

However, what he should thank for were the newspaper staff included himself who risked their lives to hold fast to their own positions in the Isolated Island. The comments made by the Intelligence Department of the Foreign Affairs shown that the *SEPM* as a foreigners' paper should be forbidden to publish in Chongqing, but the paper was specially approved to legally publish just because of considering its justice actions against Wang Ching-wei regime in Shanghai. It was specially emphasised by the Department of the Foreign Affairs that this case would not be applied to other foreigners to proposed similar request.⁸⁷ Therefore, it could be argued that the *SEPM* would have not been able to be re-established without its special contribution for Chongqing and the resultant great sacrifice for fighting against Wang Ching-wei regime in Shanghai.

The Cairo Declaration was formally proclaimed by the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of China on 1 December. The contents of the Cairo Declaration includes consensus reached in the conference that Japan must unconditional surrender, give up all islands occupied in the Pacific after the First World War, recognise the independent of the Korea, and return Manchuria and Taiwan to China.

As a matter of fact, the formal permission for the *SEPM* to be published in Chongqing was not issued until 11 February 1944. Benefited from the special approval by the Nationalist Government, the wish to re-establish the *SEPM* in Chongqing was finally realised, but more serious issue followed subsequently that the paper must comply with the strict wartime censorship on principle. This became the most important constraint on the development of the newspaper in Chongqing.

1944 marked the Japanese Army's Operation Ichi-Go campaign in Henan, Hunan and

⁸⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 334.

⁸⁷ Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0060-0013-00003.

Guangxi Provinces, aimed at controlling the traffic line from Manchuria to Southeast Asia, so that more war materials could be delivered to the Japanese front. It also saw the arrival of American Vice President Henry Wallace to Chongqing – the highest-ranking US official to visit China at that time. The Chinese and Foreign Journalist Group, including Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, Xie Shuangqiu and Zhao Chaogou, arrived in Yan'an in June, commencing their interviews. The editorial, "Welcome American comrades-in-armies", was published on 15 August in the *Liberation Daily*, an organ newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.⁸⁸ The year 1944 ended with the end of the Operation Ichi-Go campaign. The Japanese Army achieved military victory, but both Chinese and Japanese sides suffered significant losses, and Japan did not achieve the result that they anticipated.

The increasing censorship

Gould, soon after the establishment of the *SEPM* in Chongqing, realised that the newspaper would not be able to publish as freely in editorials as it was in Shanghai French Concession, and all editorials of the Chongqing edition must be censored before its publication. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government might approve the newspaper to publish in Chongqing in the hope that it could continue the co-operation with the Government, striving for international support to Chinese resistance against Japan as it was in the Isolated Island Shanghai. However, the intention of either Starr or Gould was still to attempt to maintain the newspaper with American professional features. As Gould said:

[...] Neil Starr nevertheless hadn't sent us out on a propaganda enterprise. We would try to make this an American newspaper only by printing true news, but we would completely avoid any question as to whether our editorial ideas might in some official's view be right or wrong in a given instance.⁸⁹

In contrast to pre-war Shanghai, the newspaper in Chongqing had not been able to enjoy many freedoms derived from extraterritoriality, and nearly all journalism activities of the newspaper were strictly control by the Nationalist Government. Indeed, the censorship implemented in Chognqing during the war against Japan had incurred sharp

⁸⁸ Huanying Meijun Guanchazu De Zhanyoumei [Welcome our Comrade of the American Military Inspectors], *Liberation Daily*, 15 August 1944.

⁸⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

criticism for a long time. Wang Shih-chieh as the minister of the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party on 11 January 1940 at the dinner with Chinese journalists had heard the complaining about the censorship.⁹⁰ Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, American journalists reinforced their concern on Chinese situation, but the Nationalist Government implemented more strict censorship. Western journalists organised several activities to advocate the Nationalist Government to reduce their control over journalism, but they did not receive any active feedback.⁹¹ Under these circumstances, professionalism ideals which had been ran counter to the political and social atmosphere in Chongqing sowed the seeds for the long time frustration of the newspaper in Chongqing, and finally felt obliged to suspend on the eve of Victory over Japan Day.

The *SEPM* in Chongqing often suffered publication crisis derived from the censorship from both China and the United States. Compared with the American censorship, the Nationalist Government had stricter regulation. A typical case was the incident where Joseph Stilwell was forced to leave China in October 1944. Gould, in his memoir mentioned that a report of the Associated Press on 30 October 1944 about Stilwell being relinquished of his military power and leaving China. 388 words were firstly censored by the Americans and then China censored and deleted 104 words, and finally the piece of news was read as “Chungking, Oct. 29 – Stilwell is known to have taken formal leave of Chiang.”⁹² Gould further added:

The comparatively heavy American share of the censorship on that particular dispatch was due to the fact that the American army censor got first bite. He took out everything he didn't want Spencer Moosa to say about American aspects of the Stilwell recall, and the Chinese censor then attended to everything Spencer had said about why the Chinese wanted Stilwell removed. Ultimately the American censorship was relaxed on this story and a great deal was revealed, mostly through Washington. But so far as the Chinese could control filings from Chungking, they kept the cork in the bottle.⁹³

This had not been the worst period of the paper in Chongqing. The *SEPM* in its early time in Chongqing did not experience overmuch troubles from the Chinese censors as

⁹⁰ Wang Shih-chieh, *Wang Shijie Riji* [The Diary of Dr. Wang Shih-chieh], ed. Lin May-li (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), 245.

⁹¹ Liu Jingxiu and Zhang Zhao, “Meiguo Jizheyu Zhongguo Kangzhan,” [American Journalists and Chinese Resistance against Japan] *Minguo Dangan* 1989, no. 1 (April 1989): 110-112.

⁹² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 331.

⁹³ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 331.

most of the news reported were about the United States. However, increasing numbers of Chinese news which were not reported in Chongqing local Chinese newspapers were published in the *SEPM*. It attracted many Chinese readers, especially government officials, to read the paper, but simultaneously drew Chinese censors' attention. In the early 1945, editors of the *SEPM* felt they were being not able to bear the censorship of Chongqing.⁹⁴ In Gould's memoir, there was a news report of the *SEPM* about Stilwell, and there was only a paragraph censored, but in the whole week of the negotiation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, Chinese censors proposed that the paper could not publish anything, even the announcement issued by the Nationalist Party.⁹⁵ As Gould recalled:

[...] one week during the height of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) – Communist negotiations, after Charlie (Charlie Miner) had successfully passed through the international censorship and filed to New York a full account of this still unconcluded squabble, he was advised by the local censors that he could print nothing whatever on the subject in our Chungking edition. [...] Charlie radioed me in New York, saying that he proposed to print the substance of what he had been allowed to file telegraphically to us “unless forcibly restrained.”⁹⁶

Gould persuaded Miner to keep calm and told him not to publish any news or editorials about politics, but to state in the newspaper that there should be a long report, but it had been censored, and if readers were interested in the news and they could read the New York edition if possible.⁹⁷

The New York edition reported:

Chou En-lai, Communist leader, has arrived in Chungking as scheduled, according to a dispatch from the Chungking Edition of the Shanghai Evening Post late this week.

Agreement between the National Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Government of Yen-an strongly hinted in private Washington advices to the Shanghai Evening Post last week was still hanging fire this week, but there were indications in a dispatch from the Post's Chungking Edition that some sort of a settlement was anticipated momentarily. The dispatch read:

"While withholding details beyond saying that the negotiations were continuing, Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan,

⁹⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

⁹⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

⁹⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

⁹⁷ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

declared today (Wednesday): The (National) Government is showing a genuine desire to welcome the Communists into the national effort.

Meanwhile, it is learned that Chou En-lai, Communist delegate to the People's Political Council, is scheduled to arrive in Chungking tonight (Wednesday), presumably bearing Yen-an's answer to the Government proposals, which have still not been officially disclosed."

At this point, 149 words were censored, and the dispatch continued:

"The presence of Chou En-lai in Chungking, if confirmed, is regarded as a hopeful sign that there is some prospect of settlement. Otherwise, he would be very unlikely to make a personal visit to the capital at this time."

Last week's Post report that there were strong indications of an agreement, according to private Washington advices to this newspaper, was followed by subsequent indications that the negotiations had struck a snag owing to the demands being made by the Communists.

About the same time, however Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was quoted in an Associated Press dispatch from Chungking as predicting that the Nationalist differences with the Communists would be settled peacefully. He quoted as adding there would be no civil war in China as long as he was at the helm.⁹⁸

Although this change of censorship might be based on the authority's political consideration, it caused a dilemma for the Chongqing edition of the *SEPM*. Randall Gould was concerned that because the newspaper was run under the Chinese law, he could not print the news truthfully and was reluctant to take money from their readers, due to what he saw as false pretences.⁹⁹ To the *SEPM*, although it had to bear the strict censorship, there were still positive features of the newspaper, such as some high level officials in Chiang Kai-shek's government who had American study experience and similar ideologies with Gould. This element made Gould maintain his patience towards the Nationalist Government in Chongqing at the same time when he complained the environment of the press in Chongqing. When the *SEPM* applied to establish in Chongqing, Soong May-ling and Hollington Tong provided critical support and assistance, thus the paper, by not bribing any officials, was able to be successfully approved to publish by the Nationalist Government, in which corruption had been a

⁹⁸ The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury NY edition January 1945

⁹⁹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 336.

serious issue.¹⁰⁰

In the time of the *SEPM* published in Chongqing, Hollington Tong by his active attitude helped Gould successfully solve many issues when he was irritated by the censorship of Chongqing. In October 1943, Louis Mountbatten took a plane from India across the Himalayas to Chongqing. Japanese air force at that time had implemented air attacks aimed at this air route, and many American flights had been shot down. In accordance with this situation, censors of Chongqing accepted an order that the name of Mountbatten should not be occurred in any news and editorials. Just then, Gould in a report which was not relevant to Mountbatten's visit to China mentioned the name of Mountbatten, and the censors asked Gould to delete the whole article. It irritated Gould and he immediately had it out with Hollington Tong. Tong understood and accepted Gould's concerns and amended regulations of the censorship, and Gould felt in his debt.¹⁰¹ As Gould recalled:

I went direct to Hollington Tong. I pointed out not only that my text involved no security consideration whatever, but that the general orders were stupid and possibly self-defeating. The very fact that the name of Mountbatten, ordinarily mentioned fairly often by the Chungking correspondents, was suddenly disappearing entirely from all press messages was bound to be a suspicious factor to the Japanese, who copied every word going out of Chungking by radio and were extremely smart in drawing deductions.

Holly saw the point. He not only authorized the restoration of my text to its original form, but I believe he sent down an amended order, leaving the whole question to the censors' personal discretion in any future instances. Holly appreciated my presentation, and his response to it was not merely kindly but intelligent. I know that his subordinate censors were glad about what had happened, for they told me so. It was never a pleasure for them to have to take arbitrary action. But their jobs depended on carrying out orders, naturally.¹⁰²

However, the general environment in Chongqing was still very strict and Tong implemented the harsh censorship policy but also showed sensitivity in his handling of Western journalists. For issues that he thought posed no serious threat to the government he was able to listen to and compromise with journalists. However, on critical issues,

¹⁰⁰ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 334.

¹⁰¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 332.

¹⁰² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 332.

especially those pertaining to the CCP, he gave no ground but showed sophistication in the way he implemented his orders with regard to these journalists. For example, Chris Hopper from the *SEPM*, Harold Isaacs of *Newsweek*, and Clyde Farnsworth of Associated Press submitted applications to visit Yan'an after October 1945 but these were denied by Hollington Tong. Regarding the denial of these applications Tong said, "I favored this ban myself, in part in fairness to the correspondents. It seemed to me far better to refuse the permission outright than to permit them to take the trip and then apply wholesale censorship to their dispatches."¹⁰³

Wang Shi-chieh was another important enlightened high level official in Chongqing. In Gould's opinion, he was a liberal official and journalists were basically satisfactory to his working style. Gould, before his leave from Chongqing, had a very good conversation with him. As Gould said:

I had a talk with him before my departure and found him ready to admit that the tight censorship was doing China much harm abroad. We agreed that if the prestige of the Chungking correspondents continued to suffer because of their inability to tell a full story, that would only play into the hands of American keyhole columnists and stay-at-home magazine strategists who could command an even greater following for what they termed their "inside stuff on China – what the Chungking censors won't pass."¹⁰⁴

Indeed, these enlightened officials not only in their mind did support free expression and professional journalism but also did provide significant help to the *SEPM*. In the spring of 1945, Wang Shih-chieh and Soong Tse-ven promised to American ambassador Patrick Hurley that strict censorship should not be a long term policy of China, and they supported to present news with diverse views to the public.¹⁰⁵ However, they were not able to fundamentally change the partisan trend of Chinese journalism development. When the Nationalist Government implemented strict censorship in Chongqing, a Communist partisan journalism management system under the Mao Zedong's absolute control had been established in Yan'an. And it would unavoidably cast a shadow over post-war Chinese journalism.

¹⁰³ Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, *China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), 105.

¹⁰⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 333-34.

¹⁰⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 338.

Many government officials liked to read the *SEPM* because they could acquire Chinese news that could not be published in other newspapers.¹⁰⁶ However, censorship became increasingly more restrictive with the victory of the war looming. This change was relevant to a political rivalry which was developing between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. In early 1945, news of a negotiation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party was censored in the Chongqing edition.¹⁰⁷ Randall Gould suspected this was in order to prevent a retort by the CCP.¹⁰⁸

When the private press was trapped by the restriction of an ailing economy and wartime journalism management in the course of the Nationalist Government heading west, organs of the Nationalist Party rapidly received the benefits from their key role of anti-Japanese propaganda. As a result, the Nationalist organ system during the war against Japan explored and consolidated its influence in the southwest of China where it was used in a weak area for the party's propaganda machinery to reach before the war, and this incurred much resentment from the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, the Nationalist Party kept high vigilance of the Communist's journalistic activities within Nationalist controlled areas. The Chinese Communist Party, on the one hand, made the most of its organs' legal position obtained as a product of the formation of the anti-Japanese national united front to exert the Communists' influence to alter the public opinion to favour the Communist in the Nationalist Party controlled areas. On the other hand, the Party actively engaged in united front works, aimed at dividing and demoralising the Nationalist propaganda machinery in secret by co-opting and mustering support from the press and publishing controlled by the members of the Nationalist Party who were sympathetic in a way to the Communist Party, the third political parties and social organisations. These activities of the Communist Party often suffered the Nationalists' obstruction and suppression, which was a fuse of deteriorating the relations between the two parties during the war.

In early 1945, the Yalta Conference closed, with clauses associated with the Soviet

¹⁰⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

¹⁰⁷ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

¹⁰⁸ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

¹⁰⁹ Kao Yu-ya, *Guomindang De Xinwen Xuanchuan Yu Zhanhou Zhongguo Zhengju Biandong: 1945-1949* [The Interrelationship between the Kuomintang Government's Propagation Policies and the Transformation of China: 1945-1949] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), 21.

Army sending troops to Manchuria. Within a couple of months US President Roosevelt had passed away – succeeded by Harry S. Truman – and the *SEPM* reported that the Japanese may withdraw across Asia. The Army news reported that there were rumours of planned Japanese troop withdrawal from Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, south China and even central China. They reported this as circulating in diplomatic circles in Chungking, due to Japan's military and diplomatic failures:

The Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post listed four reasons supporting the suggestion: –" First, the defeats in Burma and in the Pacific, resulting in a direct threat to the Japanese homeland, may force the Japanese to call more troops home to strengthen the island defences; secondly, the Japanese, with the end of the European war in sight, may feel forced to take precautionary measures against the possibility of a Russian invasion of Manchuria, especially in view of the termination of the Russo-Japanese pact; thirdly, China's efforts to strengthen and re-equip its armies, with the help of the United States, have imposed a growing threat to the Japanese hold on communications and the coastal corridors in south and central China; fourthly the growing probability of American landings on the China coast.¹¹⁰

On May 8th, Germany acknowledged unconditional surrender. And, with Allied success, imminent, at the end of June, the difficult decision was made to discontinue publication of the Chongqing edition.¹¹¹ On the front page of the final newspaper, C. V. Starr, Randall Gould and Charles Miner made a statement under joint names that the current wartime censorship had become unacceptable, forcing the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* to deviate from its original principle of providing straight news. As a result, the newspaper team felt that they had no choice but to suspend publication until after the victory of the war.¹¹²

While there was strong censorship, the paper was allowed to publish around issues supported by the nationalists, for example, backing Chungking's mayor Gen. So Yantzu about the assault of a Chinese woman by a crowd for being in the company of a US Embassy Official:

Said the Chungking editor of the "Shanghai Evening Post": "Scandal-mongers appear to have persuaded many Chinese that every American in uniform is a lecher, and every Chinese girl who allows herself to be

¹¹⁰ Hint of Retreat by Japs, *Army News*, 19 April 1945.

¹¹¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 336.

¹¹² Gould, *China in the Sun*, 337.

seen with him in public is a prostitute."¹¹³

As Gould recorded, one week during the negotiations between the Nationalist party and the Communist party, Charlie Miner successfully passed through international censorship and was prevented by local censors to publish anything even a statement issued by the Publicity Minister. His reaction was one of anger and frustration and he reported to New York a full account of the incident he wanted to disclose and confirmed that he would go ahead anyway unless he was forcibly restrained. Gould tried to negotiate with Miner by pointing out the seriousness of abiding by the Chinese law but if Miner felt his position was intolerable then he should close down. The outcome was that Miner omitted the political statement but clearly indicated to his readers that he had been forced to leave out details and that the readers were encouraged to seek the American publication to reveal the censored section.¹¹⁴

Suspended publication in Chongqing

Just before the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, a sudden increase in censorship by the Nationalist government led to the Chongqing edition suspending publication on 24 June 1945. This was unexpected, because there were no censorship troubles in the first year of the Chongqing edition, and the newspaper was successful in attracting numbers of Chinese English-reading subscribers.¹¹⁵

The final edition included the statement:

DELETED BY CENSOR

An experiment concludes with this issue of the Chungking Edition, *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.

In an announcement published in the first number, appearing Oct. 13, 1943, we reviewed the record. Fifteen years previously a group of young men has started an American daily newspaper in Shanghai. They surmounted many difficulties, added a Chinese-language affiliate, but suspended by Japanese compulsion from Dec. 6, 1941.

On Jan. 1, 1943, we started a weekly American Edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* in New York City. In introducing our Chungking edition 10 months later we said: "though the appearance

¹¹³ Goldfields News Section, *Sunday Times*, 24 June 1945.

¹¹⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

¹¹⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 335.

and frequency of our present publications under war conditions necessarily differ from the original Post, we intend to preserve the original character and principles whose primary interest was always straight news.”

We have now come to the conclusion that publication of an American newspaper in the Posts’ tradition has clearly impossible in China under wartime censorship restrictions which go far beyond considerations of military security. Therefore we are suspending under victory as been won, when we expect to resume daily publication in Shanghai.

Meanwhile our American Edition, which represents news and editorial policies of the former Shanghai paper, is continuing. Subscribers to the Chungking edition are offered an option of their money back for the amount of unfilled subscriptions, or the American edition by mail, subject to the operations of the Chinese censorship.¹¹⁶

The statement was signed by C.V. Starr, Randall Gould and Charles S. Miner. The editors forewarned of this in the New York edition of the *SEPM* on 22 June 1945, in the front page article “Post suspends Wartime issue in Chungking” along with printing Chongqing edition’s statement about closing and added:

During its 20 months of existence the Chungking edition won a considerable following among both foreign and English-speaking Chinese readers, Five hundred copies a month were donated to the US Army and flown to various points within China, where these were made available to readers of the American armed forces by the Special Service Section. At the outset the Chungking edition specialized on news sent by radio from the United States, but in response to reader demand it published an increasing percentage of news from points within China. Special pains were taken to assure an impartial presentation.¹¹⁷

The article went on describing intermittent conflict with censors during 1945, explicitly noting that censors’ concerns did not include the changes of biased reporting; rather the censors’ concerns were non-military. An example is provided of a blanket ban on printing anything about the Communist Party during an acute stage of cross-party negotiations. The *SEPM* pointed out that they were not subject to any additional censorship than the Chinese press. It summarised it, so:

It was known to be an American newspaper and its tradition previously had been to publish all angles of every news story regarded as

¹¹⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 337.

¹¹⁷ Post suspends Wartime issue in Chungking, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 22 June 1945.

important.

Under such circumstances, the editor and management of the Chungking edition found themselves in an increasingly embarrassing position. It was therefore decided, after due consideration, to suspend publication for such time as war censorship compels an abandonment of original standards.

The stories on the front page of the first New York edition after the Chongqing edition's closure – the edition of 29 June 1945 – were fairly consistent with those in the New York edition before the Chongqing edition's closure. The front page articles of 29 June 1945 were:

“Dim Hope Held For Immediate Repatriations” – a reprint of the State Department's report on the status of Japan's prisoners of war and civil detainees

“Gold At 1800 –I After Sales Are Suspended” – about the gold sales in Chongqing

“Heading For Moscow” – about T.V. Soong's trip

“National City Opens Philippines Branch At Former Quarters” – around National City Bank's reopening

“Trade Registration” – about the extension of timeframes for foreign firms to register in China (a story from Charles Miner reported by radio, direct from Chungking)

“War Fronts Of The Far East”

“Chiang Hails U.S. War Aid But Stresses Economic Need” – a story from Charles Miner reported by radio, direct from Chungking

“38 Specialists End Technical Studies In U.S.” – about Chinese visitors under a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration program

“First Attached, China Also 1st On Charter Roll” – about signing of the Charter of the United Nations

“N.Y. Observance Will Make China's Eight Years Of War” – about the Ambassador's guest speaking engagement.¹¹⁸

Around this time, in China, work was being done on healing the problems between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. As part of this plan, on 1 July 1945, six

¹¹⁸ See the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* (New York edition), 29 June 1945.

representatives of the People's Political Council visited Yan'an at the invitation of the CCP.

Huang Yanpei admired the democratic emphasis that Mao propagated, and praised the efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to improve Chinese progress.¹¹⁹ On 7 August, Huang Yanpei's book, *Return from Yan'an* was published by Guoxun bookshop in Chongqing, and the *Xinhua Daily* published striking advertisements on its front page for three days. Published without accepting censorship, this book, published mere days before Japan's surrender, marked the beginning of the Movement of Refusing Censorship.

The Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, aimed at urging Japan to surrender as soon as possible, was issued on 26 July. On 6 August, Hiroshima was bombed, on 8 August, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria began, on 9 August Nagasaki was bombed and on 15 August Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan. The following day, he issued an Imperial Rescript ordering Japanese forces to cease fire. However it is not until 9 September that the Japanese troops in China formally surrender, marking the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The *SEPost and Mercury* editor, Gould, entered the post-War period with an optimistic view towards freedom of the press in post war China. He based this positive outlook on the statements of T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan, and Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information who together assured the U.S. Ambassador Hurley that liberalisation was a key future focus and that censorship was not an ongoing practice within the press institutions in China.¹²⁰ Gould had a favourable impression of Wang Shih-chieh due to an earlier conversation when Wang Shih-chieh was first appointed to the publicity ministry; he indicated to Gould that he recognised the damage that the censorship was doing abroad.¹²¹

With the end of the war, thoughts of seeking peace and democracy initially began to spread amongst intellectuals, and then influenced the whole society. When the War of

¹¹⁹ Huang, *Yan'an Guilai* [Return from Yan'an] (Dalian: Dadong Shudian), 43-44.

¹²⁰ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 338

¹²¹ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 334

Resistance against Japan broke out and resistance became main theme of Chinese society, some intellectuals further hoped this war could be an antidote to change the political and social chaos, which both the Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth Movement failed to realise.¹²² To them, the coming of VJ Day should not just mean a military victory, but a historical opportunity to improve post-war peace and democracy. However, there was a huge gap between Chinese social reality and their political ideals, and this stimulated their general anxiousness. This anxiousness was expressed well by General Zhang Zhizhong, who wrote in the face of the victory:

Despite the great victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, domestic issues are still loaded with danger and are delicately poised. This makes us raise a sense of anxious consciousness.¹²³

Conclusion

Journalists and newspaper organisations faced an impossible situation during the second Sino-Japanese War and the Isolated Island Period for Shanghai. Fear, intimidation, supplemented censorship as setting the scene for insurmountable obstacles to professional journalism. Newspapers were vital in the War of resistance against Japan, and the *SEPM*, clearly led the charge of foreign-owned newspapers in resisting censorship. Their sacrifice was great: at least five staff were murdered, including colourful and well known editors Zhu Xinggong and Samuel Chang.

The *SEPM*'s editors and owner were very keen to preserve the tradition of the newspaper particularly its commitment to professional news reporting. Once the paper fell under Japanese control, Starr's strategy was to open the New York edition in order to continue to publish editorials and news that could no longer be produced once extraterritoriality was eradicated in Shanghai. After the situation in Shanghai was untenable, the *SEPM* accomplished an impressive feat in managing to get the paper re-opened in Chongqing. Overcoming great difficulties in producing the paper (getting supplies, carrying out printing, as well as distribution) the Chongqing edition proved to be invaluable in the

¹²² Hung Chang-tai, *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 2.

¹²³ Zhang Zhizhong, *Zhang Zhizhong Huiyilu* [The Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong] (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1985), 716.

wartime situation. English readers included those from all sides who wanted to know what was going on. However, having to operate under both Nationalist and American censorship regulation proved too much for the *SEPM*. The paper closed just before the War of resistance against Japan reached final victory.

In the vastly different world of post-war Shanghai, the *SEPM*'s editors and owner sought to re-establish the paper, now one of only two English language papers in Shanghai. Unfortunately, without the protection of extraterritoriality and in a very changed political environment, the *SEPM* was to face obstacles which even the ingenuity, grit, and determination of Gould and Starr were unable to overcome

Chapter 4: Return to Shanghai: ‘Victory Brings Rebirth’

Two months after the suspension of the Chongqing edition of the *SEPM*, a campaign that sought to scrap censorship broke out in Chongqing and later spread to other cities across Nationalist Party controlled China. This campaign, known as ‘the Movement of Refusing Censorship’ was largely instigated by the deep-seated political divisions between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. With victory over Japan looming, it could be said that the catalyst for the movement was also a mounting sentiment of optimism and urgency regarding the possibility of ushering in an era of civil liberties and democracy, or at the very least, the restoration of pre-war freedoms and rights. The movement finally achieved a temporary victory. This provided the impetus for the re-establishment of the *SEPM* in Shanghai. After the outbreak of the Refusing Censorship Movement, C. V. Starr and Randall Gould believed that it would be the turning point of post-war Chinese journalism. Thus, they made the decision to re-establish the *SEPM* in Shanghai. The first part of this chapter outlines this broader historical context in which the *SEPM* was able to recommence newspaper and radio operations in Shanghai.

Prelude to the Movement of Refusing Censorship

Although the Nationalists and the Communists had avowed to sincerely cooperate with each other against Japanese invasion, sharp and complex contradictions and conflicts which had gradually grown since the outbreak of the War of Resistance fundamentally altered the pre-war balance of power between the two parties.¹ Up to the victory of the war, these fundamental contradictions and conflicts were not eased up, rather, the issue of post-war power distribution raised tensions between the two parties, reaching a critical point breaking out in a military clash. This potential risk was sensitively captured by Peter Vladimirov, the liaison officer for Comintern in Yan’an, and it was recorded in his diary of 21 August 1945 based on his observation that the Communist and the

¹ In the earlier stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, compared with the heavy loss of the Nationalist’s main forces and affluent territories of southeast China as the result of confronting and fighting with Japanese Army, the Chinese Communist Party by making the most of the situation not only stabilised their regime in the remote areas of northwest China, but also quickly reinforced its strength. With the change in the balance of power, distrust and friction between the two parties successively intensified throughout the war. For a detailed analysis of the underlying causes of the contradictions and conflicts between the two parties during the war, see Chen Yung-fa’s *Zhongguo Gongchan Geming Qishinian* [Seventy Years of Chinese Communist Revolution] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, Ltd., 2013), 297.

Nationalist armies mixed and clashed when they were simultaneously dispatched for the takeover of local regimes in the former Japanese occupied areas, and they reproached each through the media.²

Besides the increasing risk of military conflict, the struggle by both sides over the issue of journalistic control also continued. With the privately owned media outlets constrained by an ailing economy and the restrictions of wartime journalism management as the Nationalist Government headed west, organs of the Nationalist Party rapidly received the benefits of their anti-Japanese propaganda. As a result, the Nationalist Party consolidated its influence in the southwest of China, and this incurred much resentment from the Chinese Communist Party.³ Meanwhile, the Nationalist Party maintained high vigilance regarding the Communists' journalistic activities within Nationalist controlled areas.

The *Xinhua Daily* was one of the main Communist organs of propaganda and it was able to legally publish in the Nationalist Party controlled areas during the war against Japan. The paper in the process of propagating Communist political views and policies often engaged in bitter wars of words with the Nationalists and other “dissidents” from other parties. Although the legal position of the *Xinhua Daily* was recognised until 28 February 1947, the Nationalists were well aware of the actual threats to their regime from Communist propaganda disseminated through the paper. Hence, restrictions in public and sabotage in secret against the *Xinhua Daily* continued from the time of its establishment in Wuhan on 11 January 1938.⁴ However, the Nationalist Party fully understood that despite the enduring campaign of spite between the two parties, they could not ban the *Xinhua Daily* (considered a signpost of the Nationalist-Communist relations by foreigners) lest the CCP gain an opportunity to condemn the Nationalist Party for sabotaging their cooperation in their struggle against Japan, and thereby

² Peter Vladimirov, *The Vladimirov Diaries: Yenan, China, 1942-1945* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 503-04.

³ Kao Yu-ya, *Guomindang De Xinwen Xuanchuan Yu Zhanhou Zhongguo Zhengju Biandong: 1945-1949* [The Interrelationship between the Kuomintang Government's Propagation Policies and the Transformation of China: 1945-1949] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), 21.

⁴ The earliest attack against the *Xinhua Daily* happened in the evening of 17 January 1938, which was only the seventh day after the newspaper started to publish. The newspaper's history to a certain degree reflects the spotty Nationalist-Communist relations. As the war against Japan went on, conflicts between the two parties intensified ceaselessly, interference against the *Xinhua Daily* through public censorship or secret sabotage became increasingly frequent. More details about the *Xinhua Daily*'s history, see Han Xinru, *Xinhua Ribao Shi: 1938-1947* [A History of the Xinhua Daily: 1938-1947] (Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 1990), 26-27.

winning the sympathy and support of public opinion.⁵

Apart from legal propaganda in the Nationalist Party controlled areas, inviting journalists to visit Yan'an was another highly successful Chinese Communist Party tactic during the war. The accounts given by the Western journalists whom the Party invited to visit Yan'an, such as Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, were particularly beneficial to the Party in projecting a contrasting image, undermining the existing unfavourable public perception. What they wrote influenced their governments' policies attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party, generating a wide range of international support that the Party was badly in need of at that time.⁶ The group of Western and Chinese journalists who visited Yan'an on May 17 1944 were included on a list of journalists' that the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party strictly scrutinised. But even so, they did not realise that Xie Shiangqui, director of the interview section of the *Saodangbao* (a Nationalist military organ) was aiding the Communist Party from within the Nationalist camp.⁷

Movement of Refusing Censorship

One of the objectives of the Communist united front works was to do as much as possible to undermine the Nationalist wartime censorship. The Communists slowly built up enough strength to strike back against the Nationalists, whose own propaganda had been undermining them. The outbreak of the Movement of Refusing Censorship was a result of Communist united front works. A key figure is Huang Luofeng. He was one of the Communists active on the press and publication front in the Nationalist Party occupied areas. Huang joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927.⁸ After spending his early life in Yunnan Province for the Party's revolutionary cause, he engaged in the publication of books in Shanghai that aimed to introduce the theories of Communism to the masses. He moved to Chongqing in 1939, as the manager running the Dushu

⁵ Matthew L. Wang, *Zhongguo Guomindang Xinwen Zhengce zhi Yanjiu*: (1928-1945) [A Study on the Journalism Policies of the Chinese Nationalist Party: 1928-1945] (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1996), 160.

⁶ For further details regarding the discourse concerning the united front works of the Chinese Communist Party addressed to the Western journalists who visited Yan'an, see Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 42-61.

⁷ Chongqing Ribaoshe, *Kangzhan Shiqi Chongqing De Xinwenjie* [The Press in Chongqing during the War of Resistance against Japan] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1995), 184-85.

⁸ Hu Sheng, "Zhuihui Huang Luofeng Tongzhi [Mourn and Recall Our Comrade Huang Luofeng]," *Chuban Gongzuo*, no. 11 (August 1985): 23; Shang Ding, "Huang Luofeng: 'Jujian Yundong' De Cehuairen [Huang Luofeng: The Person to Plot the Movement of Refusing Censorship]," *Zongheng*, no.3 (March 2000): 56.

Publishing House. He also shouldered liaison work between the South Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and the press and publishing sector in Chongqing.⁹ The New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 entirely unmasked the hostility between the two parties, and as a result, the Nationalists forcedly closed three publishing institutes (Dushu, Shenghuo and Xinzhi) suspected of close links with the Communist Party.¹⁰ Huang consequently felt obliged to flee to Hong Kong.¹¹ During that time, he still kept in touch with the Chinese Communist Party organisation under the pseudonym of Yuan Zhao.¹² In the spring of 1942, he returned to Chongqing, and continued the work of secretly establishing united front operations there, in accordance with Zhou Enlai's instructions.¹³

The heads of 13 publishing institutes who had pro-Communism leanings or were to a certain degree sympathetic to the Communist Party were successfully called together in the summer of 1943 – effectively sowing the seeds for the establishment of the New United Publishing Enterprise Agency. This agency was initially just a forum, in which members convened a couple of times per month to discuss their perspectives on the current political situation. Huang exploited his skills in handling the forum in subtle ways to propagate the CCP's guidelines and policies.¹⁴ It was to culminate in the formation of a publishing united front in Chongqing under the leadership of the CCP. Huang Luofeng held the position of president in this agency, and Guoxun Bookshop, which performed a critical role in the later Movement of Refusing Censorship, was a member of the agency. Shang Ding, as the manager of Guoxun Bookshop also assumed a directors' role in the agency.¹⁵ Later, Huang launched a series of activities through this agency against the Nationalist wartime censorship and economic policies which

⁹ Hu, "Zhuihuai Huang Luofeng Tongzhi," 23-24; Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56.

¹⁰ Shen Jingzhi, "Kangzhan Houqi Huang Luofeng Tongzhi zai Chongqing de Wenhua Chuban Huodong [Cultural and Publishing Activities by Our Comrade Huang Luofeng in Chongqing at the Last Stage of the War of Resistance against Japan]," *Chuban Gongzuo*, no. 11 (August 1985), 31; Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56; Hu, "Zhuihuai Huang Luofeng Tongzhi," 24.

¹¹ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56.

¹² From a published letter by Huang Luofeng from Hong Kong to his comrade, Huang during his time in Hong Kong still actively contacted the publishing colleagues of the Chinese Communist Party. See Huang Luofeng, "Huang Luofeng zhi Liu Daming de Xin: 1941 Nian 11 Yue 12 Ri [A Letter by Huang Luofeng on 12 November 1941 to Liu Daming]," *Chuban Shiliao*, no. 1 (March 2006), 46-48.

¹³ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56.

¹⁴ Shen, "Kangzhan Houqi Huang Luofeng," 31.

¹⁵ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56; Shang Ding, "Yan'an Guilai Yu Jujian Yundong," *Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao*, no.5 (May 1983): 124-25; Shen, "Kangzhan Houqi Huang Luofeng," 31.

restricted the press and publishing.¹⁶

On 1 July 1945, six representatives of the People's Political Council visited Yan'an at the invitation of the CCP. Huang Yanpei as a representative during this trip had a conversation with Mao Zedong, seeking his advice on the way forward for the nation-building of the future:

(Huang Yanpei): Based on my about sixty-year experience, which just takes what I've seen with my own eyes into account, I deeply feel that prosperity can come quickly, but it is difficult to elude the final fate of perishing. A great deal of units, such as a person, a family, a group, a place, and even a country, are not able to avoid the dominance by this law. In the early period, people are engrossed. ... However, when the environment gradually gets better, people accordingly become languished. ... When we read a history, we can find incalculable cases of terminating the political regime and self-defeating. ... All in all, things are always develop by this law. I basically know some deeds of the main leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. I hope to find a new way which can loosen the bonds of the law.

Mao Zedong answered that "we have explored a new way, in which we shall not obey this law. The new way is democracy. The government will not slack only if it is supervised by the people. When everyone takes their own responsibility, terminating the political regime will be avoidable and unnecessary."¹⁷

After returning to Chongqing, Huang, in accordance with a pre-arranged agreement, wrote accounts of his trip, and submitted them to Shang Ding for publication. When Shang Ding received the manuscripts, he thought this book reflected the achievements of the CCP in its controlled area, and would expose the Nationalists' long-term lies aimed at disgracing the Communists. For this reason, he felt that the Nationalist censors may ban the book, or they would require him to delete any content that cast an unfavourable light on them.¹⁸ Labouring under the anxiety of this dilemma, Shang Ding sought out Huang Luofeng to talk matters over. After being deep in thought for a moment, Huang proposed to circumvent the censors and publish the book directly. Moreover, he suggested that this book could lead the charge and may act as the catalyst for a tempest of censorship refusal. He promised that if Huang himself would commit to

¹⁶ Shen, "Kangzhan Houqi Huang Luofeng," 32.

¹⁷ Huang Yanpei, *Yan'an Guilai* [Return from Yan'an] (Dalian: Dazhong Shudian, 1946), 43.

¹⁸ Shang Ding, "Yan'an Guilai Yu Jujian Yundong," *Xinwen Yanjiu Ziliao*, no.5 (May 1983): 125.

this idea, he would mobilise tens of book shops and publishing houses in Chongqing to follow, and try to persuade all others in cultural, publication and news reporting activities to support this movement.¹⁹

On 7 August, the book was published.²⁰ After mobilisation, on 17 August a joint statement formally announced the refusal of censorship from 1 September 1945 - signatures from 16 publishing institutes in Chongqing were appended. This document was soon submitted to the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party, the Association for the Promotion of Constitutionalism, and the People's Political Council.²¹ The influence of the movement continued to expand. After September, this movement spread to other cities.²² On 12 September, the Minister of Propaganda, Wu Kuo-chen, declared that censorship of the wartime period would be annulled from 1 October, but the area where the military were still attempting to regain control from Japanese forces would not be included. The Nationalist Party in its 10th Central Committee convened on 22 September also decreed that the censorship over the press, books and magazines would be cancelled from 1 October.²³

Re-establishment of the *SEPM* and its Radio Station in Shanghai

Soon after the announcement, Charlie Miner went back to Shanghai to investigate the viability of the re-establishment of the newspaper. He learnt that local censors were still reluctant to report the chaotic political and economic situation, and in order to recommence publishing, the government required that publishers had to agree to submit to censorship.²⁴ When Miner returned to the original newspaper office in Shanghai, he found that much equipment had been stolen. However, these problems did not affect the decision to resume the daily newspaper in Shanghai. As Starr and Gould believed, increasing numbers of Chinese would embrace fairness and common sense, so they decided to accept what they thought would be only temporary censorship in order to re-

¹⁹ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56; Shang, "Yan'an Guilai," 125.

²⁰ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56; Shang, "Yan'an Guilai," 125-26.

²¹ Shang, "Huang Luofeng," 56; Shang, "Yan'an Guilai," 126; Shang Ding, "Yan'an Guilai De Chongjibo [The Influence of the Book 'Return from Yan'an']," *Jiaoyu Yu Zhiye* 1985, no. 3: 47.

²² Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi* [A Comprehensive History of Chinese Journalism] (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 1996), 2:1002-03.

²³ Fang, *Zhongguo Xinwen Chuanboshi*, 2:1004; Randall Gould, *China in the Sun*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1946), 339; Shang, "Yan'an Guilai De Chongjibo," 47.

²⁴ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 339.

establish the *SEPM*.²⁵ As Gould recalled:

With the peace, there arose hope that censorship in China would instantly be no more. But one of the first announcements issued by the National Government after Japan's surrender was that censorship could not yet be relinquished. This was not taken lying down; by September 15 a total of twenty publications in Chungking had taken formal stand that they would not submit their products to the tender ministrations of the censors any longer. On October 1 China's wartime censorship was stated to be abolished – but only in Free China. On the plea that military operations were still in progress in areas of Japanese occupation, the lid remained on there. Soon after arrival in Shanghai, Charlie Miner found that the Chinese censors objected to a full portrayal of the chaotic political – economic situation either through local publication or in radio messages home.

Nevertheless it was decided to resume publication of the daily *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*. Charlie was at first denied entry to our plant by a Japanese sentry posted at the door, although this was a month after Tokyo's surrender. He employed flanking tactic and went in through a window. Much of our equipment had been stolen. Even after Charlie was grudgingly granted free entry, he had a terrific job on his hands in restoring enough order to the print shop to permit renewed operation. Also, it was made clear by the Chinese authorities that we must promise to submit to censorship if we wanted permission to publish again. Charlie queried Neil and myself in New York City, and we told him to go ahead, accepting all Chinese Regulations on the presumption that fairness and common sense would prevail.²⁶

After extensive preparation, the *SEPM* finally resumed publication in Shanghai on 24 September, and on the front page, C. V. Starr, Gould and Charlie Miner submitted a joint article entitled 'Victory Brings Rebirth' symbolising their aspirations for the future. In the article, they pointed out that they fully understood the challenge they would face, and their aim was to retain the original newspaper's values of reporting 'straight' news and independent views because they firmly believed that this would be beneficial to both China and America.²⁷

In late September 1945, the *SEPM* regained the *Huang Pu* Radio Station, and re-established its *Ta Mei* Radio Station.²⁸ On 8 October, the station signed a corporation

²⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 340.

²⁶ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 339-40.

²⁷ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 340.

²⁸ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye* [Radio enterprise in Shanghai of the Old China] (Beijing: Dang'an Chubanshe and China Radio & Television Publishing House, 1985), 509-10.

agreement with the United States Information Service. In accordance with this agreement, the station would be used by the United States Information Service until 31 December 1945.²⁹ Unfortunately, before this contract had expired, the *Ta Mei* radio station was under new ownership due to the restrictions of the radio ownership policy of the post-war Nationalist Government.

The pre-war prosperity of radio broadcast, which generally derived (especially in foreign concessions) from private Chinese and foreign-owned radio stations in east coast metropolises, no longer existed during the War of Resistance against Japan. In the Japanese occupied areas, radio stations that were not willing to cooperate with the collaborationist regimes were forced to close. Meanwhile, using the war as a pretext, the Nationalist Party did not permit independent radio stations in the areas it controlled either.³⁰ Unlike the newspapers and news agencies, due to the fixed and cumbersome nature of the machines and equipment, the Nationalist Party's official radio station's move to the west did not proceed smoothly. The situation began to turn from 1939 onwards when the Central Radio Enterprise Bureau was established to guide and govern the national radio network as determined by the Nationalist hierarchy. When non-official radio stations were restricted by both subjective and objective factors to broadcast in hinterland China, the Central Radio Station under the auspices of the government rapidly developed and began to establish its superiority in the Nationalist Party controlled areas. From then on, official radio stations overwhelmingly replaced private Chinese and foreign-owned stations and began to dominate China.³¹

Radio - under the monopoly of officials - played an important role for the Nationalist Government, helping it to secure the final victory of the War of Resistance. After the Nationalist Government retreated to southwest China, it realised that it was difficult to deliver newspapers on time in this vast and inhospitable region, and the news that did arrive through print-media was either already stale upon arrival, or became stale very soon thereafter. Radio therefore replaced the newspaper as the Nationalist armies' main

²⁹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q431-1-45.

³⁰ Zhao Yuming, *Zhongguo Xiandai Guangbo Jianshi: 1923-1949* [A Concise History of Chinese Modern Radio Enterprise: 1923-1949] (Beijing: China Radio & Television Publishing House, 1987), 84.

³¹ Kao Yu-ya, *Guomintang de Xinwen Xuanchuan yu Zhanhou Zhongguo Zhengju Biandong: 1945-1949* [The Interrelationship between the Kuomintang Government's Propagation Policies and the Transformation of China: 1945-1949] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), 22-23.

means for accessing up-to-date news.³² Furthermore, radio held far greater strategic importance for the Nationalist Government during the war time than newspapers did. Compared with conventional propaganda methods, radio can more easily penetrate into the enemies' occupied areas for the purpose of diffusing propaganda to the masses. This fact was raised in a manual printed by the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party in 1942. It was entitled *The War of Radio Propaganda* – besides diplomatic strategy, economic pressure and military force, radio was spoken of as one of the essential weapons in the war.³³ Wu Daoyi, the director of the Administration of Radio, in a post-war speech summarising the contribution of radio to the victory over the Japanese, praised radio staff by acknowledging that during the war they had fulfilled an enormous responsibility as the mouthpiece of the government, which allowed it to exert considerable influence over public opinion.³⁴ Radio during wartime China obviously had been considered a political resource that the government should control and exploit to serve its own ends, rather than a platform for freedom of speech.

This approach to radio station management was copied nationwide with the Nationalists' post-war takeover of areas formerly occupied by the Japanese. It is no surprise then that, given the incredibly powerful means of communication radio represented at that time, the Nationalist Government made the decision to implement overarching control and strict management of radio stations in post-war China. On 27 August 1945, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications issued a notice in Shanghai, in which it was explained that the Nationalist army would soon arrive in Shanghai, and that radio propaganda would become an important activity after the military operation.³⁵ Chen Guofu, an influential decision maker in the Nationalist Party, in a special telegram dated 19 September addressed to Qian Dajun, the mayor of Shanghai, made particular reference to the following points: that radio is the mouthpiece of the nation-state of China, enabling it to broadcast the Chinese voice to the world; radio is a critical tool for

³² Gong Cunxiao, "Wo yu Zhongguang" [Central Radio Station and Me], in *Zhongguang Wushinian Jinianji*, ed. Wu Shutun (Taipei: Kongzhong Zazhi She, 1978), 129-30.

³³ The Nationalist Party Archives, 496/216: *Wuxiandian Xuanchuanzhan* [Radio Propaganda War], 1.

³⁴ The Nationalist Party Archives: Shengli Huandu Yu Woguo Guangbo Shiye [Return to the Capital Nanjing after the Victory against Japan and Chinese Radio Endeavour], *Guangbo Zhoudao*, no.1, 1946.

³⁵ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, eds., *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye* [The Broadcasting of Shanghai in Old China] (Beijing: Dang'an Chubanshe and China Radio & Television Publishing House, 1985), 497.

propaganda and for the education of the Chinese people.³⁶

The Nationalist Party's emphasis on radio meant that this enterprise in post-war China unavoidably developed along party controlled lines. Although a distinct policy about radio station management had not yet been enacted in late 1945, Starr (by his own initiative) had learnt that the Nationalist Government held the view that foreigners should not have the authority to own radio stations. Based on this information, he quickly made a decision to sell up the Ta Mei Radio Station. Upon the recommendation of Liu Guangxun, the former owner of the station, Zheng Zhaoji and Wang Yancun presented themselves as potential purchasers of the station. On 3 November 1945, Jack Yuen and Li Wenjie (as attorneys representing the *SEPM*) and Zheng Zhaoji signed the contract conveying the property rights of the Tai Mei Radio Station.³⁷

As the contract between Starr and the United States Information Service had not at that time concluded, the United States Information Service still held the right to use the Ta Mei Radio Station until December 1945. On 15 December 1945, Zheng Zhaoji signed a new contract with the United States Information Service to the effect that the Tai Mei Radio Station broadcast the *Voice of America* program for one hour every day, and in return for this, the American side provided vacuum tubes and other essential spare parts. Starting from June 1946, the time of broadcast for *Voice of America* was reduced to half an hour every day as supplies from the American side were reduced. The contract was not renewed when it terminated on 31 December 1946.³⁸ After Zheng Zhaoji took over the radio station from Starr, we can see that he retained the name of 'Ta Mei' and the association with the United States Information Service. There was no specific regulation regarding radio stations under private Chinese ownership for a quite a long time after Chiang Kai-shek's take-over of Shanghai. In this period, the general attitude of the Shanghai Municipal Government was to decline to support any private Chinese radio stations until a formal regulation had been issued.³⁹ Nevertheless, the early post-war radio management was in chaos. The Shanghai Radio Station, as an official medium of

³⁶ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 502-03.

³⁷ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q431-1-45.

³⁸ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q431-1-45.

³⁹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 547-48.

the Nationalist Government in Shanghai also undertook administrative functions to manage local radio stations but such a facility did not possess a strong administrative capacity to cope with a complex situation bereft of precisely defined regulations. Particularly complex issues surrounded the radio stations whose associations included government and foreigners. This point was reflected in the file concerning the Shanghai Radio Station and the Central Broadcasting Management Office dated 8 December 1945:

Despite the Ministry of Transportation and Communications absence of any approved application for private Chinese radio stations to broadcast, three private radio stations have defiantly broadcasted and four stations are preparing to broadcast. As for radio stations owners of the communities of the party, governmental and military systems, or foreigners, thirteen stations are broadcasting, and seven stations are preparing to broadcast. Some of them have submitted application, but others directly started their broadcasting business. As a result, the contents of radio programmes are problematic and the condition of radio signal is chaotic. Before these stations acquire legal permits, although we (the Shanghai Radio Station) can trace and investigate them in the name of the Shanghai Branch of the Central Broadcasting Management Office, much damage has been done and many problems still remain. We are also not willingly to request Shanghai Police Office to execute our tasks by proxy because this might raise a doubt that the administration authority of radio stations have been taken over by police. All in all, there have been 72 radio stations in Shanghai, including running and preparing to run, and the quantity of radio stations is proliferating. If we do not work out an effective way to immediately ban these stations, more than 40 private stations that we have commanded to suspend may continue their broadcasting in the name of public communities or foreign ownership, and at that time, the situation will be more difficult to control.⁴⁰

The formal policy was finally decreed in Shanghai on 16 March 1946.

Act Three: radio station except for those owned by state are classified as two types:

1. Public radio stations: radio stations established and owned by government agencies of the Republic of China are recognised as public radio stations, with an exception that radio stations established and owned by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications are classified as state owned radio stations.
2. Private radio stations: radio stations established and owned by citizens of the Republic of China, or companies, manufacturers, schools and organisations established and owned purely by Chinese citizens are recognised as private radio stations.

⁴⁰ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 556.

Act Four: foreign institutions, people, companies (not absolutely established and owned by Chinese citizens), manufacturers, schools, organisations are totally forbidden to establish and own their radio stations in China.

...

Act Six: all who intend to establish radio stations must fill the forms designed by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and submit to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. A radio station can only be established after official check and approval.

...

Act Twenty Five: radio stations are not allowed to broadcast erroneous news, all comments, information, songs and words must be without contents of resisting government orders and policies, jeopardising public security, and exerting harmful influence on social morality.⁴¹

There was a turning point marking the Nationalist Government's change in policy regarding radio station control: the situation went from relative chaos in the early stages after VJ Day to orderly and effective administrative control maintained by the state apparatus. Just five days after the policy was issued, Shanghai Telecommunication Bureau (STB) declared that all radio stations (including those operating under public and private ownership) must register in the five days from the 25th to the 30th of that month.⁴² Shanghai Police Office on 2 April submitted a proposal for their implementation plan as predicated on Act 25 of the Radio Management Regulation issued by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.⁴³ Just as Starr had learnt, foreign radio stations were absolutely forbidden. Moreover, the Nationalist Government decided to use its diplomatic resources to facilitate the elimination of foreign radio stations from China. During the 29th conference of the Central Radio Enterprise Guidance Committee of the Nationalist Party convened in June 1946, it was formally proposed that preliminary investigations concerning foreign radios located in Shanghai should in the first instance be undertaken by the STB, and then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to take responsibility for negotiating with relevant foreign institutes on the

⁴¹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 569-71.

⁴² Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 573.

⁴³ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 575.

matter of the closure of radio stations.⁴⁴

In light of the Nationalist Government's decision to mobilise all resources to shut down foreign radio stations, the retention of the name of 'Ta Mei' would inevitably bring troubles. The Central Broadcasting Management Administrations (CBMA) soon suspected that the conveyance of ownership might be a trick, whereby the American counterpart operated through a puppet Chinese owner with the intention of eluding the banning of their radio stations. Subsequently, a supplementary investigation was requested by telegraph on 12 July to the STB.⁴⁵ In its report to the CBMA, the STB confirmed on 16 November that the *Tai Mei* Radio Station was completely Chinese owned and managed. Five days later the CBMA responded with the instruction that the *Ta Mei* along with three other radio stations must cease operations in the near future, as they were believed to be owned by foreigners – specifically owners holding American, Soviet Union and French nationalities respectively.⁴⁶ On 10 December, the CBMA ordered the STB to close the aforesaid four radio stations and pointed out that the Publicity Department had informed the relevant embassies that these stations would be closed immediately and their equipment would be dismantled and removed.⁴⁷ After receiving such unambiguous instructions, the STB issued a notice on 20 December, stating that excepting 18 radio stations which had been registered, all other radio stations must stop their illegal broadcasting activities before 31 December. The following day, the STB contacted the Shanghai Police Office and the Songhu Garrison Command to authorise forced closure of those radio stations that persisted in broadcasting after 31 December. The Bureau also contacted the Shanghai Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to afford diplomatic assistance (if need be) in the process of banning foreign radio stations.⁴⁸

The Ta Mei Radio Station, as a result, was obliged to suspend all of its business on 1

⁴⁴ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 589.

⁴⁵ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 581.

⁴⁶ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 639,642-43.

⁴⁷ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 641.

⁴⁸ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and Shanghai Municipal Administration of Radio and Television, *Jiuzhongguode Shanghai Guangbo Shiye*, 645-46.

January 1947. Starr in the interim announced that the Tai Mei Radio Station had absolutely no further connection with his business, and this notice was published in the *SEPM*. Government investigations into Ta Mei ownership were a very slow process. Finally, after nearly nine months of waiting, the station was confirmed as a private Chinese station, and restored to full broadcasting capacity until 26 September 1947.⁴⁹

The *SEPM* and its Discontents: Building and Labour Disputes

Since the middle of the War of Resistance, the Nationalist Government was continually afflicted by increasingly serious corruption. The irony of the situation was not lost on the newspaperman Zhang Youlun whose take on it was popularly circulated in the streets of Chongqing as “people struggling with shortage of materials at the battle front, officials enjoying high living in the rear-end.” Corruption also drew Western journalists’ attention. As some incidents of corruption were exposed in their news reports, which to a certain degree damaged the image of the Nationalists in the eyes of the West, they felt obliged to tighten censorship further, with a specific focus on Western journalists.⁵⁰

The huge task of seizing assets in areas formerly occupied by the Japanese further stimulated the cupidity of Nationalist officials. Many were overwhelmed by the urge to line their own pockets during the takeover process. Corruption affected Shanghai with special severity. Wu Kuo-chen, the mayor of Shanghai at the time, recollected that although corruption started with the Nationalist’s takeover, it was commonplace everywhere in the country - Shanghai as the largest city of China with the highest population and greatest wealth became the Eldorado of Nationalist bureaucrats intent on amassing huge wealth. In the eyes of those in a position to plunder the spoils of victory, Shanghai achieved the high water mark of corruption.⁵¹ He pointed out that different sections of the government and military had their own right to seize assets, but there was no centralised administration to plan, manage and monitor this process. It is no surprise then that the Nationalist commissioners competed avidly to seize as many properties as they possibly could.⁵² Their corruption seriously damaged civil interests, and caused far-

⁴⁹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q431-1-45.

⁵⁰ Liu Jingxiu and Zhang Zhao, “Meiguo Jizhe yu Zhongguo Kangzhan [American Journalists and Chinese Resistance against Japan],” *Republican Archives* 1989, no.1 (April 1989): 111.

⁵¹ Wu Kuo-chen, *Cong Shanghai Shizhang Dao “Taiwansheng Zhuxi” (1946-1953 Nian): Wu Guozhen Koushu Huiyi* [From the Mayor of Shanghai Municipal to the President of Taiwan Province (1946-1953): Wu Kuo-chen’s Oral Memoirs] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999), 4.

⁵² Wu, *Cong Shanghai Shizhang*, 2.

reaching inflation which was very negative to national economic recovery and development at the very beginning of post-war era. It also (to a large degree) encouraged the deformed partisanship characteristic of journalism in post-war China. With regards to media operations, the Nationalist takeover usually made it very difficult to return property to the real owners.⁵³ Cheng Shewo, a famous newspaperman, expressed his anger at the baneful influence derived from the Nationalist corruption in the following way:

It definitely should be private newspapers' responsibility and duty to sacrifice ourselves for the country in the cause of resisting foreign invasion. Today, we have achieved the great victory, and there is no way that private newspapers should be returned to their real owners. We shall resume our enterprise while relying on our own hard work. We are not going to ask for any direct or indirect allowance from our government, but there is only one request that we need to make: we need to take our property back from the Japanese. We do not want to occupy the property belonging to others, but if our own property in the first place were robbed by the Japanese, and then seized by our government, we will struggle untiringly for its return as long as we survive.⁵⁴

Besides the aforementioned Nationalist policies, corruption was another element, which seriously circumscribed the *SEPM*'s post-war development. After the newspaper had been re-established in post-war Shanghai, Gould arrived in China with the passion to rise to the challenge of realising his ideal of establishing a genuine American style newspaper that delivered objective news based on an independent view.⁵⁵ However, serious corruption dampened his ardour after he arrived in China and realised that his hopes and expectations were miles apart from reality. After he left China in 1949, he detailed a catalogue of woes, which ranged from having to take public transport, the forced occupation of places of amusement and buildings by various gangs and military forces, to problems resulting from the low morale of the Nationalist troops, who were continuously troublesome.⁵⁶ The newspaper itself was a victim of undisciplined behaviours.

Avenue Edward VII where the *SEPM* had been located in the French Concession was

⁵³ Kao, *Guomindang De Xinwen Xuanchuan*, 28.

⁵⁴ Cheng Shewo, *Baoxue Zazhi* [Notes about the Press] (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1956), 157-58.

⁵⁵ Gould, *China in the Sun*, 340.

⁵⁶ Randall Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover, 1949," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 277, no.1 (September 1951): 184.

renamed Chun Cheng Road, which was based on the name of Chiang Kai-shek. The newspaper office was located at No. 17, but it only occupied the first floor of the building. The second floor, No. 15, was occupied by a group of soldiers who belonged to the Ministry of Communication. These soldiers did not pay rent to the landlord, and regularly dumped rubbish and dirty water out of the windows.⁵⁷ Their activities were a source of aggravated nuisance for the newspaper's office. Relying on his good private relations with the mayor, Wu Kuo-Chen, Gould hoped to get permission to use the second floor of the building temporarily for the printing machine.⁵⁸ The printing factory which was located next door at No.19 and was being restored after extensive fire damage. On 12 July 1946, Gould applied to temporarily use the rooms upstairs until the No.19 was fully restored.⁵⁹ On July 17, the Shanghai Municipal Government ordered the 23rd Military Police regiment of the Songhu Garrison Command to investigate and verify the relevant facts regarding the building's use.⁶⁰ The Songhu Garrison Command sent instructions on 22 July to the 23rd Military Police regiment to perform the order.

However, the 23rd Military Police regiment used the investigation to attempt to occupy No.15 themselves as their barracks. In their report, it was argued that the disputed building belonged to the International Savings Society, but that the agent had transferred the house to Chen Ziya to manage. However, Chen Ziya, who worked for Wang Ching-wei's regime as the Chairman of the Grains Council had been arrested as a traitor. Director Liao Hua of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics had confiscated this property and sent soldiers from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to hold it. In fact, these soldiers did not have any administrative affiliation with the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, which meant that their occupation was in breach. The Military Police also claimed that the *SEPM* were relying on their special American position in their proposal to take over the second floor. The investigators then argued that the newspaper's proposal to use the second floor was unacceptable. At the same time, they argued that the soldiers currently occupying the building did not have permission to do so. The Military Police suggested that the Songhu Garrison Command should order that these soldiers be removed from the building to make the building

⁵⁷ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q127-8-143.

⁵⁸ See Gould, "Shanghai During Takeover," 182.

⁵⁹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q127-8-143.

⁶⁰ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q127-8-143.

available as a barracks for themselves (the Military Police).⁶¹

In their reply to the Shanghai Municipal Government, the Songhu Garrison Command sought to maintain the existing arrangements. On 14 August, the Songhu Garrison Command repeated the contents of the investigation as reported by the Military Police, but at the same time, they emphasised that the soldiers living at No. 15 were under the order of Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. This was done without any mention of the Military Police's conclusion that these soldiers were occupying the house without proper cause or authorisation. The Songhu Garrison Command thought that the requests from by both the *SEPM* and the Military Police were unreasonable. It is likely that the Songhu Garrison Command realised that any suggestion of changing the status quo would offend the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, an important agency that they could not afford to displease.

Wu Kuo-chen tried his best to help the newspaper use the room of No. 15 in the way of lease. Gould appreciated every support afforded to him from the mayor, but this was not able to change his negative attitude concerning the corrupt post-war governance of the Nationalist Party.⁶² The position of the *SEPM* therefore became increasingly awkward. The corrupt Nationalist Government had certainly discouraged and exasperated Gould. However he persisted in his own anti-Communist standpoint, which differed markedly from John Powell's position, who criticised the Nationalist Party corruption and American policy towards China.⁶³ This dilemma, if you like, accounted for much of the post-war internal tensions that the newspaper faced. The editorials of the post-war *SEPM*, which appeared to the outside world as radical and highly critical of Chinese society, was a visible embodiment of this dilemma. In Wilkinson's view, when Gould became rather disillusioned with post-war Shanghai soon after his return, the editorial of the *SEPM* under his leadership contained many more snide and barbed sarcastic remarks whose targets included the Communists, the Nationalist Party and Chinese all on the same day!⁶⁴ This had its source in Gould's profound disappointment with the situation

⁶¹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q127-8-143.

⁶² Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 182.

⁶³ Mark F. Wilkinson, "The Shanghai American Community, 1937-1949," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953*, ed. Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 243.

⁶⁴ Wilkinson, "The Shanghai American Community," 243-44.

he found the *SEPM* in – constantly having to deal with the pernicious consequences derived from serious corruption. Indeed, the very adverse circumstances Gould encountered had more to do with the sharp, disgruntled moodiness of the editorials than the explanation favoured by Wilkinson, namely that Gould was a hypocritical China hand. Not only did the Nationalist corruption frustrate private Chinese and foreign initiatives to restore the supportive framework of professional journalism in the aftermath of the war, but it also gave them little room to manoeuvre politically.

On top of this, the *SEPM* was continuously dogged by labour disputes. In accordance with the archives, the earliest labour dispute after the re-establishment of the paper in Shanghai happened in early 1946. Labour disputes continued until and even after the final closure of the newspaper. They were initially caused by residual historical issues. In March 1946, Zhu Changhai, the representative of many former employees who had worked for the Chinese edition of the *SEPM* before the civil war, appealed to the Shanghai Municipal Government. He alleged that they were dissatisfied that the *SEPM* managers had not re-employed them after its re-establishment. Zhu Changhai claimed that the former workers that he represented had all fought against the Japanese invaders and the Wang Ching-wei regime, and had paid a heavy sacrifice during the Isolated Island period. In addition to Zhu Xinggong and the others who were murdered, many other workers were arrested, and Zhu Changhai himself was injured from the shooting perpetrated by Wang Ching-wei's spies. The workers said they had no complaints concerning those matters as they fully understood that they were opposing invaders, but they could not accept that they were now refused employment, when they knew the newspaper was being republished.⁶⁵

The Shanghai Municipal Government conducted an investigation into this case, and coordinated the negotiations between employers and employees. According to the investigation, the *SEPM* had employed some of the former workers of the English edition and magazine department. In response to the workers who had not been re-employed, the newspaper's representative, Xu Dachun, explained that the newspaper management did not know that these workers were still in Shanghai when they were preparing to republish. He contended that the newspaper was not able to provide further

⁶⁵ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q6-8-3113.

employment for the former workers, but that the newspaper could offer them a reasonable severance pay. The workers accepted severance pay in lieu of re-employment, but they sought to increase the payment. The amount of severance pay that they sought was far beyond what the managers of the newspaper would accept, so an agreement was not reached. The management finally proposed that they would ask C. V. Starr, the owner of the newspaper who was living in New York, about the specific amount of severance pay that would be acceptable. The workers expressed their willingness to wait for Starr's reply.⁶⁶ It is unclear how the matter was resolved. There is no further documentation in the archives on this matter but it is highly likely that the workers and the newspaper reached a private agreement.

The pressures from the inflation in the Nationalist Party-governed regions were directly reflected in the workers' unrest.⁶⁷ Ample evidence in the archives shows that the *SEPM* workers were not satisfied with their wages, as they failed to keep pace with inflation. Gould claimed that serious inflation meant that cash sometimes lost nearly half of its nominal value overnight in the Nationalist Party-governed regions, and that his newspaper paid wages based on the cost of living index as issued by the Nationalist government. This problem led to recurrent labour disputes as the index was revised, at first, on a monthly basis, and later on a fortnightly basis. Obviously, in this period of severe inflation, prices soared daily, and the workers' interests would suffer a heavy loss if their wages were paid in accordance with fortnightly revisions of the cost of living index. For Gould, there was no other feasible way to pay wages. Moreover, the newspaper, which was on the brink of bankruptcy due to the impact of inflation, was experiencing difficulties in meeting rising wage requirements as well. According to Gould's recollection, workers of the *SEPM* could not acquire satisfactory results as inflation had made the profits of the newspaper nearly valueless.⁶⁸ In the process of these labour disputes, it could be said that both employers and employees were victims of the Nationalist regime. Therefore, it is not hard to understand why Gould expressed his disregard for the Nationalist regime, despite sharing similar values to the Nationalist

⁶⁶ Shanghai Municipal Archives, Q6-8-3113.

⁶⁷ Suzanne Pepper, *China: Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 96.

⁶⁸ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover," 183.

Party.⁶⁹

The *SEPM* News Reports on Demonstrations of 1946 and 1947

The *SEPM* and the anti-Soviet student demonstrations of 1946

By the end of 1945, General George Marshall was appointed as the special envoy of President Truman to China. He arrived in China with the intention of mediating between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. After he dialogued formally with Chiang Kai-shek, the Three-Party Talks (George Marshall, Zhang Qun and Zhou Enlai) were held. In the early days of 1946, the armistice agreement was signed by the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, and the Political Consultative Conference was held. However, in reaction to a series of outrages perpetrated by the Soviet Army in Manchuria, an Anti-Soviet student demonstration broke out in Chongqing on 22 February 1946, resulting in damage to the building that housed the *Xinhua Daily*.

The anti-Soviet demonstrations of 1946 were ignited by the Soviet Union's patent disregard for Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. After the Soviet Army defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, without any notice given to China, massive industrial equipment in the locality was demounted and carried back to the Soviet Union as booty. Simultaneously, the Soviet Armies in Manchuria frustrated the Nationalist Government's desire to assert its sovereignty over Manchuria. These actions aroused strong indignation amongst Chinese youth, especially students, whose discontent finally culminated in several student demonstrations. These started in Chongqing and spread to other cities in the February 1946.

Media propaganda and disputes between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party regarding the anti-Soviet demonstration lasted for three days. This demonstration disadvantaged the Chinese Communist Party. Making the most of this situation, the official media of the Nationalist Party, the *Central Daily*, praised the Chongqing students and other people who attended this demonstration. Articles about the anti-Soviet demonstration occupied nearly the entire second and third pages of the *Central*

⁶⁹ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover", 182.

Daily on 23 February.⁷⁰ The *Central Daily* usually focused on two points: that all social classes strongly supported this patriotic demonstration, and that the Chinese Communist Party was an accessory to the Soviet Union's crime. On the second page, the news that Chongqing citizens were moved to tears when they witnessed students' demonstrating in the streets was published in the *Central Daily*.⁷¹ On the same page, there is another article which expresses the fact that the sense of obligation towards Manchuria apparent in the Chongqing demonstration also resonated among students in Shanghai, Sichuan and Jiangxi.⁷² Due to the fact that the office of the *Xinhua Daily* was damaged in this demonstration, the *Central Daily* reported that when students and Chongqing citizens passed the office building of the *Xinhua Daily*, they put up slogans on the wall and windows.⁷³ The slogans were later destroyed, and this action provoked the students' anger.⁷⁴ Police tried to prevent a conflict, but it was loudly declared that people who protected the *Xinhua Daily* were traitors, and the newspaper office was immediately vandalised.⁷⁵ In order to reinforce this to the reader, an editorial entitled 'Pure Patriotism' was published on the second page. The editorial included high praise for students' patriotic demonstration, explaining not only the government position towards the Sino-Soviet relations and the current problems in Manchuria, but also attacking the CCP's shameful role in collaborating with the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

Reports about the demonstration in the *Xinhua Daily* were distinctly different from those of the *Central Daily*. The Communist newspaper, dated 23 February 1946, published an article playing down the image that the Soviet Union violated Chinese sovereignty by strongly emphasising the damage to its newspaper office building. According to *Xinhua Daily*, this act of violence was committed by Nationalist Party "ruffians and spies." Concerning the demonstration itself, a brief report simply mentioned that the students had held a demonstration on the Manchurian issue, but focused on how the Nationalist

⁷⁰ The front page of both the *Central Daily* and the *Xinhua Daily* were only the title and the contents of newspaper, and the most important news were published in the second page.

⁷¹ Qizhi Tuhua Jingxinchumu, Shimin Duguan Fen Liulei [Citizens Were Affected to Tears When Demonstration Flags Coming], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

⁷² Dui Dongbei Wenti De Gongming [The Response to the Manchuria Issues], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

⁷³ Xinhuaribao Yingyebu Zuori Beidaohui Jingguo [The Process of Damaging the Newspaper Office of the *Xinhua Daily* Yesterday], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁴ Xinhuaribao Yingyebu Zuori Beidaohui Jingguo [the process of damaging the newspaper office of the *Xinhua Daily* yesterday], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁵ Xinhuaribao Yingyebu Zuori Beidaohui Jingguo [the process of damaging the newspaper office of the *Xinhua Daily* yesterday], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁶ Shelun: Chunzhen De Zuguo Ai [Editorial: Pure Patriotism], *Central Daily News*, 23 February 1946.

Party “ruffians and spies” had utilised the chaotic situation to smash the office building housing the *Xinhua Daily*. This report was published in prominence on the second page.⁷⁷ In contrast to the *Central Daily*, the *Xinhua Daily* also published eye-witness accounts from people who condemned the act of damaging the newspaper office. On the third page of the *Xinhua Daily*, many signed letters were published, reputedly from the masses, who were moved to express their sympathy towards the suffering of the *Xinhua Daily*. On that day, the *Xinhua Daily* also published an editorial, which stated that the exclusionist dictators of the Nationalist Party had damaged its building.⁷⁸ The editorial also claimed that there were banners visible in this demonstration that clearly belonged to the Radical Youth Association of Greater East Asia. The editorial further argued that this was proof that the Nationalist Party had been working in collaboration with Japanese imperialists and their puppets.

The *SEPM* news report regarding this event did not play into the hands of either of these opposing propaganda strategies. On 23 February, the newspaper placed a report on the front page entitled ‘*Students Demonstrate against USSR here on Red Army Day.*’ The *SEPM*’s views concerning this demonstration were expressed both implicitly and explicitly. What the article chose to include and exclude is very telling. This report was written by newspaper journalists who conducted interviews themselves, rather than using any sources from news agencies. They especially shunned sources from the respective Nationalist and the Communist Party news agencies. In the *SEPM* report, it was noted that in the morning 2000 students had marched to the Soviet Consulate-General’s building in order to demand that the Soviet Union respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.⁷⁹ Moreover, the *SEPM* reported a list of the seven demands that the students addressed to the Soviet Union. It also documented the reactions of Shanghai university students to these events. Under the pretext of not being able to prove the veracity of the facts, the *SEPM* chose to avoid making any comments about the version of events as reported by either the Nationalist or the Communist Parties. For example, the damage to the *Xinhua Daily* newspaper office was not reported. The author of the *SEPM* article reported that this demonstration against the Soviet Union was reminiscent

⁷⁷ Peidu Youyi Dabaoxing Xuean [Another genocide has happened in Chongqing], *Xinhua Daily*, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁸ Shelun, Yanzhong Kangyi [editorial: strongly protest], *Xinhua Daily*, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁹ Students Demonstrate against USSR Here on Red Army Day, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 23 February 1946.

of the past May Fourth Movement.⁸⁰ This is a reference that all Chinese and most foreigners in China would have understood. On 4 May 1919, Chinese students held a patriotic demonstration in Beijing against Japanese designs on Chinese sovereignty. This movement fostered the patriotism of Chinese youth. Clearly, the editorial choices in the *SEPM* article expressed its support for the anti-Soviet demonstration; the allusion to the May Fourth Movement is strong evidence of this, as it indirectly acknowledged that what the Soviet Union had recently done in Manchuria was as offensive and beyond the pale as what the Japanese had done 30 years earlier.

Incidentally, after the CCP seized political power in 1949, this anti-Soviet demonstration was barely mentioned in Chinese history books.⁸¹ In order to prove the legality of its socialist regime, the Chinese Communist Party glorified the Sino-Soviet friendship and attempted to conceal the facts about the plundering of China by Stalinist Soviet Union. This strategy was clearly reflected in official propaganda by the CCP in 1950. According to this propaganda, when Japan surrendered, a number of industries in Manchuria had been destroyed, and the subsequent Nationalist Party occupation of Manchuria and the ensuing civil war led to Manchuria suffering further devastation.⁸² After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union helped China restore and develop manufacturing industries according to the equal Sino-Soviet agreements.⁸³ The anti-Soviet demonstration of 1946 directly reflected the Soviet Army's mistreatment of Manchuria. This was in opposition to the CCP's argument.

The *SEPM* and the anti-American student demonstrations of 1947

On Christmas Eve 1946, Shen Chong, described as a student of Peking University, was raped by an American marine, William Pierson. This is significant, as it incited several anti-American demonstrations which led to the American Army's withdrawal from China in January 1947. The findings of the investigation by the American authorities

⁸⁰ Students Demonstrate against USSR Here on Red Army Day, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 23 February 1946.

⁸¹ Chinese historical textbooks, both for high schools and universities, do not refer to any information on the anti-Soviet demonstration in 1946, however, the contents about the anti-American demonstration in 1947 were mentioned a lot. Research on the anti-Soviet demonstration was quite limited as well. Jiang Pei, a history professor of Nankai University, in 2003 published a journal article, in which he examined the anti-Soviet demonstration of 1946. He acknowledged that this issue might be a taboo for historical scholars in mainland China.

See Pei Jiang, "1946Nian Fansu Yundong Shuping (a summary on the anti-Soviet movement in 1946)," *Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Social Sciencys)* 36, no. 1 (January 2003): 65.

⁸² *China's Youth March Forward* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1950), 10.

⁸³ *China's Youth March Forward*, 10.

raised doubts about her account of the event. The investigators claimed that Shen Chong did not resist violently, and that only evidence of normal sexual activity could be found after a genital examination, concluding that the rape was not as she alleged.⁸⁴

The Nationalists blamed the incident on the Communists. Evidence which directly establishes a link between Shen Chong and the CCP has not been found. It was strongly suspected that the Chinese Communist Party fabricated the incident with the hope of sparking anti-American sentiment amongst China's citizens, thus causing the Nationalist regime to suffer due to its dependence upon American aid. At least this is the account that has been accepted from such important sources as Wu Kuo-Chen, the Mayor of Shanghai. As a senior officer of the Nationalist Party, he believed that the majority of anti-American demonstrations in the Nationalist Party-governed regions were instigated by the CCP, in order to cut off aid from the United States to the Nationalist government.⁸⁵

As would be expected, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party newspapers offered markedly different views on the anti-American demonstrations. The attitude of the *Central Daily* was contradictory and revealed a dilemma. On the one hand, it made a valiant attempt to shun the reporting of this demonstration as it feared further arousal of anti-American sentiments. On the other hand, it sought to show that the National Government took an uncompromising stance in the negotiation of the rape incident with the Americans. The news about the incident in the *Central Daily News* was published in an inconspicuous place on the fourth page, and simply stated that the anti-American demonstrations were a response to a rape and that the authorities had negotiated with the American side, requiring them to punish the culprit by law.⁸⁶ The following day, the *Central Daily News* published another report entitled 'General Marshall attaches great importance to the Peiping incident.' It informed readers that General George Marshall and the Ambassador John Leighton Stuart had understood the importance of this

⁸⁴ Zhang Hong, *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945-1953* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 78-80.

⁸⁵ Randall Gould, "Aid to China: A Shanghai View," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no.13 (July 1948): 150.

⁸⁶ Meibing Wu Nvsheng An Yipai Daibiao Jiaoshe, Yaoqiu Yifa Jiuban [Our Representative Negotiated with American Side, and Required to Punish the American Soldier who Raped the Chinese Female Student by Law], *Central Daily News*, 2 January 1947.

incident.⁸⁷ It attempted to promote the view that the American authorities had worked very hard in the interests of the Chinese people.

In contrast to the *Central Daily* publications, *Liberation Daily* exercised the strategies of the Communist Party, utilising the anti-American demonstration to promote the image that American imperialism and its puppet Chiang Kai-shek regime were the enemy of the Chinese people. On the front-page of January 3 1947, in an article entitled 'Protesting the Bestiality of the American Army,' the *Liberation Daily* used approximately half of its paper content to report how anti-American demonstrations broke out in many Chinese cities, due to the "fact" that Americans looked down on and insulted the Chinese.⁸⁸ The following day, with the obvious aim of reinforcing the propaganda effect of this anti-American demonstration, the *Liberation Daily* published some negative reports regarding American society on the front page. These reports included a case of embezzlement involving an American Senator and the purported high crime rate in America after the Second World War.⁸⁹

Although this demonstration was directed against the Americans, the *SEPM* did not try to cover it up. The newspaper remained committed to its opposition to this demonstration through its reports, but its reports were diametrically opposed to those of the *Liberation Daily*. On 3 January, the *SEPM* published a piece of news entitled 'Central University Students to Take Part in Large Protest Parade Today' on the front page. The author of this news report was a newspaper correspondent - he based his account on interviews that he had conducted himself. The article introduced the issue of the anti-American student demonstration in Nanjing.⁹⁰ According to this report, however, the protesting Central University students did not reach a unified agreement on the requirement regarding the withdrawal of the army. A dispute arose in a meeting that they held on the New Year's Day about whether or not the withdrawal should be

⁸⁷ Mashuai Zhongshi Pingshi Shijian [General Marshall attached great importance to the Peiping incident], *Central Daily News*, 3 January 1947.

⁸⁸ See the front page of the *Liberation Daily* on 3 January 1947.

⁸⁹ See the front page of the *Liberation Daily* on 4 January 1947.

⁹⁰ Central U Student to Take Part in Large Protest Parade Today, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 3 January 1947.

limited to the U.S. Army or should also include the Soviet Army.⁹¹ In addition to this report, the *SEPM* published a letter (purporting to be bona fide) sent by a Shanghai university student in which he wrote that although he was sympathetic to the plight of the unfortunate girl in Peiping, the rape incident should not become a pretext for a political movement against America or Americans given that the cooperation between China and America was important to the future prosperity of both nations. He reminded readers to never forget that the armies of both China *and* America had fought shoulder to shoulder against the Japanese.⁹² The letter was indeed conveniently pro-American. However, there is no reason to doubt that the origin of this letter was genuine.

Compared with the reports of the anti-American demonstration published in the *Central Daily* and the *Liberation Daily*, the standpoint of the *SEPM* was relatively independent as it was different to both the *Central Daily* of the Nationalist Party and the *Liberation Daily* of the Communist Party. As an American-run newspaper, the *SEPM* did not behave like the *Central Daily*, which was mortally shy of this event and endeavoured to hide the American marine's shameful crime of rape. Although this event was disadvantage to the American interests in China, it was still reported on the front page of the *SEPM* with details. Meanwhile, the newspaper did not behave like the *Liberation Daily*, which deliberately sensationalised this event and aimed at shaping a negative image of the United States in China. The *SEPM*'s position seems to have been that the inflammatory nature of the crime should not be enlarged as a political issue detrimental to Sino-American relations, the perspective conveyed in the student's letter made the *SEPM*'s reporting of this event appear more neutral. However, the only English edition of the *SEPM* was maintained in post-war China, and it was not able to have much influence to Chinese society. This case reflects partisan journalism domination in post-war China.

The 'White Gaps' of the *SEPM* and its Closure

As analysis of the two demonstrations has shown, Gould made his editorial opinion clear through deft selection of material for publication – this is exactly what we would expect

⁹¹ Central U Student to Take Part in Large Protest Parade Today, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 3 January 1947.

⁹² Central U Student to Take Part in Large Protest Parade Today, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 3 January 1947.

an experienced and clever editor to do. However, more colourful claims have been made about Gould during this period. He was described as snide, insolent and ready to lash out against any thing that annoyed him in post-war Shanghai.⁹³ At the same time, he was praised by Paul French as using provocative methods to resist the imposition of censorship by the Nationalist government. According to French, Gould infuriated censors for allowing readers to understand his meaning when many of his news items were deleted due to the censorship exercised by the Nationalists. He achieved this by leaving plenty of white gaps in his newspaper during the last period of the Nationalist regime.⁹⁴ Close analysis, however, reveals that the issue of the white gaps is more complex than French portrays.

White gaps, in fact, only occurred on a few days of May of 1949. All of the white gaps occurred in relation to news about military reversals suffered by the Nationalists. According to Gould's recollections, censorship suddenly became 'whimsical and irritating' in the late spring of 1949. As pure blank space was forbidden after censors deleted some parts of a news report, Gould found a humorous way of meeting the demands of the censors while drawing attention to the act of censorship. He placed ironical advertisements in these blank spaces. Examples were statements such as 'we are for good government' or 'tell us about your prosperous business in the columns'. These amusing attempts to draw attention to censorship were possibly nothing more than that – it could be argued that they seemed to have achieved little, but then it is very unlikely that Gould expected to do anything but annoy the censors. He certainly would not have been deluded enough to believe that he could strike a decisive blow at censorship by engaging in these overtly provocative and puerile games. Actually, the Nationalist Party's extremely strict censorship in May 1949 was just a desperate ploy. On 23 April, Communist troops occupied Nanjing, the capital city of the Nationalist regime. The controlling methods used by the Nationalist Party were not limited to the excesses of censorship. On the day before the Communist Party occupied Shanghai, they also indulged in what could only be termed – given the circumstances – futile public displays of delusions of grandeur or exercises in extremely optimistic wishful thinking. In either case, the fact that Nationalist soldiers were ordered to hold a parade bearing banners that

⁹³ Wilkinson, "The Shanghai American community", 243.

⁹⁴ Paul French, *Through the Looking Glass: China's Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 249.

stated that the Nationalist Government would win the war soon in the streets of Shanghai, and this the very day before they actually fled the city, was indeed an empty spectacle and no doubt a desperate gesture orchestrated by the generals seeking to rally the populace to pay the ultimate sacrificial price so that they themselves could hold onto Shanghai for a little longer.⁹⁵

Figure 6: An example of Gould's response to censorship and the ban on 'white gaps' in the paper, May 21, 1949⁹⁶



Currently, there are some distinct accounts (supported by largely insufficient evidence) regarding the newspaper's closure. Chinese scholars generally share a similar view. They attribute the necessity of closure to the newspaper's hostile activities with regards to the Chinese Communist Party and more widely the interests of the Chinese people.

⁹⁵ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover," 183.

⁹⁶ The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* on 21 May 1949 left white gaps. The headline and the majority of contents had been censored. However, the only paragraph left indicated that this report was about the Nationalist military evacuation from Shanghai.

The evidence that they draw upon inevitably focuses on the *SEPM* labour disputes and the publication of false reports regarding mines in the mouth of the Yangtze River.⁹⁷

Neil O'Brien basically takes the Chinese scholars' side. Relying on the statements made by the *SEPM* staff in July 1949, he argues that the main reason for the newspaper's closure was Gould's attempt to shirk his responsibilities with respect to the workers' pay.⁹⁸ However, Paul French offers a radically different explanation for the closure. He argued that the newspaper suffered a very serious set-back after Communist troops occupied Shanghai when communist members, posing as newspaper staff, infiltrated the newspaper office and required Gould to publish pro-communist reports and articles. French argues that this forced Gould to close the paper.⁹⁹ According to Frederic Wakeman, the *SEPM*'s closure needs to be attributed to Gould's strong dissatisfaction with employees in the print room – specifically their interference with the paper's news editorial.¹⁰⁰ There may be an element of truth to both these arguments. However, the evidence each side presents to support its position is scant, to say the least.

This section will re-examine the process of the newspaper's closure through a comprehensive analysis of relevant primary sources. There have been a variety of primary sources available to reveal the history of the newspaper's closure. These include Gould's memoirs, relevant records held in the Shanghai Municipal Archives, memoirs of bystanders, and relevant news reports by several newspapers. Later, Gould wrote down his own account of the newspaper's closure, and this was published in the form of an article in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* in September 1951. Relatively complete records documenting the newspaper's closure have been conserved by the Shanghai Municipal Archives. John Leighton Stuart visited Shanghai in the summer of 1949 to acquaint himself with the circumstances that American businesses and citizens were experiencing there under Communist rule. This

⁹⁷ Wang Xin, "Yifen Poju Yingxiang De Waishang Huawen Wanbao (An Influential Foreigners-Run Chinese evening paper: The *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*)," *Journalism & Communication* 1993, no.3: 156; Fang, *zhongguo xinwen chuanboshi*, 2:1216; Ma Guangren, *Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi* [A Journalism History of Contemporary Shanghai] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 6-7.

⁹⁸ Neil L. O'Brien, *An American Editor in Early Revolutionary China: John William Powell and the China Weekly/Monthly Review* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 140.

⁹⁹ French, *Through the Looking Glass*, 249-50.

¹⁰⁰ Frederic Wakeman, *Red Star over Shanghai: The Communist Transformation of the Municipal Police, 1942-1952* (New York: Mirror Books, 2011), 191-93.

is how he indirectly came by the story of the newspaper's closure.¹⁰¹ A discussion of these matters can be found in his memories. Last but not least, the closure of the *SEPM* drew wide attention at the time, and was reported by several newspapers. Relatively complete and diversified primary sources make it possible to uncover more of the history of the *SEPM*'s closure.

On 23 May, Shanghai finally changed hands again. Shortly, it could be observed that scores of rumbling trucks fully loaded with soldiers travelled towards the Bund from the west, and columns of soldiers were marching behind in a curtain of darkness. At 3 a.m. in the morning of the next day, the noise of the machinegun and rifle rang out in the city of Shanghai.¹⁰² In the morning, as Gould relates, "residents peeked out of windows to see Communist soldiers in greenish-yellow uniforms stretched out on sidewalks asleep under the Nationalist victory banners!" By 25 May 1949, the People's Liberation Army had captured Shanghai. With the Communist troops making a triumphal march into Shanghai, one after another, the traffic of the city was severely jammed. It created a host of difficulties for the *SEPM* to publish that day's papers. The street that the newspaper office was located in was blockaded off for a time, and many workers who were living in the north or east of Shanghai were not able to get to work. The service from news agencies that the paper relied as a source of news was at one time completely knocked out.¹⁰³ In spite of these difficulties, the paper still managed to publish four pages that day, which included an important editorial, speculating on the newspaper's prospects in a Shanghai under Communist rule:

This newspaper feels that it can speak for the American community of Shanghai. Perhaps to some extent it can in this matter speak the mind of the foreign community generally. We do not believe that there is any major difference as between the foreign and the Chinese communities. In other words, we believe that here is a very generally held point of view: Shanghai is essentially non-political. It is a great trading and industrial city. What it hopes is that a true "liberation" has now come. If this proves to be the case, Shanghai can provide a tremendous resource in starting the whole of China back on the road to prosperity.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ John Leighton Stuart, *Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador* (New York: Random House, 1954), 250-53.

¹⁰² Communists Take Over Shanghai, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 25 May 1949.

¹⁰³ Don't Shoot the Piano Player, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 26 May 1949.

¹⁰⁴ Let "Liberation" be just That! *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 25 May 1949.

From this editorial, the paper had identified itself only as an English paper for the Americans in Shanghai, and at most for the foreign community residing in Shanghai. The management of the paper knew at that moment that a Communist victory eliminated the hope of recreating the glamour and influence of 1930s that its Chinese edition had allowed it to enjoy. They might also have realised that despite the concessions they were willing to make, the *SEPM*'s survival was not assured. If the CCP revealed that it had no tolerance for private and foreign commercial interests in Shanghai, the political and economic conditions needed to maintain the *SEPM*'s viability would no longer exist. As to that, the managers of the paper could only hope that the coming Communist authority, after fully weighing the value of Shanghai as a unique trading and industrial centre both for China and the world, would allow Shanghai to enjoy a neutral almost non-political position. On 20 March 1949, a report to Chen Cheng reflects that Gould intended to continue the *SEPM* after Shanghai was to be taken over by the Communist troops, although he was hesitating and took a sceptical attitude towards the CCP. As the report shows:

Most of foreign businessmen in Shanghai are remaining hesitant. Many foreign journalists who are working in the areas of Nanjing and Shanghai have decided to continue to work in their place when the Communist troops intrude into the south. Randall Gould, the editor in chief of the *SEPM*, has close relations with American businessmen in Shanghai. He remains hopeful but has realised that tribulations may come. However, he still believes that the business would continue under the CCP's administration, and wishfully thinks that the publication of the Shanghai Evening Post Mercury will be maintained. Recently, the CCP has implement prohibition aimed at those foreign journalists in Peiping and Tianjin, and the official news office of the United States had been forbidden. Gould deemed that the CCP might begin to muzzle the press. He mentioned that Zhou Enlai in Chongqing during the war against Japan did promise Gould, among others, that the CCP would maintain the freedom of the press, and no censorship would be implemented under the CCP's administration. Gould at that time even believed these statements. He spoke out the promises made by the CCP, and regarded the CCP during that time as rather trustworthy, but today, he feels obliged to doubt these promises.¹⁰⁵

This was indeed a high-risk gamble. Nevertheless, Gould still wanted to give the coming Communist regime the benefit of the doubt. In March 1949, on the basis of what the Chinese Communist Party did in occupied Manchuria and North China, Gould surmised

¹⁰⁵ Academia Historica, 008000001200A.

that there were no firm grounds for optimism in a Communist dominated Shanghai.¹⁰⁶ He pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party did not fulfil their commitment to safeguarding the freedom of the press. In Peiping, two Chinese newspapers and seventeen foreign journalists were forced to cease their journalistic activities, even though these foreign journals were not involved in politics.¹⁰⁷ However, he also mentioned some positive elements in Communist-governed areas. He recognised that law and social order had been established and that in North China there was still freedom of religious practice.¹⁰⁸ Based on this analysis, Gould finally decided to remain in Shanghai while preparing for the worst. As he predicted, the *SEvening Post and Mercury*, as the only American daily in Shanghai, would continue to be published after the Communist takeover of Shanghai.¹⁰⁹ There is evidence that such optimism was certainly not shared by everyone in a position of responsibility at the *SEPM*. Wu Kyatang is a case in point. As the executive editor of the paper, Wu Kyatang became a person of interest for Communist secret agents. He was provided that if he became a member of the CCP, his position would have been more palatable. However, as someone who had trained professionally in the United States, and believed in democratic principles, the political aims of the CCP proved to be unacceptable to him. For this reason, Wu arranged to escape to Japan by the last commercial flight out on 16 May.¹¹⁰ This took place on the eve of the occupation of Nanjing by the People's Liberation Army.

As for the Chinese Communist Party, there was no reason to suspend the Communist revolution in Shanghai. The revolutionary tasks of the Party were confirmed and crystallised in its Second National Congress.¹¹¹ In accordance with the declaration of this congress, capitalist imperialism and feudal warlord-bureaucracy were considered to be the main plagues to be stamped out – according to this perspective, they had been the source of untold tribulation and suffering for the Chinese masses. Consequently, the congress confirmed that these internal menaces would be the targets of the Party's first-stage revolution, known as the democratic revolution.¹¹² The declaration also

¹⁰⁶ Randall Gould, "China Outlook: A Business View," *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no.8 (April 1949): 90.

¹⁰⁷ Gould, "China Outlook," 90.

¹⁰⁸ Gould, "China Outlook," 90-91.

¹⁰⁹ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 183.

¹¹⁰ Gould, *Shanghai During the Takeover*, 1949, 182.

¹¹¹ The Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was convened from 16 to 23 July of 1922 in Li Da's dwelling place which was located inside the International Settlement of Shanghai.

¹¹² The Central Archives, ed., *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* [selected documents of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Chubanshe, 1988), 1:114.

emphasised that the success of the democratic revolution would not achieve complete liberation of the proletariat. The CCP decided that as it was the only political party representing the interests of the proletariat, it would therefore need to mobilise the oppressed masses to bring the whole edifice of capitalism crashing down, and gradually bring about a society based on genuine communism – “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”¹¹³

The Party recognised the need to continue its revolution until all elements antagonistic to the aims of communism had been eliminated. Chen Yi’s speech in 1952 summarised the political achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in such terms:

In the past three years owing to the persistent efforts of the people, Shanghai has changed from a city dependent on the imperialist economy for its existence to a city independent of the imperialist economy and which is developing on its own. Shanghai is no longer a city serving the imperialists and reactionary elements but a city for the people and production. Shanghai has wiped out the dirt and poison left behind by the imperialists and their running dogs and has started on its way to normal and healthy development.

Mayor Chen Yi, Shanghai, May 28, 1952¹¹⁴

The implementation of socialist programs aimed at raising the general welfare of all comrades certainly would certainly bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party in the eyes of the Chinese masses (if such a scheme could actually be brought about) as well as bolstering the legitimacy of its newly attained membership in the world Communist camp. As a recognised member of the international Communist camp it was also obliged to recognise the Soviet leadership, and identify with the orthodoxy of the Communist revolutionary theories, as expounded by the regime in the Soviet Union. This norm emerged in the pre-war Comintern. The common revolutionary cause and the unshakeable belief in Marx-Leninism made the Communist parties in each country join together under the Comintern, which in reality was dominated by the Soviet Union, and formed a relationship of superiors and inferiors with each other. Moscow was the centre

¹¹³ The Central Archives, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:114-15.

¹¹⁴ Frederic Wakeman, ““Cleanup”: The New Order in Shanghai,” in *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 22.

of the international Communist movement. The regime there was imbued with overarching authority and legitimacy in matters relating to the interpretation of classic Communist theories and to the implementation of Communist revolutionary movements in other countries. Such interparty relationships had to be maintained if these regimes were to succeed in their mission.¹¹⁵ A politically neutral Shanghai could not be allowed to exist – it would have meant accepting Western economic liberalism, which was irreconcilable with the orthodox Communist revolutionary theoretical system. Had the Chinese Communist Party adopted such a policy, the new and still fragile Chinese Communist state power would have found itself shunned and shut out in the cold in unprecedented isolation from the international Communist camp. This might have spelt political suicide for the regime.

Cleaning the media up was therefore one of the highest priorities for the Chinese Communist Party in the process of wiping “out the dirt and poison left behind by the imperialists and their running dogs” – leaving them in place was entirely incompatible with implementing the socialist transformation in Shanghai. It can be seen that the Party was prompt in its drastic takeover and reform of local newspapers and radio stations. The business of the *SEPM* continued as usual within the first few days of the establishment of Communist rule in Shanghai.¹¹⁶ However, many Chinese owned media outlets rapidly ceased operations.

In 1948, the CCP enacted its media policy, aimed at completely dominating news media. On 8 November, the *Decision of the Solution towards Foreign news agencies in liberated cities* was issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. According to this policy, news media were considered to be tools of the dominant classes, political parties and social groups engaged in class struggle at the perennial expense of the proletariat.¹¹⁷ This was a clear signal that the Party would take absolute control over all news media from commercial operations to news reporting, and independent media would not be allowed to exist in Communist China. In addition, the activities of Western

¹¹⁵ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side: China and its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2011), 252-53.

¹¹⁶ Gould, “Shanghai During the Takeover,” 184.

¹¹⁷ See Liu Shaoqi, “Dui Huabei Jizhetuan De Tanhua [A Talk to the Journalists from North China],” in *Zhongguo Gongchandang Xinwen Gongzuo Wenjian Huibian* [A Collection of Documents of the Chinese Communist Party about Journalism], ed. Media Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1980), 3:248-63.

journalists' were ear-marked for further restriction. From 1948 onwards, in order to maintain control, the Soviet Union required the Chinese Communist Party to modify its foreigner policy, and discontinue its relations with the West, including non-communist foreign supporters.¹¹⁸ In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party issued more explicit policies against foreign interests in China. The Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Central Committee was held in March, and during that conference, Mao Zedong put forward the strategic principle of absolutely and methodically ridding China of imperial influence. At the conference, he specifically emphasised the need to restrict Western journalists. This change meant that even those pro-Communist Western journalists felt unwelcome.¹¹⁹

Shenbao, which had had a history of over 70 years, became the first target for “reform.” The history of *Shenbao* finally came to an end on 27 March 1949 when the last edition of the paper was printed. The next day, in the same building, on the same printing presses, editions of the *Liberation Daily* were printed. This paper had been designated as the organ of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China.¹²⁰ This event - that *Shenbao* as one of the oldest and the most influential commercial newspapers in contemporary China was replaced by *Jiefang Daily* - has symbolic significance, as it marked the coming of a whole new era in the history of Chinese journalism, an era dominated by Communist ideology. Many other Chinese managed media which were classified as being close to the Nationalists were suspended on March 28. Chinese owned newspapers, such as *China Times*, *Ta Wan Pao*, *Hsin Min Pao*, *Sin Wan Pao*, *Hua Mei Wan Pao*, did not publish on that day.¹²¹ Meanwhile, the Shanghai Radio Station was taken over by the Shanghai Military Control Commission, and was then transformed into the Shanghai People's Radio Station and started broadcasting on this very same day.¹²² Nevertheless, the only three foreigners owned newspapers in Shanghai - the *North China Daily News*, the *SEPM*, and the *China Weekly Review* – continued to publish. Perhaps not quite as usual, but at least they were still in operation – for a limited

¹¹⁸ Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 63.

¹¹⁹ Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China*, 65.

¹²⁰ Song Jun, *Shenbao de Xingshuai* [Shenbao's vicissitudes] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 1996), 224.

¹²¹ Communists Suspend Two Chinese Papers, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, 28 May 1949.

¹²² Junguanhui Jieguan Hu Guomindang Guangbodiantai [The Radio Station of the Nationalist Party in Shanghai has been taken over by the Shanghai Military Control Commission], *Liberation Daily*, 28 May 1949

time.

Shortly after this, the *SEPM* began to experience some serious setbacks. As one of the most important symbols of a new state power, the new Communist authority replaced the Nationalist Gold Yuan with the Renminbi, which became the only legal currency in Shanghai. However, a set of standard wages based on the new currency akin to the living index of the Nationalist government was not implemented.¹²³ This posed a considerable hidden problem. Inflation was still not controlled effectively, so labour disputes were bound to occur as long as workers demanded higher wages. If this occurred, the *SEPM* management would not have had any power to negotiate with a reasonable wage acceptable to both sides.

Such an issue really should have been resolved with the Communist government, but communication between the parties had become problematic. Although it had been announced that American, British or other foreign nationals' affairs in Shanghai would be dealt with by a foreign affairs office, it was difficult to talk with an appropriate person. All conversations were required to be formal and conducted in Chinese even if the official was known to have good English language ability.¹²⁴ English, formerly the *lingua franca* of daily life in Shanghai, especially inside the foreign settlement, was now forbidden. Not surprisingly this sudden and radical change induced panic and anxiety among the foreigners.¹²⁵ Obviously, the Communists considered the continued use of English in Shanghai as an ugly reminder of Western colonialism. It indicated that the CCP not only had no intention to rely on Western commercial activity and capital in Shanghai, but it also indicated that it intended to make the foreign presence a target for attack.

This point was further confirmed in early July when the temporary ban on the departure of foreigners was issued, and although this ban was eventually cancelled, departure visas for foreigners were no longer as easy to obtain and required payment of exorbitant fees to cover such items as workers' benefits.¹²⁶ At this moment, the Communists' strategy to wipe the slate clean of foreign influence in Shanghai began to emerge. The

¹²³ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover," 184.

¹²⁴ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover," 184.

¹²⁵ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 253-54.

¹²⁶ Gould, "Shanghai During the Takeover," 185.

Communists needed a pretext, and conflicts between oppressed Chinese workers (the proletariat) and foreigners (not fully and overtly in support the new state power) would do very nicely. As Stuart summarised, these conflicts were usually based on labour disputes regarding wages. The new regulations brought in by Communists of course were designed to place foreigners in a distinctly disadvantageous position. Those who were found to be in breach of these regulations were punished in a “name and shame” manner favoured by the Communists – violators were often forced to make formal apologies in local newspapers.¹²⁷ For a time, this form of public punishment became more and more frequent.¹²⁸ Through it all, the media obviously performed a critical role. The Party needed to transmit its anti-imperialism political view through propaganda disseminated by the media operations it had managed to dominate. This was, of course, as we have seen, the motive behind the Communists’ immediate control of the local press.

The staff of the *SEPM* could not save themselves from the Communist media purge. When July set in, labour disputes with the management of the paper consistently heated up, and finally triggered the closure of the newspaper. On 8 June, five representatives of the employees were appointed to negotiate with the management on the matter of restoring the same payment that they had had in 1946.¹²⁹ By 11 June, the two sides had failed to reach any agreement - the dispute centred on the specific amount of the wage increase. The workers’ demands meant a triple increase in costs based on their current wages, and in the view of the newspaper’s management, their demands exceeded the limits of their ability to pay. This situation was reported to the Communist authority in Shanghai, in the hope that the dispute would be resolved with the authority’s mediation. The authority took a passive attitude. On the one hand, hoping that the negotiations between labour and management would continue, while on the other hand, they were not prepared to respond to the crucial question of a new living index.¹³⁰ As the core issue of the negotiations could not be resolved, subsequent negotiations also failed to achieve

¹²⁷ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 253-54.

¹²⁸ Wakeman, *Red Star over Shanghai*, 154.

Another case was recorded by Gould. When three White Russian girls left a restaurant, a Chinese beggar was trying to approach them. One of the girls was stated to knock down the beggar. As a result, those three girls were arrested for a couple of days. They were finally released after they paid the compensation to the beggar, and the made a collect apology in a local Chinese newspaper. See Gould, “Shanghai during the Takeover,” 185.

¹²⁹ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-22.

¹³⁰ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-18.

any results.

The tempest which culminated in the closure of the *SEPM* finally broke on 14 June. On that afternoon, Douglas, the business manager of the newspaper, telephoned Gould, and urgently reported that he had been besieged in his office by members of the newspaper's labour union agitating about the midmonth payment.¹³¹ Gould and Miner then hurried to the office where the greatly increased numbers of labour union members demanded that their pay claims be met immediately.¹³² About the labour organization, Gould recalled that its members had enlarged in the past a few days from originally just printers to the union of workers and staff, and now it asked the management of the *SEPM* to immediately make the final decision about the midmonth payment. Gould believed that based on the situation that the new index was not issued, labourers relying on the CCP administration's sanction proposed the wage scale which was far more than the purchasing power of their original wages.¹³³ Once again, negotiations proved futile, and when Gould, Miner and Douglas tried to leave the newspaper office building and return home, they were detained by workers and locked in the building. Under these conditions, Gould announced that the newspaper would close until discipline was restored. Shortly after, three representatives of the city's General Labour Union arrived on the scene and provided mediation. After much discussion, Gould agreed to publish the newspaper of the following day, and in return for this, they were released, and the workers for their part guaranteed that future negotiations on wages would be orderly.¹³⁴

Things seemed to have taken a favourable turn so far. However, a news report by Gould changed the situation again, and made it develop more and more unmanageably. The negotiation was to be arranged at 4 o'clock the next day. Just before 3 o'clock when the newspapers for the day should have started to print, Gould unexpectedly received a phone call from Douglas who had just been given notice from the labour union of the printing house that workers would refuse to print the paper unless an article (written by Gould) which reported a crisis in Shanghai caused by the new government was withdrawn from the front page.¹³⁵ This demand in Gould's view was absolutely

¹³¹ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 185.

¹³² Gould, "Shanghai during Takeover," 185; Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-28.

¹³³ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 185.

¹³⁴ Gould, "Shanghai during Takeover," 186; Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-18.

¹³⁵ Gould, Shanghai During the Takeover, 1949, 186; Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-18.

unacceptable, and it was sternly refused:

My news story certainly did not reflect credit on the government, but it was fair and factual. For this reason, and also on general principle, I declined to accept the unprecedented theory that our union might dictate the contents of our news columns.¹³⁶

Gould thereupon issued a written order to ask that the newspaper article be printed as originally written. However, the 15 June edition of the newspaper was not printed, and the *SEPM* was not published after 14 June 1949.¹³⁷ Gould later contacted the *North China Daily News*, and asked them to print the *SEPM*'s unpublished news of 15 June, but the report was in the end censored by the workers of the *North China Daily News* in the same way.¹³⁸ When Gould made the decision to order his workers to proceed with the publication of the censored news report, he might not have noticed that a subtle change in his situation had just occurred.¹³⁹ Just two days before, on 13 June, the Shanghai Military Control Commission had issued the regulations governing private radio stations in Shanghai, which was published in *Liberation Daily* of that day:

Article Three: Without the allowance of the Commission, all political programmes, such as commentaries, political speeches and newsletters, are forbidden to broadcast.

Article Four: All radio programmes should not include the content of anti-People's Government, anti-Liberation Army, anti-Chinese Communist Party, anti-Chinese People, anti-world democratic movement, and corrupting public's morals.¹⁴⁰

Although the regulation nominally was only for radio stations, it demonstrated that the Communist Shanghai authority had zero tolerance of any view which was in opposition to its own. Gould's news report definitely sabotaged the Communists' view of the situation, so there was no reason for the governors to allow the article to be published. In this situation, things could only have been resolved by Gould agreeing to withdraw his news report from publication. However, Gould was just what John Leighton Stuart

¹³⁶ Gould, Shanghai during Takeover, 186.

¹³⁷ Gould, Shanghai During the Takeover, 1949, 186-87.

¹³⁸ Gould, Shanghai During the Takeover, 1949, 187.

¹³⁹ When Gould was reviewing the later event of the Yangtze River mouth mining reporting, he still complained that there was no regulation for foreign newspapers regarding the taboos of news reporting when the Shanghai Military Control Commission punished the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, and the *North China Daily News* for the news reporting. This shows that he did not notice that the Communist regulation about news reporting had actually been proclaimed by analogy with radio.

¹⁴⁰ Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Shanghai Junshi Guanli Weiyuanhui [The Shanghai Military Control Commission of the Chinese Liberation Army] *Liberation Daily*, 13 June 1949.

claimed he was, “with a fine sense of his duty to the newspaper.”¹⁴¹ He made a stand, and even went as far as attempting a counterattack by having his report published in the British owned newspaper, but his efforts were fruitless.

The decision determining the ultimate fate of the *SEPM* was made over the next few days. Through radiophone, Gould established contact with its owner C. V. Starr, who attempted to visit Shanghai to deal with the crisis, but was refused a visa. During their talks, Starr advised Gould that the problems relating to wages would not be a stumbling block if the full independence of the newspaper editorial could be maintained; otherwise, the newspaper should be closed.¹⁴² On the basis of this instruction, Gould, in the negotiations on 21 June, stated he wanted to discuss the wage issue and continuing publication, but the workers must be prepared to accept two of his claims: printing 25 newspaper copies of 15 June, and signing a document ensuring they would not interfere with the editorial affairs of the newspaper. Their representatives declined to accept Gould’s proposal, and the negotiations broke down.¹⁴³

Gould’s position was quite clear: censorship should simply not be carried out by his workers who, although able to set type in English, could not understand English at all and had never previously shown any interest in the contents of the newspaper. From his point of view, it must have appeared that the labour union of the *SEPM* was just a puppet of the Communist authority, which could not tolerate the existence of any independent foreigner-run newspaper. Based on this analysis, Gould announced his resignation as editor of the newspaper and president of the publishing company, and declared his company would cease all business from 1 July.¹⁴⁴ The formal declaration was handed over to labour representatives in the negotiations of the 23 June.¹⁴⁵

It is John Leighton Stuart’s view that the Communist authority did not directly participate in the dispute between the management and the workers.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps viewed from the outside, the situation seemed like this. However, Gould nursed a longstanding suspicion concerning the workers in the print room of the newspaper. Early in his letter

¹⁴¹ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 253.

¹⁴² Gould, *Shanghai During the Takeover*, 188.

¹⁴³ Shanghai Municipal Archives, file B128-2-112-28.

¹⁴⁴ Gould, “Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949,” 188.

¹⁴⁵ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-28.

¹⁴⁶ Stuart, *John Leighton Stuart’s Diary*, 42.

to General Albert Coady Wedemeyer on 17 November 1948, Gould complained that he felt “surrounded by wolves and saboteurs in our own plant.”¹⁴⁷ Since CCP took over Shanghai, Gould’s experience made him further believe that the CCP’s influence was behind the labour movements. As he said:

The Communists arrived in Shanghai almost wholly without program for dealing with city problems. Wishing to win the prompt and full support of labor, they proceeded at once to expand all union organizations and to give quiet assurance that any tactics short of actual violence would be approved in extorting “new deal” conditions from ownership – especially foreign ownerships.¹⁴⁸

In Shanghai, the quantity of labour movements and strikes in the second half of 1949 far exceeded any time before. Elizabeth Perry attributes this situation to the economic difficulties. She points out that many capitalists moved to Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo due to their anxiety to the circumstances in the Chinese Civil War, and it led to the trend of business closure and labourers’ wages to be reduced. Thus, labourers had to struggle for their livelihood. She also emphasises that the new Communist regime openly promised their acknowledgement of the proletarian supremacy further encouraged and stimulated the labourers’ movements.¹⁴⁹ To the closure of the *SEPM*, the motivation of the labour dispute was far more than the wage issues. Workers’ attempts to interfere with editorial affairs thus to absolutely control the paper was what the CCP expected. As for Gould’s suspicion that the Communists must have masterminded the workers’ activities, it was, to some extent, corroborated by evidence provided by the Printers’ Union of Shanghai when it made public its relations with the Chinese Communist Party, published in the *Liberation Daily* of 24 and 25 October 1949:

After the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, [...] our worker mates established ‘Shanghai Municipal Letterpress Printing Professional Trade Union’. It functioned under the Nationalist reactionaries’ organisational system on the surface, but the Communist secret agent in reality guided the union, preparing to struggle against the Nationalist reactionaries. [...] Up to September 1947, as the Nationalist reactionaries more crazily devastated our revolutionary organisation, [...] for saving the effectives of revolution, our comrades of the secret agent felt obliged to lurk and work secretly. This situation

¹⁴⁷ Gould to Wedemeyer, 17 November 1948, Albert Coady Wedemeyer papers, Correspondence File, Hoover Institution, cited in Wilkinson, “Shanghai American community, 1937-1949”, 243.

¹⁴⁸ Gould, “Shanghai during the Takeover,” 186.

¹⁴⁹ Elizabeth J. Perry, “Masters of the Country?: Shanghai Workers,” in *The Early People’s Republic, in Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 60.

was maintained until Shanghai was liberated, and after that, we were re-organised. [...] It was told to our worker-class proletariat brotherhood that we will achieve victory if we stand by the side of people's revolution, and those who support anti-people and anti-revolution shall be defeated and annihilate by people's force.¹⁵⁰

Although there is evidence that strongly points to the maintenance of a close relationship between the Communist authority and the workers of the *SEPM*, Gould (in the process of figuring this out) demonstrated a consistently provocative and uncompromising approach to conflict. Such behaviour on Gould's part in a sense played into the hands of the CCP – making an example of Gould sent a clear and positive message to the public regarding the CCP's determination and ability to overcome the hegemony of and the "running dogs" of American imperialism. The closure of the paper was a public spectacle that proved that in the face of the CCP's public authority, the means of resistance at the disposal of the newspaper were absolutely negligible. Even in the Isolated Island period, the *SEPM* struggled in its own way and as best it could against the regime of Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese occupying forces - it was a contest between the public authority of the Wang-Japan group and the immunities afforded by the terms of extraterritoriality of the Western powers in Shanghai.

It is worth outlining the situation for foreigners in Shanghai at the time of the CCP takeover. Since the occupation of Nanjing by the Liberation Army, the CCP had refused to recognise the John Leighton Stuart's diplomatic status in his capacity as American ambassador. On the morning of 25 April, a small force of the People's Liberation Army broke into the American ambassador's residence, entering Stuart's bedroom.¹⁵¹ Huang Hua had previously explained the CCP's position regarding all former embassy officials when he met with Stuart on 13 April – they could only be treated and protected as ordinary foreign nationals, and they were not to be recognised as diplomats nor enjoy diplomatic privileges until their respective countries had established diplomatic relations with the new Chinese Communist state power (the CPP).¹⁵² In the interim, and until its authority and control had been properly established, the Liberation Army had search and entry rights with regards to any premise in the occupation of suspicious person, be he or

¹⁵⁰ Yinshua Gonghui Lishi [The History of the Printing Labour Union], *Liberation Daily*, 25 October 1949.

¹⁵¹ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 239; Stuart, *John Leighton Stuart's Diary*, 120.

¹⁵² Huang, *Huang Hua Memoirs*, 116-17.

she Chinese or foreigner.¹⁵³ Stuart still had a strong sense of mission to fulfil in his capacity as ambassador, although it had been made clear from the Communist side that they no longer recognised him as America's ambassador. Notwithstanding, he proposed to visit Shanghai with the purpose of acquainting himself with the situation for local American interests under Communist rule.¹⁵⁴ When Philip Fugh called on Huang Hua on 31 May, he brought up the proposed itinerary of Stuart's visit to Shanghai.¹⁵⁵ The Communist authority finally approved this itinerary, which permitted Stuart to set out for Shanghai on the evening of 11 June.¹⁵⁶ However, he was not allowed to exercise any ambassadorial function and or power:

I had determined ... to make an issue of the internationally accorded rights of diplomatic immunity in such matters as not having baggage searched. The Communist official position was that we had no such rights, being only ordinary citizens, so this might well be a test of conflicting principles.¹⁵⁷

After making representations to relevant authorities, Stuart was in the end begrudgingly allowed to style himself "former" American Ambassador in Shanghai.¹⁵⁸ Clearly, effective consular protection for American citizens in Shanghai could not be obtained in any meaningful way. It was under these circumstances that those at the helm of the *SEPM* had to oppose the Communist state apparatus single-handedly.

Although the *SEPM* had been ordered to cease operations, workers' pay was still a pending issue. And just at that moment came the ever-effervescent event of the Yangtze River mining report. The *North China Daily News* initially reported on it on 10 June. In the evening of that day, the *SEPM* published a front page news report with the title of *MCC Investigating Reported Mining of Shanghai Harbour*. The following days, this news was repeatedly reprinted.¹⁵⁹ The Communist Shanghai authority did not take the news seriously until 21 June when the *Liberation Daily* announced that this news was pure invention:

The so-called news that mines are laid at the mouth of the Yangtze River by the Nationalists has now been proved as a downright rumour. This rumour was initially fabricated and spread by the British owned the *North China Daily News*. Obviously, this intrigue was a close teamwork by several groups, and finally aimed at creating hardships of Shanghai people's daily life which make them fall into the trap that they set. If we review the news published in the past week, we can easily figure out the truth of the rumour campaign. The *North China*

¹⁵³ This sentence occurred in the original Chinese version of Huang Hua's memoirs, which was published in 2008. However, it was deleted in the later published English version.

¹⁵⁴ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 250.

¹⁵⁵ Stuart, *John Leighton Stuart's Diary*, 136.

¹⁵⁶ Stuart, *John Leighton Stuart's Diary*, 142.

¹⁵⁷ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 251.

¹⁵⁸ Stuart, *Fifty Years in China*, 250-51.

¹⁵⁹ See Ma, *Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi*, 6.

Daily News on 10 June published a long report about so-called 'shipping suspended here as river entrance feared mined' on the front page. They did not gain any relevant official information from the military representative of the (Shanghai) Customs, but they constantly report and discuss the so-called news based on the words, such as probably, perhaps. Later, such rumour prominently featured on the front page of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*. [...].

This wave of rumour attack was definitely masterminded by the British-American Imperialists who try to generate difficulties for the people of Shanghai. Shanghai's People from all walks of life are irate considering the deliberate fabrication by the *North China Daily News*-led media, and ask the government to severely punish relevant responsible parties.¹⁶⁰

One day after the article was published, Peyton-Griffin, the editor of the *North China Daily News*, was summoned to the Foreign Affairs Department of the Shanghai Military Control Commission and compelled to explain the news report, which the Commission characterised as a deliberately fabricated rumour.¹⁶¹ The following day, Peyton-Griffin published a formal apology in several Shanghai newspapers, guaranteeing that he would not make the same mistake. Later, the Shanghai Military Control Commission issued a formal warning to the *North China Daily News* stating that this was in accordance with their finding of the fact of the breach of regulations (i.e., the publication of fabricated anti-revolutionary news) and in order to honour the public's strong condemnation of the newspaper. This administrative sanction was published by many newspapers. According to the commission's requirement, the offending paper (the *North China Daily News*) had to publish it on its front page.¹⁶²

The event of the Yangtze River mining report reflected the Communists' strategy of dealing with the problem of foreign media outlets in Shanghai that were not unequivocally pro-Communist. In the *Liberation Daily* article regarding the Yangtze River Mining report, it was pointed out that the mining information had not been released by Communist officials. Therefore, it concluded peremptorily, the Yangtze River mining report as published in the *North China Daily News* was untrue. This was a clear signal from the CCP that the media had no right to report any news which had

¹⁶⁰ Changjiangkou Bingwu Bulei Shishi [It is not true for the Information that mines are laid at the mouth of the Yangtze River], *Liberation Daily*, 21 June 1949.

¹⁶¹ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 187.

¹⁶² Ma, *Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi*, 6-7.

been gathered by their own devices - they could only quote the information that had been authorised by Communist officials. The CCP had effectively brow-beaten the media throughout the whole course of the event. Of course, it had been the one to scream “rumour” longest and loudest, triggering the outbreak of the event; and then it had mobilised the indignation of the masses, while advocating the intervention of its own authority; and finally forced the hapless person (Peyton-Griffith) responsible for the publication into a position of abject humiliation by requiring him to publish an apology on the front page of his own newspaper. As a result, what started out as a “journalism” incident was enlarged into a political event that involved the whole society. In the process of “resolving” the issue to its own satisfaction, the Communist regime reinforced its legitimacy as the ablest opponent to the imperialists still present on Chinese soil, and the most strident and tireless protector of the Chinese proletariat.

The event of the Yangtze River mining report soon reverberated in the bowels of the *SEPM*’s printing room. On 24 June, the Shanghai Municipal Bureau for Social Works received an indictment to demand the Shanghai Communist authority to punish Gould. It included the allegation that Gould had cheated his workers out of their payment, and that the workers had recently discovered two inflammatory new reports penned by the editor of the *SEPM*. The newly exposed reports included: (1) English transcription and Chinese translation of Chiang Kai-shek’s speech (given by radio) received in Shanghai on 7 June:

Chiang Kai-shek promised Shanghai over the radio from Taiwan last night that he would recapture this city within four months or commit suicide.

Such was the report today from several local Chinese listeners who said they had heard the Generalissimo orate on his life and hard times for one hour over the air.

First Chiang apologised to the people of Shanghai for losing the metropolis. He explained that the reason his promised “fight to the last man” had misfired was that troops in the rear had been bought off, causing a chain-reaction of disaster.

But all that is being fixed up, he intimated.

Although the course of his projected recapture campaign was expected to include air-bombing, he said, people could consider themselves safe in a radius of 40 miles from the center of Shanghai.

In other words, Shanghai and suburbs would not be bombed but such city as Quinsan would appear to lie barely within the area of

projected operation. Whether such cities as Hangchow and Nanking would be spared or included as more than 40 miles from Shanghai evidently was not made clear in the broadcast.¹⁶³

(2) the Yangtze River mining report of 10 June with both English and Chinese translation:

The Shanghai Military Control Commission was today investigating the report that a Nationalist LCM had mined the Yangtse River mouth, suspending shipping operations for the past 24 hours.

A Shanghai Maritime Customs official said that the only method to determine specifically whether the river entrance was mined, would be to mine sweep the entire harbor.

Lack of available craft for such operation now places the harbor in a vacuum, as the reports have prompted local shipping concerns to delay or divert arrivals and departures of vessels, pending clarification of the situation.

It was reported this morning that a foreign shipping firm had radioed to foreign naval craft, berthed outside of the Yangtse River, to probe the possibilities of the suspected mine-laying activities. This however could not be confirmed.

A high Customs official, responsible for the distribution of the warning to all shipping concerns, said that officially the harbor was still open to shipping, but that operators were warned to use their own discretion.

Only activity in the harbor, with the exception of small junks, was the dispatching this morning of a Customs light tender up-river to tie-down a wreckage buoy.¹⁶⁴

And (3) the Chinese translation of the disputed news report about the Shanghai labour disputes by Gould.¹⁶⁵ It is hard to imagine that such work could be completed only by the workers themselves.

In short, the workers alleged that Gould owed them money (even though he had declared that operations had ceased) as the wage dispute was still unresolved and they had

¹⁶³ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-28.

¹⁶⁴ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-28.

¹⁶⁵ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-112-28.

uncovered damning evidence of false and inflammatory reports - both disloyal to and to the discredit of the Communist regime. The print room workers did not recognise management's order to suspend the newspaper's operations. They insisted that they were still working as usual, and they were owed wages that included days worked after the cessation of operations. Irony of ironies, Zhou Enlai was one of the persons who participated in the final closure of the *SEPM*. On 28 June 1949, the Shanghai Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reported to Zhou Enlai on the measures taken regarding matters involving Gould and the *SEPM*. John Powell also ignored Gould's announcement by distancing himself from Gould's position and declaring that he and his newspaper stood with the workers and the CCP.¹⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, Gould was the personal target of many attacks from the time of the announcement of the closure of the newspaper until he left Shanghai in December 1949. *Liberation Daily*, a mouthpiece of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee (it also published *World Affairs* as an official magazine of the Chinese Communist Party) described Gould as an "imperialist woodworm" who launched psychological warfare against the Chinese people through the fabrication of rumours whose sole purpose was to mislead the masses.¹⁶⁷

In early September 1949, C. V. Starr finally responded to pressure by paying out a large sum of money from New York for the demobilisation of the workers, and the labour disputes forthwith came to a close.¹⁶⁸ Gould notified the Shanghai government that the payment had been made to the workers. It was also reported by *Liberation Daily* as following:

Through the three months since 14 June when the workers of the American owned *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* were sent away, they stood out for their inflexible conviction concerning their reasonable demands. Up to 9th of this month, the issue of payment that

¹⁶⁶ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949," 188. See also O'Brien, *An American Editor in Early Revolutionary China*, 251. John Powell was considered to be politically couth the Communists of China - he was designated as sympathetic to Chinese people. However, this point alone could not ensure the survival of his newspaper, as China had been not able to provide the market that the newspaper relied on. As foreign and private businesses were taken over in succession, and American aliens who had previously been the main readers of the *China Weekly Review* continually left China, the quantity of advertisements in the *China Weekly Review* plummeted. This inevitably led to financial and operational difficulties and as a result in December 1950 it was changed from a weekly to a monthly journal. This change was still not able to solve the most serious problem of all - it had to publish in accordance with the Chinese Communist Party line, while it relied economically on an American market/readership. When the paper took a pro-Communist stand denouncing American policy, most of the paper's readers were not in China but in America. The American government was irritated by its articles relating the Korean War. A trade embargo on the paper followed. It immediately resulted in severe financial difficulties which compelled Powell in June 1953 to announce the closure of his newspaper after publishing the July issue of that year.

¹⁶⁷ Ruo Du, "Suqing Diguozhuyi De Quzhu" [annihilate imperialist borers], *Shijie Zhishi* 1949, no.5: 3.

¹⁶⁸ Shanghai Municipal Archives, B128-2-83-76, 15; Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover," 190.

the workers demanded had generally stalled. [...] It finally ended with victory thanks to the workers' daring work. All of the workers voted that their victory derived from the protection of people's rights and the support given to the truth by the people's government. They wanted to express their thanks to the people's government.¹⁶⁹

Obviously, for the Communist authority, it was a patent propaganda victory over former "imperialist masters." As Gould said, the Communist regime achieved popularity by compelling owners to pick up the tab for all the workers' wage demands.¹⁷⁰ But from capitulation, came release. Gould finally obtained the visa he needed from the Communist authorities that permitted him to leave China. He left on 25 September by the repatriation ship *General Gordon*.¹⁷¹

The *SEPM*, Professional Journalism and Turbulent Modern China

Since its establishment in 1929, the *SEPM* had an historical life of about 20 years, in which it experienced the boom of national economy and unequalled national crisis in pre-war Shanghai, the gory Isolated Island, difficult time in wartime capital Chongqing, depression in post-war Shanghai, and finally was forced to close in June 1949, only half a month after Shanghai was taken over by the CCP. Not only does the *SEPM* reflect an odyssey of an American newspaper in China, but is a history to record the vicissitude of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in the first half of the 20th century as well.

As an American owned and managed newspaper, the *SEPM* in its journalistic practice unavoidably had American features, such as the reporting of news based on American journalists' viewpoint and standing points of editorials which reflected American interests. These features made the *SEPM* different from any other Chinese or British newspapers. However, the newspaper did not affiliate with the American government and any American political party. As a commercial newspaper, its priority was definitely its readers. Maintaining a sufficiently large quantity of readers through the provision of news reporting and editorials was the key way for the newspaper to survive. C. V. Starr as the owner of the *SEPM* utilised the newspaper as the main platform to publish

¹⁶⁹ Meishang Damei Wanbao Jiufen [The Labour Dispute of the American Newspaper: the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury], *Liberation Daily*, 12 September 1949.

¹⁷⁰ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949," 185.

¹⁷¹ Gould, "Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949," 190.

advertisement of his insurance company. The advertising effect, to a large degree, depended on the quantity of the newspaper's readers.

Americans in China and some Chinese senior officials were the main readers of the English edition of the *SEPM*. Both groups were keen to know American official standing points regarding significant events and the Chinese policy of the United States. Many editors of the Chinese edition had American education background, and American values more or less influenced their news reporting and editorial works. More importantly, the American features did not turn out to be the obstacle to the Chinese reading the Chinese edition of the paper, but this became a main selling point. Thus, American features in the news bias of the *SEPM* were the result of commercialisation rather than purely political position.

The American news bias of the *SEPM* seemingly had been in conflict with journalistic objectivity, which is a key principle in professionalism ideology. The importance of the value of objectivity is that it was not merely an ideal disconnected from reality. Objectivity was supposed to be the *raison d'être* of all activity at the practical level, and as such it was also an inevitable source of ethical dilemma.¹⁷² Although journalism objectivity is defined and explained by different scholars based on their own views and perspectives, there is a common value which is to reduce subjective factors in news reporting. Dennis and Merrill, for example, propose three key points of objectivity: "1) separating facts from opinion; 2) presenting and emotionally detached view of the news; and 3) striving for fairness and balance".¹⁷³ Michael Schudson identifies the canon of the concept with four points: "1) through expressed allegiance to the norm in speeches and textbooks; 2) ethnographic observations of journalists at work; 3) content analysis that measures the degree of impersonality and non-partisanship in news stories; and 4) resistance displayed by adherents when the norm is challenged or criticised".¹⁷⁴ Objectivity ideally is to make journalism overstep political influence, but how and in what degree it can be realised in practice is always a question to be debated and challenged by scholars. Carey, for example, argues that objective means journalism

¹⁷² Steven Maras, *Objectivity in Journalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 9.

¹⁷³ E. E. Dennis and J. C. Merrill, "Journalistic Objectivity," in *Basic Issues in Mass Communication: A Debate*, ed. E. E. Dennis and J. C. Merrill (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 111.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Schudson, "The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism," *Journalism* 2, no. 2 (August 2001): 149-50.

under the commercial motive adjusts its political position to be diverse, thus to avoid alienating any certain group of audience.¹⁷⁵ Michael Schudson also questions this term. He argues that both ‘partisan’ journalists and ‘objective’ journalists all reject “inaccuracy, lying and misinformation,” but ‘objective’ journalists do not like ‘partisan’ journalists who present information from a specific group or organisation without critical assessment.¹⁷⁶ From the scholars’ discussions above, it is clear that the notion of objectivity is incapable of fully encasing subjective information and influence particularly once the demands of commercialisation with its need to attract readers are satisfied. Based on the view of history, the emergence of objectivity is a progress for journalism to avoid partisan domination, and improves the professional independence of journalism.

However, the later development of journalism objectivity became distinct with the United States. National crisis and the full scale war against Japan in the 1930s objectively changed the trajectory of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, and in this process, partisan journalism realised its restoration and began to dominate the press in China. When the press regresses to the position of endorsing for political parties, journalistic objectivity will be unavoidably deprived as the foundation of the concept, which is against partisan journalism has not existed.

As an American newspaper which had a long history of publication in Shanghai foreign settlement, the *SEPM* is unavoidably doubted towards its property that whether the newspaper was a product of Western colonialism in China. Thus, it will be further challenged regarding the paper’s ideology of public service, especially whether it serviced for underclass Chinese. First of all, social poverty and colonialism should not be simply understood as a binary opposition relation. Moreover, moral criteria based on nationalism should not be simply adopted as the only dimension to describe the relations of the two concepts. Professional journalism is better to serve public interests when interacting with social poverty and unfair under a colonial system rather than partisan journalism. Indeed, the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was just a benefit from treaty ports and colonies in Chinese territory. With the pro-condition of professionalism,

¹⁷⁵ James W. Carey, “The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator,” *The Sociological Review* 13, no. s1 (May 1965): 23.

¹⁷⁶ Schudson, “Objectivity Norm American Journalism,” 150.

social poverty and other problems under colonialism are likely to be reported and discussed by the media in a relatively objective view. Partisan journalism, in the contrary, simply serves for the interests of political parties, and the issues, such as poverty and colonial compradors, in partisan media will unavoidably become the agendas manipulated based on the parties' interests.

Undoubtedly, the CCP's propaganda made the Party acquire sympathy and public opinion support in the Chinese Civil War. Unfortunately, to a large degree it marked failure of professional journalism in China. Since the outbreak of the war against Japan, the situation forced the *SEPM* to co-operate with the Nationalist Government. The influence of the American diplomatic policy might have been a reason to facilitate this co-operation, but the property of the *SEPM* as a commercial newspaper which was independent from political parties was not changed. With the restoration of partisan journalism in post-war China, it seized the space for professional journalism, causing the newspaper to experience a depression in post-war Shanghai and its final closure in June 1949. The case of the *SEPM* represents the process of commercial newspapers during the war against Japan to be successfully incorporate and controlled by the Nationalist Government. However, there was another typical case during the war period that the CCP achieved control over some relevantly independent journalists. Both of them together marked the end of professional journalism in China, and thus the competition of propaganda between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party became the main stream of post-war Chinese journalism, and the CCP's propaganda finally achieved victory in 1949. In the following paragraphs, Edgar Snow's case will be presented to concisely explain the process of professional journalism to be transformed into the CCP's propaganda agent during the war against Japan.

Edgar Snow was an American professional journalist who graduated from the Missouri School of journalism. After he arrived in China, he witnessed the growing national crisis and other serious social issues. Snow began to disappoint the Nationalist Government, and his ideas began to be well to the left of centre, but he still maintained his independent position and fully understood that American newspapers would lose their trust in him as long as he was known as a pro-Communist.¹⁷⁷ However, successively serious national

¹⁷⁷ John Maxwell Hamilton, *Edgar Snow: A Biography* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 56.

crises made Snow unknowingly involved in Chinese politics. Prompted by the sympathy to students' patriotic emotions, Edgar Snow together with his wife Helen Foster Snow not only supported, but also encouraged and guided Chinese students to attend demonstrations against the Japanese invasion and Chiang Kai-shek's foreign policies regarding Japan. However, these students' movements were not purely patriotic demonstrations, but had been permeated by the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the left-wing organisations which were closely related to the CCP.¹⁷⁸

Snow's professional journalistic position was inevitably distorted since he began to be involved in Chinese politics. Distorted professionalism combined with the Chinese Communist Party's interests brought about his journalistic trip to Yan'an. Based on the standpoint of a professional journalist, this was a significantly important trip to present an unknown world to most people, but simultaneously forfeited his principle of objectivity derived from an independent position and professional consideration in his journalist work. Not only was it mixed with nationalism, but also deeply mingled with the interests of political parties. Professional journalism ideology also lost its place with Snow's trip to hinterland China. It was proven afterwards that the combination of Snow's political connection derived from his participation in the activities by left-wing organisations and the CCP, and the Party's political needs to acquire support for establishing its united front work, were critical factors in Snow's visiting Yan'an.¹⁷⁹ Finally, Snow's writing became a successful propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party as it reflected CCP's politics. Since then, he was forced to modify his writing several times with the amendment of CCP's policies.¹⁸⁰ After these experiences, Snow's halo as a professional journalist was unavoidably questioned and challenged. To the CCP, their political propaganda was successfully released in the way of professional journalism, and thus received good results.

Snow's case further highlights the process through which professional journalism ideology became distorted under growing nationalism pressure, and then compounded with the political needs of the regimes in hinterland China. The restoration of political

¹⁷⁸ S. Bernard Thomas, *Season of High Adventure: Edgar Snow in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 145.

¹⁷⁹ Brady, *Making Foreign Serve China*, 42-43.

¹⁸⁰ Brady, *Making Foreign Serve China*, 47.

parties' domination over journalism was thus realised. Being different from Gould, Snow, with his deep disappointment regarding the Nationalist Government, placed his hopes in the CCP. Unfortunately, the party's journalism policies were derived from, yet even more strict and sophisticated than, Lenin and Stalin.¹⁸¹ The publication of the *SEPM* in the Isolated Island Shanghai and Wartime Capital Chongqing, and Edgar Snow's visit to Yan'an, were two different ways in which the nationalism pressure compounded on professional journalism and co-operation with Chinese regimes in the hinterland. Compared to the first, the latter way was more fatal to professional journalism as the closure of the *SEPM* shows.

Snow's experience to a certain degree reflects that resistance against exotic threat and struggling for domestic reform were the two main elements came cross the modern Chinese history. Li Zehou proposes that enlightenment was finally repressed by saving the nation.¹⁸² Edmund Fund amends the binary opposition relations between the two terms, and he argues that cherishing liberal and democratic values and demanding for political and constitutional reform may not be always in the opposite with establishing a strong and powerful government and inspiring anti-imperial nationalism. However, Fund still has to recognise the historical fact that Chinese struggling for personal rights and political reforms did not fundamentally challenged the ruling order of the Nationalist Party and changed the result of the Chinese Civil War.¹⁸³

Based on the case of the *SEPM*, saving the nation and enlightenment in journalism development of modern China might not be absolutely in opposition to each other, but the objective result is that political parties relying on the successively growing nationalism since the outbreak of the war against Japan realised their control and domination over journalism and it led to the depression of the *SEPM* in post-war Shanghai and the final closure in June 1949. During the wartime period, either Gould or other Chinese journalists who published articles in the *Journalist Weekly*, a supplement of *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, expressed the idea that they fully understood the necessity of government exerting control over journalism for the highest national interests, which

¹⁸¹ Gao, *Hongtaiyang*, 374.

¹⁸² Li Zehou, *Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shilun* [An Intellectual History of Thoughts and ideas in China] (Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe, 1987), 7-41.

¹⁸³ Edmund S. K. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 1929-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9.

was resistance against Japanese invasion, but they anticipated the new beginning of the professionalisation of journalism in post-war China. Thus, their professionalism ideal was only limited as an ideal and under the effective governance of the Nationalist Government, there was little space for the *SEPM* to practice professionalism.

Fung owns the frustration of efforts for domestic reform in modern China to the weak position of Chinese intellectual elites' cultural tradition in competing with the dominant political culture which was armed and violent.¹⁸⁴ However, to Chinese journalism, only this reason is not sufficient to explain the good development of its professionalisation in pre-war Shanghai and post-war Hong Kong. The case of the *SEPM* presents that the national crisis in the 1930s finally forced many journalists in China to change their persistence on independence of journalism and choose to cooperate with the Nationalist Government.¹⁸⁵ When professionalism ideals were submerged by the emotion of saving the nation, politicians would occupy the moral high point to realise their control over journalism. Hopes for restoration of professional journalism in post-war China were finally disillusioned with the Nationalist Government's takeover of the former foreign concessions in the treaty ports and realised effective management over the press there. Although Nakamura Motoya argues that controlling journalism was not the policy of the Nationalist Government at the early stage of post war China, he still recognises that Hong Kong became the sanctuary of intellectuals to critic politics since 1947 as the Nationalist Government began to strengthen their policy for free speech.¹⁸⁶ The sharp contrast of the boom of the press in post war Hong Kong and Shanghai proves again the fatal weakness of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, heavily dependent on the existence of treaty ports and colonies.

Conclusion

The experience of the *SEPM* was not an accident nor an isolated case in the history of journalism in China. The means the CCP mobilised to achieve social control were actually highly effective – it was a case of skilful social mobilisation by means of a long-

¹⁸⁴ Fung, *Search of Chinese Democracy*, 346.

¹⁸⁵ See Gao Like, “Zai Ziyou Yu Guojia Zhijian: Xinyueshe, Dulishe Liumei Xueren De Qilu [Between Liberalism and State: Different Decisions made by America educated intellectuals in the Crescent Moon Society and *Independent Review*],” in *Baoren Baoguo: Zhongguo Xinwenshi De Lingyizhong Dufa* [To Serve the Nation: Journalists as Prisms of Chinese Press History], ed. Lee Chin-Chuan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013).

¹⁸⁶ Nakamura Motoya, *Sengo Chūgoku no Kensei Jisshi to Genron no Jiyū 1945-49* [Constitutionalism and Freedom of Speech in China during the Civil War Period, 1945-1949] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2004), 177.

honed mastery of the machinery and techniques of mass propaganda. Although the *North China Daily News* maintained publication by reaching a temporary compromise with the Communist regime regarding the issue of the Yangtze River mining report, sharp and deep contradictions plagued the paper as it tried to balance very conflicting objectives – maintenance of the standards and principles of professional journalism while avoiding the ire of the Communist regime. However, the newspaper suspended operations soon after it published reports on the Korean War which were a source of serious irritation for the Communists in June 1950.¹⁸⁷ Other papers, such as John Powell's *China Weekly* review, gained much respect for their struggles and losses at the hands of the Japanese. The *SEPM*, however, clearly led the charge of the foreign-owned papers in resisting censorship as well as resisting the Japanese. Gould was proud of the *SEPM*'s endeavours and efforts. He wrote in his memoir that no other Shanghai paper dared to fight the Japanese to such an extent. His adherence to professional standards during the trying final year of the paper is testament to the depth of his commitment.

From what has been examined in this chapter, the *SEPM* persisted in its principle of reporting news objectively and in an independent manner, even though the general media environment in post-war Shanghai and China in general was immersed in political propaganda. When faced with the controlling censorship of the Nationalist regime, Gould chose a tactful way to stem the tide of trouble and successfully maintained the newspaper's independence. Emery and Roberts in *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media* recommended the *New York Times* as a model of professional journalism in so far as it consistently conveyed a reasonable attitude in public reporting, seldom allowed personal invective to colour its reporting, and consistently avoided the extremes of black-and-white news reporting.¹⁸⁸ The present study argues that the *SEPM* largely realised this ideal in Shanghai despite the fact that the media environment was at times extremely harsh. In such a chaotic period and society, what Gould had to deal with in order to secure the *SEPM*'s survival and continue to publish in alignment with the core values of professional journalism was well and truly far beyond issues limited to the niceties of nuanced reporting. Gould's risky strategy may reflect that he was not fully aware of the relevant policies of the CCP. His

¹⁸⁷ Ma, *Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi*, 7.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Emery, Edwin Emery and Nancy L. Roberts, *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, 9th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 108.

observations of the bitter experience of both Chinese and foreign media in Manchuria and North China after the Communist's occupation should have made him realise that this was nothing more than the result of the implementation of the CCP's policies. However that may be, it certainly appears to have been a case of unfounded hope triumphing over bitter experience. If so, that is entirely to Gould's credit.

Chapter 5: China, journalism, the *SEPM* and Bourdieu's theory of field

This thesis has demonstrated how the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, as a foreign owned and run entity, enjoyed the benefits of extraterritoriality, and that this is a central part of its success during this period. Once extraterritoriality ceased in Shanghai, the story of the survival of the *SEPM* is one of prolonged struggle before its final closure in 1949. It is important now to explore the potential of a possible future iteration of research on this newspaper, namely the application of a theoretical framework that attempts to delineate more precisely the underlying forces shaping the development of professional journalism in early twentieth century China. This chapter seeks to marry the foregoing findings of this present study of the *SEPM* to key elements of Pierre Bourdieu's (1930 - 2002) theoretical framework (as proposed in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*) with the aim of further elucidating key aspects of the journalism field in China.¹ As Silvio Waisbord so succinctly puts the case:

The emergence of journalism in modernity, as well as other occupations and professions, reflected the broad process of the division of labor and the specialization of technical knowledge. What happened in the press and journalism was another manifestation of the increased complexity and organization of modern society in institutions with their own rules and norms. By directing our attention to the relation between the journalistic field and other fields, Bourdieu's theory offers a dynamic, action-oriented perspective that contextualizes journalism within a set of social and historical developments. Journalism, its practices and ideals, cannot be understood in isolation from a particular social formation and the complex ever-changing interaction between fields.²

Monika Krause's research uses Bourdieu's theory of fields of cultural production to focus on the relevant historical evidence in the United States regarding the history of the public service ideal that has permeated discourse about journalism there from the late 19th to early 20th centuries.³ She concluded that the implementation of the journalistic

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

² Silvio Waisbord, *Reinventing Journalism and News in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 13.

³ Monika Krause, "Reporting and the Transformations of the Journalistic Field: US News Media, 1890-2000," *Media Culture Society* 33, no. 1 (2011): 90.

ideal of public service in the United States has largely depended on the presence (within the autonomous journalism field) of field-specific *capital*, which is independent of political advantage or literary merit.

Active news-gathering or reporting is the distinctive innovation of journalism. This practice became common in the 1860s and 1870s, with the emergence of a relatively autonomous field of practice with its own stakes, relatively independent from political advantage or literary merit. The power of field-specific capital to organise practices in the media has varied since then. The field consolidated in the era from 1890 to 1914, with the newspaper industry expanding. In this period we see a first golden era for local reporting and investigative journalism.⁴

Krause enumerates the advantages that the application of the concept of the journalistic field brings to studies such as hers and this present one:

Field theory allows us to historicize journalistic ideals and analyse their institutional base [...];

Field theory directs us to the prevalence of a distinctively journalistic practice as an indicator of journalistic autonomy. Active news-gathering from a variety of sources is the distinctive innovation of journalistic production and whether and how much this happens needs to be considered in examination of journalism as journalism [...];

Field theory allows us to integrate evidence across media forms. News production as a whole is an important and neglected unit of analysis; it is both narrower than ‘the media’ or ‘communication’ as a whole, and broader than specific media forms or genres [...];

Field theory allows us to compare field properties across historical periods or national contexts [...]. We can examine the force of field-specific capital to organize practices. We can examine the changing relationships of the journalistic field with other fields, most notably the economic and the political field.⁵

Huang Shun-Shing and Hsiao Hsu-Chih explored the applicability of Bourdieu’s field to the history of journalism in non-Western countries. By reviewing research on the press in post-war Taiwan, Huang Shun-Shing found that although there were increasing numbers of studies that contributed to supplying more abundant details to form a fuller

⁴ Krause, “Reporting and the Transformations,” 100.

⁵ Krause, “Reporting and the Transformations,” 90.

picture of journalism, the emphasis was, in the final analysis, still limited to exploring the theme of absolute social control by the Nationalist Party. He found that this was so even when these studies focused on policies and legal dimensions relevant to the history of journalism. Huang criticised these research methods for submerging the study of journalism history into narratives of political development, thereby preventing the development of the press from being studied for its own sake.⁶ By adopting the Bourdieu's theory of field, he found evidence that challenged the standard notion that the dilemma of the press in Taiwan is derived from unavoidable political and economic pressure. Instead, he argued that the problem is more one of journalists' lacking a sense of history and needing to collectively re-think the dilemmas that their contradictory roles pose for them. In Bourdesian terms, the multiplicity of positions within the field that journalists occupy as instruments of state propaganda for national ideology, guardians of public opinion independent of authority while at the same time striving for commercial viability and advantage.⁷ Hsiao Hsu-Chih focuses on the assassinations of journalists in China during the Republican period (see chapters 2 and 3 of the present study) and analysed its effect on the press.⁸ In his opinion the application of Bourdieu's field theory yielded information that challenged received ideas about the meaning of the assassinations. This approach enables scholars to imagine and explore alternative facts and possible meanings. Moving the focus of research to a more comprehensive examination of the multi-dimensional features of the journalistic field (during the Republican period) and its relatedness to local society and political violence allows for a shift in interpretations of historical evidence that have tended towards an inherently revolution-centred viewpoint which has sought to represent the assassinated journalists as martyrs to free speech.⁹

It has been argued that a comprehensive history of journalism in China needs to not only acknowledge the foreign origins of newspapers in modern China, but also account for how foreign ideas and practices of professionalisation were introduced into China and

⁶ Huang Shun-Shing, "Xinwen De Changyu Fenxi: Zhanhou Taiwan Baoye De Bianqian [Analysing the Journalistic Field: The Vicissitudes of the Press in Post-war Taiwan]," *Xinwenxue Yanjiu*, no. 104 (July 2010): 116.

⁷ Huang, "Xinwen De Changyu Fenxi," 151-53.

⁸ Hsiao Hsu-Chih, "Baoli, Ansha Yu Xingcunzhe De Jiye: Minguo Shiqi De Xinwen Changyu Chutan [Violence, Assassination and Survivors' Memories: A Tentative Examination on the Journalistic Field during the Republic Period]," in *Xinwen Meijie De Lishi Mailuo* [Historical Trajectory of News Media], ed. Huang Shun-Shing (Taipei: Cheng She-Wo Institute for Chinese Journalism, Shih Hsin University, 2014), 24.

⁹ Hsiao, "Baoli, Ansha Yu Xingcunzhe," 24-37.

adapted to local conditions. This makes the *SEPM* an important vehicle for exploring many aspects of Chinese journalism of the late 1920s to the late 1940s. Indeed, it has been amply demonstrated that Shanghai's special conditions made it a haven for the flourishing of Chinese journalism, despite the political turmoil in China in the late 1920s. It has been noted that the Manchurian warlord leader Chang Hsueh-liang was persuaded to join the Nanjing Nationalist Government that Chiang Kai-shek led in December 1928, and it marked the successful accomplishment of the Northern Expedition. China at that moment was only nominally unified, and real power in many areas was still wielded by local warlords. This situation led to the civil wars within the factionalised Nationalist Party from March 1929 to November 1930. Additionally, the CCP had possessed its own military force, and successively organised riots and created Soviet Zones nationwide.

Crucially, it has been shown that by studying the newspaper's archives there is much evidence of the efforts to professionalise journalism throughout this turbulent period. We have also seen that there is much evidence of the devastating effects that such conflicts had on the development of professional journalism. This period of the *SEPM* is very much marked by the angst-ridden articles that many Chinese journalists felt the need to write (often – for their own safety - anonymously) as their activities as journalists began to shift from protecting the public interest through objective reporting (a value chiefly derived from the professional prototype of American journalism) to activities that became increasingly partisan; and ultimately to forms of journalism heavily controlled by the ideologies of the CCP (particularly after the military takeover at the end of May 1949). Up to the early 1950s, the original mass media market, which had been maintained for nearly half a century, became a vehicle for highly politicalised and state-managed Communist propaganda.¹⁰

Introducing field theory

A central concept in Bourdieu's work is what he refers to as *habitus*. This concept involves an analysis of both the course of an individual history and history as it is objectified in institutions. Therefore this chapter explores the historic conditions of journalism's beginnings in China. This is a prerequisite to understanding the *habitus* of some of the key figures at the *SEPM* when it was established in 1929. Application of

¹⁰ Zhang Jishun, "Thought Reform and Press Nationalisation in Shanghai: The Wenhui Newspaper in the Early 1950s," *Twentieth-Century China* 35, no. 2 (April 2010): 79.

field theory also highlights the central importance of semi-colonial extraterritoriality that arose in the nineteenth-century due to China's weakened state - relative to other nations such as Japan and Britain - coupled with the Qing government's ability to apply precedents from its own indigenous legal system (developed out of the necessity to manage conflicts with the Manchu population).

The existence of this system meant that the rulers of the Qing Empire had experiences to draw upon when they accommodated foreign demands for extraterritoriality and built institutions in order to deal with its problems. Nowhere is the continuity between "traditional" and treaty port institutions more salient than in the case of the Mixed Court in Shanghai. By comparing the Chinese version of the treaty texts with other legal sources, we can observe a direct borrowing and adaptation of long existing Sino-Manchu legal concepts and institutions.¹¹

The professionalisation of journalism within China itself was heavily – but not solely - dependent upon the existence of treaty ports that supported the cultural, legal, political and economic conditions that facilitated the flourishing of a distinct culture of professional journalism; or more properly, according to Bourdieu's approach, the development of a distinct *habitus* specific to the journalists (agents) working for newspapers established and protected by extraterritoriality. Shanghai's enjoyment of the benefits of extraterritoriality created a social microcosm or 'field' which facilitated and supported the flourishing of professional journalism there. In *The Logic of Practice*, Bourdieu understands human beings' *practices* through the conceptual lens of what he calls the *habitus* - a Latin term meaning 'disposition,' 'condition' or 'state.' This concept is a sort of shorthand for an array of conditioning factors (socio-cultural, cognitive, environmental and historical) that endow an individual with 'dispositions' that are more or less valuable or legitimate depending on the social sphere that the individual is acting within. As Bourdieu explains, *habitus* is "constituted in the course of an individual history, imposing its particular logic on incorporation, and through which agents partake of the history objectified in institutions."¹² *Habitus* shapes behaviour in accordance with largely unexamined assumptions and presumptions about an individual's legitimate

¹¹ Pär Cassell, "Excavating Extraterritoriality: The 'Judicial Sub-prefect' as a Prototype for the Mixed Court in Shanghai," *Late Imperial China* 24, no. 2 (December 2003): 157-58.

¹² Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 57.

place and role within a social sphere, or what Bourdieu calls ‘field’(see Diagram 1: The Field of Cultural Production in the Field of Power and in Social Space).

Bourdieu’s *Theory of Practice* (1972) comprises three main elements, namely *field*, *capital* and *habitus*. The interplay of these elements leads to strategy or practice, i.e. our unconscious behavior that is in conformity with our interests and that aims at achieving our objectives by investing capital and fighting for capital. Bourdieu’s major contribution is [...] the reconciliation between structure and agency or macro and micro. In this respect, Bourdieu understands practice as the result of social structures on a particular field (structure; macro) where certain rules apply and also of one’s *habitus* (agency; micro), i.e. the embodied history that is manifested in our system of thinking, feeling, perceiving and behaving. The *habitus* assures the collective belief in the rules of the social game (*illusio*) and that actors act in accordance with their position on the field (*doxa*), which depends on their relative amount and structure of economic, cultural (and social) *capital*.¹³

Field is an analytical concept central to Bourdieu’s work. He posits the existence and motion of fields within social space. A field is constituted of a range of historical networks with specific power (political power and economic power) or capital (social, economic, cultural and symbolic capital).¹⁴ According to Gaventa,

Bourdieu introduces the concept of the field to denote the social arena in which power struggles *and* conflict take place, in which specific kinds of capital (economic, cultural, social symbolic) are at stake and certain forms of habitus and dispositions are fitted for success.¹⁵

The accumulation and transmission of the various kinds of capital (or resources considered valuable) existing in a given field occurs through the process of socialisation or ‘incorporation’ of human lives - each individual is thought to embody by degrees the

¹³ Matthias Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany: A Comparative Study Based on Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice* (Wiesbaden, Hesse-Darmstadt: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2014), 15.

¹⁴ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 16.

¹⁵ Jonathan Gaventa, *Power after Lukes: a review of the literature* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2003), 7.

presence or absence of existing capital within a field. For example, this process is best illustrated in an explanation of cultural capital:

Cultural capital (capital culturel) is especially transferred by family and education and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications. Cultural capital is the primary cause for status and relative positions within a social field. It can exist in three forms. In the incorporated (or embodied) state (*forme incorporée*), the cultural capital is a durable system of dispositions and represents one's entirety of intellectual qualifications or human capital [...] and one's culture or cultivation that presupposes a process of embodiment as it implies a time-intensive labor of inculcation and assimilation ([...]). Hence, the acquisition of incorporated cultural capital cannot be delegated. The work of acquisition is the work of oneself. The objectivized form (*forme objective*) of cultural capital exists in the form of material objects, e.g. books, paintings, monuments, instruments etc. that are transferable in their physical state. Finally, in the institutionalized form (*forme institutionnalisée*), cultural capital takes the form of a certificate of cultural competence, e.g. a formalized academic qualification (diploma) that is socially sanctioned by an institution.¹⁶

The capital each agent (actor or participant) acquires and is able to mobilise forms the framework and shifting parameters of an individual's potential and actual agency within the field:

It is the structure of objective relations (*la structure des relations objectives*) between the agents on a field that defines dominant and dominated positions [...] and that determines what agents can and what they cannot do, i.e. which practices are possible and which not. Put another way, the position an agent occupies on a field creates self-evident rules that determine his potential cruising radius, i.e. the limits of social mobility within a social field. This *doxa* forms the sense of our place and the feeling of what is possible and what not.¹⁷

The term *doxa* is originally from Greek. *Doxa*, in Bourdieu's approach, is the experience "when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation, the natural and social world appears as self-evident."¹⁸ Bourdieu initially proposed three (apparently) distinct types of *capital*: (1) *economic capital*, or the ownership of economic resources such as money and real property; (2) *cultural capital* (see above) that provide advantages facilitating the

¹⁶ Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany*, 10.

¹⁷ Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany*, 9.

¹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*, 164.

acquisition of higher positions in the society; (3) and *social capital* that refers to the social networks in a section of society, or across intersecting sections of society that allow access to valuable resources (both material and immaterial), relations and influence.¹⁹ Bourdieu also added a fourth type, that of *symbolic capital*, or honour and recognition; in other words, the credit, authority and the reputation an individual enjoys, thanks to the readiness of others to recognise possession of the other three species of *capital*:

Besides the right to enter a social field, the capital structure also determines an agent's position on the field or social space in general. Bourdieu insists on the fact that positions on social fields are relative. They are determined by the volume and structure of the agent's capital portfolio that is compared to that of other agents on the same field, especially regarding economic and cultural capital.²⁰

Bourdieu understands *symbolic capital* as “the form that one or another of these species takes when it is grasped through categories of perception that recognise its specific logic or, if you prefer, misrecognise the arbitrariness of its possession and accumulation.”²¹ Another concept central to this present study what Bourdieu calls *hystereis*, a Greek verb meaning ‘that which comes after’ or ‘to come later.’ According to Ron Martin, the use of the term first appeared in the natural sciences, in studies of the magnetic and elastic properties of metals and materials:

The following analogy may help to illustrate the idea of hysteresis. Assume a spring is suspended vertically, and that initially a small weight is then attached. The spring will stretch. The weight is then removed, and the spring returns to its original shape and state. Then the spring is subjected to the same treatment using successfully heavier weights. At some point, the weight applied to the spring will be such that when it is removed, the spring will not return to its original shape and state, but will be left permanently stretched. The downward pressure on the spring will have exceeded the spring's ‘elasticity threshold’: hysteresis can be said to have occurred.²²

Bourdieu adopts this term to describe the state whereby an “individual's dispositions become dysfunctional and the efforts they make to perpetuate them help to plunge them

¹⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 243.

²⁰ Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany*, 11.

²¹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 119.

²² Ron Martin, “Regional Economic Resilience, Hysteresis and Recessionary Shocks,” *Journal of Economic Geography*, (2011) : 7-8.

deeper into failure.”²³ He also illustrates this state with the example of generational discord:

A famous example is the generation conflict where the habitus of agents has been developed at different points in time leading to different understandings of which practice is ‘reasonable’ for one generation versus ‘scandalous’ or ‘unthinkable’ for the other generation.²⁴

Bourdieu understands the socialisation, or conditioning, of the individual as a “purely social” and “quasi-magical” process that ensures the perpetuation of certain durable and stable resources and dispositions within a field through the processes of (primary and secondary) *habitus*:

Primary socialization is the socialization that comes from the family during childhood. The resulting primary habitus (*habitus primaire*) is rather stable. The schemes of action and perception that have been transferred during childhood are an education that is linked to the parents’ social position in the social space. Therefore, the primary habitus is about ‘internalizing the external’ as the parents’ modes of thinking, feeling and behaving that are linked to their position in the social space are internalized in the children’s own habitus. [...] The secondary habitus (*habitus secondaire*) is built on the primary habitus and especially results from one’s education at school and university, but also from other life experiences.²⁵

The individual – through “a readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social” – is incorporated within social institutions in such a way that his or her subjectivity becomes conditioned to serve and “comply with the demands immanent in the field.”²⁶ This would appear overly deterministic as it seems to deny, or at least give little weight to the existence of the agency of each individual. This would perhaps be so, were it not for what Bourdieu refers to as the “performative magic of the social” – the magic is to be found in the process of incorporation of the individual with the promise of “a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy.” As Bourdieu demonstrates:

[...] it is through the capacity for incorporation, which exploits the body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social,

²³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 161.

²⁴ Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany*, 14.

²⁵ Walther, *Repatriation to France and Germany*, 13.

²⁶ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 57-58.

that the king, the banker or the priest are hereditary monarchy, financial capitalism or the Church made flesh. Property appropriates its owner, embodying itself in the form of a structure generating practices perfectly conforming with its logic and its demands. If one is justified in saying, with its logic and its demands. If one is justified in saying, with Marx, that ‘the lord of an entailed estate, the first-born son, belongs to the land’, that ‘it inherits him’, or that the ‘persons’ of capitalists are the ‘personification’ of capital, this is because the purely social and quasi-magical process of socialisation, which is inaugurated by the act of marking that institutes an individual as an eldest son, an heir, a successor, a Christian, or simply as a man (as opposed to a woman), with all the corresponding privileges and obligations, and which is prolonged, strengthened and confirmed by social treatments that tend to transform instituted difference into natural distinction, produces quite real effects, durably inscribed in the body and in belief. An institution, even an economy, is complete and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic, transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to recognise and comply with the demands immanent in the field.²⁷

Bourdieu further defines *habitus* as “the durable and transposable systems of schemata of perception, appreciation, and action that result from the institution of the social in the body or in biological individuals.”²⁸ There is a “double and obscure relation” between field and *habitus*. As Bourdieu explains:

On one side, it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field or of a set of intersecting fields, the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even torn habitus. On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction. Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy.²⁹

Habitus permits agents to adopt advantageous practices and strategies within the field. Bourdieu further proposes a three-fold analysis of field that seeks to elucidate the following dimensions: (1) relative positions of the field in question to what Bourdieu refers to as an over-arching field, known as the field of power; (2) relative positions of specific agents and institutions within a given field; and (3) the *habitus* of agents and

²⁷ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 57-58.

²⁸ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 126-27.

²⁹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 127.

institutions of the field in question.³⁰ To examine the position of any given subfield is a critical step for revealing its boundaries:

One of the key insights in Bourdieu's work [...] is that fields do not exist in isolation, but they are in permanent relations with other fields. The boundaries of any given field are demarcated in relation to others on the basis of a unique capital – characteristics such as particular skills, training [...]. They have a particular capital constantly nurtured to reinforce separation and to protect them from external influences.³¹

Each relative position within a field represents a spatial distribution of *capital* and power. In order to recognise and accumulate different species of *capital* (such as the enjoyment of higher prestige) for present enjoyment or to have such *capital* at one's disposal to mobilise it strategically or profitably in the future, each agent must internalise field-specific rules in order to have any chance of succeeding in the field in question.

Bourdieu's Theory of Practice and Journalism: Applying Bourdieu to Journalism

In *On Television and Journalism*, Bourdieu proposes the notion of the journalism field, which he characterises as an independent microcosm governed by its own laws - due to their unique rules, fields are autonomous. However, he also qualifies this autonomy as relative. Given that each field is embedded in a social space, its position simultaneously possesses the interactive relations of attraction and repulsion with other fields. For instance, the intellectual field may also be influenced by the politic, the economy or religion. Bourdieu asserted that the internal practice of journalism cannot be understood by examining external conditions alone because of the journalism field's specific (but not absolute) autonomy.³²

Bourdieu and other researchers have analysed the relative position of the journalistic field. It is located in its most contiguous surroundings, the field of cultural production, which is also part of the field of power in the social and national space (see [Diagram1](#)). Bourdieu divides the field of cultural production into two horizontally arranged sub-fields: (1) the cultural pole close to small-scale production, for example small literary journals and avant-garde arts that are produced for a narrow group of cultivated people,

³⁰ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 104-05.

³¹ Waisbord, *Reinventing Professionalism*, 12.

³² Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 39.

specialists and experts; and (2) the economic pole, which is akin to large-scale production. Journalism is generally included in the second pole as it is understood to produce for mass consumption. Each field in Bourdieu's paradigm is a space teeming with conflicts and competitions amongst agents (participants) contending for monopoly over the 'effective' *capital* of the field in question. In Bourdieu's *The Rules of Art* (considered to be one of the most accessible presentations of his sociological approach) he considers substantial and potential positions or position-takings, which are possible or problematic, as products of the logic specific to each field.³³ Under the structure and position of a field's setting, Bourdieu argues, internal and external competition is the mechanism that maintains the dynamic operations of the field which also leads to changes within and outside the field.³⁴

In *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Bourdieu and Wacquant's very comprehensive introduction to Bourdieu's theoretical approach), 'field' is described in the following terms:

In highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e., spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields.³⁵

In the artistic field, effective capital appears as cultural authority, whereas in the field of power effective *capital* is understood to be the potency of power itself within the hierarchy of position-takings and the relative rate of conversion of each position's authority within the field.³⁶ Bourdieu regarded a field as "a field of forces and a field of struggles in which the stake is the power to transform the field of forces. In other words, within a field, there is competition for legitimate appropriation of what is at stake in the struggle in the field."³⁷ Exploring external conditions for the transformation inside a field, Bourdieu deemed that internal struggles of a field are to a certain degree arbitrated by external bindings and influences. He further explained that even if struggles inside a

³³ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 232.

³⁴ Rodney Benson, "Field Theory in Comparative Context: A New Paradigm for Media Studies," *Theory and Society* 28, no. 3 (June 1999): 465-66; David Hesmondhalgh, "Bourdieu, the Media and Cultural Production," *Media, Culture & Society* 28, no. 2 (2006): 213-14

³⁵ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 97.

³⁶ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 17-18.

³⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, "The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field," in *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, ed. Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 44.

field are based on a field's inherent logic concerning what is most at stake, the outcomes of such struggles often rely on that particular field's connections with struggles external to itself in the field of power.³⁸

In *The Field of Cultural Production* (an edited collection of his essays) Bourdieu further proposes another analytical concept (pertinent to this present study) which he refers to as the (two) principles of hierarchisation. He uses this concept to characterise the dynamics of struggle in the field of cultural production: (1) the *heteronomous* principle relates to fields with a heavy dependence on the economic and political forces that prevail in the field; and (2) the *autonomous* principle for fields endowed with specific kinds of *capital* that foster a degree of independence from the economy.³⁹ The comprehensive autonomous degree that a given field or sub-field possesses will determine the power relations in the struggle whereby each contending agent or group of agents is attempting to impose their own standards and authorisations (in other their own version of 'effective' *capital*) on the whole set of agents and producers all aiming at the same goal or *symbolic capital*. The autonomous degree can be diversified over time (and according to national tradition) and the entire structure of the field for this will be altered.⁴⁰ The decline of the autonomous degree of a field corresponds with growing demands for heteronomy both within and outside of the field.⁴¹

Bourdieu deemed that understanding the degree of autonomy of both the journalistic field and the various publications that journalists produce within the field is critically important for revealing the prevailing circumstances in the field.⁴² In a recent study entitled 'Bourdieu, the Media and Cultural Production,' David Hesmondhalgh provides a convincing example of how the application of these concepts specific to Bourdieu's concept of the field of cultural production is of relevance to understanding contemporary media production, providing that (for Hesmondhalgh's purposes) greater emphasis is accorded (than in Bourdieu's work) to the relationship between cultural production and cultural consumption. Hesmondhalgh draws attention to the value of Bourdieu's

³⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 252.

³⁹ Pierre Bourdieu and Randal Johnson, *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 40.

⁴⁰ Bourdieu and Johnson, *Field of Cultural Production*, 40.

⁴¹ Bourdieu and Johnson, *Field of Cultural Production*, 45-46.

⁴² Bourdieu, "The Journalistic Field," 43.

approach in so far as it places emphasis on the interconnectedness of the field of cultural production with other social fields. This is especially pertinent to the analytical foundation of the present thesis, depending as it does on these distinctions inherent to Bourdieu's approach, such as the classification of the small-scale production and large-scale production as two sub-fields: small-scale production is considered to possess a relatively higher degree of autonomy (with regards to the field of power); whereas large-scale production (where journalism is located) is more subject to the rules beyond the sub-field.⁴³ The salience of this distinction to the present study will become increasingly apparent (see below).

Thus, seeking objectivity in journalistic practical work is a behaviour, which is known as *habitus* in field theory. It relies highly on the type and the quantity of capital that journalism possesses in the field. When journalism possesses the relevant democratic political and cultural capital, the degree of freedom that journalism can enjoy will be higher than it would be without such capital. Seeking objectivity, to this degree, is the journalistic *habitus* that results from a journalistic field with appropriate capital. Thus, journalistic objectivity in practice is highly restricted by capital compared with the notion of objectivity proposed just as an ideal.

Bourdieu considered the core focus of competition specifically in the field of cultural production as the struggle for legitimate monopoly over the field, especially for the authority to dominate public opinions. Furthermore, "occupants of the two opposite poles of the field of culture production has at stake the monopoly of the legitimate intentions of the writer which are organised around the two interrelated conditions of autonomy and heteronomy."⁴⁴ Just as the existence of the competition, which causes the alteration of the distribution and relative weight of species of capital, the structure of the field is modified, and the field therefore possesses a historical dynamism and flexibility.⁴⁵


⁴³ Hesmondhalgh, "The Media and Cultural Production," 214; Bourdieu, *The Rules of Arts*, 217.

⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 256.

⁴⁵ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 18-20.

Figure 7: The Field of Cultural Production (Bourdieu)

The Field of Cultural Production in the Field of Power and in Social Space



Key

CE: Capital - economic

CC: Capital - cultural

CSs: Capital - symbolic, specific

AUTON+: High degree of autonomy

AUTON-: Low degree of autonomy

Applying field theory to the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*

Bourdieu's background was as an ethnographer; one of his earliest works was *Sociologie de l'Algerie*, published in 1958. It argued that:

Social science cannot simply provide detached, objective knowledge about situations but, equally, it cannot be merely the projection of subjective, inherently narcissistic social involvement. Bourdieu argued that reflexivity involves subjecting objectivist explanations of primary experience to a second-order scrutiny, as a result of which unreflecting situations and detached analyses of them are both submitted to sociological analysis. Objective representations of situations are as much parts of the reality to be explained as the realities which they seek to represent.⁴⁶

This necessitates the description of environments, processes and interactions that may seem obvious to the insider. For example, a Bourdieusian analysis of London Fashion Week includes substantial detail on aspects that are well-understood by even the most casual observer, such as ticketing arrangements and the catwalk layout.⁴⁷ For this reason, some obvious elements of both China's and journalism's history, politics, practices and personalities may be described in an unusual – but necessary – degree of detail.

In order to apply a Bourdieusian analysis of journalism through the prism of the *SEPM* it is necessary to understand the environment that the *SEPM* began in. As a parallel, when studying contemporary Algeria, "Bourdieu argued that it was necessary to have an understanding of the status quo ante of traditional Algerian society as a pre-requisite for understanding the contemporary reality of social breakdown."⁴⁸ The centre of modern Chinese press was geographically located in very limited colonial and foreign concession zones. These areas in the Bourdieu-proposed field of cultural production are located in the top most area in the following diagram:


⁴⁶ Robbins Derek, "The Responsibility of the Ethnographer: An Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu on 'Colonialism and Ethnography'," *Anthropology Today* 19, no. 2 (April 2003): 11.

⁴⁷ See Joanne Entwistle and Agnès Roca-Mora, "The Field of Fashion Materialized: A study of London Fashion Week," *Sociology* 40, no. 4 (August 2006): 735-751.

⁴⁸ Robbins, "The Responsibility of Ethnographer," 11.

Figure 8: The Field of Cultural Production – Modern China

The Field of Cultural Production in the Field Based on Modern Chinese Case



Key
 CE: Capital - economic
 CC: Capital - cultural
 CSS: Capital - symbolic, specific
 AUTON+: High degree of autonomy
 AUTON-: Low degree of autonomy

Although the space that they occupied is very limited it contained the most abundant economic and *cultural capital* at the time. The areas immediately below the top in the field of cultural production represent places located immediately adjacent to the colony and foreign concessions. The *capital* that journalists benefited from is largely or closely related to the strong influences from the semi-colony and foreign concessions. Hence,

the growing profession of journalism within the Qing Empire and Beiyang/Warring period had access to the economic and *cultural capital* of the semi-colonies and foreign concessions. Those involved in the earliest days of journalism benefited from opportunities to acquire and accumulate economic and social capital, with their ability to move within, between, and in and out of these liminal zones of extra-territoriality. At this time, very few people had this privilege. Likewise, their Christian beliefs became avenues to access further *economic* and *social capital* within publishing. In the field of Chinese politics, the Protestants such as the London Missionary Society experienced low *social capital*, having to face persecution by the Qing government, ideological differences with the powerful Catholic Church and the dislike for them of the East India Company. However, their support of each other and interrelations within the field of publishing led to the accumulation of strong *capital* within the field of professional journalism, as exemplified by the career of journalist and publisher Wang Tao. It could also be argued that the *habitus* of the protestant missionaries was highly compatible with that of publishing and, as it evolved, professional journalism. The non-conformist *habitus* was in large part made of the *doxa* of a focus on the individual's relationship with God; reading the Bible; and spreading the *Gospel* (literally meaning *good news*). This *doxa* – individualism, literacy and news – was highly compatible with the developing *doxa* of professional journalism.

Extraterritoriality, both politically and economically, provided essential protection for journalism activities. At that time, colonies and treaty ports were located in the Chinese areas with the most developed economies, active cultural exchanges with the West, and were the most open to almost all things foreign. In contrast to China's hinterland, they were very cosmopolitan in outlook. The experience of semi-colonialism formed part of the essential *habitus* for many Chinese, including those Chinese journalists who helped to create the earliest formation of the profession. One cannot understand the Chinese journalists' *habitus* without understanding the effects for semi-colonialism and nationalism. The semi-colonial features combined with the innate Chinese social system formed a special modern Chinese nationalism with ambiguous and subtle features. Nationalism can be seen as the product of imagined communities, and as such nationalism in most of the African and Asian continents can be characterised as “in its origins a response to the new-style global imperialism made possible by the

achievements of industrial capitalism.”⁴⁹ To be specific, capitalism, by relying on the circulation of printed matters, helped to create a consciousness within the masses of the nation. Nationalism fundamentally uprooted the rules of local historical dynasties, and coerced the dynasties to adapt to the new situation.⁵⁰

In addition to Chinese political culture, the special semi-colonial social structure (as shown in Figure 8) causes the decline of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism. In accordance with Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, this situation can be understood as the imbalance between the capital in the colonies and the treaty ports of south-east China and the hinterland areas. Colonies and treaty ports, such as Hong Kong and Shanghai, possessed most of the capital essential for the professionalisation of journalism. In contrast, the hinterland areas of China which are geographically large had very limited capital. Under this structure, the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was fragile and unsustainable as it heavily relied on the existence of colonies and treaty ports.

The opposite and intertwined relations between nativism and modern Chinese nationalism were subtly presented in colonies and treaty ports with people who were galvanised by the high demand for labour to move into there from all over China. Nativism haunted Chinese modern nationalists, and triggered heated discussions and debates amongst them about whether a powerful central administration should be established to maintain a highly united China or China as a nation-state should be not more than a sum of a simple addition of each regional part.⁵¹ Bryna Goodman by observing the transition of people’s identities in the modernisation of Shanghai found that when immigrants moved into the new and completely strange metropolis, they were firstly held together by the associations formed and founded based on their native places.⁵² The following excerpts from an article written by Wei Hua for the *SEPM* supplement *Night light* (14 July 1939) is illustrative of these extremely profound attachments to native place:

⁴⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 139.

⁵⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 139-40.

⁵¹ John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 14.

⁵² Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2-3.

The Story of Chilli

...

I am curious to know whether chilli can hearten people up, and become tough and gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and Sichuan are the most tough and unafraid in China. There are some old sayings, such as 'tough temperament of people in Chu area' and 'the Qin Empire must be destroyed by the people of Chu even if there were only three households left'. These expressions reflect the honour and glory of Hunan people. People from Hunan and Guangxi like chillies, and it is rather interesting that people in west Hunan like the spiciest of food. Therefore they should just be the representative of 'tough temperament of people in Chu area.' If people in Jiangsu and Zhejiang were accustomed to have chillies, would their temperament become tougher, and would the nickname 'people of tough temperament' therefore still apply to Hunan only?

...

Since I have been in Shanghai I am obviously not able to have chilli for every meal, so I crave chilli. As I write this article, saliva spurts to my lips. So, when can I return to my homeland to have chilli?⁵³

Native-place associations were the essential ingredients of the Shanghai municipal ecology in the following half-century, and structured social, economic and political organisations in the city's development.⁵⁴ The colonial administration in Shanghai preferred native-place associations to Chinese authority in dealing with the maintenance of order in the foreign concessions. Native-place associations, therefore, acquired their influence, and the leaders of the associations became substantive representatives of Chinese communities. This process objectively not only made the native-place associations possess the function of municipal administration, but also promoted these associations to form a combined Chinese community to cooperate with or struggle against colonial administration. Once the native-place associations were drawn into the conflicts with colonial administration, they could obtain nationalist praise from people for their attempt against imperialism.⁵⁵

It has been proposed that the degree of foreign aggression was proportionate to increased nationalism, but inversely proportional to increased nativism.⁵⁶ However, one should not

⁵³ Lajiao De Hua [The Story of Chilli], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 July 1939.

⁵⁴ Goodman, *Native Place*, 2-3.

⁵⁵ Goodman, *Native Place*, 147-50.

⁵⁶ Luo Zhitian, *Luanshi Qianliu: Minzu Zhuyi Yu Minguo Zhengzhi* (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2001), 154.

overlook the opportunity for nativism to combine with colonialism to form a special mentality. At the same time many Chinese nationals resisted and resented colonialism, they also felt the progressiveness of Western modern civilisation, acquired practical benefits (or *capital*) through their collaboration with colonial administration, and felt a sense of being recognised and had a greater sense of self-worth from the mere fact of being of service to the colonisers. In essence, in the colonialists' field, the colonialists held power and decided on the rewards and recognition system. This led to a situation where Chinese people participated in the field – taking pride in their identity as inhabitants of the colonial area – but simultaneously accepting the colonialists' judgement of them as being inferior. The concept of 'mimicry' well summarises the split personality as a typical feature of people who are subjects in the colonial system. To live under the colonial administration, they have both humble and rebellious attitudes to their colonisers. It has been proposed that in a semi-colonised country, such as China (never fully conquered by Western powers) the 'mimic' personality would be more visibly and exaggeratedly present. This feature was especially embodied in those compradors and commercial elites who had threads of connection with Westerners. Although they hold the identity documents to prove their Chinese citizenship, they would be willing to accept their position as being colonised and hoped to realise a complete Westernisation.⁵⁷ The existence of the 'mimic' personality became an essential part of the Chinese middle-class *habitus* and can be seen in the growth of professional journalism in China.

Following in the footsteps of the United States, Chinese journalism started its professionalisation from the 1920s, but the Chinese political and social foundation for this development was absolutely different from that of Western countries. In 1920s China, the space in the field of cultural production occupied by professional journalism was confined, and the structure of such a field itself under semi-colonial China was unstable. In this situation, professionalisation would unavoidably suffer fatally once the field structure changed in the 1930s. Part of the suffering that was to be the lot of many professional journalists in Shanghai during the 1930s was the deep-seated anxiety regarding the development of professional journalism and a profound sense of pending doom or generalised pessimism that grew as the political situation worsened. The

⁵⁷ Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 309-10.

commitment to the Missouri School of Journalism ideal of public service in increasingly adverse circumstances was to become a very real source of suffering. This is clearly expressed in Lu Yi's "call to journalistic arms" contribution to the *SEPM* supplement *Journalist Seminar* (14 November 1935). Equally to the fore is his sense of alarm and desperation:

Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards

Currently, our journalistic endeavour, the same as our nation, is suffering a misery. The development of journalism, to a large degree, is limited by its environment. It is undeniable that the press in China has achieved an obvious progress these years, but journalists who still have a clear analytical mind will not feel fulfilled in the present situation compared with the pace of the epoch and the responsibility that we should take. For an endeavour, if we want it to make significant progress, its every single cell needs to be strengthened, and the press in China is no exception. With the exception of the corrupted journalist with slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who consider the press as their tool for their own personal promotion of official career and fortune, journalistic staff should constantly strengthen themselves and optimise their team to accelerate the development of the press and taking up the mission of the epoch to guide people to achieve the victory of improving Chinese social development. This is our vocation! We hope our colleagues through their professional organisations come together to engage in academic and practical skills studies, re-think relevant theories, rectify morals and discipline in order to strengthen the force of the movement, which aims at changing immediately the mentality and behaviours of decadence, pessimism, romance, timidity and selfishness, so that we can form a strong journalistic fighting group to struggle with the sinister environment.

Colleagues of the Journalist Seminar are all juniors of the press, but we always hold steadfast to our position as a cog in a big machine, and never give up the responsibility of being a cog. By our determination to improve the press in China at the current stage, we started self-education work in Shanghai. We always exert ourselves for our ultimate goal whatever the efficiency or influence of our work in the past year. Improving the press in China at the present time is a significant duty, thus it definitely not something our small group of people can complete. However, we do believe that our will-power and beliefs are by no means our group's concern, but a common need in the society. Therefore, we throw ourselves into work actively, and hope all our peers nationwide can join together to improve the endeavour. We hope we can become tighter in order to foster widespread progress. The crisis of the Chinese nation is intensifying day by day. Under these difficult circumstances, every journalist should get behind saving our nation!⁵⁸

⁵⁸Minzu Zijiude Fenghuozhong Women Ying Jiajin Zili Gongzuo [Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 14 November 1935.

To be specific, had China established a political system similar to that in Western democratic countries, professionalism would have continued after China's semi-colonial status ended. However, this was not to be. The Revolution of 1911 only made China become a nominal republic, and in the following 25 years it was deeply entangled in warfare among warlords, civil war between the Nationalist Party and Communist Party, and successive threats and armed infiltration by the Soviet Union and Japan. Although the economy and culture during this period achieved a certain degree of prosperity, a genuine republican system had never been established up to the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. It was with this background that the *SEPM* was established. An analysis of the field in the period spanning the establishment of the *SEPM* to the Japanese invasions saw the field of the commercial Chinese press remaining in very limited colonial and foreign concession zones, but with competition opening with the creation of Communist Party presses. Whilst extraterritoriality continued to provide protection for journalism activities, they were constrained by the growing assertiveness of the Nationalist Government and the fear of the Japanese invasion. The extraterritoriality of the settlements created a free field for journalists within the settlements who worked for foreign newspapers, which gave them more freedom, fully capitalised on by the *SEPM* journalists. However, they certainly had good reason to carefully weigh the *capital* and power of those around them as they were under attack by the Japanese, by the Nationalists and by the British. The *cultural* and *social capital* of belonging to the Missouri school clearly influenced hiring of the *SEPM* staff, from Crow, to Gould, and onward.

The *nomos* of the *SEPM* staff began with the official line that staff were independent of owner C. V. Starr. However this explicitly changed with the invasion of Manchuria, when C. V. Starr asserted his *economic capital* and dictated the newspaper's view. This would not necessarily have caused a professional crisis (*hysteresis*), as the staff were thinking on similar lines. Key parts of a journalist's *nomos* are directly impacted by the fact their means of expression is ultimately owned by the employer, who can change the terms of the agreement at will. Although the owner, editors and journalists experienced their *habitus* within the field of journalism, the fact remains that the owner has the ultimate *economic capital* and can decide the "rules of the game."

Certainly, use of censorship and propaganda can be consistent with professional journalist practices and philosophy. Even within the Missouri School's Journalists' creed (or *nomos*), the need for censorship (and partisan journalism) at times of national crisis is recognised: "I believe that suppression of the news, for any consideration other than the welfare of society, is indefensible."⁵⁹ Indeed, from the very start, the *nomos* of the *SEPM* explicitly acknowledged that there was an aspect of national self-interest for Americans, for example stating they were "firm on matters involving Sino-American relations."⁶⁰ Indeed, American journalists in China were very comfortable in China and with the Chinese, especially as compared to their experience of Japan and the Japanese. This was demonstrably not because China offered more political or journalistic freedom than Japan: before Japan's whole scale invasion of 1937, the Japanese government had tolerated a fair amount of journalistic freedom, especially compared to Chiang Kai Shek's military government.⁶¹ Life in China had been viewed by the American journalists as more enjoyable than in Japan, due to factors such as extraterritoriality and their relations with Missouri-trained locals:

Autonomous Western communities in China and extraterritorial privileges made them more psychologically secure and relaxed than in Japan. Moreover, they maintained a cordial relationship with American-educated Chinese officials, including Hin Wong, editor of the Central China News Agency, and Hollington K. Tong, the censor of foreign press at the Ministry of Information.⁶²

The American journalists were predisposed to relate to and enjoy Chinese people and culture more than Japanese, and even the Shanghailanders Briton. The Chinese journalists, likewise connected well with their American colleagues – the American progressive ideology and rhetoric (albeit a form of American imperialism) "was greeted by the Chinese as an antidote to European and Japanese styles of naked exploitation."⁶³ The *nomos* of professional journalism explicitly changed with invasion: "First, wartime journalism management should be a united rather than permissive. The external aim of

⁵⁹ Ronald T. Farrar, *A Creed for My Profession: Walter Williams, Journalist to the World* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 203.

⁶⁰ Thomas Ming-Heng Chao, *The Foreign Press in China* (Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), 66.

⁶¹ Park Tae Jin, "Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1941: The American State Department and Propaganda on the Sino–Japanese Conflict," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, no. 3 (2011): 393.

⁶² Park, "Guiding Public Opinion," 393.

⁶³ Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence," *Journalism Studies* 12, no. 5 (2011), 566.

wartime journalism management and control is to strive for strengthening our country and crumbling enemies, and the internal aim is for avoiding leakage of military secrets, reinforcing people's consciousness to fight and promoting the civil-military cooperation nationwide."⁶⁴ Despite the *SEPM*'s distinctly anti-Japanese position, the senior staff maintained the *doxa* of the *SEPM* at that time did not stem from nationalism but rather that this is a professional commitment to reporting.

The conditions in the external 'field of power' were always in a state of flux, rendering fragile and unstable the balance between the field of cultural production in colonies and treaty ports and the field of cultural production in hinterland China. The status quo began to be subverted seriously after the commencement of the war against Japan. During this period, social life took on a crazy, inherently contradictory character, very much expressive of a prolonged "crisis" situation:

[...] "life in the "isolated island" was not just "poverty." The extravagant era of "lopsided prosperity" formed a striking contrast... teahouse brothels sprung up like mushrooms and conducted a booming business. Movie theaters were perpetually overcrowded, and dance halls proliferated. People idled away their time on the dance floor in the afternoons and evenings, and morning dances even appeared for those whose cravings were seemingly unsatisfied... It is small wonder that contemporaries described life on the "isolated island" as both heaven and hell... During the Isolated Island Period between 1937 and 1941, the term became a synonym for "solitude," "overcrowding," "nowhere to live," "luxury and dissipation," "lopsided," "soaring commodity prices," "depression," "unfree," and "struggle." This usage originated from the collective daily lives of the people on the "isolated island" of Shanghai...

In Shanghai during the Isolated Island Period, on one side was overweening wealth, and on the other were the bones of those who had frozen to death in the streets, leaving people somewhere between "resistance" and "apathy."⁶⁵

While the Japanese invasion was an incredible boon for the intensification of nationalist sentiment and the proliferation and dissemination of its attendant ideologies and activism, it meant the beginning of an extended period of crisis for the journalists

⁶⁴ Xinwen Shiye Zai Zhanshi [War Time Journalism], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 9 January 1939.

⁶⁵ Yao Fei, "A Study of Daily Life in Shanghai During the Isolated Island Period," *Chinese Studies in History* 47, no. 3 (2014): 49.

working at the *SEPM*, known in Bourdieusian terms as a state of *hysteresis*. There was a misalignment during the extremities of this period between journalists' *nomos* and *doxa* – a disparity that would cost some journalists their lives. The 'Journalist Seminar' expressed the journalists' *nomos* of "We should not fear any threat" even though a renowned journalist, his son's friend and a chauffeur were murdered. The *nomos* of fearlessness must have been tempered by real life when developing the journalists' *doxa*. Interestingly, during this period, there was no conflict between the *nomos* and *doxa* of the communist party members and other journalists. They are united in the partisan urge to save China. Communist Party Member, Lu Yi, condemned "corrupted journalists with slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who consider the press as their tool for their own personal promotion of official career and fortune", focusing on individualistic problems. He viewed the journalist as a partisan nationalist: "Under the difficult circumstance, every journalist should get behind the effort to save our nation!"

Part of the *SEPM doxa* was about valuing diversity of opinion, as is demonstrated by their diverse staffing, for example with leftist, Thackrey, anti-communist Hsaio Fung-soh, and pro-Japanese Woodhead. The *habitus* of the *SEPM* journalists – where they bring their *nomos*, *doxa* and *capital* to play within the field – was influenced by American ways of thinking, behaviour and habits, as the paper were formed and run by Americans. The paper was run as a *habitus* that was less racist than many British contemporaries – not only were the Americans a welcome relief from the old-school colonialism of the British, Starr gained some notoriety for publishing news in mandarin, appointing Chinese people to his management board and offering his western and Chinese staff the same conditions. Working with Americans, rather than British, could arguably have assisted Chinese agents in addressing and resolving issues of mimic personality: the Chinese agents gained the benefits and pleasures of the West, without being beholden to their Western colleagues as their colonial masters.

Arriving in Shanghai in the early 1930s, Harry Carr (1935, p. 186) of the Los Angeles Times reported that "everybody hates everybody else in Shanghai" and "upon one point only do they (Europeans) concentrate, emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually: they all hate the Americans."⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Volz and Lee, "Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere," 565.

Struggling to integrate the fearless reporting that was valued by the Missouri-trained journalists and the fear of the growing power and ruthlessness of the Japanese, journalists relied on their wordsmithing – their *social* and *cultural capital* – to respond to their predicament. They wrote multi-layered pieces that were subservient to the Japanese on a superficial level while showing their rebellion in a nuanced way. According to field theory, each position is objectively determined by its objective connections with the rest of the positions in the field, so the journalists' position in the field changed significantly when the Government changed from Chiang Kai Chek's Nationalist Government, to the Japanese Imperial Army to Wang Ching-wei's regime. These reciprocities between these agents in the field (the journalists and the ruling group) made up fundamentally different productive properties. For the journalists, this was a sudden and extreme change, with delays in adapting their *habitus* in response (*hysteresis*). At first in the Isolated Island period, journalists clung to their *nomos* of professional reporting – focusing on fearless reportage. Their *doxa* was more complex, for example, from the beginning there was pressure from the owner to report against the Japanese. Looking at the Isolated Island as its own field can give useful insight of the distinct *habitus* of Isolated Island inhabitants.

China, which had long been controlled by various political forces, was again divided into the enemy-occupied area, the Guomindang-controlled area, and the liberated area. Because China is a vast country, daily life was not the same everywhere. Even in a small area like Shanghai, due to the “isolated island,” different scenes of life appeared. The “isolated island” is a temporal concept but also a spatial concept.⁶⁷

In the Battle of Shanghai, the French Concession and International Settlement declared neutrality. With the outbreak of war shortly before, gates and fences had been built to separate the settlements from the surrounding areas; the International Settlement actually seized this opportunity to expand its size. However, there were still ways to enter the settlements and refugees began to pour into the Shanghai settlements for safety, for example, with more than 60,000 refugees flooding in just one day.⁶⁸ Thus the Isolated

⁶⁷ Yao, “Daily Life in Shanghai,” 48-49.

⁶⁸ Tao Juyin, *Gudao jianwen: Kangzhan shiqi De Shanghai* (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), 27-28, cited in Yao, “Daily Life in Shanghai,” 30.

Island was porous from its very beginning. To cope with huge population flows, the foreign concessions shut down all external traffic and the French Concession proclaimed martial law prohibiting all traffic. Still waves battered the gates and fencing, gaining entry. Many refugees wandered the streets destitute, while a hundred refugee camps were established in opera houses, temples, sports fields and schools.⁶⁹ Movement into and out of the Isolated Island occurred but took on a dangerous element, with many abuses by the Japanese troops who patrolled and controlled the borders. During this time, exchange of information was vital to survival. Newspapers were key – they even opened in the refugee camps:

As early as October 30, 1937, The Gazette (*Xinwenbao*) reported on the establishment of a print workshop at the Jincheng Refugee Camp. Later, under the direction of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, each of the camps launched self-help production projects.⁷⁰

Access to *capital* became a life and death matter in the Isolated Island. Smuggling and hoarding were regular strategies, the housing market boomed and garbage restaurants opened, which served food picked out of garbage:⁷¹

Even the beggars no longer asked for money but waited near the shelves of various food stands: when they saw someone buying a flatbread dough twist or a rice bun, they would steal it. People generally did not report such thefts, and the police did not intervene.⁷²

During the war against Japan, Chinese intellectuals and journalists began to support government control over the press instead of their professional ideals, in the hope that a press highly dominated by government could inspire Chinese patriotic ambition to achieve victory over the Japanese. However, to do so, many suffered extreme privations. Inflation was a huge issue:

When the face value of currency no longer corresponds to its actual value, the power of material objects becomes more apparent. Chen Cunren wrote in his book: At first, I could buy two reams of newsprint with the money left over from hospital consultation fees, after expenses.

⁶⁹ Yao, "Daily Life in Shanghai," 30.

⁷⁰ Yao, "Daily Life in Shanghai," 35.

⁷¹ "Tezhong Shanghai shenghuo [A Special Kind of Shanghai Life]," *Shanghai Shenghuo*, no. 5 (1940), cited in Yao, "Daily Life in Shanghai," 42.

⁷² Chen Cunren, *Kangzhan Shidai Shenghuo Shi* (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), 193 cited in Yao, "Daily Life in Shanghai," 41.

Now the price of newsprint rises every day in a straight line, and gradually I could only buy one ream; a few days later, I couldn't buy even one ream. I switched to hoarding things like indanthrene dyestuffs, sugar, and powdered milk.⁷³

Those newspapers with foreign ownership were sheltered to an extent by their extraterritoriality. The French Concession and International Settlement created a distinct field to operate in – an opportunity not shared by locally owned papers. The *SEPM*'s *political, cultural and social capital* were enhanced by this arrangement, giving them greater power to resist government attempts at censorship. In this violent period, with Nationalists killing collaborators, Wang Ching-wei's agents killing rebels, and the Nationalists and Communists fighting each other as well as the Japanese, it took some readjusting for the journalists' *habitus* to adapt to the new conditions. For example, Zhu Xinggong was actively and militantly working against the Japanese, however, with his assassination, nationalist sentiment in *Night Light* fell into depression, and *Night Light* returned to its original focus as a column devoted to literature. Wakeman argues that Chinese resistance towards Japanese and the collaborationists they supported was overcome by brutal means intertwined with ambiguous elements.⁷⁴ Although nationalism, to a certain degree, was successfully repressed by cruel means in Shanghai, it had indeed brought Chinese journalism to an irreversible transformation. With complete Japanese occupation of the city, large numbers of journalists left Shanghai and moved to hinterland China – the ideas and experience they had acquired in Shanghai were applied in their journalistic practice there. Many cherished illusions of a free and democratic post-war China, which would necessarily facilitate the revival of professional journalism. However, as Hung Chang-tai argued, an increase in patriotic emotion was nefarious to professional ideals.⁷⁵

The choice of which side to back - what political ideology to support - was a vexed one. Journalists not only had to choose to support either the Nationalists or the Communists,

⁷³ Chen Cunren, *Kangzhan Shidai Shenghuo Shi* (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), 177-78 cited in Yao, "Daily Life in Shanghai," 44.

⁷⁴ Frederic Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.

⁷⁵ Hung Chang-tai, *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 10

but also were sometimes in a bind about the degree to which they ought to let go of the cherished values of professional journalism, such as freedom of the press, something which Pang Guan, writing for the *SEPM* supplement, *Journalist Weekly* (7 July 1939) clearly believed was not in anyone's interest (and least of all the national interest) to cling to in the absolute. His position regarding a relaxation or suspension of this ideal is aligned with the Journalists' Creed (or *nomos*) of the Missouri School (as noted above) to uphold the welfare of society - above all else - at times of national crisis:

Journalism and Freedom

[...] Journalists and journalistic agents should have sufficient freedom, and attempts to restrict such freedom will be considered an adversary of journalism. This ought to be an unalterable principle. Nevertheless, this freedom should be wielded with the premise of not prejudicing national interests. There is no doubt that freedom must be restricted once it challenges national interests. Unifying consensus and actions is crucial in the process of social mobilisation for completing the aim of struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall become zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country as shown by the case of Liang Shih-chiu. [...].⁷⁶

Events did turn more people toward the Communist view, and many left-leaning journalists entered the field, thus changing the interactions and interconnections between agents. Even the long standing feud between Liang Shih-chiu and Lu Xun can be read as acting out of this powerful conflict between the *habitus* of the writers who supported the Nationalists and those who supported the Communists. No one remained outside partisan politics. Liang Shih-chiu argued for the right to judge literature and art based on his own values, while Lu Xun argued literature and art should be a critical tool to educate and evoke people under the circumstance of the war against Japan.⁷⁷ The tension existed between saving the Chinese nation and protecting the freedom of journalism. Their apparently superficial squabbles were often nuanced and could be interpreted on numerous levels, and reflected diametrically opposed *habitus*. For example, when Lu Xun labelled himself a *proletariat* as a political act of associating with the 'little' people he was highlighting Liang Shih-chiu's earlier definition of "proletariat" as "the lowest class who served the state [...] only by having children"

⁷⁶ Xinwen Yu Ziyou [Journalism and Freedom], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 17 July 1939.

⁷⁷ Wu Lichang, "Chongdu Liang Shiqiu De Yu kangzhan Wuguan Lun [Reflection on Liang Shi-qiu's Statement of Articles He Adopted not Needed to Relate to the War against Japan]," *Journal of Shanghai University (Social Science)* 8, no. 5 (October 2001): 43-44.

(Liang 1929b, 3), emphasising Liang's membership of the elite.⁷⁸ In Liang Shih-chiu's *habitus*, those with *economic, cultural and social capital* are elevated, while in Lu Xun's, those without this *capital* are not - this would become especially noteworthy in the Yan'an rectification movement of 1942. The Yan'an Rectification movement marked a sharp division between the *nomos* of the Western style journalists, in their quest for professionalism and the communist journalists, in their quest for authenticity. The Yan'an rectification movement has been classified as an attempt by Mao to remove his competitors within the party – especially those with Soviet-sponsored Comintern links.⁷⁹ However, it also targeted “the teachers, students and others who had joined the rural rebellions”⁸⁰ as “these individuals had been pursuing their own professional, intellectual and political interests”.⁸¹ So, professionalisation itself was identified as an enemy of the revolution. The utility of thought and action was the communists' focus:

In brief, the authorities alleged that intellectuals invoked Marxist-Leninist ideas without considering Chinese realities, wallowed in abstruse issues and valued their own experiences but not the working-class perspective. Intellectuals hence offered few usable tactics or strategies for the revolutionary movement. Moreover, intellectuals selfishly focused on becoming successful educators, artists and so on. They sang their own praises and liked to put down work done by others. They disliked assignments incompatible with their goals and even flouted orders, and they came and went as they pleased.⁸²

It appears that, by contrast, the Nationalists eagerly embraced the concept of middle class superiority. It was said of two key Nationalists, Hu Zongnan (a general in the Republic of China Army) and Dai Li (head of Chiang's Military Intelligence Service):

Educated to be elementary school teachers, Hu and Dai both felt, with that peculiarly unselfconscious conceit of the lumpen-intellectual, that they were born to enjoy a great and important destiny. Full of the traditional literatus's sense of cultural self-importance... Consumed with a sense of their own importance and driven by an ambition that seemed to know no bounds...⁸³

⁷⁸ Wang Pu, “The Promethean translator and cannibalistic pains: Lu Xun's ‘Hard Translation’ as a Political Allegory,” *Translation Studies* 6, no. 3 (2013): 333.

⁷⁹ Eddy U, “Reifications of the Intellectual: Representations, Organization and Agency in Revolutionary China,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 64 no. 4 (December 2013): 630.

⁸⁰ U, “Reifications of the Intellectual,” 630.

⁸¹ U, “Reifications of the Intellectual,” 630.

⁸² U, “Reifications of the Intellectual,” 630.

⁸³ Frederic Wakeman, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 21-22.

The *doxa* of radical equality among the Communists could be seen as diametrically different to the *doxa* of elitism of the non-communist journalists. However, there was one area where their *nomos* and *doxa* overlap – the importance of fighting the Japanese, and, to a certain extent, increasingly fierce nationalism. The overlapping fields of politics and journalism in Yan'an and Chongqing competed for supremacy – for international recognition and for financial support. This regional division has been repeated throughout the history of the *SEPM*'s publishing. The period of 1943 to 1945 was certainly a time of conflict within China, as even the American Navy and Army played out their conflict through the competing OSS operations run by the Army, and the Navy's SACO operations. The OSS's SI division was dominated by China experts such as Hayden. By contrast, the SACO group rejected involvement of any "old China hands":

To Miles, SACO's success rested on personal respect. During his earlier service in China, he had cringed at Americans who thought they could run the country better than the Chinese, whom they considered lazy and dull-witted. Miles knew that attitude would destroy his vision, and from the start, he refused to accept any "old China hands."⁸⁴

There was a change of attitude away from Colonialism and overt racism occurring within the westerners, as a result of the rising *capital* of the Chinese agents within the field. This *capital* was *political* – as Chinese politicians and diplomats gained increasing concessions from the West to be enacted with victory over Japan – and *cultural* – as nationalism among Chinese people reduced the levels of mimicry, and the Chinese Communists presented a new vision of an authentic Chinese-ness that was not based on a European model. This conflict displayed itself clearly when the old and new *habitus* were revealed together, in sharp and strange contradiction. As one example, a newsmagazine reported that the SACO "learned simple rules to avoid cultural gaffes that would undermine the spirit of SACO: Don't yell or say "Chinaman" or "coolie."⁸⁵ And shortly after quoted one of the SACO members, Lieutenant Commander Stanley McCaffrey, saying "You probably laughed at the coolie as he rhythmically went hopping

⁸⁴ Linda Kush, "What Was the Navy Doing in China?," *World War II* 25, no. 4 (2010): 60.

⁸⁵ Kush, "What Was the Navy," 60.

along carrying a couple of loads at either end of his yo-yo pole.”⁸⁶ In a second example, the *SEPM* itself said “During its 20 months of existence the Chungking edition won a considerable following among both foreign and English-speaking Chinese readers,” without pause to think that English was actually the foreign language in China.

Important concepts in Bourdieu’s field theory such as *field*, *habitus*, *capital*, *doxa*, *nomos* and *hysteresis* have been applied to the case of the *SEPM* in order to better articulate aspects of its history and its place within the broader sweep of the history of professional journalism in China. The key concepts of *field* and *habitus* establish an analytical framework through which the course of an individual’s history as well as history as it is objectified in social institutions can be re-told through the paradigm of a symbiotic relationship that dynamically transforms both entities. This chapter has sought to apply Bourdieu’s field theory in such a way as to tease out elements of the historical outline of the *SEPM* (compiled and documented in preceding chapters) that are particularly salient to the development of professional journalism in Shanghai. This thesis drew attention to Monika Krause’s description of the advantages of the concept of field of cultural production. The first and fourth points are worth reiterating here to remind us of the rationale for this application:

Field theory allows us to historicize journalistic ideals and analyse their institutional base [...];

Field theory allows us to compare field properties across historical periods or national contexts [...]. We can examine the force of field-specific capital to organize practices. We can examine the changing relationships of the journalistic field with other fields, most notably the economic and the political field.⁸⁷

The combination of this particular journalistic field’s extraterritoriality (relatively stable across time) with the fluctuating presence and levels of activity of agents (both Chinese and foreign) imbued with *social* and *cultural capital* derived principally from the Missouri School of Journalism generated a characteristic *habitus* whose *doxa* and *nomos* were both generic and specific. Specific enough to be recognised as valuable *effective capital* within the field of journalism in Shanghai, and sufficiently generic to have currency in other fields of journalism on the national and international scenes (see article

⁸⁶ Kush, “What Was the Navy,” 62.

⁸⁷ Krause, “Reporting and the Transformations,” 90.

below published in the *SEPM* supplement *Journalist Weekly*, 10 July 1939). At least, this was the case until extraterritoriality could no longer shield Shanghai's field of journalism from events in the increasingly tumultuous external field of power.

A prolonged state of *hysteresis* was provoked:

Expression of Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai from the
Chinese Journalists' Youth Association

The Chinese Journalists' Youth Association is strongly concerned by the direful troubles encountered by journalists in Shanghai. The Association wishes to demonstrate support for journalists in Shanghai to sustain their faith, and keep up their efforts to maintain internal justice and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the Yangtze River. Nearly half of the total number of newspapers in Shanghai have been suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left their jobs. The Chinese Journalists' Youth Association has established branches in the main cities of China, and is willing to do its utmost to help journalists who are not able to engage in journalism work arrange new jobs in other cities. The Association expresses the greatest indignation towards the terrorist attacks on journalists, and the greatest respect and sympathy for the journalists involved in these serious troubles, as they stand their ground in the face of temptation.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Zhongguo Qingnian Jizhe Xuehui Gaikuang [A Introduction of the Chinese Journalists' Youth Association], *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, 10 July 1939

Appendix 1: Glossary

Bureau of Investigation and Statistics 軍
統

Blue Shirts 藍衣社

Chang, Hsueh-liang / Zhang, Xueliang
張學良

Chang, Samuel / Zhang, Shixue 張似旭

Chenbao 晨報

Chen, Cheng 陳誠

Chen, Eugene 陳友仁

Chen, Guofu 陳果夫

Chen, Yi 陳毅

Chen, Ziya 陳子亞

Cheng, Zhenzhang 程振章

Cheng, She-Wo / Cheng, Shewo 成舍我

Central Daily News 中央日報

Chiang, Ching-kuo / Jiang, Jingguo 蔣
經國

Chiang, Kai-shek / Jiang, Jieshi 蔣介石

China Times 中華時報

Cixi 慈禧

Dai, Li 戴笠

Di, Baoxian 狄葆賢

Ding, Mocun 丁默邨

Dunhuang's Liaison Gazette 敦煌進奏
院狀

Fan, Changjiang 范長江

Fang, Hanqi 方漢奇

Fu, Siao-en / Fu, Xiao'an 傅筱庵

Ge, Gongzhen 戈公振

Guangxu 光緒

Guoxun Book Shop 國迅書店

Hang, Shijun 杭石君

Harada, Kumakichi 原田熊吉

Ho, Feng-shan / He, Fengshan 何鳳山

Ho, Yao-tsu / He, Yaozu 賀耀組

Hsin Min Pao 新聞報

Hu, Daojing 胡道靜

Hu, Feng 胡風

Hu, Hanmin 胡漢民

Hu, Shih / Hu, Shi 胡适

Hua Mei Wan Pao 華美晚報

Huang, Hua 黃華

Huang, Luofeng 黃洛峰

Huang, Tianpeng 黃天鵬

Huang, Yanpei 黃炎培

Huang, Yuansheng 黃遠生

Jiang, Guozhen 蔣國珍

Kang, Youwei 康有為

Kung, Hsiang-hsi / Kong, Xiangxi 孔祥熙

Lih Pao 立報

Li, Tsung-jen / Li, Zongren 李宗仁

Li, Shiqun 李士群

Liang, Qichao 梁啟超

Liang, Shih-chiu / Liang, Shiqiu 梁實秋

Liao, Hua 廖華

Liberation Daily 解放日報

Lu, Yi 陸詒

Liu, Zucheng 劉祖澄

Mao Tse-tung / Mao, Zedong 毛澤東

National Herald 自由西報

New United Publishing Enterprise
Agency 新出版事業聯合總處

Okamoto, Suemasa 岡本季政

Osaka Mainichi Shimbun 大阪每日新聞

Puyi 溥儀

Qian, Dajun 錢大鈞

Ren, Baitao 任白濤

Saodangbao 掃蕩報

Shang, Ding 尚丁

Shenbao 申報

Shen, Chang-huan / Shen, Changhuan
沈昌煥

Shen, Chong 沈崇

Shibao 時報

Songhu Garrison Command 淞滬警備區

Soong, Tse-ven / Song, Ziwen 宋子文

Soong, May-ling / Song, Meiling 宋美齡

St. John's University 聖約翰大學

Subao 蘇報

Sun, Yat-sen / Sun Zhongshan 孫中山

Ta Kun Pao 大公報

Ta Wan Pao 大晚報

Tang, Enbo 湯恩伯	Yu, Dafu 郁達夫
Tong, Hollington 董顯光	Yuan, L. R. / Yuan, Lunren 袁倫仁
Tseng, Hsü-pei 曾虛白	Yuan, Shikai 袁世凱
Wang, Ching-wei / Wang, Jingwei 汪精衛	Yuan, Shu 袁殊
Wang, Shih-chieh / Wang, Shijie 王世杰	Yun, Yiqun 惲逸群
Wang, Shiwei 王實味	Yung, Wing 容閎
Wang, Tao 王韜	Zhang, Binglin 章炳麟
Wang, Y. P. / Wang, Yingbin 汪英賓	Zhang, Jinglu 張靜廬
Wong, Hin / Huang, Xianzhao 黃憲昭	Zhang, Tianyi 張天翼
Woo, Kyatang / Wu, Jiangtang 吳嘉棠	Zhang, Xueliang 張學良
Wu, Bannong 吳伴農	Zhang, Zhizhong 張治中
Wu, Kuo-Chen / Wu, Guozhen 吳國楨	Zhang, Zuolin 張作霖
Wu, Tieh-cheng / Wu, Tiecheng 吳鐵城	Zhao, Guodong 趙國棟
<i>Xinhua Daily</i> 新華日報	Zhou, Enlai 周恩來
<i>Xinwenbao</i> 新聞報	Zhu, Changhai 朱長海
Xu, Baohuang 徐寶璜	Zhu, Xinggong 朱惺公
Xu, Dachun 徐大春	Zou, Rong 鄒容
Yenching University 燕京大學	
Yoneda, Shōtarō 米田庄太郎	

Appendix 2: Historical Time Line

1927

April	Chiang Kai-shek by his military and local forces launched a violent suppression directed against organisations, especially labour organisations, led by the Chinese Communist Party. It is known as the April 12 Incident. Six days later, the Nationalist Government in Nanjing was established with the victory of the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River.
July	Wang Ching-wei changed his pro-Communist standpoint, and announced the Nationalist Government he led in Wuhan would cease the co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party.
August	A military rebellion planned and implemented by the Chinese Communist Party broke out in Nanchang, the Capital of Jiangxi Province on 1 August. It was the reaction of the Chinese Communist Party towards its organisations and influence being purged previously by the Nationalist Party both in Nanjing and Wuhan. It is known as the Nanchang Uprising. Then, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened an emergency meeting in Hankou on 7 August in accordance with the direction of the Communist International. At the meeting, land revolution and armed resistance against the Nationalist Party were confirmed as the main policies of the Party. Mao Zedong in the meeting proposed that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". This meeting is known as August 7 Meeting.
September	Insurrections in the areas closed to the border between Jiangxi and Hunan province broke out in accordance with the dispositions of the Chinese Communist Party. It is known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising.
October	Mao Zedong with the armed force who participated in the Autumn Uprising arrived in the country town of Ninggang. Since then, the Jinggang Mountain area began to become a Communist revolutionary base.
November	<i>Zhongguo Baoxueshi</i> (A History of Chinese Newspapers) written by Ge Gongzhen was published in Shanghai. This is the first Chinese academic monograph on Chinese journalism history.

1928

June	In the morning of 4 June, Zhang Zuolin, warlord of Manchuria, was killed by the explosion plotted by the Japanese Kwantung Army when he was on his own train heading for Mukden. It is known as Huanggutun Incident.
August	The Central Broadcasting System as the official radio station of the Nationalist Party was established in Nanjing with the call sign of XKM.
December	Zhang Xueliang, son of Zhang Zuolin, who inherited the power of Manchuria made a statement recognising Chiang Kai-shek's leadership on 29 December. On this day, the Five-coloured Flag of the Beiyang Government was lowered in Manchuria, and it was replaced by the Blue Sky with a White Sun Flag which represented the Nanjing Nationalist Government.

1929

April

The *Shanghai Evening Post* was established in Shanghai on 16 April.

1930

May

The Central Plains War, which derived from the infightings of different factions amongst Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen and Yen His-shan in the Nationalist Party broke out. The civil war lasted until November of the year when Chiang Kai-shek achieved military victory.

June

On June 11, The *Mercury* was purchased by the *Shanghai Evening Post*, and the name of the newspaper became the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.

December

The Publication Law was issued by the Nationalist Government on 16 December.

1931

September

The Japanese Kwantung Army launched a military operation on 18 September aimed at consolidating its control over Manchuria. It is known as the Mukden Incident. Soon after, Japan occupied the whole area of Manchuria.

November

The Chinese Soviet Republic establishment was announced on 7 November against the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China by the Chinese Communist Party in Ruijin of Jiangxi Province. The Communist *de facto* controlled areas in this time were called the Soviet Zone.

The Red China News Agency as the official news agency of the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Ruijin on 7 November.

December

Red China, the official newspaper of the Chinese Soviet Republic, was established in Ruijin, the Capital of the regime on 11 December. This newspaper is the earliest organ of the central regime of the Chinese Communist Party.

1932

January

On 28 January, a military conflict broke out in Shanghai between China and Japan. It is known as the Shanghai Incident.

March

Manchukuo establishment was formally announced on 1 March, and Aisin-Gioro Puyi ascended the throne to be the emperor.

1933

January

Chinese edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* was published from 16 January.

March

Japanese troops occupied Chengde, the capital of Rehe Province on 4 March.

May

The Tanggu Truce was reached on 31 May. It meant the *de facto* recognition of the Nationalist Government towards the independent position of Manchukuo, and the border between the Republic of China and Manchukuo was based on the Great Wall.

September

The Nationalist Government on 1 September issued the order of protection for journalists and public opinion institutes. Thus, the day is commemorated as the Journalist's Day in the Republic of China, and it still continues in Taiwan.

1934

October	Having evaded the pursuit of the Nationalist Army, the Chinese Communist Party began to withdraw from Jiangxi Province. This is known as the Long March.	
November		On 13 November, Shi Liangcai, the owner of <i>Shenbao</i> , was assassinated when he was driving his car from Hangzhou to Shanghai with his wife and son.

1935

January	The Zunyi Conference, which was held by the Chinese Communist Party during a stopover on the route of the Long March, was closed on 17 January. During this conference, the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Communist Party was confirmed. Six days later, Japan called out its armies to attack the Nationalist defenders in the border of eastern Chahar as retaliatory action of the military conflict between the Nationalist and Manchukuo on 15 January. This is known as the East Chahar Incident.	
May	On 30 May, four Japanese soldiers who entered areas north of the Great Wall in Chahar province without the required travel permits by the Nationalist Government were detained by the local defenders. This is called North Chahar Incident.	
June	The <i>Chin-Doihara Agreement</i> was signed on 27 June as the solution of the North Chahar Incident. According to this agreement, the Chinese parties who participated in detaining four Japanese soldiers must be punished, and migration from Shandong Province to Chahar would be forbidden.	
July	The <i>He-Umezu Agreement</i> was secretly signed on 6 July. The Nationalist's military forces in Chahar and Rehe should have been withdrawn in accordance with this agreement.	
September		Cheng She-Wo established <i>Libao</i> in Shanghai on 20 September.
October	On 4 October, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Army Minister and the Navy Minister of Japan confirmed three principles in Japanese China policy. It is known as Hirota's Three Principles, which includes 1) to force China to change its policies regarding reliance upon Europe and the United States against Japan; 2) to force China to recognise the independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-Manchukuo policies; 3) to force China to co-operate with Japan in the border areas with Mongolia in the light of increasingly serious communist threat from Mongolia.	
December	On 9 December, thousands of students from universities of Peiping took to the streets, appealing the government to promote democratic development, stop the civil war and prepare for a self-defence war against Japan. This is known as the December Ninth Movement.	

1936

February	A Japanese military mutiny broke out in Tokyo on 26 February. It was organised by a group of young officers of the Imperial Japanese Army with the goal of purging their political and ideological rivals in both military and government of Japan. The mutiny was soon suppressed. Since then, the military influence in Japanese Government began to successively increase. It is known as the February 26 Incident.	
June		On 3 June, American journalist Edgar Snow arrived in north Shaanxi Province, the Red Base of the Chinese

August	<p>Communist Party, to conduct his interviews for the <i>Daily Herald</i>.</p> <p><i>The Northwest. Corner of China</i>, a collection of dispatches written by Fan Changjiang during his visiting and interviewing as a correspondent of <i>Ta Kung Pao</i> in northwest China from May 1935 to June 1936, was published.</p>
October	The last Communist troops arrived in Shanbei on 22 October, as the Communist Party ended the Long March.
December	Dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-shek's command to fight the Communist Army in Shanbei, led Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to mutiny after arriving in Xi'an, Chiang Kai-shek was held captive on 12 December. This is known as the Xi'an Incident. After various consultations, Chiang Kai-shek was finally released on 25 December.

1937

July	In the evening of 7 July, Japanese troops conducted military manoeuvres around the Marco Polo Bridge. Then the military conflicts with the local Chinese armies broke out, and Peiping and Tianjin were soon after occupied by the Japanese Army. It is known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. It marked the outbreak of the full-scale war of Chinese resistance against Japan.	
August	The Japanese Army launched the battle, aimed at occupying Shanghai since 13 August.	
September	Chiang Kai-shek made a statement in which he acknowledged the legality between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party for resistance of Japanese invasion on 23 September. Thus, the Second United Front formed.	
November	The Battle of Taiyuan ended. Most areas of Shanxi Province were occupied by Japanese Army.	The Chinese Youth Journalist's Association was established in Shanghai on 8 November. Thus, the day is appointed as the Journalist's Day in the current People's Republic of China.
November	On 12 November, the Japanese Army occupied Shanghai with the exception of the Internal Settlement and the French Concession. The Nationalist government declared Chongqing the war-time Capital on 20 November.	
December	The Great Way Municipal Government of Shanghai was established on 5 December under the Japanese support. Su Xiwen took the mayor position. Its administration areas contained all districts of Shanghai with the exception of the International Settlement and the French Concession. The Japanese Army on 13 December occupied Nanjing, the capital city of the Republic of China, and massacred the city for several weeks. On the following day, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established in Peiping under the Japanese support. Its administration areas were generally in North China.	The Shanghai Municipal Council issued the order to ask all Chinese newspapers in the Shanghai foreign settlements to accept censorship by the Japanese controlled Shanghai authority. Then, on 16 December, C. V. Starr announced that both Chinese and English editions of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> were all American newspapers, and they refused to accept any censorship in Shanghai. It opened the journalistic movement of newspapers to claim their foreign ownership in Shanghai foreign settlements thereby enabling them refuse censorship.

1938

March 28	The Reform Government of the Republic of China was established in Nanjing on 28 March under the leadership of Liang Hongzhi.
April	The Nationalist Army achieved victory in the battle of Tai'erzhuang.
September	Japanese armies began to their military actions of mopping up Communist controlled rural areas, aiming

at destroying Communist established guerrilla base areas. The military activities were kept until the end of the War of Resistance against Japan.

October	Guangzhou on 21 October was occupied by Japanese armies, and four days later, Wuhan also fell into Japanese hands.	On 26 October, <i>Xinhua Daily</i> , a Chinese Communist Party newspaper, began publication in Chongqing.
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1939

January	The Japanese performed the first air attack on war-time capital Chongqing on 15 January. This city later suffered bombing several times during the War of Resistance against Japan. On 30 January, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Nationalist Party was closed. The Chinese Communist Party criticised the conference outcome of making the policy of passive resistance against Japan and active fighting against the Communist Party. This conference marked the beginning of the military conflicts between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party during the War of Resistance against Japan.	
April		Zhao Guodong, a general newspaper vendor of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> , was assassinated on 18 April.
August		Zhu Xinggong, an editor of the Night Light supplement of the Chinese edition of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> , was assassinated on 30 August.
September	The local regimes in Chahar, Suiyuan and the north areas of Shanxi Province which had been established after Japanese occupation were integrated by Japan within the Mongolian Borderlands United Autonomous Government under the leadership of the Prince Demchudongrub.	

1940

March	Under the Japanese support, the Reorganised Nationalist Government of the Republic of China was established in Nanjing on 30 March, and Wang Ching-wei was the head of the regime. It took over the previously established Provisional Government and the Reform Government. The Mongolian Borderlands United Autonomous Government only nominally belonged to Wang's regime, and still maintained its own administration jurisdiction.	
July		Samuel Chang, an editor and manager of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> , was assassinated on 21 July. Cheng Zhenzhang, an editor of the Chinese edition of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> , was assassinated.
October	Huangqiao Incident, a military conflict between the Nationalist troops and the Communist troops, occurred in the north part of the Jiangsu Province. The Nationalist troops were defeated.	
December		The Yan'an Xinhua Radio Station was established on 30 December. It is the first radio station of the Chinese Communist Party.

1941

January	In retaliation to the Huangqiao Incident, the Nationalist troops attacked the Communist armies in the south of Anhui Province. This is known as the New Fourth Army Incident.	A poem by Zhou Enlai, blaming the Nationalist troops for the New Fourth Army Incident, and complaining of injustices against the Communist Party, was published on the first page of the <i>Xinhua Daily</i> on 18
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		January.
April	Japan signed the <i>Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact</i> with the Soviet Union on 13 April. According to this treaty, the Mongolian People's Republic was recognised by Japan, and in return for this, Manchukuo received the acknowledgement from the Soviet Union.	
June		Li Junying, a vice-manager of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> , was assassinated on 23 June.
December	Japan began to attack Pearl Harbour on 7 December. Then, Japan declared war on Great Britain and the United States, and the Pacific War broke out, and soon after, Hong Kong was occupied by Japan. On 9 December, China formally declared war on Japan.	The Japanese Army occupied the Shanghai International Settlement. All anti-Japanese newspapers were censored, and the Isolated Island period ended.
1942		
April		The <i>Liberation Daily</i> under the direction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party began to be completely revised. The newspaper on the day published an article 'A Notice of the Revision of the Party Newspapers', written by the publicity department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was followed with an editorial 'To the Readers', which emphasised the Party and the people's spirit, militant style and organisational disciplines as the highest principles of the Party's papers.
June	The United States Navy achieved victory at the Battle of Midway on 7 June. It marked a shift in the balance of power toward the Allied Forces in Asian and Pacific areas.	
1943		
January		The New York edition of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> commenced publication from 1 January in the United States.
February	The Soviet Union achieved victory at the Battle of Stalingrad on 2 February. The victory marked the Allied Forces beginning to gain the initiative in European warfare.	
September	Italy surrendered to the Allies on 8 September.	
October		The Chongqing edition of the <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> began to publish on 31 October.
December	The Cairo Declaration was formally proclaimed by the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of China on 1 December. The contents of the Cairo Declaration includes consensus reached in the conference that Japan must unconditionally surrender, give up all islands occupied in the Pacific after the First World War, recognise the independence of Korea, and return Manchuria and Taiwan to China.	
1944		
April	The Japanese Army launched the Operation Ichi-Go campaign in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi Provinces, aimed at controlling the traffic line from Manchuria to Southeast Asia, so that more war materials could be delivered to the Japanese front.	
June	On 6 June, the Allied Forces began to operate the Normandy Landings, and then the second front in Europe against Germany was successfully opened.	The Chinese and Foreign Journalist Group, including Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, Xie Shuangqiu and Zhao Chaogou, arrived in Yan'an, commencing their interviews to the Chinese Communist Party leaders.
August	American military observers arrived in Yan'an.	The editorial, <i>Welcome American Comrades-in-Arms</i> , was published on 15 August in the <i>Liberation</i>

Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.

- October Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell to become the commander of the United States forces in China from 31 October.
- November Patrick Jay Hurley was appointed ambassador of the United States in China from 30 November.
- December The Operation Ichi-Go campaign ended. The Japanese Army achieved military victory, but both Chinese and Japanese sides suffered significant losses, and Japan did not receive the result that they anticipated.

1945

- February The Yalta Conference was closed on 11 February. The relevant clauses associated with the Soviet Army sending troops to Manchuria were confirmed by the heads of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States.
- April President Roosevelt passed away on 12 April, and the president position was succeeded by Harry S. Truman.
- May Germany acknowledged unconditional surrender on 8 May.
- June
- July The *Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender*, aimed at urging Japan to surrender as soon as possible, was issued on 26 July.
- August The atomic bombs were dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in turn on 6 and 9 August. The Soviet Union also declared war on Japan on 8 August, and then sent its troops into Manchuria. On 15 August, Emperor Hirohito addressed the *Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War*, marking Japan's formal declaration of unconditional surrender. Chiang Kai-shek on the day ordered Okamura Yasuji, the commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army of Japan, to command Japanese troops in China to surrender to the government of the Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek also sent three telegrams to Mao Zedong, and invited him to Chongqing for negotiations on the issues of post-war China. Mao finally accepted Chiang's invitation, and arrived in Chongqing on 23 August to negotiate with the Nationalist Government. Three days later, the signing of the *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance* was announced, stating that the Soviet Union acknowledged the Nationalist Government was the only legal government of the Republic of China.
- September
- October The *Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party of China*, also known as the *Double Tenth Agreement* was signed on 10 October after negotiations. The file aimed to solve Chinese political issues in a peaceful manner after their victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.
- November When the Nationalist Party attempted to take over Yingkou, a port of Manchuria, from the Soviet Army

The Chongqing edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* was suspended, as the management of the newspaper was dissatisfied with the harsh war-time censorship by the Nationalist regime.

On 7 August, the book *Return from Yan'an* was published by Guoxun bookshop in Chongqing in the situation of without accepting censorship. It marked the beginning of the Movement of Refusing Censorship.

On 12 September, Wu Kuo-chen declared the censorship would be annulled from the 1 October, and the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* was re-established in Shanghai on 24 September.

on 3 November, they discovered that the city had been relinquished to the Communist Party by the Soviet Union underhand. It led to the later military conflict between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party for seizing Manchuria. On 16 November, the Nationalist troops forcedly captured Shanhai Pass, the key which connects Manchuria and North China, from Communist troops.

December General George Marshall was appointed as the special envoy of the President Truman. He arrived in China with intentions of mediation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. After He dialogued formally with Chiang Kai-shek, the Three-Party Talks (George Marshall, Zhang Qun and Zhou Enlai) was hold.

1946

January On 10 January, the armistice agreement was signed by the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, and the Political Consultative Conference was held.

February In reacting to a series of outrages of the Soviet Army in Manchuria, an Anti-Soviet student demonstration broke out in Chongqing on 22 February. Three days later, an agreement between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party on military reorganisation and the integration of Communist forces into the National Army was signed.

The building of *Xinhua Daily* was damaged by some angry students and masses in the process of the demonstration.

March On 17 March, the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party refused to accept the Political Consultative Conference Agreement which was previously arranged between their representatives with the Communist Party and the Democratic League. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 25 March issued an order that CCP's troops must occupy main cities of Manchuria after the Soviet Army withdrew from there.

April The Soviet Army began to withdraw from Manchuria from 6 April. When George Marshall returned China on 18 April, Changchun had occupied by the Communist troops.

May On 5 May, Nanjing reinstated its Capital of the Republic of China. On 18 May, the Nationalist troops occupied Siping after a fierce battle with the Communist troops. Then, the Communist Army under the pressure withdrew from Changchun, and the city was occupied by the Nationalist troops.

June The armistice agreement in which required the Nationalist armies and the Communist armies to stop fighting for 15 days in Manchuria were announced by Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai on 6 June. The agreement later was prolonged for another 8 days. The *Foreign Assistance Act* was ratified by the Congress of the United States on 26 June. This act referred to the military and economic aids to the Nationalist Government of China. On the same day, troops of the Nationalist Party attacked Communist dominated areas in Hubei Province, and local Communist troops later successfully broke out of the military encirclement.

July On 11 July, American Congress agreed to appoint John Leighton Stuart as the ambassador to China. On 29 of the month, a transport corps belonging to the U.S. Marine Corps on the main transport route connected Peiping and Tianjin was attacked by the Communist troops. It is known as Anping Incident as the scene of the event was happened near the town of Anping.

August

Mao Zedong, in the interview by the American

		journalist Anna Louise Strong on 6 August, coined the term 'paper tiger' to express that the Chinese Communist Party had been ready to fight with American imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
September	On 30 September, the Nationalist armies launched the battle to occupy the Communist controlled city Zhang Jiakou.	On 5 September, the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government issued the policy of saving newspaper papers, aimed at limiting the quantity of printed sheets of the press and publication. On 7 September, the Ministry of National Defence made a decree Forbidding Foreign Radio Stations in China. In accordance with this decree, all foreign radio stations should be banned with the exception of the American military radio station.
October	On 2 October, George Marshall expressed his opposition towards the military action of the Nationalist troops to occupy Zhang Jiakou. Chiang Kai-shek then agreed on a truce for five days if the Chinese Communist Party accepted two conditions: they must attend the National Assembly and withdraw their troops from the eighteen places they were occupying at the time. After discussions with George Marshall and John Leighton Stuart, Chiang Kai-shek on 6 October agreed on a 10 days truce on the condition of the Communist Party accepting the aforementioned two conditions. However, Wang Bingnan, a representative of the Chinese Communist Party in Nanjing, on 8 October took Zhou Enlai's message to John Leighton Stuart that the Chinese Communist Party refused to accept Chiang Kai-shek's conditions of truce. On the next day, George Marshall went to Shanghai to persuade Zhou Enlai to enter into further negotiation, but it was refused by Zhou. Two days later, Zhangjiakou and Chifeng were captured by the Nationalist troops, and the Nationalist Government declared that the National Assembly was to be held on 12 November.	
November	Representatives of the United State and the Republic of China signed the <i>Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation</i> on 4 November. The National Assembly was formally held on 15 of the month, but only Kuomintang, Youth Party and some independent delegates attended the parliament. It was boycotted by the Chinese Communist Party and the rest of parties.	
December	On 24 December, Shen Chong, a student of the Peking University, was raped by the American marine William Pierson. It led to the rise of anti-American furores in China. Four days later, George Marshall asked President Truman to recall him.	
1947		
January	The Constitution of the Republic of China was formally issued on 1 January, and it would be put into force from 25 December of the year. On 8 of the month, George Marshall left China, and the United States Department of State formally announced termination of its mediation in China on 29 January.	
February		<i>Xinhua Daily</i> , the only Chinese Communist Party's newspaper in Chongqing, was forced to close down by the Nationalist Party.
March	All offices of the Chinese Communist Party in Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing were forced to close on 7 March, and staff drew back. All efforts for negotiation ended in failure, and the last military observers of the United States Army withdrew from Yan'an on 11 of the month. Then, the Nationalist armies waged war on Yan'an with the purpose of seizing it, and realised military occupation on 19 March, however, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had evacuated the place.	

May	The Communist Army won the Menglianggu Campaign. The 74th Reorganised Division of the Nationalist Party, which was well equipped with American devices, was wiped out. On 20 May, student demonstrations against civil war and starvation broke out in the main cities, and demonstrators suffered pressure of government.
August	The Communist troops of Shanbei won the battle of Shajiadian on 20 August. It resulted in the main Nationalist force in Shanbei being annihilated. Meanwhile, Albert Coady Wedemeyer as the special envoy of American president visited China again, and he strongly criticised the military incompetence and the political corruption of the Nationalist regime in Nanjing on 22 August.
October	The Democratic League was outlawed by the Nationalist Government on 28 October, and the party had no choice but turned to absolutely support the Chinese Communist Party.

1948

March	Siping, as a pivot to connect north and south of Manchuria, was occupied by the Communist Army on 13 March.	
April	Chiang Kai-shek on 19 April was elected as the President of the Republic of China in the National Assembly. Three days later, Yan'an was recaptured by the Communist Army.	On 2 April, Mao Zedong in talks with the staff of <i>Jinsui Daily</i> , a Communist newspaper, pointed out that the task of newspapers should serve the Party to communicate with the masses, and propaganda the policies and principles of the Party.
June		On 3 June, Mao Zedong required all level of the Communist governments to regain control of the media. He proposed that all Communist newspapers must have someone familiar with all policies of the Chinese Communist Party present, so that before publication, all contents inconsistent with the Party's propaganda requirement could be censored.
October	Jinzhou was seized by the Communist troops on 15 October. Thus, the Nationalist troops in Manchuria were no longer able to acquire reinforcements from North China.	
November	The Communist Army won Liaoshen Campaign, and Manchuria was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Soong May-ling, Chinese First Lady, urgently visited the United States, and in the meeting with President Truman on 10 December, she proposed that the United States should provide further aid to China for helping and supporting Chinese against Communists, but this proposal was refused.	<i>Decision of the Solution towards Foreign news agencies in liberated cities</i> was issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 8 November.

1949

January	On 10 January, the Communist Army won the Huaihai Campaign. It led to the capital city Nanjing directly under threat from the Communist Army. On 21 January, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed to relinquish his president position, and vice-president Li Tsung-jen assumed all responsibilities and power.	
February	The Communist Army came into Peiping on 3 February, and the Pingjin Campaign which aimed at controlling North China came to an end.	
April	Delegates of the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party started the negotiations on the content of the <i>Domestic Peace Agreement</i> in Peiping on 13 April. On 20 April, the Nationalist Government announced the refusal of the <i>Domestic Peace Agreement</i> . The next day, Mao Zedong and Zhu De issued the order, in which the Communist Army was	Liu Shaoqi, vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, stated on 21 April that journalists must be Marxist supporters with relevant knowledge of the Communist Party's strategies, and ability for independent hard work.

	required to cross the Yangtze, and two days later, Communist Army occupied the capital city Nanjing of the Republic of China.	
May	Shanghai on 25 May was occupied by Communist troops.	
June		The <i>Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury</i> ceased publication from 15 June.
July		The Post Mercury Company stopped all business from 1 July.
October	Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 10 October.	

Appendix 3: Bibliography

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Shanghai Municipal Police Archives

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Sunday Times

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Appendix 4: Journalist Seminar Supplement

No.	Date	Title	author	Theme 1	Theme 2	Remarks
(1)	1934.08.31	At the journalist seminar	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	Seminar	'Huai Yun' was a penname of Yuan Shu
		Feelings at the seminar	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism	Seminar	
		Are newspapers really not able to use vernacular language (one)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism	Language	
		Ownership change of <i>Shibao</i> is buzzing	Zu Cheng	Management	Practice of journalism	
		Active Japanese journalists at battlefield	Wu Yi	Regional China journalism	International journalism	Wu Yi was a friend of "Yuan Shu", and he was not a member of the seminar.
(2)	1934.09.07	Short introduction of journalism	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		
		Analysing rhetoric issues in news writing	Zhang Xianmei	Practice of journalism	Language	
		Active Japanese journalists at battlefields	Wu Yi	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
(3)	1934.09.14	Life should be with passion	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Are newspapers really not able to use vernacular language (two)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism	Language	

		The establishment course and activities of the Sichuan press corps in Peiping	Kui Wen	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		Japanese journalists calling at Peiping and Tianjin on the day before three-year commemoration of the Mukden Incident	Huai Yun	Regional China journalism	International journalism	
		Newspapers in Guangzhou	Dong Nan	Regional China Journalism		
(4)	1934.09.21	The beginning of journalism studies	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		The press prints of 1934	Xian Mei	Technology		
		Seminar last week	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened in the Beautiful Sichuan Cuisine Restaurant. It was held by Yun Yiqun. Shen Songfang, Xu Xinqin, Shen Qianli, Lü Yiwu, Su Dezheng and Lv Kuiwen attended.
(5)	1934.09.28	How to seek for a correct attitude to engage in journalism	Su Dezheng	Practice of journalism		
		Research on interview practice	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Journalism, film	Bao Kui	Practice of journalism		

		Situation of the press in Kaifeng		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		An article about typesetting in newspaper offices	Ye Tongsheng	Technology		
		Seminar last week	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened in the Jessfield Park. It was held by Yuan Shu. Zhai Yicheng, Lu Yi, Xu Xinqin and Shen Qianli attended.
(6)	1934.10.05	Some pending questions	Zhi Han	Practice of journalism		<u>Please explain</u>
		journalists falling into dilemma	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		Arguing film journalism	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism	Technology	
		Historical material of journalism studies (one): Guangzhou professional journalism school		History of journalism	Regional China	
		Seminar last week	Kui Wen	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened in the Green Apple Garden Restaurant. It was held by Lv Kuiwen. Yuan Shu, Shen Qianli, Zhai Yicheng, Mr. 'Lihua', Shen Jun and Chang Shan attended.

(7)	1934.10.12	Propose some points to spur myself and journalists comrades of the seminar	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism		
		American journalists' features	Wu Yi	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Introduce journalism education institutes (Journalism Department of Fudan University)	Bao Kui	Journalism education and studies		
		Seminar last week	Ban Nong	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened on 7 October. It was held by Yang Bannong. Yun Yiqun, Yuan Shu, Lu Yi and Zhai Yicheng attended.
(8)	1934.10.19	Welcome American journalists corps to Shanghai	Huai Hui	International journalism		'Huai Hui' was a penname of Yuan Shu.
		Imperfect aspects of international news	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		American journalists' features (continue)	Wu Yi	International journalism		
		Journalism and literature	Nai Ding	Practice of journalism		
(9)	1934.10.26	News photos and journalistic photograph (one)	Xi Ju	Practice of journalism	Technology	
		Journalism and literature (continue)	Nai Ding	Practice of journalism		

		The whole course of the merger between Rengo and Dentsu	He Fan	International journalism		
		Talks by French journalist Mrs. Poirot when she visiting Peiping		Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Seminar last week	Lv Shi	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened on 21 October at the Green Chamber Restaurant. Lu Yi, Xu Xinqin, Zhai Yicheng, Fu Yuchang, Lü Kuiwen, Song Zhefu, Fu Yingzhou and Yan Pinzao attended.
(10)	1934.11.02	Issues about the rationality of journalism control		Practice of journalism		
		News photos and journalistic photograph (two)	Xi Ju	Technology	Practice of journalism	
		Journalists' life and integrity	Huang Jingan	Practice of journalism		
		American education for journalists	Wu Yi	Journalism education and studies	International journalism	
		Comment on the Press quarterly	Da Lin			Please explain
		Introduce journalism education institutes II (journalism major of business faculty at the Hujiang Commercial School)	Yi Nong	Journalism education and studies		

(11)	1934.11.09	Who the anatomist of the era?	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		Please explain
		Introduce journalism education institutes III (journalism faculty of Yenching University)	Xi Chao	Journalism studies		
		Two mottos	Hui ying	Practice of journalism		Please explain
		Studies on using printers	Crane, translated by Qiang Sheng	Technology		
		Seminar last week	Jun Liang	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened on 4 November at West Si Chuan Restaurant. It was held by Zhang Junliang. Lu Yi, Lü Yiwen, Wang Jiaowo, Lu Jingfang, Lei Mingzhe and Hu Zhengbing attended.
(12)	1934.11.16	Mourn Mr. Shi, an entrepreneur of journalism	Huai Hui	History of journalism		
		We need new weapon to fight	Hu Zhengbin	Practice of journalism		
		How journalists coping with emergencies	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Readers need to know knowledge about the world	Ren Lin	International journalism	For readers	

		Studies on using printers (continue)	Crane, translated by Qiang Sheng	Technology		
(13)	1934.11.23	Problems of 'no problem'	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		
		Total amount of Japanese newspapers	Huai Hui	International	Japan	
		Journalism, drama, film	Ban Nong	Practice of journalism	Technology	
		Argue the press studies and comment on the <i>Press quarterly</i>	Tian Shiyong	Practice of journalism	Journalism studies	
15	1934.11.30	Track back French newspapers in China from <i>Le Journal de Shanghai</i>	Shanghai News agency	Study of Journalism	International journalism	
		After attending the seminar	Gu Qiuqiang	Practice of journalism	Seminar	
		Competition for battlefield news	Morisu Shinsaku, translated by He Fan	Practice of journalism	Regional China	
		Seminar last week	Xi Mai	Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened on 25 November at Dafang Noodles Restaurant. It was held by 'Xi Mai'.
16	1934.12.07	Vulgar report of jazzism (one)	Xiao Ying	Practice of journalism		'Xiao Ying' was a penname of Yuan Shu.
		Analyse journalists' life	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Newspapers in Chengdu	Hui Ying	Regional China		

		Daily newspapers reaching to 3 million		Regional China journalism		
		A successful evening daily: the <i>Mercury</i>	Hu Daojing	Practice of journalism	History of journalism	
17	1934.12.14	Represent the press to present a petition in the Fifth Plenary Session				This article was first published on <i>Ta Kun Pao</i> of Tianjin on 10 December.
		Vulgar report of jazzism (two)	Xiao Ying	Practice of journalism		
		Classification between office and field works of journalism	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism		
		Dispatch and correspondence (one)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		Evening news in Paris	Lao Hongxun	International journalism		
		Dialogue	Mo Zi	International journalism		'Mo Zi' was Zhai Yicheng.
18	1934.12.21	The transformation and transition of the press in Shanghai by observing the change of management (one)	Hu Daojing			

		Dispatch and correspondence (continue)	Yi Qun	International journalism		
		Competitions for battlefield news (continue)	Morisu Shinsaka, translated by He Fan	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Seminar this week: how to acquire free speech		Practice of journalism	Seminar	This seminar was convened in Kung Tak Lam Cuisine. It was held by Yun Yiqun, recorded by Lv Kuiwen and Yang Bannong. Yuan Shu, Zhang Xianmei, Shen Qianli, Lu Yi, Tang Huiping, Xu Xinqin, Hu Daojing, Fu Yuchang, Lü Yiwen and Wu Bannong.
19	1934.12.28	The story of Arthur Brisbane	Yuan Chao	History of journalism	International journalism	
		Observe the change and transformation of the press in Shanghai based on facilities (two)	Hu Daojing	Technology	History of journalism	

		Dispatch and correspondence (continue)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		Interview journalist: Mr. Xie Liuyi	Hu Zhenghuan	Practice of journalism		
20	1935.01.04	How newspapers agencies can reinforce human resources for interview	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism		
		<i>Shishi Xinbao</i> made a large number of redundancies	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		Dispatch and correspondence (continue)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		The issues of 'repeating old things'	Zhai Yicheng	Practice of journalism		
		The story of Arthur Brisbane (continue)	Yuan Chao	History of journalism	International journalism	
		The adversity of the press in Germany	Liu Chong	International journalism		
21	1935.01.11	The incident of <i>Shishi Xinbao's</i> redundancies		Practice of journalism		A letter of the staff of <i>Shishi Xinbao</i> submitted to Shanghai Journalist

						Union on 1 January 1935.
		Dispatch and correspondence (continue)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		The story of Arthur Brisbane (continue)	Yuan Chao	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Newspapers and journalists should have the right to keep the secret of the sources of news (one)	Liu Chong	Practice of journalism		
		Another statistics of the sales of newspapers nationwide		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	The data from <i>Chinese newspapers and magazines Index</i> published by Chinese Commercial Advertisement Company
22	1935.01.18	Newspapers and journalists should have the right to keep the secret of the sources of news (two)	Liu Chong	Practice of journalism		

		Local newspapers	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism		
		Dispatch and correspondence (complete)	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		
		The press in Suiyuan		Regional China journalism		
		Readers' comments		Practice of journalism		Shi Jidong wrote to Journalism Seminar, describing the press in Guizhou
23	1935.01.25	Introduction of a Soviet Russian authoritative journalist		Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Save the failure of journalistic policies	Gong Debai	Practice of journalism		It is translated from the editorial of Jiuguo Ribao of 22 January.
		Newspapers and journalists should have the right to keep the secret of the sources of news (complete)	Liu Chong	Practice of journalism		

24	1935.01.31	Seminar this week: moral issues of journalistic staff		Practice of journalism	seminar	This seminar was convened at Yangtze Hotel on 27 January. It was hosted by Yun Yiqun, recorded by Yang Bannong. Lu Yi, Xu Xinqin, Huang Jingan, Zhu Yajie, Liu Zucheng, Hu Zhuoren, Lv Yiwen, Shen Songfang, Shen Jicang, Lv Kuiwen, Su Dengzheng, Zhang Zixi and Wu Tianwu attended.
		The moral and discipline issues of the press	Ban Nong	Practice of journalism		
		Improve remuneration and change life style	Jing An	Practice of journalism		
		Personal cultivation and external allure		Practice of journalism		
		Local newspapers (two)	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism		

25	1935.02.07	A sarcasm of moral issues of journalists	Yu Fei	Practice of journalism		Yu Fei was a penname of Yuan Shu
		Investigation on the newspapers in Guangxi		Regional China journalism		
		Journalists in Peiping: interviewing Chen Baosheng	Li Manlin	Regional China journalism		
		Talk about the catalogue of newspapers and books about journalism				
		Local newspapers (three)	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism		
26	1935.02.14	Understanding the sense of humiliation and self-rethinking	Li Zhongyao	Practice of journalism		Li Zhongyao was a friend of Yuan Shu
		Materials about journalists' moral and discipline issues		Practice of journalism		
		The incident of insulting journalists in the film 'new women'		Practice of journalism		

		Journalists in Peiping: interviewing Ms. Shaotang Xiuhui	Li Manlin	Regional China journalism		
		Italy issued a new censorship order		Practice of journalism	International journalism	
27	1935.02.21	Why we should talk about moral and discipline issues	editor	Practice of journalism		
		Talk about journalists' moral and discipline issues	Liu Chong	Practice of journalism		
		Military and political authorities asked to protect public opinion		Practice of journalism		
		A compile of newly newspaper studies		Journalism education and studies		
		Rationalisation of newspapers' supplements	Zhang Zhizhong	Practice of journalism		
		British journalistic leader Lord Riddell passed away		International journalism		
		Journalists in Peiping: interviewing Guan Yixian	Li Manlin	Regional China journalism		

28	1935.02.28	Self-criticising moral and discipline issues are our regular task	Zhuo Wei	Practice of journalism		
		exaggerated propaganda	Du Chongyuan	Practice of journalism		The article was from <i>Xinsheng Weekly</i> of 23 February 1935
		Journalists in Peiping: interviewing Lin Zhongyi	Li Manlin	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Journalists in Peiping: interviewing Guan Yixian (continue)	Li Manlin	Practice of journalism		
29	1935.03.07	Authority and strength of character	Zhi He	Practice of journalism		
		We are looking for the strength of character	Zheng Shiren	Practice of journalism		
		Journalists' cultivation	Shi Junbo	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		The future of literature supplement	Zhi Zhong	Practice of journalism		

		Thoughts after attending the speech of Italian journalist in the Pacific Conference	Si Xi	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
30	1935.03.14	Sparingly resort to the power of public opinion	Bu Lao	Practice of journalism		
		A poem for journalist	Editor	Practice of journalism		
		A material about moral issues again	Hui Ying			
		Journalists' cultivation (continue)	Shi Junbo	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		Arrearage issues of news telegram	Zhong Hua	Practice of journalism	technology	The article was from <i>Shenbao</i>
		Newspapers in Macau		Regional China journalism		
31	1935.03.21	Discuss on the difficulty of the interview works based on the case of Yao Jinping	Zhi Han	Practice of journalism		
		Visiting French journalism schools	Shen Songfang	International journalism	Journalism education and studies	

		Talk about interview work	Mao zhui	Practice of journalism		
		Journalists and cultivation	Jun Liang	Practice of journalism		
		Investigation on the newspapers in Gansu		Regional China journalism		
		Newspapers in Japan	Da La	International journalism		
32	1935.03.28	The background when journalists of the <i>Asahi Shimbun</i> visited China		Practice of journalism		
		journalists' cultivation (continue)	Shi Junbo	Practice of journalism		
33	1935.04.04	Suggest to issue a ban to the Social news titles harmful to journalistic moral	Lin Yun	Practice of journalism		Lin Yun was a friend of Yuan Shu
		Newspapers in the Soviet Russia	Zhu Yun	International journalism		
		Realistic issues should be focused on in interview	Mao Zhui	Practice of journalism		

		The declining German press		Practice of journalism	International journalism	Cited from <i>World Knowledge</i>
		The press in Luoyang		Regional China press		
34	1935.04.11	Speech on practical issues of interview	Mao Zhui	Practice of journalism		
		Issues of journalists' remuneration	Liu Mengping	Practice of journalism		
		Rising of the <i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	Liu Chong	International journalism	History of journalism	
35	1935.04.18	Long standing issues of inexact news reporting	Yi Zheng	Practice of journalism		
		The abnormal development of correspondence	Lv Chongcheng	Practice of journalism		
		Adolph Simon Ochs, the owner of the New York Times, passed away		International journalism		
		Dictatorship and democracy of newspapers	Zhu Ren	Practice of journalism	International journalism	Translate from an editorial of the <i>Chicago Daily</i>

		The press in Zhejiang		Regional China press		
		A letter from Mr. Mao Zhui		Practice of journalism		
36	1935.04.25	Journalists need relevant health care: call for articles about 'journalists' health issues'		Practice of journalism		
		33 rd conference of Japan Journalism Association convened	Hui Ying	International journalism		Translate from Shanghai <i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>
		The press in Zhejiang (continue)		Regional China journalism		
		Dictatorship and democracy of newspapers (complete)	Zhu Ren	Practice of journalism	International journalism	Translate from an editorial of the <i>Chicago Daily</i>
		Ink street		Practice of journalism		
		A letter from Mr. Fu		Practice of journalism		
37	1935.05.02	Advertisement and journalistic moral	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		

		Rectify the press in Wuhan		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		Discussion on 'free journalist'	Mao Zhui	Practice of journalism		
		Whether newspapers need 'yellow journalism'	Qian Lanping	Practice of journalism		
		Ink street		Practice of journalism		
38	1935.05.09	An initiative of 'amateur journalist'		Practice of journalism		
		Discussion on journalists' healthy issues.		Practice of journalism		There are two parts in the article. Hui Ying completed part one and Xue Pu finished part two.
		Ink street		Practice of journalism		
39	1939.05.16	From 'critique' and 'purge' to 'health protection' and 'freedom of occupation'	Mao Zhui	Practice of journalism		
		Materials of newspaper studies (one)		Journalism education and studies		

		Compare the press in Japan with China	Hu Hanjun	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Makers of the Spanish–American War		International journalism	History of journalism	
		The press in Zhejiang (complete)		Regional China journalism		
40	1935.05.23	Critical discussion on the issues about title		Practice of journalism		Translate from an editorial published in <i>Shijie Xinwen</i> of February
		Operation of local newspapers	Yang Bannong	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		Investigation on the situation of Japanese, British and American newspapers in China	Nai Jing	Practice of journalism		
		Makers of the Spanish–American War (continue)		International journalism	History of journalism	
		An interesting census		Practice of journalism		

41	1935.05.30	Investigation on the situation of Japanese, British and American newspapers in China (continue)	Nai Jing	Practice of journalism		
		A study on British, German and Russian journalism	Gao Huaiping	International journalism		
		Makers of the Spanish–American War (continue)		International journalism	History of journalism	
		The press in Changsha		Regional China journalism		
42	1936.06.6	Rising of the small size of newspapers		Practice of journalism		
		Management of local newspapers	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism		
		How to run and manage local newspapers	Han Zi	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		The press in Changsha (continue)		Regional China journalism		
43	1935.06.13	After reading <i>Zaobao</i>	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism		

		Discussing public opinion	Man Zhi	Practice of journalism	Journalism theory	
		Newspapers in Guangdong		Regional China journalism		
		The press in Changsha (continue)		Regional China journalism		
		An introduction of the press in Kaifeng		Regional China journalism		
44	1935.06.20	Our requirement	Si Yi	Practice of journalism		
		The prospect of internal correspondence	Xu Xinqin	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Supplement	Zhu Shousan	Practice of journalism		
		Newspaper offices which have been attacked since the past month		Practice of journalism		
45	1935.07.04	Our past year	Yang Bannong	Practice of journalism	seminar	
		The press in Malaya	Huang Jiping	International journalism		

		Seminar last week: the prospect of the small size of newspapers		Practice of journalism	seminar	This seminar was held on 27 June in the Beautiful Sichuan Cuisine Restaurant. The meeting was hosted by Yun Yiqun. Lu Yi, Liu Zucheng, Xu Xinqin, Yang Bannong, Zhai Yicheng, Shen Qianli, Su Dezheng and Wu Hancang attended.
46	1935.07.11	Speak my mind to the graduates of journalism major students of universities	Si Yi	Practice of journalism		
		About news editorials	Hui Ying	Practice of journalism		
		Correspondence	Zhu Jia	Practice of journalism		
		'journalism imperialism': Japan intensified its international propaganda during the war	Yu Xinnian	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		The press in Malaya (continue)	Huang Jiping	International journalism		

47	1935.07.18	Comments of the press towards the publication law		Practice of journalism		
		How to manage local newspapers (continue)	Han Zi	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Local newspapers	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism		
		The duty and vocation and duty of the press	Ji Da	Practice of journalism		
48	1935.07.25	The leaflets demagoguery should be prohibited immediately	Si Xi	Practice of journalism		
		The stories of press photographers		Practice of journalism		
		The process of the <i>Xuzhou News Evening</i> was closed down		Practice of journalism		
		Japanese journalists co-operation	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism	International journalism	

		Japanese policies about controlling the press		Practice of journalism	International journalism	It was translated from <i>Gaizao</i> published in June.
		The sources of news	Yu Xinnian	Practice of journalism		
49	1935.08.01	The issue of journalists co-operation		Practice of journalism		
		Japanese journalists co-operation (continue)		International journalism		
		Feedbacks of Chinese journalists about the amended publication law (continue)		Practice of journalism		
		Commemorate Walter Williams	Jian	Practice of journalism	History of journalism	
		Temporary routes for telegram news		Practice of journalism		
50	1935.08.08	Review 'written news'	Yu Zhong	Practice of journalism	Language	
		Recalling Walter Williams		Practice of journalism	History of journalism	

		Issues of ameliorating local newspapers	Chen Shuhe	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
51	1935.08.15	Journalists in commission and academic studies	Ju Shen	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	'Ju Shen' is a pen name of Liu Zucheng.
		Analyse the network of the international communications	Huai Lun	Practice of journalism	International journalism	'Huai Lun' is a pen name of Yuan Shu.
		Fudan newspapers exhibition and its duty	Shu Zongqiao	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		Local newspapers under the feudal influence	Long	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
52	1935.08.22	Our view and anticipation: speech on the anniversary celebration	Editor	Practice of journalism	Seminar	
		Review and anticipation	Yi Qun	Practice of journalism	Seminar	
		Commemorate the one year celebration of 'journalist seminar'	Yang Bannong	Practice of journalism	Seminar	
		'Journalism blog' copy: about 'publishing and reading newspapers'	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	For readers	

53	1935.08.29	Comments on the publication law	Lun Xun	Practice of journalism	Journalism management	
		Jone and Murofuse Koshin	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Comments on amending the Publication Law	Lun Xun			
		Self-criticism toward the past year		Practice of journalism		
		Newspapers and feudal force	Bai Chang	Practice of journalism		
54	1935.09.05	The speech of journalism lecture	editor	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		Comments on amending the publication law (two)	Lun Xun	Practice of journalism	Journalism management	
		How to choose newspapers (two)	Fang Qingru	For readers		
		Visit national newspaper exhibition in Hangzhou		Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
55	1935.09.12	far-sighted views of the journalists festival	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		

		A new way of the press in China	Wen Fu	Practice of journalism		
		The press in southwest China	Lu Yi	Regional China journalism		
		Comments on rectifying legislators and justicers on the publication law		Practice of journalism	Journalism management	
		About journalism lecture and commemoration funding		Practice of journalism		
57	1935.09.19	Rectification of words in newspapers	Xian He	Practice of journalism	language	
		Journalism interview and writing	Ju Chen	Practice of journalism		
		Talk about radio news		Practice of journalism	Technology	The author of this article should be Yuan Shu by comparing with his book <i>Jizhedao</i> [the way of journalists]
		About the funding of Jones Williams		International journalism		

58	1935.09.26	About the small and compact size of newspaper	Yang Bannong	Practice of journalism		
		How to avoid negative effects on the mind of journalists	Bi Nong	Practice of journalism		
		Journalists should not be frustrated and discouraged	Jian			
		Journalism interview and writing (one)	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Suggestions on the principles that can improve the press	Gao Huibi	Practice of journalism		
59	1935.10.03	The beginning of journalism lectures	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	
		Journalism interview and writing (two)	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Talk about radio news (continue)		Practice of journalism	Technology	
		Moral issues of the press	Ma Xingye	Practice of journalism		
		Japanese publication and censorship	Morgan Young,	Practice of journalism	International journalism	

			translated by Wang Jian			
60	1935.10.10	American journalist attempt to implement the five hour week day policy		Practice of journalism	International journalism	This article is originally from <i>Baoren Shijie</i> [Journalists world], no. 1935.
		Owners of the newspapers and journalists	Hai Ning	Practice of journalism		This article is originally from <i>Baoren Shijie</i> [Journalists world], no. 1935.
		Journalism interview and writing(three)	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
		Japanese publication and censorship (continued)	Morgan Young, translated by Wang Jian	International journalism	Practice of journalism	
61	1935.10.17	Special missions of the press in China	Xu Ke	Practice of journalism		
		Three developmental routes for newspapers (one)		Practice of journalism		This was the first lecture content of journalism tutorial. It

						was delivered by Cheng Shewo and recorded by Liu Zucheng.
		The <i>Yomiuri Shinbun</i> and early Japanese journalism	Huai Yun	History of journalism	International journalism	
		Journalism interview and writing (four)	Zu Cheng	Practice of journalism		
62	1935.10.24	In memory of Ge Gongzhen	Lu Yi	History of journalism		
		A suggestion to establish the funding for Ge Gongzhen	Peng Shixin	History of journalism		
		Three developmental routes for newspapers (two)		Practice of journalism		
		Talk about the development direction of newspapers in China	Jun Yan	Practice of journalism		
		The letter attached by the annual plan of Hu Jiang Commercial School		Journalism education and studies		
		Preparation of Hankou for the newspaper exhibition		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	

		Japanese publication censorship (continued)	Morgan Young, translated by Wang Jian	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
63	1935.10.31	Solutions for professional traditional competition	Bai Ding	Practice of journalism		
		Three developmental routes for newspapers (three)		Practice of journalism		
64	1935.11.07	Insights to us from the Wang's case	Han Cang	Practice of journalism		It is based on the contents of the first journalism lecture, which was delivered by Cheng Shewo and recorded by Liu Zucheng.
		Considerations about the press	Shen Songfang	Practice of journalism		
		Safeguard the position of professional journalists	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		

65	1935.11.14	Saving our nation by intensifying our work standards	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism		
		Current European and North American trends in journalism		Practice of journalism	International journalism	It is based on the contents of the second journalism lecture, which delivered by Gu Zhizhong and recorded by Liu Zucheng.
		Issues of local newspaper	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Japanese publication censorship (continued)	Morgan Young, translated by Wang Jian	International journalism		
		About the death of Ge Gongzhen	Xian	History of journalism		
66	1935.11.21	Professional organisation of journalists	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism		
		Journalism lectures	editor	Practice of journalism	Journalism education and studies	

67	1935.11.28	Journalism perspective	Zi Yuan	Practice of journalism		
		Overview of international journalism co-operation movement	Huai Yun	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Staff structure of local newspaper	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism	Journalism management	
		Issues of journalistic staff qualifications		Practice of journalism		
68	1935.12.05	Ideas drawn from the practical work of interview	Zhang Yan	Practice of journalism		
		Power of correspondence in diplomatic warfront (one)		Practice of journalism		
		Reuters is being enlarged and preparing to move a new 9 floors building		International journalism		
69	1935.12.12	The press in the front of national calamity		Practice of journalism		Translate from the <i>Central Daily News</i>
		Power of correspondence in diplomatic warfront (two)		Practice of journalism		

70	1935.12.19	Latinisation and the future of newspapers	Xian	Practice of journalism		
		The press in Nanchang		Regional China journalism		
		The system of local newspapers (continue)	Yang Bannong	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Newspapers of the Soviet Union		International journalism	Practice of journalism	
71	1935.12.26	The declaration of Shanghai journalists for the freedom of speech		Practice of journalism		
		Autumn conference convinced by Shanghai journalists for the freedom of speech		Practice of journalism		
		Journalists and public movements	Shen Songfang	Practice of journalism		
		Newspapers and society	Liu Huoxuan	Practice of journalism		
		Newspapers in Bengbu	Bu Shaofu	Regional China journalism		

72	1936.01.02	History and journalism	Tao Xisheng	History of journalism		
		A talented journalist		Practice of journalism	History of journalism	
73	1936.01.02	The establishment ceremony speech of the Press Institute of Peiping and Tianjin	Tao Xisheng	Practice of journalism		
		The Press Institute of Peiping and Tianjin		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		Biography of the press (one): the wealth and diligence of William Hearst	Ming Yaowu	International journalism	Practice of journalism	
74	1936.01.16	Are semi-colonial countries able to control journalism?	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism	International journalism	
		Censorship is not what China needs today	Yang Bannong	Practice of journalism		
		Chinese national liberation and the task of public opinion	Fu Yuchang	Practice of journalism		
		Advocating journalist union to implement the proposed law of struggling for free speech		Practice of journalism		

		Appeal a nationwide investigation on newspapers in China		Regional China journalism		
		The press in Nanjing		Regional China journalism		
75	1936.01.23	Strive for free speech		Practice of journalism		
		Conversations in streets (one): free speech		Practice of journalism		
		The press in Nanchang		Regional journalism		
		Perspectives of journalism	Zi Yuan	Practice of journalism		
76	1936.01.30	<i>Ta Kung Pao's</i> policy to develop to the south	Liu Zucheng	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		Ideals of tabloids	Liu Shi	Practice of journalism		
		Japanese policies for journalism control		International journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Conversations in streets (two): censorship		Practice of journalism		

		Investigation on the press in Luzhou	Ren Min	Regional China journalism		
		The original of Chinese newspapers	Mei Jun	History of journalism		
		The amount of Japanese newsprints sold to China		International journalism	Practice of journalism	
77	1936.02.06	Battlefront of Public opinion during the national calamity period	Zhu Cheng	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
		The situation of the press in Europe during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War		International journalism		
		Reading newspaper	Yue	For readers		
78	1936.02.13	Foreign journalists in China arguing the pros and cons of Chinese censorship		Practice of journalism		
		Integration of journalists in Tokyo		International journalism		
79	1936.02.20	The nature of journalism cannon	Xian	Practice of journalism		

		Elaborate account of Shao Piaoping's death	You Luan	History of journalism		
		New features of the progress of the press	Liu Zhanhua	Practice of journalism		
		Overview of the press in Lu Country of Sichuan Province		Regional China journalism		Contents are as same as the survey of the press in Lu Country in the volume 76.
		The press in Shanghai		Regional China journalism		
80	1936.02.27	Newspapers today	Rong Min	Practice of journalism		
		Journalists' moral standards		Practice of journalism		
		'readers' complaint'		Practice of journalism		Speeches of the presentation by Zhou Zuoren at journalism professional school
		How newspaper advertisement create strong impact		Practice of journalism		Translate from <i>Editor & Publisher</i> , vol. 8, no. 25

		Overview of the press in Fuzhou		Regional China journalism		
		Supplements of newspapers in Qingdao	Di Rong	Regional China journalism		
82	1936.03.12	Influence of the amended the draft of the publication law to the press		Practice of journalism		
		Five points of the draft of the publication law passed		Practice of journalism		
		The future of newspapers	Vernor Nash	Practice of journalism	Technology	
		Report of visiting 'exhibition about New Hankou'	Huai Yun and Kui Wen	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
83	1936.03.19	About news on walls		Practice of journalism		Name printed is not clear, but it is inferred as Yuan Shu by conferring with <i>Journalists' Principles</i>
		The invention of letterpress	Huai Yun	Technology		
		Visiting the Osaka <i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	Bang Jie	International journalism		

84	1936.03.26	Chinese journalism endeavour and the press policies	Chen Mingde	Practice of journalism		
		Conscience and vocation	Yun Yiqun	Practice of journalism		
		Journalists preparatory committee in Wuhan appealed to make sufficient amendment in the Publication Law		Practice of journalism		
		The press in Danyang	Li Juan	Regional China journalism		
85	1936.04.02	The doom of newspapers in Late Qing		History of journalism		From Ge Gongzhen's <i>A Newspaper History of China</i>
		Overview of the press in Tai Country of Jiangsu Province	Lu Xiyu	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	
86	1936.04.09	Track the origin of 'news' down	Huai Yun	History of journalism		
		News vendors in Nanjing		Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism	

87	1936.04.16	Japanese news agency endeavour after two big news agencies merged		International journalism		
		Dickens' journalist career	Xia Renqi	Internationalism journalism	Practice of journalism	
		The press course involved in dispute in Suzhou	Xian Ying	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
		Recent situation of foreign news agencies in China		Practice of journalism		
		Political parties and newspapers at the early stage of the Republic of China		Practice of journalism		
88	1936.04.23	The press course today	Wei Sujin	Practice of journalism		
		British, American and French newspapers		International journalism	Practice of journalism	
		The press course and journalists' life in Nantong	Xia Shi	Regional China journalism	Practice of journalism	
89	1936.04.30	Feelings considering European journalism course	Shen Songfang	Practice of journalism	International journalism	

		Difference between tabloid and small size newspapers	Half journalist	Practice of journalism		
		Newspapers' position in the Hundred Days' Reform: one higher, and another one lower	Mo Ming	History of journalism		
90	1936.05.07	Speech for the column suspending	Li Biquan	Practice of journalism		Li Biquan is an alias of Yuan Shu
		Written down on the eve of the column suspending	Lu Yi	Practice of journalism		
		Japanese policies about journalism control, and backdrop of published contents on newspapers		Practice of journalism	International journalism	

Notes: This table is original translation based on Xu Jizhong's Masters thesis of Anhui University in 2013, 'Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar], 87-96. In the very beginning, the issue number of this supplement was not marked until 30 November 1934 with the number 15, but there were only 13 issues published before the day. Number 55 and 57 was marked in turn on the supplement of 12 and 19 of September 1935, therefore number 56 was omitted. Thus, although the last issue of the supplement was marked 90, there were only 88 issues.¹

¹ See Xu Zhongji, 'Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar], a Masters' Thesis, Anhui University, 2013, 17.

Appendix 5: Journalist Weekly Supplement

No.	Date	Page	Title	Author	Theme 1	Theme 2
1	1938.12.12	7	Prologue	editor	Practice of journalism	History of journalism
			The past and today of journalism in Hong Kong	Xian Zhang	History of journalism	Regional China
			Internal news agencies in China	Yi Shan	Regional China	Practice of journalism
			Journalism of inland China in developing		Regional China	Practice of journalism
2	1938.12.19	8	Sources of warfare news	Jian Sheng	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Critic journalism and journalistic criticism	Dong Lv	Practice of journalism	International journalism
			News about guerrilla warfare in Pudong	Shen Chang	War with Japan	Practice of journalism
			Calamity of newspapers	Chu Chen	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Information of the press in inland China		Regional China	War with Japan
3	1938.12.26	7	Fault of newspapers in Shanghai	Xi Tu	Practice of journalism	War with Japan

			About the conflagration in thatched shacks in West Shanghai	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	
			Interviewer and newspapers	G. R. Bush	Practice of journalism	
			Investigation of newspapers in Chongqing		Regional China	War with Japan
			Information of the press in inland China		Regional China	War with Japan
4	1939.01.02	8	Ask each newspaper to think over news reports about guerrilla carefully	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Establish local newspapers and guerrilla newspapers	Ma Yingzi	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Several suggestions	Shen	War with Japan	Practice of journalism
			Investigation of international main news agencies		International journalism	
5	1939.01.09	7	Wartime journalism	Tang Ke	Political journalism	War with Japan
			Solutions of issues of Chinese press (one)	Hu Daojing	Practice of journalism	
			66 years history of Shenbao (one)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Several current tasks	Hua Chao	Political journalism	War with Japan
			Newspaper clipping and sticking	Chen Naikuan	For readers	
			Information of the press in inland China		Regional journalism China	International journalism

6	1939.01.16	8	Journalists' new tasks in the new period of the War of Resistance against Japan	Hu Yuzhi	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Chinese modern press: introduce a new published book on journalism	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	History of journalism
			66 years history of Shenbao (two)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Newspaper clipping and sticking	Chen Naikuan	For readers	
			Information about the press		Regional journalism China	International journalism
			Chongqing <i>Xinhua Daily</i> established North China version		War with Japan	Regional China
7	1939.01.23	7	66 years history of Shenbao (three)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Reestablish communication network	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Newspapers editorials		Practice of journalism	
			Develop journalism works behind the enemy's rear lines	Chang Jiang	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
8	1939.01.30	8	66 years history of <i>Shenbao</i> (four)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Methods for establishing correspondence network	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	
			Newspapers in Japanese controlled area		Practice of journalism	War with Japan

			Experiments of getting sources through internationally interviewing	Qiu Jiang	Practice of journalism	International
9	1939.02.06	8	66 years history of Shenbao (five)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Journalism education and the major of law politics journalism	Yi Shan	Journalism education	
			Experiments of getting sources through internationally interviewing	Qiu Jiang	Practice of journalism	International journalism
			News about the press		Regional journalism China	International journalism
10	1939.02.13	8	66 years history of Shenbao (six)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			The death of Qian Hua	Lin Sheng	War with Japan	
			Investigation of tabloids in Zhejiang		Practice of journalism	Regional China
11	1939.02.20	7	66 years history of Shenbao (seven)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			New ways to establish local newspapers	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	
			Practical experience for News Night	Zhou Zhizhen, Chen Xinde, Xie Zhangzhe	Practice of journalism	

			Nationwide newspaper exhibition	Xing He	Practice of journalism	
12	1939.02.27	7	66 years history of Shenbao (eight)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Argue again about the importance of establishing local newspapers	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism
			The establishment of Yan'an branch of the Chinese Youth Journalist Association	Shu Ying	Regional journalism	Practice of journalism
			The press in wartime capital		Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Catalogue of terrorist events about Shanghai press last year		Practice of journalism	War with Japan
13	1939.03.06	8	The demand exceeding the supply in the interior	Liu Lin	Regional journalism	War with Japan
			Debate supplement and qualified people for local newspapers	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism China
			Cease of newspapers in Shanghai	Lin Shen	Practice of journalism	Political journalism China
			66 years history of <i>Shenbao</i> (nine)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Assume the price of transceivers	Wen Yuankun	Technology	Practice of journalism
14	1939.03.13	8	66 years history of <i>Shenbao</i> (ten)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Theories and practical works of local newspapers	Yi Shan	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism China

			Traitors' newspapers in south Yangtze River	Lin sheng	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			News of the press		Regional journalism China	War with Japan
15	1939.03.20	7	Congratulation on the establishment of new radio station in Chongqing	Li Xiangfu	Regional China	War with Japan
			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part one)	Chang Jiang el al	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			How to do research on Chinese journalism history	Hu Daojing	Journalism history	
			News of the press		Regional journalism China	War with Japan
16	1939.03.27	8	Discover Chinese journalism history	Li Xiangfu	History of journalism	
			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part one)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Administrative policy of Japanese journalism	Stuart Lilico	International journalism	
			News of the press		Regional journalism China	War with Japan
17	1939.04.03	8	Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part two)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Journalism development in the north and west areas of the Guangdong Province	Li Wen	Practice of journalism	Regional China

			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part two)	Chang Jiang, Di Jiang, Shao Zonghan, et al	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
18	1939.04.10	8	Shanghai should also hold newspaper exhibitions	Li Xiangfu	Practice of journalism	
			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part three)	Hu Daoding	History of journalism	
			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part three)	Chang Jiang, Qiujiang, Zonghan, et al	Practice of journalism	
			Journalism work: necessity of frontier propaganda	Gang Guo	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
19	1939.04.17	8	Shanghai newspapermen should strengthen self-discipline	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part four)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part four)	Chang Jiang, Qiu Jiang, Zong	Practice of journalism	War with Japan

				Han, el al		
			Journalism work: grow up in work, and Phoenix Nirvana	Gang Guo	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
20	1939.04.24	8	Argue about the declaration by the local press	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	Regional China journalism
			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part five)	Hu Daojing	Journalism history	
			Journalism work	Gang Guo	Practice of journalism	
			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part five)	Chang Jiang, Qiu Jiang, Zong Han, el al	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
21	1939.05.01	8	Short introduction of Russian language dailies	Zhi	International journalism	
			Chinese Youth journalists association established Chinese journalism college in Hong Kong		Regional China	War with Japan
			Important points for journalistic interview in the new period (part six)	Chang Jiang, Qiu Jiang, Zong Han, el al	Practice of journalism	

			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part six)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
22	1939.05.08	8	Qualitative changes of the press during the wartime	Fan Changjing	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Lore of Chinese journalism history: the origin of journalism (part seven)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Interview and understanding	Nai sheng	Practice of journalism	
			Fu Jian newspaper and culture: developed during the war		Regional China	War with Japan
			Journalism work: we need perseverance on all front segregation and monitoring	Gang Guo	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
23	1939.05.15	8	Trained Soldiers making psychological attack: workshops of wartime journalistic works in Gui Lin	Hong Fei	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Foreign journalists in Japan	Translated from the <i>Snake of March</i>	International	
			Discuss newspapermen organisation	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	
			A history of central newspapers (part one)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	

24	1939.05.22	8	War and newspapermen	Da Gong	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Re-discuss the press disaster	Chu Chen	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Experiments of getting sources through internationally interviewing	Meng Qiujiang	Practice of journalism	International journalism
			A history of central newspapers (part two)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
25	1939.05.29	8	Discuss the oppression of Chinese newspapers from anti-British movement	Translated from the China Weekly Review	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			New Chinese expression and newspapers	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	
			A history of local newspapers	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
26	1939.06.	8	Harrowing and heroic chapter: the foreword of the coalition newspaper in Chongqing		Regional journalism China	War with Japan
			A history of local newspapers	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	Regional journalism China
			Wartime newspapers' development	Chu Chen	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			New Chinese expression and newspapers	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	

27	1939.06.12	7	Shu Zongqiao	Nai Sheng	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			<i>Minli Bao</i> and Song Jiaoren		Political journalism	History of journalism
			Local newspapers' history (three)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			Jinhua's newspapers and culture		Regional China	
28	1939.06.19	8	Censorship and propaganda	Chen Xueping	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Interview skills	Tian Ping	Practice of journalism	
			Establish Chinese journalism study through the strength of the collective	Dong Lan	Journalism education	
			Newspaper movement in inland China	Wang Ping	Regional China	War with Japan
29	1939.06.26	7	Shanghai newspapers and the British Publishing Law (one)	Nei Sheng	Practice of journalism	
			Skills for reading newspapers	Wei Lian	Practice of journalism	
			Local newspapers' history (three)	Hu Daojing	History of journalism	
			<i>Guomin Ribao</i> : agitate national revolution		Regional China	
			Some new and rising newspapers in wartime Hong Kong	Chen Ziqiang	Regional China	War with Japan
30	1939.07.03	7	Undergoing of Reuters	Pang guan	Practice of journalism	International journalism

			Skills of news edit: compound and dividing into page methods	Jun Yi	Practice of journalism	
			<i>Guomin Bao</i> : a revolutionary magazine abroad		History of journalism	
			Shanghai newspapers and the British Publishing Law (one)	Nei Sheng	Practice of journalism	International journalism
31	1939.07.10	8	Establish wartime newspapers' literature supplement	Chen Ziqiang	War with Japan	Practice of journalism
			Soviet newspapers	Huo Qiu	International journalism	Practice of journalism
			Discuss advertisement	Yang	Practice of journalism	
			Children's World: a publication for revolutionary education		History of journalism	
			An introduction of Chinese Youth journalists association	Qian sheng	Practice of journalism	
			Express sincere solicitude for the press in Shanghai from the Chinese Youth journalists association		War with Japan	Practice of journalism
			Propaganda in Kong Hong for registering journalists who lost their job in Guangzhou		Practice of journalism	Regional China
32	1939.07.17	7	Journalism and freedom	Pang Guan	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Printing workers movement in Hong Kong	Jie Yu, Nai De	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism
			Journalism development in the last two years	Chang Jiang	Practice of journalism	History of journalism

			Tabloids in guerrilla area	Chu	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
33	1939.07.24	7	From conditions as a journalist to discussing non-professional journalism movement	Hong Fei	Practice of journalism	
			Journalism development in the last two years	Chang Jiang	Practice of journalism	History of journalism
			Establish a regulation for non-professional reporters	Pang Guan	Practice of journalism	
34	1939.07.31	7	Principles of wartime propaganda	Ye Chuchuan	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Newspaper information in each area	Feng Ling	Regional journalism	Practice of journalism
			Journalism development in the last two years	Chang Jiang	Practice of journalism	History of journalism
35	1939.08.07	7	Discuss newspapers in Inner Mongolia and their responsibility		Practice of journalism	Regional China
			The experience of a warfront journalist in the European war period: a recalling by a British warfront journalist		International journalism	Practice of journalism
			<i>Jiu Guo Shi Bao</i> (Saving the Country Times): a Chinese newspaper abroad	Chu	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
36	1939.08.14	7	Newspapers and foreign exchanges	Ying Chuan	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Applying the principle of efficient and simple for newspapers' editors	Pang Guan	Practice of journalism	

37	1939.08.21	7	Southwest Chinese journalism today	Lang Han	Practice of journalism	Regional China
			<i>Warfare Front Daily</i> and <i>Resistance Daily</i>	Jun Yi	War with Japan	
38	1939.08.28	7	Southwest Chinese journalism today	Lang Han	Practice of journalism	Regional China
			China hands in Japanese press	Yuan Lang	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Termination of the coalition newspaper in Chongqing		Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Information for the press		Practice of journalism	War with Japan
39	1939.09.04	7	A newspaperman's heroic death: mourn for Mr Zhu Xinggong	Qian Sheng	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			News writing structure	Mei Qiquan	Practice of journalism	
			<i>Wartime Daily</i>		War with Japan	
			Recalling journalism	Jin Taiyan	Practice of journalism	History of journalism
40	1939.09.18	7	The war between Germany and Poland and being aware of reading newspapers	Nei Yao	International journalism	
			Wall, Wall Journalism, journalism literature: develop Wall-Shanghai Journalism Movement	Fan Quan	Practice of journalism	
			Journalism and advertisement (one)		Practice of journalism	

			Newspapers and propaganda	Chen Yili	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
41	1939.09.25	6	How to write local dispatches		Practice of journalism	Regional journalism
			1. Start from fully understanding the story	Pei Zhen	Practice of journalism	
			2. Smash formularism	Liu Yi	Practice of journalism	
			3. About subjects and skills	Li Liangyu	Practice of journalism	
			Newspapers and propaganda	Chen Yili	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Voice newspaper		technology	
42	1939.10.02	6	The position of advertisement in commercial society	Yi Li	Practice of journalism	
			A short history of Soviet journalism	Yi	History of journalism	International journalism
			Paper bullet strategy in the first European war	Ru Ying	International journalism	
43	1939.10.09	6	Issues of raw and semi-finished materials for the press	Zhang Zhe	Practice of journalism	
			A suggestion to local newspapers	Hu Yuzhi	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism
			A notification of the Youth Journalists Association		Practice of journalism	
			Skills for scrap	Chen Yili	For readers	
44	1939.10.16	6	Mourn Mr Ge Gongzhe	Nai Sheng	History of journalism	

			Discuss public opinion	Zhen	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Skills for scrap	Chen Yili	For readers	
45	1939.10.23	7	Mr Ge Gongzhen and free speech	Yang Ji	History of journalism	
			A tall and thin figure	Zhou Shoujuan	History of journalism	
46	1939.10.30	6	Recalling Mr Ge Gongzhen's life	Ge Shaolong	History of journalism	
			Skills for scrap	Chen Yili	For readers	
47	1939.11.06	7	Apply Telexing photos and its fundamentals	Yi Ye	Technology	
48	1939.11.13	6	From visiting language and literature exhibition to discussing new literature and journalism	Shi Ni	Practice of journalism	
			Newspaper's personality and appearance	He	Practice of journalism	Technology
			News title's subjectivity	Yong fu	Practice of journalism	
			Journalism in Guangxi	Jian Pu	Practice of journalism	Regional journalism China
49	1939.11.20	7	Lay hope in the press	Liang Hanco	War with Japan	
			The Chinese Youth Journalists Association established a branch of South Yangtze River guerrilla area		Regional journalism China	

			Structure of editorial office	Yi Ye	Practice of journalism	
			Skills for scrap	Chen Yili	For readers	
50	1939.11.27	8	Adjustment and improvement of local newspapers	Gao Jie	Practice of journalism	War with Japan
			Issues of newspapers collation	Yi Ye	Practice of journalism	

Appendix 6: List of Selected Translations from *SEPM* Supplements

No.	Supplement	Title	Author	Date
1	Journalist Seminar	Journalists should not be discouraged	Author unnamed	26 September 1935
2		Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards	Lu Yi	14 November 1935
3	Journalist Seminar	Prologue	Editor	12 December, 1938
4		Calamity of the Newspapers	Chu Chen	19 December, 1938
5		Information on the press in inland China		12 December, 1938
6		Several Current Tasks	Hua Chao	9 January, 1939
7		Wartime Journalism	Tang Ke	9 January, 1939
8		Newspapers in Japanese controlled area		30 January, 1939
9		Shanghai newspapermen should strengthen self-discipline		17 April, 1939

10		Censorship and Propaganda	Chen Xueping	19 June, 1939
11		Establish Chinese Journalism by the Strength of the Collective	Dong Lan	19 June, 1939
12		Broad Discussion of Interview Skills	Tian Ping	19 June, 1939
13		Journalism and Freedom	Pang Guan	7 July, 1939
14		Express Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai from the Chinese	Youth Journalists Association	10 July 1939
15		Simple newspapers in Guerrilla Areas	Chu	17 July 1939
16		Propaganda and rumour mongering	Jun Y	31 July 1939
17		A newspaperman's heroic death: mourn for Mr Zhu Xinggong	Qian Sheng	4 September 1939
18	Night Light	Forbearance	Zhu Xinggong	18 June 1939
19		Japanese Dream	Cheng Mei	19 June 1939
20		The Spirit of Su Wun	Shen An	18 June 1939
21		Stories of Chilli	Wei Hua	14 July 1939

22		Fable: Story of a Fly	Huai	24 August 1939
23		Poles: Struggle for Freedom	Huang Yingdai	29 August 1939
24		Special Issue for the Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the French Revolution Struggle between light and dark: impressions in terms of the commemoration of the French democracy and republic		

Appendix 7: Translations

The following articles are original English translations of the Chinese articles published in *Journalist Seminar*, *Journalist Weekly*, and *Night Light*. They have been selected to reveal the practical skills and ideologies of journalistic professionalism, balanced with nationalism under the national crisis, and Chinese images towards Western countries, including their political systems and culture. These articles record the transformation of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism and professionalism ideals in Chinese journalists' mind throughout those years.

Journalist Seminar

Translation 1: Journalists should not be discouraged

Author unnamed, Journalist Seminar, 26 September 1935

I met some journalists in an occasion. They all talked about some issues in the press, which made me depressed. I feel that the journalists are missing their heroic mettle, and their position of journalists is being challenged. Journalists should take the responsibility to these results. There was one time that journalists were endowed with infinite power by the society, but journalists did not rationally use the power. Some journalists only treat newspapers as a commodity, and others consider newspapers as a stopover in their official careers, even some people treat journalist work as political officials. Such behaviours have undermined journalists' moral principles. I am a journalist as well, and I feel ashamed of these things. However, I would like to be enthusiastic to comfort my colleagues. I want to tell them that journalist after all is a glorious profession at the moment.

We should not fear any threat as long as we can rectify our team, realising what I propose to 'rectify journalists' behaviours', and re-establish the authority of public opinion. We should not fear any threat.

I am not willingly to speak with strong heroic style, but relevant facts are manifest. In modern society, there are some 'steely figures', such as Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin and Mustafa Kemal. They used to be journalists, but all of them have departed from the duty of journalism as they made it as their tools. This is damage to the press. Nevertheless, it at least can be proved that newspapers are able to contain the spirit of fighters.

Everyone should not be discouraged!

Translation 2: Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards

By Lu Yi, Journalist Seminar, 14 November 1935

Currently, our journalistic endeavour, as same as our nation, is suffering a misery. The development of journalism, to a large degree, is limited by

environment. It is undeniable that the press in China has achieved an obvious progress these years, but journalists who still have a clear analytical mind will not feel fulfilled in the present situation compared with the pace of the epoch and the responsibility that we should take. For an endeavour, if we want it to make a significant progress, its every single cell needs to be strengthened, and the press in China is no exception. With the exception of the corrupted journalist with slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who consider the press as their tool for their own personal promotion of official career and fortune, journalistic staff should constantly strengthen themselves and optimise their team for accelerate the development of the press and taking up the mission of the epoch to guide people to achieve the victory of improving Chinese social development. This is our vocation! We hope our colleague by their professional organisations come together to engage into academic and practical skills studies, re-think about relevant theories, rectify the moral and discipline for strengthening the force the movement, which aims at immediately changing the mentality and behaviours of decadence, pessimism, romance, timidity and selfish, so that we can form a strong journalistic fighting group to struggle with the sinister environment.

Colleagues of the Journalist Seminar are all juniors of the press, but we always remain our position as a screw in a big machine, and never give up the responsibility of being a screw. By our determination to improve the press in China at current stage, we started self-education work in Shanghai. We always make efforts for our ultimate aim whatever the efficiency or influence of our work in the past year. Improving the press in China at the current stage is a significant duty, thus it definitely not our small group of people can complete. However, we do believe that our wills and beliefs are by no means our group's concern, but a common need in the society. Therefore, we throw ourselves into work actively, and hope all our peers nationwide can join together to improve the endeavour. We hope we can come tighter to realise a common progress. The crisis of the Chinese nation is intensifying day by day. Under the difficult circumstance, every journalist should come from behind for saving our nation!

Journalist Weekly

Translation 3: Prologue

the editor, Journalist Weekly, 12 December, 1938

Chinese people generally have formed a contradictory and complex consciousness of journalists. In a positive perspective, journalists are advisors of the society, help people to receive information and express their opinions, and organisers of people. They cannot be praise too much even with any great and rhetorical expression. In a negative perspective however, some journalists indeed cover up and glamorise evil in current society. People who have all done something which is seriously or slightly against their conscience, but those bad journalists attributed these bad things to the social environment.

Cheng Shewo in the year before was invited to deliver a journalism workshop, and his first words were in the view of newspapermen of Peiping and Tianjin, most of Shanghai journalists like starting rumours when nothing happens and fleeing based on a critical condition. I today must point out that this is a serious misunderstanding. Shanghai journalists in terms of professional ability and courage is much better than those Peiping and Tianjin journalists. This statement partly reflects the truth although it sounds slighting exaggerated.

A celebrity cultural I met on the day before yesterday said it is true that the private life of those journalists who have their nightlife is definitely somewhat romantic. The criticism which asks to impose a strict discipline for journalists' private life is too unnatural to accept. My friends are well satisfied when they hear such pleading for them, but it should not become the reason to have a lower serious and rigorous requirement.

In this epoch, journalists hold a position of great responsibility, and raise people's increasingly aware of their responsibility. It seems that people are willingly to remain distant from journalists in their daily life, but hope journalists become a reliable compass inside. Therefore, journalists obtain a new lease of life.

Vitalised journalists shoulder heavy cross of workload, setting off on their long journey. They are not lonely, but will encounter great difficulties. They need to cooperate with comrades, thus to step into the path of safety.

Journalists' lives should not be deified. They must have some knowledge gaps and vices in their private life as they are just mortals. It may be difficult to overcome all problems and weakness, but if they must make some progress if they try their best.

The *Journalists Weekly* is journalists' own field. Although it is neither a college nor a church, I still sincerely hope you can give some advices which can help both you and me, and as a result, everyone may further do something, from which people can benefit.

Translation 4: Calamity of the Newspapers

Chu Chen, Journalist Weekly, 19 December, 1938

In the past, Shanghai was the journalism centre in southern China. Generally, the press in Shanghai was successively improved although the development of technology and the scale of journalism did not reach the levels initially anticipated. From the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan, the situation improved and there was a special press boom in Shanghai to serve this need. Whatever the newspaper, or whoever the individual journalist, all engaged excitedly and enthusiastically with their work and in their roles. The press boom in Shanghai during this period is an unprecedented phenomenon in Chinese journalism history.

Following the retreat of Chinese troops from Shanghai as the war developed, the city became an isolated island and with this change the press in Shanghai fell into darkness. Many newspapers that had been publishing for a long time were suspended. Under strong pressure created by the occupation forces, many intellectuals and journalists accepted new tasks and successively moved into hinterland China. There is however a minority of journalists who have decided to remain in Shanghai and these have begun a long march in a lonely and dangerous environment. This is the so-called 'period of calamity of newspapers'. Those journalists who have stood fast and remained in Shanghai are subject to all manner of bloody terrors and coercion. Such coercion spans from soft promises to threats and intimidation, bombings, poisoned fruit, and even the delivery to journalists of severed human body parts such as arms and heads. In the face of such menace and seduction the beliefs of some have been shaken and these collaborate with the enemy, engaging in shameful works in betrayal of their homeland. However, the majority of these combatants of journalism still remain true to their own positions. They use up the last of their strength in the fight to give hope to people in the Isolated Island.

It has been more than one year since the outbreak of the full-scale war against Japan, several new newspapers have been established in Shanghai, and some newspapers that possess a long history have been re-established. It appears on the surface that it is a boom for the press of Shanghai, but if we analyse the situation more carefully, we can see that the boom is abnormal. That is to say that the press of Shanghai operates in a 'difficult' period and the degree of the difficulty is growing.

It is obvious that the press in Shanghai along with the whole city will continue its descent into darkness until the balance of the war is fundamentally reversed. To consolidate our front, we should enlarge our scale, enrich our contents and unify our position, so that our fighting capacity can be intensified.

In fighting the difficulties in the dark Isolated Island, whether as an individual or the entirety, it is manifest that there are many weakness and shortcomings in the newspapers. These weakness and shortcomings need to be urgently solved.

It might be difficult to briefly explain the specific weakness. To be abstract, it can be summarised as three points. Firstly, the work to unite the journalism staff remaining in the Isolated Island is not proceeding effectively. Secondly, the division of focus as well as coordination amongst each newspaper is not performed rationally, and the pre-war shortcomings of extravagance and waste of human resources and materials continues. Thirdly, in reading the contents of newspapers one can feel the tense atmosphere of the war. However, these same newspapers are glutted with irrelevant, rash and bombastic elements, while the parts that do have relevancy lack strength. The effort to make contact with hinterland China is not progressing actively.

Of course, Shanghai is an isolated island. Everything is constrained by this special environment. All facilities and ideals are definitely not attainable at this time, but

there are still many things that we can make efforts to improve. The press in Shanghai is falling into tribulation, and fighting against tribulation is the only way out.

Translation 5: Information on the press in inland China

Journalist Weekly, 12 December, 1938

***Yishi Bao* Re-established in Kunming**

After the preparation by Cardinal Paul Yü Pin and Father Vincent Lebbe, *Yishi Bao* had re-established in Kunming and published its first issue on the 8th of the month. It is temporally decided to one large page every day. The general manager is Niu Yimo, and the chief journalist, the editor in chief, and the manager are assumed in turn by Luo Longji, Zhao Ximeng, Li Shaotie. It has been known that professors from each university are invited to be in charge of the supplementaries of the paper. Meanwhile, *Yishi Sea and Land News Agency* was established and began distributing news that day.

***Central Daily* Published Local Edition**

The *Central Daily* and the Central News Agency might simultaneously start their journalistic business in Kunming. This was discussed in the conversation between Long Yun, Chairman of Yunnan Province, and Zhou Fohai, Minister of Propaganda Department, after he arrived in Kunming by air. The *Central Daily* at present has been published in Chongqing, Guilin and Guiyang. The paper is planned to expand to Chengdu, Xi'an and Lanzhou, and the branch of the Central News Agency might be established there as well.

***Saodang Bao* published Guilin Edition**

Saodang Bao, which originally published in Wuhan before the city being fallen had moved to Chongqing. Some staff of *Saodang Bao* has been posted to Guangxi to prepare publishing Guilin edition this year.

Current Situation of *Jiuwang Ribao*

Whereabouts staff of *Jiuwang Ribao* had become suspense in intellectual clique since Guangzhou fell into enemy. Now, information that we have known about them will be released here.

Guo Moruo is the leader of *Jiuwang Ribao*. When Guangzhou was in emergency, a telegram was sent to him for instructions of further action. He read the telegram, saying the newspaper office could retreat to Guilin if it was necessary. As a result, staff who worked in Guangdong Province had retreated under the order to west by the steamship *Zhaoqing* two days before the fall of Guangzhou. There were a

plethora of intellectuals followed, but they split up after they arrived in Wuzhou. As the retreat was processed orderly, they did not suffer a heavy loss for materials. Workers of the newspaper also retreated with office staff. The order of withdrawal was very good. In accordance with their letter, even Ahua, an orphan we found and adopted in a street of Guangzhou, who was considered by us as the future Chinese Maxim Gorky, followed with the newspaper to retreat to the west with a jacket.

Translation 6 Several Current Tasks

Hua Chao, Journalist Weekly, 9 January, 1939

The War of Resistance against Japan has stepped into a new and critical stage, which marks the division from the past 18-month military resistance to striving for the final victory. At this stage, China will struggle for seizing the initiative, in which Japanese troops will suffer overwhelming attack anywhere, regardless of being in the Japanese occupied areas or guerrilla areas. As a result, Japanese troops have to be constantly on the run. When enemies are exhausted, the general offensive aimed at annihilating Japanese Army will be launched, and China will achieve the success of the resistance cause. This is the strategy and direction of the Chinese Army. As the transformation of the direction, the Chinese Army will get a U-turn, which wins the initiative of the battlefield from the previous disadvantaged position. Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese supreme leader, recently in the interview of *Da Gong Bao* pointed out that: “the Chinese situation now is much better than last year. The government will by all means fight to a finish and simultaneously hope to acquire more support and effort from Chinese people.” Three things have been proved from this concise talk. First: Chinese people have strong confidence to win this war. Second: the present situation of the war is taking a turn for the better. Third: all Chinese people both domestic and overseas should continually make joint effort for the country to achieve the final victory. At this new and critical stage, Chinese journalists, especially journalists in Shanghai, should work hard without exception for strengthening the resistance force as the coordination of the development of the War of Resistance against Japan. Come together to struggle for the great endeavour which saves and liberates the nation. Therefore, I deem that people who engage in journalism on the Isolated Island must reach a consensus about the following essential tasks.

First, it is necessary to promote our works behind enemy lines. At the second stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, works on politics, military, economy and culture are necessary to be promoted for the advantage that we fight against enemies on the battlefield. Although journalistic activities on the Isolated Island belong to works behind enemy lines, we should not ignore the importance of effort in guerrilla areas of hinterland. On account of the condition of their lower education and inconvenient transportation, they need help of the Isolated Island journalists as their guide to enlighten and promote their consciousness of resistance.

Second, our strength needs to be gathered. The spirit of journalists' hard graft in the past 14 months on the Isolated Island is commendable. However, our strength has not been strong enough to face the current environment. Everyone should be trained with strong will, calm tendency and courage, so that they can independently struggle, overcome and conquer the environment. In other words, they should have the ability to flight and struggle against evil monsters and have the belief of not compromising with them. This is the only way which can make us stronger in the War of Resistance against Japan, discharge our duty as sentinels of Chinese journalism, and pride of ourselves as Chinese people.

We are not able to fulfil the journalists' duty on the Isolated Island facing the resistance environment until we gather our strength and promote our works behind enemy lines.

Translation 7: Wartime Journalism

Tang Ke, Journalist Weekly, 9 January, 1939

Editor's note: This article was originally published in *Saodang Bao* on 19 November last year. The article is reprinted here because its topic which is about the endeavour of wartime journalism and tasks of journalists still applies to the current situation.

Newspapers in peacetime are a weapon for political struggle. During the wartime, they are the tool for national defence. Just as a famous journalist said, there are three critical components in modern war: money, steel and newspaper. During the war in Europe, General Hindenburg said that Germany did not fear the British tanks and guns, but dreaded leaflets dispersed from their planes. From these cases, we can see that the spiritual weapon is far more effective than soldiers armed with bullets and armour. The United States of America is a democratic and progressive country. Once Presidential elections start, those newspaper tycoons, such as Hearst and Raymond, are always the most noticeable people nationwide. This shows the importance of newspapers in political struggle during the peacetime. Another case was that after the war had broken out in Europe of 1914, the British politician Lloyd George formed a coalition government, and engaged journalism baron Lord Northcliffe as the chancellor who was in charge of propaganda. This proves the significance of propaganda during the war.

We should specifically focus on the study of wartime journalism, especially analyse the difference of journalism between peacetime and wartime. These will be listed in the article as a reference of the principles to reform Chinese journalism for the war to resist Japan.

First, wartime journalism management should be a united rather than permissive. The external aim of wartime journalism management and control is to strive for strengthening our country and crumbling enemies, and the internal aim is for avoiding leakage of military secrets, reinforcing people's consciousness to fight and promoting the civil-military cooperation nationwide. At the early stage of the war in Europe, the third bureau of German general staff established wartime journalism bureau, which has been the most powerful machinery during the war.

Except for censoring newspapers nationwide, the bureau is also in charge of issuing German wartime news in their military occupied areas. Japan after the Mukden Incident immediately reinforced the journalism bureau of the Army Ministry. By re-organising Rengo and Dentsu, Domei News Agency as the core of Japanese journalism management and control, was established. Journalism in Far East has been generally monopolised by Japanese warlords. These are good examples to show the importance of wartime journalism management and control. Even in the Britain and America that highly believe in freedom during the wartime, such as war in Europe and American Civil War, journalism is strictly controlled by government.

Second, wartime journalism business should be prosperous and resemble military industry, rather than decreasing. Newspapers during the war usually need to take up more stressful works of propaganda and report than peacetime. This can be seen from the sales of newspapers and the creation of famous journalists. In the first place, sales of newspapers must be flourishing during wartime. In accordance with the statistics by the journalism research division of Tokyo Imperial University, newspaper circulation of each day in the United States from 1910 to 1920 (the First World War) was even one forth higher than present day. Japanese *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* in 1930, which was before the Mukden Incident totally issued 650,000 papers, but up to 1933, it had reached 750,000. Moreover, wartime is a good opportunity to train journalists to be mature. There are well-known ten top journalists in Japanese history of the press, such as Kishida Ginko, Yanagawa Shunyo, Fukuchi Genichiro, Narushima Ryuhoku, Fukuzawa Yukichi. They raised them above the ruck in the process of the First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Tokutomi Iichiro, the most respected elder statesman of journalism in Japan, also acquired his honour during the wars in past years. A great newspaper is closely and inseparably related to some outstanding journalists, and they are all created in special times. This just reflects the old sayings that 'appropriate places can foster elites' and 'great men are products of the times that they live'. War, famous journalists and great newspapers are just in a reciprocal relationship.

Reviewing China, we can find that the *Spring and Autumn Annals* of the Zhou Dynasty and *Tipao* during the Han and Tang Dynasty have been widely recognised as pioneers of newspapers in the world by both Chinese and international scholars. Even if we consider the modern newspaper of *Shenbao*, the paper has a history of 65 years since it was established in 1873. Nevertheless, how much progress have we achieved so far? We should particularly reflect on this situation that since the outbreak of the war against Japan, which is our second revolution, there has been a good enthusiastic social atmosphere, and these advantages should have promoted our journalistic endeavour to achieve great progress to outperform our enemies. But do we have a united institution which plans, manages and guides journalistic endeavour, and do we have certain journalism policies based on our Outline of Resisting Japan and Nation Building? The facts are just in the opposite. As lack of essential preparation in peacetime, foundation of large newspapers became unstable when the war broke out. As a result, spiritual demand is proliferating under the united wartime journalism system, newspaper sales is conversely decreasing. The war against Japan has continued for over a year, and where are our outstanding journalists?

It is a hard fact that the Chinese journalism situation discussed above is incongruous with the mainstream of wartime journalism overseas.

To sum up, it proves that we need to put in a lot of effort in journalistic endeavour. I concisely propose these above suggestions as the general goal of our government, especially departments in charge of propaganda, and our people, especially journalistic staff, to strive for.

Translation 8: Newspapers in Japanese controlled area

Journalist Weekly, 30 January, 1939

In Japanese controlled areas, nearly all newspapers were the local edition of the *New Shenbao*, which was the organ paper of the Japanese in China.

Newspapers in Shanghai Foreign settlements were totally forbidden to sell in Japanese controlled areas. As a result, they were absolutely locked away with the place outside the areas. If some people who attempted to secretly transport newspapers from Shanghai foreign settlements into Japanese controlled areas were found, they would suffer the most severe punishment by the Japanese.

In Japanese controlled areas, half contents of the newspapers were the information from Japanese news agents, and nearly the rest part of the printed sheets was the wanted posters of the leaders of Chinese guerrillas.

Translation 9: Shanghai newspapermen should strengthen self-discipline

Journalist Weekly, 17 April, 1939

Since the war broke out, nationalism elements began to be implanted into journalistic professionalism, thus public services, to a certain degree, were replaced by nationalism as the most important duty for Chinese journalism. The author proposed that Chinese newspapers in Shanghai should provide the emotional anchor for 4 million people. However, the anchor at the moment had been nationalism rather than public services.

As the author said, “Chinese resistance against Japan not only is for Chinese to strive self-liberation, but also for justice for the mass. Chinese language newspapers owned by foreigners in Shanghai should be in accordance with the two points above. Therefore, newspaper staff in Shanghai should specifically consolidate their team, and intensify the fort in cultural warfront. Towards the invasion activities and the scum who were doubted to engage in collaboration, they should on the one hand report their intrigue, and on the other hand give them a merciless blow.”

Translation 10: Censorship and Propaganda

Chen Xueping, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939

Censorship and propaganda are the two most powerful forms of social control. However, their properties are different. Censorship is passive containment of individuals' freedom to express, ideas and behaviours that clash with the present national system. Propaganda is passive creation of information for giving rise to a common opinion within the group.

In peacetime, it is necessary for government to carry out censorship, in the hope that social order can be maintained and people's benefit can be safeguarded. Drama and fiction content which is considered filthy will be forbidden regardless of its country of origin. However, governors usually utilise censorship to establish their personal authority and consolidate their power. As a result, censorship will be abused. Take parents' attention to their children's acts for instance, if parents discipline their children excessively, it may cause two possible situations. Children may become hyper timed, dull, subservient and feel themselves inferior; or in contrast, children may also tend to be rebellious, aggressive, stubborn, and get some other bad habits. In the same way, when a government excessively controls their people's speech, they will receive a similar result. Just as an old saying of Confucius, 'virtuous and law-abiding people should have considerable autonomy rather than much restriction, and foolish and savage people should be educated and punished for them to understand the fault they commit.' Modern liberal countries are not willing to control people's speech, and even if they want, they are not able to implement measures to do so. However, dictatorships, such as Soviet Russia, (Fascist) Germany and Italy, have utilised censorship perfectly. As a result, people do not dare to speak out their frustration and fury. Finally, when these widespread discontents accumulate to a certain level, they will overwhelmingly break out.

During the wartime period when government has determined its diplomatic guiding principal, differences will weaken the force of resistance and be advantageous to enemies to blatantly propagandise themselves, and as a result, triumphalism will falter. Therefore, censorship should be strictly carried out. However, it does not mean we should blindly implement control. During the special wartime period, almost everyone is uneasy and anxiously waits for news. It means any message is easy to be adopted. This provides a good condition for transmitting rumours. Some sudden incidents, such as Wang Ching-wei publishing the circular telegram to announce his peaceful plan with Japan, and changes of battlefield, like the fall of Guangzhou, should not be printed out immediately on newspapers in case of over-stimulating those people who worry the sky could fall. However, our government is not able to control foreign news agencies. Some senior officials at times are not prudent when they represent government to release information. It may lead to wide circulation of erroneous messages, which imperceptibly promote people to fabricate details based on their imagination. When such situations happen, simply performing censorship may backfire. Censorship can block the circulation of some unreasonable messages,

but simultaneously may provide more room for personal assumption to create more details due to lack of information in the society. Therefore, information control can only be implemented effectively when censorship and propaganda work co-operatively.

We are not able to avoid the influence of propaganda in the modern society that we are living. To an individual view, advertising exerts a subtle influence on us when we buy everyday objects. To a country view, as most of people are lacking of the correct understanding of the national policies and principals, as a result, we are no longer free to be influenced by the preaching of a party or a faction. If propaganda is properly applied, it can become a form of social education. In Europe and North America, people usually learn elementary knowledge of medicine and hygiene from advertisements. Propaganda during wartime is remarkably effective. For instance, the Entente Powers, as the United States' participation finally achieved victory. Most of the American people initially did persist in isolationism, not willingly getting entangled in the war. However, their disgust with Germany increased as the days passed after large scale propaganda was implemented, and the warring public opinion ultimately dominated America nationwide. This made U.S. Government dare to formally declare war. George Creel, the head of the United States Committee on Public Information, after the war based on his experience of propaganda wrote down the book, *How We Advertised America*. It was said by him that propaganda documents were totally for 75,000,000. In his opinion, 'paper bullet' truly contributed to the victory of the Entente Powers.

Propaganda is hyper effective, but is difficult to practically apply as well. Rhetoric of propaganda should be concise and clear, so that audiences are easily able to repeat them. However, the contents should include sufficient implications, which make readers unwittingly accept the ideas of propaganda. Propagating an idea can be realised by various methods, such as newspaper, broadcasting, poster and film, and each repeat exposure can deepen the readers' impression. As propaganda in modern society has become a specific subject to study, more details about it are not able to be discussed here. However, it should be paid attention that propaganda contents cannot be far from the facts. The function of propaganda is to appropriately delete or add details based on the facts in the published reports. For example, it would be well if heroic deeds on the battlefield are magnified and our armies' failures are made as light as we can. If there are a couple of reports which are not based on facts, audiences may not easily believe our propaganda afterwards.

Considering the methods of the propaganda and censorship that our government is applying, it seems that there are still many shortcomings. Take war reports for instance, the victory of the Battle of Taierzhuang has been propagandised appropriately, but some victories achieved in south Shanxi Province in past months, and the annihilating Japanese armies in north Jiangxi and Hubei Province recently are not systematically reported. To the propaganda about warfront fighting in a specific area, being silent after a couple of sensationalising will give audiences a clear implication that we have got failure in this area. A temporary military failure in a specific area is usual and inevitable. People should

know a general situation of the facts about the scale of military failure. Otherwise, doubts will be raised and spread among them if they are not able to acquire information. Reports about arms and planes transportation and preparation for evacuation in air raids in rear areas, should be censored are always published on newspapers yet. It has been a puzzle that Guangzhou had fallen in a very short time, and this has been a topic leading to manifold vitriolic surmises in foreign newspapers, magazines and books even up to today.

To sum up, all comments contrary to present anti-Japanese policy and undermining national unification should be censored strictly, but the public opinion which can promote the efficiency of central and local administration is important especially during war against Japan. Strict instructions must be issued against those prevailing cock and bull rumours at present. We cannot bear empty silence. It means we should adeptly exploit propaganda to make people know what has happened. Propaganda especially should be widely, technically and systematically used to influence foreign public opinions.

Translation 11: Establish Chinese Journalism by the Strength of the Collective

Dong Lan, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939

Development of a cause on the one hand depends on successive effort, and on the other hand relies on the introspection based on the past achievement. These experiences apply to Chinese journalism cause as well. The foundation of Japanese modern journalism cause was worse than China, but their journalism research institute has been established and run for more than 20 years, and their the quantity of their newspaper publication has reached four millions. Such achievement is by no means accidental. Works in research institutes should not be ignored, and these works usually become the soul to guide practical works.

Aimed at promoting publication of newspapers in China, Vernon Nash and Rudolf Loewenthal from the journalism department of the Yenching University spoke out their ideas about the press development in China. There are external and internal points. External points include removing illiteracy and bettering transportation, and internal points are to train and cultivate qualified people for the press. In terms of training qualified people, we firstly need to understand the current condition of the press in China, and propose as many issues as we can, so that new trained people can solve them by highly individualised approaches. In other words, they believe that practicable research works based on ourselves (epoch and environment) should be done in journalism departments, so that our journalistic practice can be benefited in the future. There are some difficulties for doing the relevant research. They pointed out two points. First, the study of the press is obviously not an independent subject, but is synthesised with others, such as history, economy, sociology, so the press study can only be promoted with the development of the progress of research on these subjects. Second, it is difficult to search and collect essential academic references. The two said points might not be big issues in other countries, but seriously influence the development of Chinese journalism. Research in China is performed by each individual, but such

works can be done overseas by groups. If such difficulties cannot be overcome, academic and professional standards will not be able to be established.

Difficulties weighed more than scattering of research resources, as a result, those difficulties are not able to be overcome successfully. Nash and Loewenthal's observation and examination strike home. We should rely on the strength of the collective to research works for establishing Chinese journalism study (rather than simply adopt a foreign system), so that the Chinese journalism cause can be promoted.

Translation 12: Broad Discussion of Interview Skills

Tian Ping, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939

Correspondents need to possess a strong body. Even if they do not go to bed until 3 o'clock at night, they still need to get up at 6 o'clock if there is a big rally somewhere at 7 o'clock in the morning. They need to cheer up to arrive at scene with pencil and coated duplex board, writing down what they heard. If they need to greet an honoured guest from another province, it is normal that they wait at railway station, wharf and airport for three or five hours. They must endure even if they work from morning to evening or in a whole night, miss a couple of meals, and travel for 50 kilometres in a day.

They definitely need to possess a comprehending mind. When something just happens, after closing their eyes to think about it for a few seconds, they should calculate possible consequences. Then they arrange interview works to prove these consequences, and published them on newspapers. Although their deductions are not able to be as correct as what Zhuge Liang did, these deductions at least need to be reasonable, so that they can avoid their interview to be totally in vain. If we met a very important person who was difficult to get access to interview with, or an incident which was not open to journalists, we would back off and give up the interview attempt. As a result, we would be embarrassed the next day when we opened the newspapers and did not find such relevant reports. For avoiding such situation, we should search our mind for a method. When the first method is unsuccessful, the second one comes. If this one is still unsuccessful, we should immediately work out the next until we achieve what we want. We can finish this work by hook or by crook with the precondition of not breaking the law. We may suffer supercilious looks and be met with setbacks. When we meet dirty people, we are obliged to compliment them, but these do not mean we stand to lose as long as we successfully acquire news through interview.

We should pay special attention to listening to what other people are chatting about in public places, such as the grand building of the Young Men's Christian Association, cinema, club, and even streets. How great it is if an unimportant chitchat after our extraction finally becomes a piece of news.

It is essential for us to have the ability of dealing in all sorts of rhetoric on a public

occasion with gallantry and popularised smile. In the process of dealing with people, when we meet friends from Jiangsu or Zhejiang Province, we may as well chat about things of Shanghai or Suzhou. As for friends from Hunan or Hubei Province, we should still be able to hook up with them. Sichuan dialect and mandarin are indispensable for us to know. As a result, nobody will remain distant from you, and this will facilitate your interview.

If we are involved into a chaotic situation, such as an assassination, we should be very careful, and be acutely aware of our position by law at any time. Being meticulous is critical for us to understand the cause and result of a thing in the interview. I suggest you not start writing, especially editorial comment, before you fully understand the networks of the thing with others. Some will be unsubstantiated by journalists' cursory conclusion based on their inaccurate observation. Mistakes can be correct, but you will be afflicted psychologically.

We should keep clam as a bystander when we interview, but facing a disaster, such as a place that just suffered Japanese air raid or a conflagration, we still need our emotion, and with the emotion to be engaged in relieving the disaster. In this way, the news that you write must be much better than the report based on the interview of just simply asking and observing.

Modesty is an essential virtue in our interview. However, you do not need to be lavishly modest when ten people are talking an important person. You first try to be close to the person that you want to interview, after a bow, you can respectfully ask him to pass comments. If there are many journalists there, you should quickly write down what the guest is talking about, especially those exciting sentences on your coated duplex board with neat handwriting. By such amazing handwriting on the beautiful paper, you can openly ask a signature from the distinguish guest. When you open the newspaper next day, not only will you read a fantastic news report, but also your interview notes with a signature.

We do not know what we shall interview today when we just open our eyes in bed early in the morning. If you want see that newspapers tomorrow are full of exclusive interviews and reports from our correspondents, you have to get up early, and head for the places where news stands a good chance to be acquired or to create. Could it be said that it is impossible of getting news under heaven? The key point is whether you actively tramp the streets, gathering information.

The word 'Caifang' (interview) is composed by Cai (pick up) and Fang (visit). The first character 'Cai' means to choose. If two things simultaneously happen or two conferences convened at the same time, we are obliged to make a decision to choose one after weighing the importance each other.

For successfully completing your interview, you may have to master some skills, such as translating telegraph codes, swimming, riding bicycle or horse, driving cars or boating.

Wherever you work, you should give preference to build up friendship with members of staff who work for transport institutes or companies.

Translation 13: Journalism and Freedom

Pang Guan, Journalist Weekly, 7 July, 1939

Networks of things should be understood in the dialectical view, rather than stubborn, dogmatic, and inflexible comprehension.

Journalists and journalistic agents should have sufficient freedom, and attempts to restrict such freedom will be considered an adversary of journalism. This ought to be an unalterable principle. Nevertheless, this freedom should be wielded with the premise of not prejudiced national interests. There is no doubt that the freedom must be restricted once it challenged the national interests. Unifying consensus and actions is crucial in the process of social mobilisation for completing the aim of struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall become zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country shown by the case of Liang Shih-chiu.

The editorial ‘Resistance and newspapermen’ by *Da Gong Bao* of Hong Kong on 5 April pointed out that “Japanese invasion has exerted a huge influence on the press of China. It significantly changed the property of the press and the position of newspapermen. Newspapermen initially believed in liberalism, but their belief had to be fundamentally changed since the War of Resistance against Japan. The existence of newspapers in hinterland China is only for one aim, which is striving for propaganda which is advantages of resistance and saving the country. Therefore, newspapers at the present should not be a private institute of liberalism, but an institute of public propaganda strictly controlled by government.” This property change is admirable because it can reflect the needs of the reality to journalism.

The validity of this change is also proved by foreign cases. The United States should be considered as the most free and open country. However, deceitful people utilised this freedom to create rumour, aimed at undermining the national administration. As a result, President Roosevelt had to take unprecedented steps of warning. The fact is that the U.S. government has been managing to impel the Senate to get back to the amendment of the Neutrality Acts since it was deferred to discuss in the Senate. At the moment, an American news agency on 12 July abruptly published such information without foundation that “President Roosevelt attempts to propose a threatening message to the Congress, but Secretary of State Hull thinks it may not be effective. As a result, both sides could split over it.”

This is a venomous lie, which was definitely manufactured elaborately by isolated loyalists. In my opinion, things may be more than this. International conspirators may even engage in the fabrication and transmission of the rumour.

This has not been simply an issue of endangering domestic politics, but a threat to the world peace. If this were able to be glossed over by ‘freedom’, treasonable acts would become the right for personal ‘freedom’. President Roosevelt did not stick to the convention, and turned out to make an announcement endorsed by himself through the White House on the 13th to give a stark denial to the rumour with warning. “The news agency provided information to all newspapers that according to government sources, Secretary of State Hull disagrees with the wording of the message on the Neutrality Acts that President Roosevelt is preparing to submit to the Congress. The title that the Washington newspaper adopted shows the President differs with the Secretary of State on the Neutrality Acts. The title and the whole editorial are invalid and not based on the fact. In the light of bad influence to American political life, it should be warned. I also hope readers of newspapers can understand this warning. According to investigation, this news agency used to publish disinformation. Secretaries of the White House and I consistently urged them to be careful about the information delivered. However, they are getting desperate to fabricate facts. I please for attention by the public opinion that the White House is impossible and not necessary to deny all disinformation. Based on this case, rational people cannot endure such behaviours. I as the President hereby make the announcement, which only focuses on this news agency lest other American press and news agencies were implicated.”

The last two sentences show the positive attitude of the statement. President Roosevelt did not utilise this chance to attack the freedom of journalism, but just warned the rumour mongering, which has exerted dreadful effect on American political life. In America, there are always some people who obsess with criticising President Roosevelt as a person trying to become a dictator. This event may be helpful to them to confirm Roosevelt’s charge. We think we should adopt Lu Xun’s comment on some literati who did not revere the feudal ethics during the Six Dynasties to think about the American case. Lu Xun said that “in that era, people who outwardly revere the feudal ethics in fact were ruining the ethics, and in the contrast, those whose behaviours were considered as damaging the ethics actually recognised and believed in the ethics.” Today, we should carefully check and examine those who support or damage the freedom and democracy of politics; otherwise we shall fall right into the trick that crafty devils play.

Translation 14: Express Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai from the Chinese Youth Journalists Association, *Journalist Weekly*, 10 July 1939

The Chinese Youth Journalists Association is strongly concerned about the dire situation faced by journalists in Shanghai. The Association in the demonstration wishes to the journalists in Shanghai to sustain their faith, and keep their efforts to maintain internal justice and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the Yangtze River. Nearly half of the total amount of newspapers in Shanghai have been suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left their jobs. The Chinese Youth Journalists Association has established its branches in the main cities of China, and is willing to try the best to help the journalists who

are not able to engage in journalism work arrange new jobs in other cities. The Association expresses the great indignation towards the terrorist attacks to journalists, and the respect and sympathy for the journalists involved into serious troubles as they stand in their ground in front of temptation.

Translation 15: Simple newspapers in Guerrilla Areas

Chu, Journalist Weekly, 17 July 1939

There have been prominent changes of newspapers in China, not only in quality but also format since the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. The creation and development of simple newspapers in each guerrilla area as an emerging phenomenon is just a distinct case to embody this point. Limited by environment and technical tools, the format of these simple newspapers is usually shabby and crude, but they have profound effects. Today, we shall hereby introduce *Huibao*, which is one of such simple newspapers. This is a 16 Kai (185mm×260mm) size paper mimeographed with blue ink. Although space for printing is limited and handwriting replaces types, all types of newspaper articles are included, such as dispatches, comments, editorials based on news, and supplement. A certain amount of income of the paper is derived from advertisement. As an essential part of the War of Resistance against Japan, such simple newspapers in guerrilla areas under the harsh environment are developing quickly in hinterland China. Although these simple newspapers in guerrilla areas cannot hold a candle to newspapers in metropolis as the objective circumstances, they will make a crucial contribution to the future development of local newspapers.

Translation 16: Propaganda and rumour mongering

Jun Yi, Journalist Weekly, 31 July 1939

The development of capitalism gives rise to more and more intense competition amongst imperialist countries. For seizing more interest in the interests the ruling class, their struggles, open and secret, have never ceased. As a result, besides diplomacy, economy and politics, the importance of journalism policy and propaganda techniques is increased. All journalist organisations are controlled to become the outpost of psychological war. The intense propaganda battle just reflects the acute conflicts amongst imperialists.

As a means of fighting comparable to the military and economy, the utilisation of propaganda plays an important role as an indispensable part in a war. After the First World War, Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, said that German failure is attributed to none of the *Times* by themselves. He clearly explained the function of propaganda.

Propaganda is more important to fascist countries. The nature of fascism is

cheating and blackmail. Only propaganda can mask its evil and ugly weakness. Exaggerated rhetoric is adopted to daunt timid persons and sensational statements are used to fill the stomach of hungry people.

Nevertheless, propaganda must be based on some facts although the sense and meaning of the fact lacks true, so that it can be believed by normal people. Things which come out of zero will finally become rumours. Its falsity can be perceived even by the lowest educated people, and propaganda will have little effect as time passes.

Fabricating rumour needs to cudgel creators' brains because they need to think up much 'news' every evening, such as existing internal disagreement, Chiang Kai-shek's regime is becoming bankrupt, Communist Party means to share wives and properties, massacre people, someone forsakes an evil regime, the Soviet Union is ambitious. However, in front of the clear facts, even the most foolish people will laugh at those rumours as real fantasy.

Considering the Manchuria-Mongolia border conflict, Japanese propaganda is 'beyond all imaging.' Based on their reporting, tens of Soviet and Mongolian planes are shot down every day, and the total quantity of the planes shot down has reached for more than 500 planes in a not very long time. By analogy, the Soviet Air Force can be annihilated shortly. Is not this grateful for the countries who advertise them as anti-Communism? However, the lies were exposed by the Soviet Union. On the 18th, the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* reprinted the talk of the Associated Press's correspondent in Far East, who had returned to Shanghai from Heilongjiang. Based on this talk, Japanese achievement is actually shooting down two machineguns and wreckage of plane with red star. These wreckages are generally equal to two planes. Up to now, Japanese propaganda has absolutely failed.

Translation 17: A newspaperman's heroic death: mourn for Mr Zhu Xionggong

Qian Sheng, Journalist Weekly, 4 September 1939

Mr Zhu Xionggong, an editor of the *Night Light* column of the *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, was suddenly assassinated when he walked on the way from his home to the newspaper office at approximately 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 30th August.

Mr Zhu was an upright, outspoken and rigorous person. Perhaps this is the main reason that he fallen a prey to a plot. It is a tragedy that a defenceless literati is paid attention by those indecent so-called heroes.

Citizens felt regret when the grievous news came to Shanghai. On the 1st of September, the journalist day, people gathered together in the Universal Funeral where Mr Zhu's body was kept. At 3 o'clock, the memorial meeting began. Perhaps most of people who attended the memorial meeting did not meet Zhu Xionggong. On this Isolated Island, people live from hand to mouth, but they still

find time to come, and bow with great respect to Zhu Xinggong. Some people are frugal in their daily life, however, they donated money in the memorial meeting. In the hall of the Universal Funeral Parlour, the majority of people do not recognise each other, but they all register profound respect in front of Zhu Xiongong's coffin and photo. What can be reflected from this behaviour? This is just the solemn Chinese national spirit.

Mr Zhu was a journalist and an editor of the column *Night Light*. He is literati who did not attain a high position and gain wide attention in the society. However, why so many people were touched by him? Perhaps we can answer the question through some eulogies. Shanghai Culture Fellowship's eulogy is 'Zhu Xiongong was a very talented. He understood important principles, verbally laced into traitors, and was a credit to China'. The Commercial Press's eulogy is 'he manipulated a pen like brandishing a sword to beat enemies. He struggled for justice, and died for the cause'. Mr Zhu's body will be interred at the Hongqiao cemetery, but his spirit will be alive forever. We may as well here cite the New War Readers Association's eulogy to comfort those martyrs. "To the heroes who dare to struggle for justice and humanity, for nation's liberation and liberty, for human being's fraternity and peace, you silently closed your eyes which should not be closed at gunpoint of those hideous ruffians. Sir, may your soul rest in peace! You do not die. You will not die forever. The country should be pride of you such as youth who loved freedom and seeks for felicity. Following your bloodstain, we will march forward, revenging for you and those countless martyrs."

The press is experiencing a gory time in Shanghai. On the 22nd of April last year, a bomb blast was carried out in the newspaper office of the *Mercury*. Chen Tongxuan, a member of the business department of the *Mercury*, suffered wonders, and was finally incurable and dead. *Da Wan Bao* was attacked on the 24th of July this year, and two printing workers got shot and fell. They died as honourable as Zhu Xiong. Considering newspaperman who died for promoting justice, Zhu Xiongong in journalism field of the Isolated Island is the first. People's real behaviours usually can be revealed in a critical situation. The universal truth will not die forever!

Night Light

Translation 18: Forbearance

Zhu Xinggong, Night Light, 18 June 1939

I extremely admire the British forbearance. They can tolerate all persecution, and even insult. They exhibit abiding forbearance.

Considering forbearance, the British is more staid than American, and is better than Chinese. Although there is a motto in China that "lack of forbearance in small matters will upset great plans", there is another motto to explain the principle of 'forbearance in small matters' by an ancient Chinese sage that "when

you cannot bear it, you should come forward to resist”. When Confucius met something that he cannot bear, he shouted indignantly as well that “if this can be tolerated, what cannot?!”

Translation 19: Japanese Dream

Cheng Mei, Night Light, 19 June 1939

I was free recently, so I picked up a book called *Thought, Scenery and Figure* by Tsurumi Yūsuke from my bookshelf and browse it. In the book, there is an article ‘Bumptious’, and it presents this sentence:

“Japanese are dreaming that there is one day that Japanese will become the language of the world. At first glance, it looks like a brave and patriotic idea, but it contains too many factors of danger and against humanity. It has been an old dream for one nation to conquer the world. Persia, Roma, Mongolia, and Napoleon, without exception, were all fallen on the way to this dream.” (It was translated into Japanese from a Lu Xun’s article.)

When I read it, I feel Japanese infinite ambition.

Tsurumi Yūsuke is not a great talent, and he is just a smart and enlightened politician. I remember that in a night three years ago, two Japanese famous elocutionists, Tsurumi Yūsuke and Ryutarō, together had their election speech in the Hibiya Public Hall for the Good Governance Party. For attending their speech, I took a bus with my friends from Asagaya. Definitely, their graceful postures, loud voice and emotion filled in every single word did not make me feel dissatisfy, but there were full of empty concepts. One of my friend who was studying law in an Imperial University said that “most of thinking law students from the Imperial University despise them.” We laughed when we heard this. It is not difficult to understand that Tsurumi Yūsuke has such sentence in *Thought, Scenery and Figure*, but Japanese military does not understand it at all!

We definitely know that the Japanese warlords’ ‘crazy’ does not mean they should be sent to asylums, but they are clearly acting rashly to create massacres and bombings!

Eight years ago, Tanaka Giichi wrote down that “in order to conquer the world, we need to conquer China first; in order to conquer China, we need to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia first” in his memorial. This is not just a temporal crazy action.

Education, tradition, the united and controlled ideology make Japanese people, especially army men, intoxicated! Even a young girl can understand the simple sentence, but the warlords, bureaucrats, politicians and official scholars do not understand it. It makes me call to mind that “a handcart of firewood is ignored

when the end side of a hair is focused on”.

I initially did not believe such things can happen, but I have witnessed up to now. Not only myself, but also my nation, my country are suffering such things.

The only way which can awake them is to pick up sticks and hit the heads of these dreamers.

Translation 20: The Spirit of Su Wun

Shen An, Night Light, 18 June 1939

For some reason, I felt intoxicated a little bit recently.

Recently, I begin to drink alcohol although I used to be a non-drinker. This is definitely not relevant to my desire to poetry because I have had no interests in verse for very long time. Some people might suggest me that alcohol can distract the mind from grief and unhappiness. I have to say I am also very disappointed, and do not have such the generous and leisure mentality like Scholar-officials.

I always feel drunk by the superlative, cosy and blood temptation.

“Everyone is murky, I still maintain myself to be clear; everyone is drunk, I still keep sober-minded.” Qu Yuan as a hot-blooded scholar-official must not lose his belief from a couple of drinks. However, in the turbid society, the stimulation of interests and threats are a hundred times stronger than alcohol, and this is so horrible! Even it is known that there are traps behind the interests and threats at the time, reason is still not able to overcome lure, and finally some people attempt to obtain them at all costs.

Considering this point, I call Hong Chengchou, who willingly became to be a minion of Manchu to mind. Hong used to be unflinching, and wanted to bestir himself. Once he faced a life-and-death situation, and simultaneously the lures of woman, his reason become absolutely numb. Finally, he was completely drunk, and descended to a minion.

The Person who possesses both wisdom and courage, and strong conviction will not be lured to be intoxicated in front of interests and threats at such a critical moment. This suggests Su Wu who shepherded by the lakeside of Baikal to me.

When Su Wu was detained in Xiongnu, Wei Lv volunteered to attempt to persuade him to surrender. Let us have a look at what Wei Lv said. “Mr. Su, I, Wei Lv, betrayed to Han, and surrendered to Xiongnu. Thanks for the grace by Chanyu (chief of the Xiongnu in ancient China) that I was granted a peerage. Now, I possess more than ten thousand slaves, and countless horses and other

livestock all over the mountain. Such high position and great wealth that I have would be rendered to you tomorrow if you surrendered today. Otherwise, who will remember you after you died and your body will become fertilizer for the grass?”

Su Wu kept silence after these honeyed words. Wei Lv kept saying that “if you adopt my suggestion to surrender, I would like to become a sworn brother of you. However, if you refuse me today, do you think you can be lucky to have another opportunity to meet me when you want in the future?”

Besides promises, Wei Lv threatened Su Wu by force, but whether he finally achieved his aim? Not only did Su Wu scold him, but even broke up the friendship with him since then.

The spirit of Su Wu is just awakening spirit!

‘Alcohol does not make people drunk if they do not addict in the intoxicated mood.’ This is probably common sense. Although there are luring conditions in objective circumstance, we can still overcome them by our subjective reason. We can avoid being addicted in decadent fun when we grasp the situation with determined will in the empty island and consider Su Wu as our idolater at any time.

Translation 21: Stories of Chilli

Wei Hua, Night Light, 14 July 1939

It makes me happy recently that I can have a little bit chilli every day. People from Jiangsu and Zhejiang might laugh at me, but those who are from Hunan and Guangxi must felt empathy for me.

It is a common sense that chillies are provocative, and that is why People from Jiangsu and Zhejiang do not like it. However, people in Hunan, Guangxi and Sichuan nearly have it for every meal. They cannot bear any single day without chillies, and they enjoy to be dripping with sweat and to make their mouth water by chillies.

I am curious that whether chilli can hearten people up, and become tough and gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and Sichuan are the most tough and unafraid in China. There are some old sayings, such as ‘tough temperament of people in Chu area’ and ‘the Qin Empire must be destroyed by the people of Chu even if there were only three households left’. These expressions reflect the honour and glory of Hunan people. People from Hunan and Guangxi like chillies, and it is rather interesting that people in west Hunan like the spiciest food. Therefore they should just be the representative of ‘tough temperament of people in Chu area’. If people in Jiangsu and Zhejiang were accustomed to have chillies,

would their temperament more tough, and the nickname of ‘tough temperament of people’ not apply for Hunan only?

It might be worth the work for physiologists to find out whether this phenomenon is derived from some specific physiological theories.

I am not for sure the situation of chillies in Guangxi and Sichuan provinces, but in Hunan province, people have chilly food in every season of the year. Peasants sow chilli seeds on the fertile ground in the in every late spring, and young seedlings will grow up for a couple of inches. Then, they will be moved to the field beside Ginger or other vegetables. Chillies do not need to feed much fertilizers, but need to be irrigated often.

Fruits of chillies will come out in about May and June. They are green at the time, and peasants usually pick up some of them as an ingredient to cook steamed rice. Up to the end of autumn, fruits will turn red from green, peasants at the moment will pick up all of them to sell in the market with the exception of remaining a small amount for themselves.

Chillies can be fried or soaked with vinegar and salt whatever they are green or red. It is called as ‘soak chillies’ peasants. They can also be cut as small curbs to mix with salt and curbs of bean and carrot. It makes chillies well preserved, to such an extent that they are available to be served at any season in a year.

I am obviously not able to have chilli for every meal since I have been in Shanghai, so I yearn for chilli very much. When I write this article, saliva spurts to my lips. However, which day I can come back to my homeland to have chilli?

Translation 22: Fable: Story of a Fly

Huai, Night Light, 24 August 1939

A big spider made a beautiful net in a corner of a garden, waiting for desserts to be served up. When flies fell on the net, their whole bodies were stuck by the threads, and the spider swallowed them unhesitatingly. The criminal evidence was thus immediately cleaned up.

Therefore, when other poor flies come, they will not perceive the net as a pitfall, but a paradise.

One day, a fly who thought it smart flew above and only circled around the net. The spider became impatient, and came out to greet it with “Why not come down to rest?”

The fly was too smart, and would not easily be cheated by the spider. The fly said

“I do not stay in a place where I cannot see other flies. I just cannot see a single fly in your place!”

The fly fled, and came to a place where lots of flies were gathered. It wanted to fall there, but just then, a bee warned “Do not court death, stupid fly! That is fly paper, and those flies are stuck!”

“Do not be stupid. They are dancing”, said the self-righteous fly.

Finally, it fell and became stuck to the fly paper, and suffered the same fate as the others of its kind there.

This is the story of the fly that the bee tells us. She tells us “It is not 100% safe to follow others, and safety may not exist in the world at all”!

Translation 23: Poles: Struggle for Freedom

Huang Yingdai, Night Light, 29 August 1939

People know that Poland was divided up between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Since then, it continued to perish for a century and a half until 1918 when it declared independence after the end of the First World War. Never the less Poland’s situation becomes increasingly urgent due to the extinction of Czech under Adolf Hitler’s police of claiming back German previous colonies.

Most of the Poles are Slaves, which means they can be considered blunt and straightforward. They love freedom and have strong national identity. They also have had many significant contributions to the civilisation of the world in both arts and science, such as Marie Curie who discovered radium, the outstanding romanticism composer Frédéric Chopin, and the great astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus. From these examples, it is not difficult to find the contribution made by the Poles to the arts and science.

The Poles as Slaves have a total population of 25,000,000, and there are 5,000,000 living in separate places in the world. In America, when Poles meet with each other, they still speak Polish, and their children all accept education in Polish. Every Pole is able to sing the national anthem ‘Mazurek Dąbrowskiego’ (Poland Is Not Yet Lost). Since the new Poland was established, many Poles have return to Poland.

Although the Poles are not very tall, their physiques are wiry and athletic, and these features make the Poles distinctly different with other ethnic groups of Slaves. The Poles are identifiable due to their florid cheeks and blond hair, although the hair colour of the Poles in the Southern areas of the country is darker. As for Polish women, they are naturally beautiful, vivacious and attractive.

Considering religion, the Roman Catholic Church is most influential in Poland, but there are still many Protestants, the Greek Orthodox Easterns, Jews and a small majority identify as Muslim, nationwide. Polish Jews account for 37% of the national population, and they are generally living in urban areas, especially in Warsaw. However, anti-Semitism becomes increasingly more and more serious in Poland.

The white eagle on the Polish national flag is the symbol of freedom that the Poles enjoy. The Poles irrevocably seek the sacred freedom, and carefully protect it. All people who struggle for freedom are always considered as countrymen and brothers in the Poles' mind. The Poles participated in every war for freedom in the last century. Wars stimulated growing nationalism sentiment and help many oppressed nations acquire their dream of being independent. The Poles in the tumultuous tide restored their glorious motherland, established a free and independent new Poland, and wrote a glorious historical page that people admire.

Translation 24: Special Issue for the Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the French Revolution

Struggle between light and dark: impressions in terms of the commemoration of the French democracy and republic

I doubt whether Chinese and foreigners who are living in Shanghai may not know what day today is. In past years, the French Concession was always bustling once this festival approached, especially in Gu's Park (current Fuxing Park) where there were huge crowds of people enjoying brilliant hangings and multicoloured fireworks. French aliens assembled to celebrate this great day as well. Although this year's festival has not been as prosperous as before, the bustling spectacle is still maintained. If you would like to get around strolling in the French Concession, you will find things above are true.

Seeing they are jubilant to celebrate this great day: the commemoration of democracy and republic, besides expressing sincere congratulations, I am evoked with infinite feelings. When we recall the heroic French Revolution, we should understand the divine day is effected by numerous uphill struggles, which hard wars as dark side's successive counterattacks. The light and dark could not get through a day without fighting against each other in more than eighty years.

Dark had overlaid France in 1789. The king reinforced his dictatorship and threatened the twilight, National Assembly, by force. The Paris masses responded with anger and convened demonstrations. However, it did not awake the royals. The angry masses stormed into the famous Bastille, and contacted the Gardes Françaises to occupy the armoury and simultaneously controlled all military posts in Paris. The reactionary court mobilised troops nationwide to besiege Paris. However, the court finally yielded and recognised the National Assembly. On 4 August, the well-known Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was

passed, and it laid the groundwork for the democratic republic.

Soon after, however, French nobility supplicated Prussian and Austrian help, and guided their troops into France. French counter reactionary forces seemed being gradually on the rise. Facing domestic predicament and foreign invasion, the French people raised the Volunteers, annihilating the counterrevolutionaries. Prussia relying on its 130,000 troops overwhelmingly captured Verdun fortress. When Paris was in danger, the masses bravely defend their country. Under the appeal of great patriotic appeal, enemies finally were crushed enemy, and the people achieved victory.

Later, many European countries, such as Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Spain and the Netherlands, formed the Coalition to contain France. At the critical situation, French army was reformed and new warfare techniques were adopted. These efforts effectively increased military capacity. When external crisis was successfully solved, pro-king riot broke out. Napoleon defeated them, but he proclaimed himself emperor in 1804 relying on military power, and this ruined democracy and republic. Napoleon's failure was followed by the Bourbon Restoration in 1815. The increasingly counter reactionary regime provoked the French Revolution of 1848, which contributed to the restoration of republic.

Before long, the dictatorship by Napoleon III temporarily ceased democracy again. With his failure of conquering Germany, a revolution broke out in September 1870. Since then, the revolutionary situation was fundamentally changed, and democratic republic was finally confirmed in 1875 after the fall of the Paris Commune.

Light relentlessly struggled against dark for more than eighty years. Dark sometimes covered light, but ultimately, light can completely exorcise dark, brilliantly illuminating the human beings.

The current Chinese war against Japan is just the striving for light. Light is intensely struggling against dark, and the finally result must be the victory as same as France. History tells us that it is a self-evident truth that light finally will come.

Utopian Idealism

Today is the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution. In France, the army, navy and air force attended the parade, and it makes the celebration of this year quite different than the past years.

French nationals in Shanghai prepared the celebration as same as the former years. Although, because of the current situation, this years' celebration is not as bustling as before, the connotation of this year is still significantly important.

We hereby extend greetings to those people who received medals. We also extend

cordial greetings to the French Concession. We hope the democratic France is continuing its prosperity. Long live France! Long live all democratic countries in the world!

Commemoration of French Democracy: a lesson for Chinese people by Tie Lang

The French Revolution broke out on 14 July 1789. This great movement features prominently in the history of the West. The influence of the French Revolution not only liberated the people of France, but also enlightened democratic movements in Europe. The importance of the historical contribution of the French Revolution can be equated with the Renaissance, and the Protestant Reformation. German authoritative historian said:” The French Revolution contributed to the generation of legal system, the restoration of human rights and the creation of axiom.” In light of the significance of the movement, 17 June was set by French People as commemoration day of the French democracy.

Pre-revolution France was an extreme degenerate country. Politically, the king centralised power, and different gradations in the society stood in the opposite to each other. Nobilities and clergies had privileges. They did not to pay tax. Being exploited, plebeians lived in destitution and unease. Peasants who were living at the bottom of the society worded hard years and years. Most of their income had to tribute to the king’s family and church, and this made their live into difficulty. Financially, the national economy was in a bad way as Louis XVI was militaristic and led a voluptuous life.